Simo Mikkonen, Giles Scott-Smith, Jari Parkkinen (Eds.)

Entangled East and West

Rethinking the Cold War

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Volume 4

Entangled East and West

Cultural Diplomacy and Artistic Interaction during the Cold War

Edited by
Simo Mikkonen, Giles Scott-Smith, Jari Parkkinen

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Simo Mikkonen, Jari Parkkinen, Giles Scott-Smith

Exploring Culture in and of the Cold War

The Cold War used to be portrayed as a global struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Even if this image has been challenged many times, the main images that come to mind when speaking of the Cold War, are often linked to superpower rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, the threat of a military conflict, and nuclear armament. These images have proved tenacious regardless of scholarship underlining cooperation across apparent ideological division and cross-border interaction instead of hostility. One of the key weaknesses is that many areas still lack empirical research that would fill in the gaps and provide material to allow us to re-evaluate the extent and impact of the Cold War. This volume is intended to serve these needs.

We are keen to add to the process of moving Cold War studies beyond a US-centric perspective, which ties the study of the era to the actions, policies and operations of the United States. There is obviously no denying that the United States was the key player in the Cold War, but the centricity of the US also brings many drawbacks. Perhaps the most important of these is that it has downplayed attention toward cooperative and multilateral developments during the Cold War era. One of the key aims of this volume is to bring to light the transnational connections that took place through cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange in Europe. For a long time, Cold War studies saw Europe and European countries either as victims or passive recipients in the US-Soviet rivalry. While this might seem so from the viewpoint of these superpowers, these countries were also active participants with motivations and aims of their own. These features of inter-European development have often been overshadowed by the superpower rivalry in Cold War scholarship. By focusing on Europe, this volume continues the recent endeavour to provide a more inclusive interpretation of the impact and development of the Cold War in this continent.[1]

While Europe provides the geographical backdrop for our volume, one of the important theoretical foci has been our emphasis on smaller national and transnational actors instead of governments. The diverse state and non-state actors discussed in this volume had very different interests, sometimes irreconcilable

1 This volume has been preceded by others focusing on Cold War in the European context, in particular, Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalin Miklóssy (eds.). *Reassessing Cold War Europe*. London: Routledge, 2011; Poul Villaume, Ann-Marie Ekengren, and Rasmus Mariager (eds.). *Northern Europe in the Cold War, 1965–1990: East-West Interactions of Trade, Culture, and Security*. Tampere: Juvenes Print, 2016.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110573169-001

with and even resisting bipolar Cold War dichotomies. Naturally, as some of the chapters examine local, regional or national perspectives, there is always a risk of offering a one-sided perspective on events, or even exaggerating their historical significance. Yet, by carefully setting these events within a larger context, we have sought to overcome this risk. We have strived to offer a balanced account, enriching our understanding of the Cold War as a phenomenon, and the Cultural Cold War in particular.

The Cultural Cold War is a key concept encompassing this volume. In general, studies of the Cold War have developed since the early 1990s into a point where a unified understanding of the Cold War is being constantly challenged. Most agree that the Cold War was an East-West conflict that became essentially global and was chronologically situated between the Second World War and 1989. Beyond that, however, the traditional bipolar conflict of either security or socio-economic rivalry has been challenged by different national, transnational and global explanations, and the introduction of multiple actors.[2] Can we still speak of Cold War history, or just transnational and global change during the second half of the twentieth century? *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* suggests that a pluralistic interpretation of the Cold War is possible, and even desirable. The three volumes of the series move from everyday life to the actions of statesmen, from military to cultural phenomena.[3] Yet, some critics have seen a danger in this approach, suggesting that it no longer sees the Cold War as a distinctive epoch, making it difficult to separate from other strands of twentieth-century history.[4]

Even so, we believe that the traditional political approach that emphasises foreign policy, state-to-state relationships, and questions of military security is not enough to understand the phenomenon. In contrast, the Cultural Cold War, focusing on the arts, everyday life, education, and how social activity in both East and West was affected by the Cold War, greatly expands the traditional area of Cold War studies. We do not deny the importance of the traditional approach to the Cold War, but we argue that an expansion of Cold War studies enables a better understating of how it was experienced on a daily basis at the "street level". The Cold War therefore influenced social and cultural life, and

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2 Federico Romero. Cold War historiography at the crossroads. *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (2014): 685 – 703.

3 Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

4 Lawrence D. Freedman. Frostbitten, decoding the Cold War 20 years later. *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 2 (2010); Holger Nehring. What Was the Cold War? *The English Historical Review* 127, no. 527 (2012): 923.

in turn was itself a social and cultural phenomenon. By approaching it in this way, the study of the Cultural Cold War involves new approaches and perspectives that emphasise the relevance of identity, interests, behaviour, social interaction, and how they changed over time.

By focusing on East-West interaction, the aim is to point out that despite the Cold War divide, the exchange of ideas, cultural artefacts, artistic processes and people continued throughout this period. Confrontation does not automatically mean suppression of contacts.[5] Both sides began to use culture and information in areas they had occupied after the war, paying either little attention to countries outside their areas of influence, or using more direct means of propaganda, such as surrogate broadcasting.[6]

Cultural diplomacy directed to countries designated as ideological enemies was problematic as long as the Soviet Union kept contacts to a minimum and the United States remained highly suspicious of communism. The death of Stalin marked a major change in this respect, and it was the Soviet Union rather than the United States that first began to embrace the potential for cultural diplomacy. Although the Soviet Union did not change the aim of its foreign policy, namely spreading communism, it greatly revised its approach to cultural diplomacy, increasing its resources and replacing hardliners who had opposed any interaction with capitalist countries.[7] Yet, it needs to be underlined that our understanding of Soviet cultural diplomacy as part of its overall strategy is still quite limited in scope.

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5 Michael David-Fox. The Iron Curtain as Semi-Permeable Membrane: Origins and Demise of the Stalinist Superiority Complex. In *Cold War Crossings: International Travel and Exchange across the Soviet Bloc*, Patrick Babiracki, Kenyon Zimmer (eds.). College Station, TX: A&M UP, 2014, 14–39.

6 Perhaps not surprisingly, more studies have been written from the US point of view. A good overview on US Cold War broadcasting activities directed at socialist countries is offered in A. Ross Johnson and Eugene Parta. *Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe- a Collection of Studies and Documents*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2012. Studies on Soviet Cold War broadcasting are practically non-existent, even if the Soviet Union used radio broadcasting much earlier and more extensively than the United States, see e. g. Simo Mikkonen. To control the world's information flows: Soviet international broadcasting. In *Airy Curtains in the European Ether: Broadcasting and the Cold War*, Alexander Badenoch, Christian Franke, Andreas Fickers (eds.). Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013.

7 Nigel Gould-Davies. The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy. *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 2 (2003): 193–214; Simo Mikkonen. Winning Hearts and Minds? The Soviet Musical Intelligentsia in the Struggle against the United States during the Early Cold War. In *Twentieth-Century Music and Politics*, Pauline Fairclough (ed.). Farnham: Ashgate, 2013; Pia Koivunen. Performing Peace and Friendship: The World Youth Festival as a Tool of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy, 1947–1957. Ph.D. diss., University of Tampere, 2013.

In Cultural Cold War studies, just as in traditional Cold War studies, the focus has so far been on exchanges between the US and the Soviet Union, with most research covering American cultural diplomacy. With this volume, we wish to look beyond the United States and instead bring East-West interactions within Europe to the forefront. While the Soviet Union is often excluded from European-focused research, our aim has been the opposite, to include the Soviet Union as an active participant within European connections and interactions. Some of the chapters of this volume discuss official Soviet interaction with western European states, while others single out individuals and organisations that played an important part in initiating and tending connections over ideological and political boundaries. The motivations for these activities, however, often seem very different when looking at state or non-state actors, as a number of chapters in this volume point out.

Geographically, the chapters of this volume focus primarily on connections between the Soviet Union and Western Europe, with some attention given to interaction between East and West Germany and Soviet-Finnish relations. The chapters also offer some glimpses of Soviet-American interactions, primarily from the Soviet point of view. Countries included in this book are unique in many respects. For instance, Finland tried to stay neutral in international politics, while France was more ready to engage in cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union than perhaps any other NATO country from the mid-1950s onwards.[8]

The key concepts of this volume, cultural diplomacy and cultural interaction, are not without problems. What do we mean when we speak of East-West cultural interaction during the Cold War era? What is cultural diplomacy? Together with public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy has become a widely discussed issue in connection with Cold War studies, as well as more broadly in the study of international relations. Typically, public diplomacy is considered an overarching concept encompassing influence on public opinion abroad, the interaction of private groups between different countries, and intercultural communications more generally.[9] From the state perspective, public diplomacy is a label used to distinguish between the traditional activities of diplomacy and the unofficial interactions and activities. While the United States had engaged in extensive cul-

8 See Timo Vilén's chapter in this volume; Faye Bartram. Reel Results After One Week: The Cinema and French Cold War Cultural Diplomacy with the USSR, 1955 – 1972. *Journal of the Western Society for French History* 44 (2016): 30 – 41.

9 Nicholas Cull. Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase. In *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, Nancy Snow, Philip M. Taylor (eds.), 19 – 23. London, New York: Routledge, 2009; Joseph S. Nye Jr. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008): 94 – 109.

tural relations during the interwar years, the heyday of cultural diplomacy was really after the Second World War, when many countries, led by the United States and the Soviet Union, deliberately aimed to influence international public opinion on a large scale.

Cultural diplomacy is therefore regarded here as a distinct area of public diplomacy, in which culture is used to enable varied forms of communication that project and attract support for ideas, beliefs, and values.[10] At the same time, cultural diplomacy also expands the field of diplomacy by involving private actors that otherwise have little to do with government. This includes artists, administrators, impresarios, educators, and many other individuals who acted with varying degrees of autonomy vis-à-vis state authorities. Thus, cultural diplomacy can refer both to state-to-state contacts as well as people-to-people and other networks of non-governmental organisations. This is clearly a major expansion of the accepted terrain of diplomacy, challenging existing assumptions and complicating the formation of an overall picture. For the purposes of this volume, we use cultural diplomacy to refer to both state and non-state informational, cultural, and educational exchanges across state borders.

Cultural Cold War – or Cold War Culture

One of the first attempts to provide an overview of the cultural approach to Cold War studies was an article by Patrick Major and Rana Mitter in *Cold War History* (2003). They urged a shift in focus from state politics towards a socio-cultural history of the Cold War. The subsequent edited volume included chapters on issues such as broadcasting, public opinion, and the production of popular culture. Instead of international politics, Major and Mitter wanted to emphasise the production, dissemination, and reception of culture, and the role played by “cultural actors” in the political realm. Around the same time, the volume *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945–1960* also moved the debate away from state-to-state diplomacy more towards the study of culture and ideology in the Cold War contest. Both of these volumes focused largely on the West, although the implication of what they were saying was broader.[11]

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10 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried (eds.). *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy.* New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010.

11 Patrick Major and Rana Mitter. East is East and West is West? Towards a Comparative Socio-Cultural History of the Cold War. *Cold War History* 4, no. 1 (2003): 1–22; Patrick Major and Rana Mitter (eds.). *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History.* London: Frank Cass, 2004;

In 2010, Gordon Johnston reviewed the development of studies on the Cultural Cold War. He paid attention to the fact that unlike traditional Cold War studies, the study of the Cultural Cold War was specifically a multidisciplinary area that brought together disciplines such as history, international relations, political science, sociology, and cultural studies. Johnston further emphasised the important division between the *Cultural Cold War* and *Cold War Culture* as indicated by Major and Mitter in their 2004 volume.[12] The former studies specific efforts by Cold War protagonists to utilise culture in all its forms in order to achieve political goals, in the process influencing (some would say "distorting") cultural production and reception, whereas the latter discusses the everyday modes of behaviour and thinking of those who lived during the Cold War.[13] Both, however, imply a socio-cultural approach. The difference between the two thus concerns both methodology and varying interpretations of what culture "means" in different settings.

In recent years a number of studies on East-West interaction have appeared, each one emphasising the role played by a variety of state and non-state actors, proving that the Iron Curtain was more porous than was initially thought.[14] The increasing interest in the campaign for human rights as a "catalytic converter" within East-West relations has focused attention on the role of NGOs in propelling change within societies.[15] A recent turn towards the role of experts has also begun to map out the influence of international organisations and knowledge networks in framing "technological bridges" to the Cold War divide.[16] The cumulative effect of this valuable research is to shift our coordinates for understanding the nature and extent of cross-border, trans-ideological contacts, and how the

Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (eds.). *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945–1960*. London: Frank Cass, 2004.

12 Major and Mitter. *Across the Blocs*.

13 Gordon Johnston. Revisiting the Cultural Cold War. *Social History* 35, no. 3 (2010): 290–307.

14 Idesbald Godeeris (ed.). *Solidarity with Solidarity: Western European Trade Unions and the Polish Crisis, 1980–1982*. Lanham: Lexington, 2010; Annette Vowinkel, Marcus Payk, and Thomas Lindenberger (eds.). *Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western European Societies*. New York: Berghahn, 2012; Simo Mikkonen and Pia Koivunen (eds.). *Beyond the Divide: Entangled Histories of Cold War Europe*. New York: Berghahn, 2015; Kim Christiaens, Frank Gerits, Idesbald Godeeris, Giles Scott-Smith (eds.). The Low Countries and Eastern Europe during the Cold War. *Dutch Crossing: Journal of Low Countries Studies* 39, no. 3 (2015).

15 Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad. *Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965-1985*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2010; Poul Villaume, Rasmus Mariager, and Helge Porsdam (eds.). *The "Long 1970s": Human Rights, East-West Détente, and Transnational Relations*. London/New York: Routledge, 2016.

16 Michael Christian, Sandrine Kott, and Ondrej Matejka (eds.). *Planning in Cold War Europe: Competition, Cooperation, Circulations 1950s–1970s*. Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2018.

many-sided "actorness" of civil society provided multiple opportunities for such engagement, despite the often tense diplomatic and security environment. Our volume contributes to this significant move in Cold War history by emphasising the importance of culture as a particular space where dialogue and exchange took place, both in terms of state agendas (cultural diplomacy) and inter-personal interaction (cultural relations).

While US cultural diplomacy has been the focus of a number of volumes, Soviet cultural diplomacy has received much less attention. Especially the mechanics and general aims of Soviet foreign policy in the sphere of culture have needed addressing, since existing studies have largely been on the late 1950s only.[17] Recently, however, there have been attempts to include cultural diplomacy as part of the study of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and Russia.[18] Furthermore, studies of the Cultural Cold War include a number of descriptive works written by former diplomats, politicians, and journalists, some of whom were involved in cultural diplomacy themselves.[19] Such works can be very valuable for providing insider accounts, but they also emphasise how young a field the study of the Cultural Cold War actually is. Empirical studies dominate, especially with regard to the Soviet Union where archives could not be accessed before the 1990s and new archival evidence is still available to fill in blank spots. This strong empirical basis is also evident in this volume as well, with many of the chapters drawing on previously unused archival sources held in Russia and elsewhere.

From the Russian side, there has been a major re-evaluation of the role played by culture as part of Soviet foreign policy.[20] While information, culture and education already played an important part in Soviet foreign policy before

17 Nigel Gould Davies. The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy; Simo Mikkonen. Winning hearts and minds?

18 Natalia Tsvetkova. Soft Power and Public Diplomacy. In *Russia and the World: Understanding International Relations*, Natalia Tsvetkova (ed.), 231–251. Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Roman & Littlefield, 2017.

19 There are many studies authored by former specialists, especially American, which both illustrate the processes of public and cultural diplomacy, as well as the individual experiences of those involved. See e.g. Yale Richmond. *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain.* University Park: Penn State University Press, 2003; Arch Puddington. *Broadcasting Freedom. The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.* University Press of Kentucky, 2000; Richard H. Cummings. *Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950–1989.* McFarland, 2009; A. Ross Johnson. *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond.* Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010.

20 In addition to the works mentioned earlier, the theme has also gained attention among Russian scholars, see e.g. Oksana Nagornaya. "Nuzhno Peredat' v Dar Ryad Kartin…" Povorotï Sovetskoy Kul'turnoy Diplomatii v Periodï Krizisov Sotsialisticheskogo Lagerya 1950-60-Kh Gg. *Ab Imperio* 2017 no. 2 (2017): 123–143.

the Second World War, after Stalin's death the Soviet Union revised and upgraded its cultural diplomacy machinery in order to conduct an outreach campaign on a truly global scale. While the focus of this volume is on Europe, it must be noted that from the mid-1950s the Soviet Union pursued modernisation projects, development aid and the education of foreign citizens in Soviet schools and universities, all predominantly directed at the countries of the Third World.[21] At the same time, Soviet efforts to engage with the West also increased. After decades of restrictions on cross-border movements, the Soviet Union entered into a number of bilateral agreements on cultural exchange with western countries for the purpose of expanding tourism, trade, and scientific knowledge. This increased mobility played no small part in the changing outlook of East-West relations from the mid-1950s onwards.[22] Among the bilateral cultural agreements, most attention has been given to the US-Soviet (Lacy-Zarubin) agreement from 1957, with a focus on American activities in particular.[23] On the Soviet side, most studies so far have been on the 1950s and the 1960s, with few works covering the 1970s or the 1980s when state control over academic and scientific exchanges with the rest of the world became more relaxed (despite the occasional reintroduction of restrictions and censorship).

The Structure of This Volume

The first part of this volume dives into visual aesthetics and diplomacy. It discusses how arts and diplomacy have intersected in a number of ways during the Cold War years. The section begins with Verity Clarkson's analysis of Soviet-British interaction surrounding the *Art in Revolution* exhibition of 1971. The exhibition introduced the early Soviet avant-garde to western audiences. At the time, most of what was exhibited was unknown for both western *and* Soviet audiences. The politics surrounding the exhibition demonstrates the many

21 Jeremiah Wishon. Soviet Globalization: Indo-soviet Public Diplomacy and Cold War Cultural Spheres. *Global Studies Journal* 5, no. 2 (2013): 103 – 114.

22 Anne E. Gorsuch. *All This is Your World. Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after Stalin*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; Patrick Babiracki, Kenyon Zimmer, and Michael David-Fox (ed.). *Cold War Crossings: International Travel and Exchange across the Soviet Bloc, 1940s–1960s*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2014.

23 Walter L. Hixson. *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945 – 1961*. New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1997; Yale Richmond. *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War*; Susan E. Reid. Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959. *Kritika* 9, no. 4 (2008): 855 – 904.

complicating factors related to an ostensibly artistic event. Furthermore, Clarkson's case is an excellent example of the interplay between official and unofficial agendas in East-West cultural interaction. Ksenia Malich continues with the avant-garde in her study of architecture, examining Soviet influences on Dutch post-Second World War practices. Malich traces the influences to the inter-war era, when in the 1930s, foreign specialists were invited to the Soviet Union. Even if many Dutch architects became disillusioned with the Soviet experience, experiments in standardised housing and functional cities nevertheless influenced Dutch architecture afterwards. Annette Vowinckel then moves us to photography and the use of images of the Berlin Wall in West German and US cultural diplomacy. Vowinckel reconstructs the exhibit and points out how the line between propaganda and cultural diplomacy was thin. The section concludes with Timo Vilen's chapter dealing with the ideological struggle over Finnish memory during the Cold War, represented by a particular statue in Helsinki's harbour area. Vilen points out how the struggle between the Finnish political left and right directly involved the Soviet Union as a participant. The Statue of Peace also illustrates the importance of national history and memory in shaping relations between these two nations.

The second part of this volume begins with an examination of scholarly connections and the role of individuals in international connections. This section focuses on educational exchanges and scholarly cooperation and competition, a field that has up until recently been relatively neglected.[24] Although the focus of this volume is on Europe, post-Second World War educational exchanges played an important part in such processes as decolonisation, inter-ideological dialogue, and inter-regional networks. Astrid Shchekina-Greipel begins with a chapter examining the influence of a single Soviet individual, Lev Kopelev, on Soviet-German cultural and scholarly exchange. Kopelev moved from being a translator of German literature into a dissident and was finally forced to emigrate to West Germany, where he continued his dissident activities and interaction with Soviet intellectuals. Kopelev's case illustrates how the Soviet Union's treatment of dissidents was anything but straightforward. Kopelev's connections to

24 On Soviet educational exchanges in a global context see Constantin Katsakioris. Soviet Lessons for Arab Modernization: Soviet Educational Aid to Arab Countries after 1956. *Journal of Modern European History* 8, no. 1 (2010): 85–106; Tobias Rupprecht. *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin: Interaction and Exchange between the USSR and Latin America during the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015; Julie Hessler. Third World Students at Soviet Universities in the Brezhnev Period. In *Global Exchanges: Scholarships and Transnational Circulations in the Modern World*, Ludovic Tournes, Giles Scott-Smith (eds.). New York: Berghahn, 2017.

the West, especially through Nobel laureate Heinrich Böll, made it difficult for the Soviet state to simply silence or ignore Kopelev due to the possibility of international scandal and the subsequent disruption that it could cause to diplomatic and economic relations with Western Europe. Kopelev was therefore able to maintain his role as a cultural mediator in Soviet-German relations over a long period. Natalia Tsvetkova then shifts the focus to education by analysing Soviet and American policies towards foreign universities during the Cold War. Tsvetkova argues that educational systems and the development of universities as institutions represented a key but under-researched field of cultural and ideological confrontation. The US aimed at spreading liberalism through foreign education systems, while the USSR projected Marxist models for both institutional agendas and curricula. Sergei Zhuk then discusses the role of Soviet Americanists – academics who specialised in US history, politics or culture – as sources of information for the Kremlin leadership. Zhuk describes how these Americanists acted as "cultural gatekeepers", influencing which foreign films may or may not be shown on Soviet screens. Zhuk focuses on the Brezhnev era (1964–1982), up till now a neglected period for the study of the Cultural Cold War.[25]

The third part of this volume discusses the role played by music in Cold War cultural exchange. Music played a key role in Soviet cultural diplomacy, but previous research has focused primarily on artistic mobility.[26] Evgeniya Kondrashina examines the important role played by Soviet recordings as transferable and marketable cultural products in the west. The Soviet recording industry was initially a part of the overall propaganda effort abroad, but it became a more complex actor by the 1960s. Instead of state-to-state relations, the key partners of the Soviet government in the West were western businesses like EMI whose interests were primarily commercial. Kondrashina sheds new light on the complexity of cultural production and exchange in the East-West setting. Viktoria Zora's chapter adds to this by detailing how Soviet music publishing operated in the Anglophone world after the Second World War. Zora's case illustrates the difficulties faced by Soviet officials, trying to popularise Soviet music abroad, especially in the capitalist countries. The obstacles they faced were not only internal, bureaucratic ones, but also related to the need of western companies and firms to make a profit. Both Kondrashina's and Zora's chapters emphasise how com-

25 Dina Fainberg and Artemy Kalinovsky underline this gap in Fainberg and Kalinovsky. *Reconsidering Stagnation in the Brezhnev Era: Ideology and Exchange*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016.

26 Kirill Tomoff. *Virtuosi Abroad: Soviet Music and Imperial Competition during the Early Cold War, 1945–1958*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015.

mercial, and not only ideological, factors played a considerable role in the interaction between East and West.

The section closes with Bruce Johnson, Mila Oiva and Hannu Salmi's chapter on the visit of Italian-French actor and singer Yves Montand to the Soviet Union in 1956. Montand was hugely popular in the Soviet Union and his concerts there were attended by audiences of up to 20,000. But Montand's visit also took place at a sensitive time, since it coincided with the Soviet invasion of Hungary. As a result of that, NATO countries temporarily froze projects on cultural exchange with the Soviet Union. Despite this, Montand decided to pursue the original plans and continued with his tour. Montand's visit is analysed from a number of angles, using newspaper coverage, film footage and other evidence to illustrate how the presumption of a propaganda victory for the Soviet Union, in the form of Montand's celebrity endorsement of the regime, needs to be balanced with more critical conclusions that highlight the tour's ironic and ambiguous nature.

The volume concludes with a chapter by Giles Scott-Smith, which uses the flight of West German teenager Mathias Rust to Red Square in 1987 as a symbolic event for investigating Cold War boundaries in both an analytical and geographical sense. The epic flight of Rust has generally been typecast as the act of a wayward teenager with delusions of fostering peace with the Soviet Union. Regarded as an eccentric, Rust's act has so far not received any serious attention within Cold War studies. Yet, Scott-Smith interprets his flight as a symbolic transgression of both the East-West boundary *and* the boundaries of Cold War studies, which determine who is and who is not an actor worthy of attention in East-West relations. By making use of the concept of "airworld" and delving into the cultural context of Rust and his motivations, this chapter recasts his flight at the end of the Cold War as an important moment in European Cold War culture, when an "ordinary citizen" rejected the restrictions on freedom of movement across one of the most heavily defended borders on the continent. By means of this approach, the chapter rounds off the volume by raising questions on the place of agency, the ways the Cold War divide influenced behaviour, and the difficulty in ascertaining the precise motivation behind significant events. As a result, the volume ends by pointing to still-to-be-explored fields of Cold War research hitherto ignored or downplayed, rather than claiming any "closure" or completeness regarding interpretations of the Cold War. Ultimately, the further the Cold War recedes into history, the more there is to be questioned, investigated, and discussed.

Verity Clarkson

The Soviet Avant-Garde in Cold War Britain: the *Art in Revolution* Exhibition (1971)

Visitors purchasing a catalogue at the exhibition of Soviet revolutionary avant-garde art at London's Hayward Gallery in the spring of 1971 could choose between two official versions. Both were entitled *Art in Revolution: Soviet Art and Design since 1917*, but there the similarities ended. The first, a bold red, black and white illustrated book with a cover emulating a geometric composition by Lyubov Popova, included numerous essays from British scholars and one by the Soviet architect and historian Oleg Shvidkovsky alongside translations of contextual contemporary Russian texts from the 1920s and images of key exhibits.[1] The alternative was a slim, white volume containing only four photographs, a longer version of Shvidkovsky's essay and a list of exhibits that only occasionally corresponded with the information in the other volume.

These rival catalogues – British and Soviet respectively – were indicative of two different and competing art historical narratives underlying this highly contested exhibition. Jointly organised by the authorities in Britain and the USSR, it was shown two years later than originally scheduled following lengthy and sporadic negotiations. The two catalogues might suggest that the exhibition embodied a simplistic art historical conflict emulating the binary struggle of West versus East of the Cold War. Indeed, journalistic responses in Britain focused on narratives of Soviet censorship and British capitulation, but this one-dimensional tale further obscures what was actually a highly complex organisational and curatorial process. As this chapter will demonstrate, there were instances of conflict between – and within – different organisations and withdrawals of exhibits on both sides, together with narratives of self-reflection and collaboration between British and Soviet organisers.

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1 The Archive of Art and Design, London (AAD), The Arts Council Archive (ACGB/121/40). File 2.8: Graphics.

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Art in Revolution's aim was to demonstrate how avant-garde work in architecture, theatre design, posters, typography, industrial design and film from the period 1917–27, evolved from fine art: what the Arts Council called the "abandonment of fine art's segregation from everyday life".[2] However, the process of constructing such art historical narratives is historically specific, dependent on and revealing of the politics and culture of the period in which it was written. Soviet manipulation of history for political ends is well documented, but, as Matthew Cullerne Bown and Brandon Taylor point out, Western art historiography could also be underpinned by a less overt ideological agenda.[3] Many histories of the Modern Movement in art and design were written during the Cold War and were informed by its politics. Both Paul Betts and Kathleen James-Chakraborty, analysing the art of Nazi Germany and the history of the Bauhaus respectively, have examined how modernism came to be positioned as representative of Western liberalism, specifically in contrast to art on the other side of the Iron Curtain.[4]

A belief that Russian culture was intrinsically anti-modern was not just a Cold War phenomenon: Rosalind P. Blakesley and Susan E. Reid have noted the longstanding value judgements ascribed to Western relations with Russia since the time of Peter the Great. The Cold War expanded and intensified this way of framing the world, with both East and West conceiving the other's culture as the antithesis of their own across the Iron Curtain.[5] A further issue arises in shifting definitions of "avant-garde", an elusive and problematic term.[6] Never used by the revolutionary Soviet artists themselves, the phrase became common currency in the West in the 1960s following the publication of Camilla Gray's *The*

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2 Robin Campbell and Norbert Lynton. Preface. In *Art in Revolution: Soviet Art and Design since 1917*, Norbert Lynton (ed.), 7. London: Arts Council, 1971.
3 Matthew Cullerne Bown and Brandon Taylor. Introduction. In *Art of the Soviets: painting, sculpture and architecture in a one-party state, 1917–1992*, Matthew Cullerne Bown, Brandon Taylor (eds.), 6. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993.
4 Paul Betts. The New Fascination with Fascism: the case of Nazi Modernism. *Journal of Contemporary History* 37 (2002): 541–542; Kathleen James-Chakraborty. Beyond Cold War Interpretations: shaping a new Bauhaus heritage. *New German Critique* 116, no. 39 (2012): 11.
5 Rosalind P. Blakesley and Susan E. Reid. Introduction: A Long Experiment. In *Russian Art and the West: a century of dialogue in painting, architecture, and the decorative arts*, Rosalind P. Blakesley, Susan E. Reid (eds.), 6, 13. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007.
6 Gail Harrison Roman and Virginia Carol Hagelstein Marquardt. Introduction. In *The Avant-Garde Frontier: Russia meets the West, 1910–1930*, Gail Harrison Roman, Virginia Carol Hagelstein Marquardt (eds.), 2. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1992.

Great Experiment: Russian Art 1863 – 1922 in 1962.[7] John E. Bowlt and Olga Matich explicitly position the concept in relation to changing art historiography and politics of the mid to late twentieth century, noting that whilst it is a useful general term to indicate experimentation, its use often masks complexity and pluralism: there was no single, unified "avant-garde".[8] Whilst this chapter considers the wider historiography and display of the avant-garde, its use of the term reflects contemporary usage by the British organisers of *Art in Revolution*.

Utilising archival sources, contemporary press reports and oral testimonies, this chapter investigates how an examination of the British side's organisation and reception of *Art in Revolution* can expand and problematise our understanding of the ideological positioning of modernist art histories and their use as tools of cultural diplomacy during the Cold War in the West. Although this is a one-sided, Western narrative, it is nonetheless a complicated tale of tensions between official and unofficial interpretations of art history in both Britain and the USSR and this chapter tackles it in four thematic sections: planning, organisation, reception and impact.

Organised primarily by a team from the Arts Council of Great Britain led by the art historian and *Guardian* critic turned curator Norbert Lynton, *Art in Revolution* was the first Western exhibition of constructivism to achieve some degree of direct collaboration with the Soviet Ministry of Culture. However, the exhibition's position was ambiguous: it was not mentioned explicitly in any formal cultural agreement between the two states. Such a lack of clarity led to the Arts Council becoming embroiled in problems of cultural diplomacy when the Soviet side claimed ownership and censored some fine art exhibits.

This analysis of *Art in Revolution* explores the complexities of these negotiations and responses. It was not only a struggle for ownership of a modernist narrative between Britain and the Soviet Union but also between different individuals and institutions on the British side. Despite the final exhibition going ahead as planned by the Arts Council and being unusually successful in involving the Soviet authorities, the British press seised on absences of abstract art with traditional Cold War rhetoric, accusing the Arts Council of being complicit with the Soviet regime. By attributing such censorship to a dangerous and repressive So-

7 Although MoMA's Alfred H. Barr had visited Russia in the late 1920s and written about Supermatism and Constructivism in relation to Cubism in the mid-1930s, by the 1950s and 1960s the Russian contribution to modernism was largely overlooked. Stan Allen and Hal Foster. A Conversation with Kenneth Frampton. *October* 106 (2003): 39.

8 John E. Bowlt and Olga Matich. Introduction. In *Laboratory of Dreams: The Russian Avant-Garde and Cultural Experiment*, John E. Bowlt, Olga Matich (eds.), 2 – 5. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.

viet regime, the press ultimately reinforced existing perceptions of the USSR and bolstered Western claims on the modernist narrative. However, unknown to the British press, some of the Soviet team unofficially worked with the Arts Council in keeping one of the Ministry of Culture's exhibits hidden. This chapter reveals new insights into the complex East-West negotiations underlying the organisation of a pioneering exhibition during the Cold War.

Planning: The 1960s Rediscovery of the Avant-Garde

Art in Revolution was an ambitious exhibition, reputedly the most complex attempted by the Arts Council at that moment.[9] Between 26 February and 18 April 1971, the Hayward Gallery on London's South Bank was transformed by architect Michael Brawne's ground-breaking 1000 m^2 installation.[10] He had created exhibition layouts for organisations including the Arts Council and the Tate Gallery since the mid-1960s,[11] but *Art in Revolution* offered an unprecedented opportunity to integrate subject matter with innovative methods of presentation.[12] Taking inspiration from avant-garde exhibition techniques and architecture, notably Konstantin Melnikov's angular red and grey Soviet Pavilion for the Paris Exhibition of 1925, Brawne's design transformed the brutalist concrete interior of the gallery.[13] The intention was to create a "total impression" of the revolutionary period, in which an assortment of original pieces and reconstructions were situated.[14]

Visitors entered a darkened space surrounded by filmmaker Lutz Becker's three-screen synchronised projections of original Russian revolutionary docu-

9 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.7: Papers for Special Meeting 12 February 1971.
10 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 2.4: Exhibition installation. Brawne also taught and wrote seminal texts on museum design. See Michael Brawne. *The New Museum: architecture and display*. London: Architectural Press, 1965; Michael Brawne. *The Museum Interior: temporary & permanent display techniques*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1982.
11 These included exhibitions of Naum Gabo (1966), Picasso (1967), Henry Moore (1968) and Claes Oldenburg (1970). Author unknown. Obituary: Michael Brawne 1925 – 2003. *Architects Journal*. 14 August 2003, accessed 31 August 2017, https://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/home/michael-brawne-1925-2003/145889 article.
12 Brawne. *The Museum Interior*, 31.
13 Edward Braun. Personal interview with author, 21 July 2008.
14 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 2.8. Notes on the graphic scheme for *Art in Revolution*, Edward Wright, 2 November 1970.

Fig. 1: *Art in Revolution*, February 1971. Michael Brawne's angular installation echoed Konstantin Melnikov's Soviet pavilion at Paris Expo, 1925. Source: Archive of Edward Braun, with kind permission of Sarah Braun. [photographer unknown]

mentary films edited "in the manner of the period" from original material including the *Kino-Pravda* reels of Dziga Vertov, *The First Years of the Soviet Union.*[15] Next came an exhilarating agit-prop room filled with the strident propaganda posters of Alexander Rodchenko, Gustav Klutsis and others; one reviewer described how, in evocation of Lissitzky's 1928 Soviet exhibition at *Pressa-Köln*, Ger-

15 Lynton (ed.) *Art in Revolution*, 102. Becker later used the exhibition installation and models to illustrate an Arts Council documentary film also called *Art in Revolution.*

many:[16] "Revolutionary posters flow in continuous strips from revolving presses, and hang like paper streamers from the ceiling; walls covered in photomontages engulf the spectator in a kaleidoscope of technological imagery."[17]

After immense, 35-metre long photomurals of agit trains and public festivals spreading revolutionary messages across Russia came the theatre gallery, co-ordinated by Edward Braun, a scholar of Russian drama. This section addressed new Soviet ideas in design and production via contemporary photographs, costume design and striking reconstructions of theatre sets, notably Popova's dynamic, mechanistic creation for *The Magnanimous Cuckold* (1922). Becker's photomontage sections brought together graphics and documentary photography, including examples published in *Lef* and *Novy Lef* during the 1920s. A subsequent gallery exploring art and design recreated the abstract experiments of artists such as Kazimir Malevich, Vladimir Tatlin, and Lissitzky, documenting the transfer of formal inventions from pure art into various design disciplines: typography, furniture, textile designs and ceramics.[18] The architecture section featured models including Melnikov's *House*, Ivan Leonidov's *Lenin Institute* project, the Vesnin brothers' *Pravda Building* and, outside on the rooftop sculpture court, a bright red, 12-metre high wooden reconstruction of Tatlin's *Monument to the Third International*.[19] Yet the final room of the exhibition was a stark contrast to the lively spaces created by the Arts Council's team. This gallery of figurative work had been curated entirely by the Soviet Ministry of Culture. Claiming to demonstrate how the revolutionary innovations of the 1920s had developed from the 1930s to the present day, the Arts Council agreed to include it at the last minute to ensure Soviet participation.[20]

Art in Revolution was an anomaly in Anglo-Soviet Cold War cultural diplomacy. It was not explicitly mentioned in any formal programmes of reciprocal cultural exchanges. Unlike previous exhibitions held in Britain and officially organised directly with the Ministry of Culture of the USSR – whether wholly curated by the Soviet side like *Russian Painting from the 13th to the 20th Century*

16 Myroslava M. Mudrak and Virginia Hagelstein Marquardt. Environments of Propaganda: Russian and Soviet Expositions and Pavilions in the West. In *The Avant-Garde Frontier*, Roman, Marquardt (eds.), 85.

17 The National Archives of the UK, Kew, London (TNA), Foreign Office Archive (FCO/34/106), File PW6/303/3: Press Cuttings. David Dickson. Review: Art in Revolution. *Scientist and Science Journal*, 4 March 1971.

18 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.2, Leaflet for Press or other use at Hayward Gallery February 1971.

19 Jeremy Dixon. Reconstructing Tatlin's Tower. *AA Files* 64 (2012): 45. Accessed 12 December 2016 http://www.jstor.org/stable/41762304

20 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.2, Leaflet for Press or other use at Hayward Gallery February 1971.

Fig. 2: *Art in Revolution*, February 1971. Immense photomontage murals dominated the gallery space. Source: Archive of Edward Braun, with kind permission of Sarah Braun. [photographer unknown]

(Royal Academy, 1959) or a collaborative effort, in the manner of *Great Britain – U.S.S.R.: an Historical Exhibition* (Victoria and Albert Museum, 1967) – this exhibition was not originally intended to be organised at an inter-governmental level.[21] The project was initially conceived by the young British art historian Camilla Gray, daughter of Basil Gray, curator of the Oriental Department at the British Museum and the calligrapher and historian Nicolete Gray.[22]

21 Clarkson. The Organisation and Reception of Eastern Bloc Exhibitions.
22 John Stuart. Camilla Gray: Obituary. *Design* (April 1972): 81.

In the later 1950s, under the relatively relaxed atmosphere of Khrushchev's Thaw, Gray had visited the Soviet Union to learn ballet. She developed an interest in the officially forbidden revolutionary avant-garde art which she researched by speaking to surviving artists and their families, using private correspondence and newspapers and viewing long-hidden private collections.[23] Her timing was auspicious: as her friend John Stuart later wrote:

> "Her visit to Russia was at precisely the right time. A few years earlier it would have been impossible for her as a foreigner to make contact with Soviet citizens, and a few years later many of the characters vital to her story would no longer have been alive."[24]

Although there had been artistic dialogue between Western artists and the Soviet avant-garde during the 1920s, Western interest in Soviet art had dissipated since the 1930s as the avant-garde artists and their work were suppressed under the Stalinist regime.[25] Despite acknowledging potential errors and omissions in her work, Gray was encouraged to publish by the Museum of Modern Art's (MoMA) Alfred H. Barr, who had developed connections with the Russian avant-garde since the late 1920s.[26] Gray's pioneering, lavishly illustrated book *The Great Experiment* (1962) was a vital step in rediscovering the scope of the Soviet avant-garde and its precedents, hitherto largely obscure to non-specialists in the West.[27]

Gray's proposal for an exhibition on the Soviet avant-garde was accepted by the Art Panel of the Arts Council in January 1966.[28] She had previously worked with the Arts Council on their *Larionov and Goncharova* exhibition that toured

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23 Georgis Costakis. Preface. In *Russian Avant-Garde Art: The George Costakis Collection*, Angelica Zander Rudenstein (ed.). London: Thames and Hudson, 1981.

24 Stuart. Camilla Gray: Obituary, 81.

25 Roman and Marquardt. Introduction, 6.

26 Barr attempted, unsuccessfully, to bring early twentieth century Russian art to the USA in the mid-1950s, having viewed paintings by Malevich and Kandinsky hidden in Soviet museum stores. Simo Mikkonen. Soviet-American Art Exchanges during the Thaw: from bold openings to hasty retreats. In *Art and Political Reality*, Merike Kurisoo (ed.), 57–76. Tallinn: Art Museum of Estonia, 2013.

27 Camilla Gray. *The Great Experiment: Russian Art 1863–1922*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1962. Later revised editions were retitled *The Russian Experiment in Art*. Marian Burleigh-Motley. Introduction to the Revised Edition. In *The Russian Experiment in Art: 1863–1922*, Camilla Gray, 6–8. London: Thames & Hudson, 1986.

28 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.2, Gabriel White, Director of Art, Arts Council. Letter to Sir Robert Sainsbury, 23 July 1968.

Leeds, Bristol and London in 1961.[29] At that moment, *Art in Revolution* was framed as a predominantly British project with an unofficial Soviet contribution via Gray's contacts, intended to enable access to otherwise unavailable documentary material, posters, film, photographs and designs.[30] This was an ambitious plan, the success of which would distinguish the exhibition from other contemporaneous displays of the Soviet avant-garde. The 1968 *Vladimir Tatlin* exhibition at Stockholm's Moderna Museet, for example, was ultimately compiled entirely from material available in the West despite initial efforts by the curators to borrow works via the Soviet Ministry of Culture.[31] British precursors, like *Kasimir Malevich* at the Whitechapel Gallery in 1959 (for which Gray prepared the catalogue) had also been assembled wholly from Western sources.[32] The 1960s also witnessed growing interest in Russian revolutionary art from private galleries in London like the new Grosvenor Gallery, which opened in 1960.[33] Another newcomer, the Annely Juda Gallery that opened in 1968, staged the first of a series *Non-Objective World* exhibitions in 1970, including abstract Soviet painting.[34] Such exhibitions were compiled with artworks accessible in the West and tended to focus on one or a few artists.

In contrast, *Art in Revolution* was planned as a much broader retrospective of the avant-garde movement as a whole, intended to include an unprecedented and, at first, unofficial Soviet contribution. However, it quickly became clear that this would be impossible to achieve without the official assistance of the Soviet authorities. Gray believed that although abstract fine art was portrayed as a misguided, dead-end in Soviet Russia, the 1960s had witnessed a partial rehabilitation of the 1920s avant-garde in other areas of applied art and design, notably architecture.[35] To encourage Russian cooperation with the exhibition project,

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29 Camilla Gray and Mary Charnot. *A Retrospective Exhibition of Paintings and Designs for the Theatre. Larionov and Goncharova*. London: Arts Council, 1961.

30 AAD, ACGB 121/40. File 1.2, White, Arts Council. Letter Sir Robert Sainsbury, 23 July 1968.

31 Troels Anderson (ed.). *Vladimir Tatlin*. Stockholm: Moderna Museet, 1968, 92. The exhibition ran July to September 1968.

32 Stuart. Camilla Gray: Obituary, 81.

33 Exhibitions at the Grosvenor Gallery included *Two Decades of Experimental Russian Art* (15 March-14 April 1962) and *Aspects of Russian Experimental Art 1900–25* (November 1967). See James Burr. London Galleries: The Honesty of a Painter. *Apollo* 86, October 1967, 312–313; Nigel Gosling. Pioneering Russians. *The Observer*, 29 October 1967; Exhibitions. *Design* 227, November 1967, 22.

34 Norbert Lynton. [Untitled]. In *Annely Juda: A Celebration*. London: Annely Juda Fine Art, 2007, 11–12.

35 Igor Golomshtok. Unofficial Art in the Soviet Union. In *Unofficial Art from the Soviet Union*, Igor Golomshtok, Alexander Gleser (eds.), 100. London: Secker and Warburg, 1977.

Gray recommended keeping abstract painting and sculpture as a separate antecedent to Constructivism.[36]

A meticulously worded proposal was composed to avoid "unfortunate ideological connotations" and used the working title *Soviet Design of the '20s*.[37] In October 1967, the Arts Council wrote directly to the Union of Architects of the USSR requesting co-operation in research and advice on how to obtain information on architectural models for the exhibition, but received no reply.[38] Notwithstanding a limited, renewed engagement with modernism in architecture, typified by the Soviet Pavilion at Brussels Expo in 1958, debates around the acceptability of modernism in art in the USSR were complex and ongoing.[39] Previous exhibitions of Russian fine art in Britain organised by the Soviet Ministry of Culture, such as the 1959 Royal Academy display, had shown only realist works with no acknowledgement of any experimental modernist practice in the 1910s and 1920s.[40] The Russian avant-garde works requested by the Arts Council remained incompatible with the official Soviet image presented abroad.

Organisation: "They Are Sending Us the Wrong Horse"

It was recognised from the start that bringing such an exhibition to fruition with the involvement of the Soviet Union would be challenging.[41] In 1967, the British Foreign Office had cautioned against a joint Anglo-Soviet exhibition on such a controversial subject, noting that the Soviet authorities "would not look kindly on anyone who might seek to come out to Russia to look for possible objects

36 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.6, Camilla Gray, Russian Constructivist Exhibition: Notes for Mr John Pope-Hennessy, 18 July 1968.
37 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.6 Gray. Letter to White, Arts Council, 20 September 1967.
38 Braun. Personal interview. See also AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.2, White, Arts Council. Letter to Georgui Orlov, Union of Architects of the USSR.
39 Catherine Cooke and Susan E. Reid. Modernity and Realism: Architectural Relations in the Cold War. In *Russian Art and the West*, Rosalind Polly Blakesley, Susan E. Reid (eds.). 2007; Susan E. Reid. Towards a New (Socialist) Realism. In *Russian Art and the West*, Blakesley, Reid (eds.). 2007.
40 G. Nedoshivin (ed.). *Russian Painting from the 13th to the 20th Century: an exhibition of works by Russian and Soviet Artists*. London: Royal Academy, 1959.
41 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.1, Robin Cecil, Cultural Relations Department, Foreign Office. Letter to White, Arts Council, 16 May 1967.

to the exhibition".[42] But others were more optimistic. Gray believed that a reassessment of the avant-garde was underway in the Soviet Union; the Arts Council concurred with Gray, viewing the Foreign Office's perspective as out-of-date.[43]

Wider political events further complicated negotiations and brought delays. In the aftermath of the crisis in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the possibility of staging the show without any Soviet input was rejected and *Art in Revolution* was postponed a year from its scheduled January 1970 showing.[44] When the project was cautiously revived in early 1969, it was even more closely monitored by the Foreign Office.[45] Still wary of Soviet involvement and conscious of what would now be recognised as the soft power[46] value of such cultural manifestations, they warned that "the Russians will only co-operate with the exhibition if they consider it as serving their present purposes [...] to promote a favourable view in this country of the present Soviet Union". Concerned that the Soviet side might impose such "ideological content", the Foreign Office insisted on a careful consideration of tactics, scrutinising all Arts Council letters before they were sent to the Ministry of Culture.[47]

The ambiguities surrounding *Art in Revolution*'s relationship to the official bilateral Cultural Agreement between Britain and the USSR compounded any disparities in how it was perceived by each side. As an Arts Council initiative, it did not occupy the more familiar position of a wholly Soviet incoming exhibition. In previous years, such an inbound event would have been negotiated and specifically mentioned in the Agreement, usually alongside a reciprocal British exhibition intended for Soviet audiences. Instead, the Foreign Office considered *Art in Revolution* under the Agreement's section on general exchanges of exhibitions. It was discussed as part of the Moscow renegotiation talks in early 1969, but it was never intended to be part of a *quid pro quo* arrangement.

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42 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.6, A.R. Maxwell-Hyslop, Department of Education and Science. Minute concerning conversation with Cecil, Foreign Office, 12 May 1967.

43 AAD, ACGB 121/40. File 1.2, Joanna Drew, Exhibition Department, Arts Council. Minute to White concerning Russian Design Exhibition.

44 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.1, Robin Campbell, Director of Fine Art, Arts Council. Note recording conversation with Edward Braun, 3 April 1970.

45 In 1968, the British Foreign Office became the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); it continues to be referred to as the Foreign Office throughout this chapter for brevity.

46 Joseph S. Nye Jr. Soft Power. *Foreign Policy*, 80 (1990): 153–171.

47 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.1, Robert Brash, East-West Contacts Department, Foreign Office. Letter to Campbell, Arts Council, 12 February 1969.

Consequently, until a few months before the opening, ownership remained uncertain: no written agreement detailed each side's responsibilities.[48] The Arts Council believed that the exhibition project was a collaboration,[49] but in March 1970 they received notice that the Soviet side intended "to supervise rather than just help with the exhibition".[50] The Ministry of Culture clarified that Gray could make suggestions but they would decide on the themes and exhibits, holding a final veto over content.[51] The Arts Council had been prepared for some degree of Soviet supervision whether covert or overt,[52] but this was far in excess of their original request for co-operation in research.[53]

Yet, this prospect of Soviet involvement in an exploration of the avant-garde was also tremendously exciting, arousing international interest among Western art historians. American galleries including the Guggenheim and Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) eagerly corresponded with Lynton, newly appointed in May 1970 as the Arts Council's Director of Exhibitions, for news on the Soviet negotiations.[54] Nonetheless, as the year wore on the Arts Council considered cancelling the project, complaining that all dealings with the Soviet Ministry of Culture were "desperately slow".[55] Whether this was deliberate obstruction given the exhibition's provocative subject matter or the bureaucratic inefficiency of the Brezhnev period (or both) is unclear.[56] By the autumn of 1970, Lynton's anxieties about the non-arrival of Soviet lists and data needed to construct models were acute.[57] He began alternative arrangements to prepare for an exhibition

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48 TNA, FCO 34/106. Briefing paper for Adjournment Debate on the Anglo-Soviet Cultural Agreement, 25 March 1971.

49 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.7, Papers for "Special Meeting 12 February 1971" on *Art in Revolution.*

50 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.1, Soviet Note of Confirmation, received 5 March 1970.

51 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.1, K. Kirby, Cultural Exchange Department, Foreign Office. Letter to Campbell, Arts Council, 25 March 1970.

52 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.1, Campbell, Arts Council. Note concerning letter from Kirby, Foreign Office, 25 March 1970.

53 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.2, Drew, Arts Council. Minute to White, Arts Council, undated c. 1967.

54 AAD, ACGB 121/40. File 1.6, Bates Lowry, MoMA, New York. Letter to Gray, 4 September 1968. File 1.2, Lynton, Arts Council. Letter to Edward P Fry, Associate Curator, Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum New York, 8 September 1970.

55 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.2, Drew, Arts Council. Letter to John E. Bowlt, 3 December 1970.

56 Braun. Personal interview.

57 See for example AAD, ACGB 121/40. File 1.7 Arts Council. Telegram to John Field, Cultural Attaché, Moscow, 18 Nov 1970; Lynton, Arts Council to Mr V Karyagin, Soviet Embassy London, 20 November 1970.

with no Soviet involvement, commissioning replicas and sourcing loans from Western institutions and private collectors.[58]

Such delays and conflicts between the British and Soviet organisers exacerbated tensions within the British side. The exhibition was extremely expensive and risky by Arts Council standards and relationships between Gray and the other organisers became strained.[59] Although Gray had initiated the exhibition concept and was a recognised authority on Russian art, some of the more old-fashioned members of the Arts Council were irked by the involvement of this single-minded young woman. Braun later recalled how some of the "old guard" attempted to sideline her from the project, in part because of her gender and age.[60]

Her passionate commitment to *Art in Revolution* led her into conflict with the "forbidding" personality of John Pope-Hennessy, director of the Victoria and Albert Museum and Chair of the Art Panel of the Arts Council.[61] In the aftermath of the exhibition's postponement in 1968, Gray, extremely upset and fearing cancellation, had accused members of the Arts Council of using events in Czechoslovakia as an excuse to avoid proceeding with what was becoming an increasingly complex exhibition.[62] In response to this outburst, Pope-Hennessy tried to exclude Gray, secretly suggesting the creation of an alternative organising committee where she would be just one voice among many.[63] Ambiguities over the exhibition's semi-official status were mirrored by Gray's problematic position as an independent scholar and non-official contributor to the project.[64] These issues intensified upon her marriage to Oleg Prokofiev, son of the Russian composer, in December 1969: she relocated to Moscow, becoming a Soviet citizen, which offered potential for further diplomatic misunderstandings. Pope-Hennessy

58 Western loans included the Proun Room, Van Abbemuseum, Eindhoven and Tatlin Reliefs constructed by Martyn Chalk. AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.5.

59 AAD, ACGB 121/40. File 1.6, John Pope-Hennessy, Victoria and Albert Museum. Letter to Lord Goodman, 18 October 1968.

60 Braun recalls how he was often taken up "as a man" in preference to Gray, when in fact he was "simply one of her collaborators". Braun. Personal interview.

61 Anthony Burton. *Vision and Accident: the story of the Victoria and Albert Museum*. London: V&A Publications, 1999, 216.

62 She tried desperately to persuade the Arts Council to reconsider, contradicting her earlier assertions by suggesting that the exhibition could still be assembled entirely from Western sources. AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.6, Gray. Letter to Ben Whitaker, MP, House of Commons, 7 October 1968; AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.1, White, Arts Council. Letter to Brash, Foreign Office, 21 November 1968; AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.6, Gray. Letter to Pope-Hennessy, 23 September 1968.

63 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.6, Pope-Hennessy, Victoria and Albert Museum. Letter to Goodman, Arts Council 18 October 1968.

64 Braun. Personal interview.

claimed that she had forfeited her role in the exhibition as a consequence, but Gray continued to contribute to the project, keeping in constant contact with Lynton via diplomatic bag.[65]

Given these complicated struggles over ownership, and the fact that Soviet and Western experts approached the art of the 1920s from "contradictory standpoints", how had the negotiations over content worked in practice?[66] Once the postponed project was revived in 1970, the central team of Lynton, Braun and Gray were able to hold official meetings with relevant authorities and individuals in Moscow.[67] There, they visited Melnikov in his self-designed *House* as well as George Costakis, the collector of Russian avant-garde art.[68] In attempting to agree an outline and list of exhibits, Lynton noted how they offered compromises to encourage the Ministry of Culture to be similarly flexible.

Although both Gray and Braun could negotiate fluently in Russian, the talks were hard going: Lynton described the task as a "thankless" one.[69] Awaiting confirmation of exhibits from the Soviet side a month before the London opening, Lynton received warning from Gray in Moscow that the "trickiest" items scheduled for display – including Lissitzky's *Prouns*, Malevich's *Architectonics* and the Tatlin *Reliefs*, all of which had been sourced in the West – were on a "separate list awaiting special permission" from the Soviets.[70] At the last moment, mere weeks before the exhibition opened, "completely spurious"[71] revised exhibit lists arrived in London. Lynton was alarmed as the abstract items jointly approved in Moscow had been replaced with "zeros": "Tatlin has disappeared; Lissitzky almost entirely omitted; ditto Rodchenko; [...] Instead totally unsuitable material such as two 1970 sculptures".[72] This was a substantial departure from the lists previously agreed in Moscow and the Arts Council thought it was unacceptable.[73] Lynton wryly commented, "we bought a horse in September 1970, but they are sending us the wrong horse".[74]

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65 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.2, Pope-Hennessy. Letter to Campbell, Arts Council, 21 April 1970.
66 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.1, James Bennett, Cultural Attaché in Moscow. Letter to Gabriel White, recording comment by Supagin, Soviet Ministry of Culture, 2 April 1969.
67 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.1, Campbell, Arts Council. Letter to Jackson, Moscow Embassy, 7 April 1970.
68 Braun. Personal interview.
69 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.7, Lynton, Arts Council. Letter to John Field, Moscow Embassy, 26 November 1970.
70 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.6, Gray. Letter to Lynton, Arts Council, 17 January 1971.
71 Braun. Personal interview.
72 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.7, Lynton, Basic Debating Points, undated (c. January 1971).
73 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.7, Lynton, Arts Council. Letter to Field, Cultural Attaché Moscow, 29 January 1971.

Gray's warning about the "trickiest" artworks was prescient: immediately prior to the opening of the show, the Soviet Ministry of Culture made further demands, insisting that certain pieces of "irrelevant" abstract art be removed.[75] These included original works, notably abstract paintings by Lissitsky and Malevich, in addition to reconstructions, like British sculptor Martyn Chalk's recreations of various Tatlin *Reliefs*.[76] It was another replica, a recreation of Lissitzky's *Proun Room* (1923) by Eindhoven's Van Abbemuseum that was to arouse the greatest controversy.[77] This 3.5 metre square cell containing abstract works was immensely problematic for the Soviet Ministry of Culture. They raised two objections: firstly that abstract fine art was not relevant to an exhibition of design; and secondly that Western reproductions had no place in what they believed was an official Soviet exhibition. They demanded that the works be removed or they would withdraw their other contributions, causing both a diplomatic scandal and a financial disaster for the Arts Council.[78]

The British exhibition team wanted to oppose the Soviet demands, Lynton arguing that the evolution of abstract art before its application in various fields of design was the "core" of the exhibition. Despite high-level personal appeals by Lord Goodman, Chairman of the Arts Council to the Soviet Deputy Minister of Culture, Popov the *Proun Room* was withdrawn. The entrance to this freestanding structure was blocked and it remained in the centre of the gallery, resembling a sealed tomb.[79] Lynton, Braun and Gray complained bitterly, feeling betrayed by the Arts Council hierarchy led by Goodman, and supported by Lord Eccles, Minister for the Arts. Braun regretfully recalled that the two Lords "didn't think it was worth the scandal" of a diplomatic incident.[80] Critics in the British press echoed Braun's sentiment, complaining, "no one was anxious to face the consequences of offending the Russians".[81]

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74 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.7, Lynton. Minute to Robin Campbell re Ministry of Culture lists, undated (c. December 1970).

75 Braun. Personal interview.

76 Some of the withdrawn pieces by Lissitzky and Malevich were exhibited at the Annely Juda Gallery. TNA, FCO/34/106. Red Seal. *Guardian*, 3 March 1971; James Mossman. Letter to *The Times*, 3 March 1971, 13.

77 TNA, FCO/34/106. Peter Hopkirk. Russians Censor Room Full of Art. *The Times*, 26 February 1971.

78 British Library Sound Archive (BLSA), National Life Story Collection (NLSC). Artists' Lives, Lynton, Norbert, c. 2004.

79 TNA, FCO/34/106. Bermard Levin. Keeping an Exhibition Ideologically Germ-Free. *The Times*, 2 March 1971, 14.

80 Braun. Personal interview.

81 John Russell. London. *Art News,* April 1971.

Fig. 3: *Art in Revolution*, February 1971. Exterior of the freestanding Proun Room replica, prior to being closed to the public. Source: Archive of Edward Braun, with kind permission of Sarah Braun. [photographer unknown]

However, unbeknownst to the British press and Soviet Ministry of Culture, the British side also withdrew an exhibit with unofficial Soviet consent. Two of the Soviet representatives who came to assist with the exhibition, Shvidkovsky (author of the catalogue essay) and Nina Dubovitskaya, were sympathetic to the Arts Council's views as long as they avoided any personal controversy.[82] Lynton recalled the fate of one particular 4 m high monumental aluminium sculpture of a female figure with "a flock of birds emerging from her arm [...] like an unfor-

82 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.6, Gray. Letter to Lynton, Arts Council, 17 January 1971.

tunate accident" which was intended for the Soviet Ministry of Culture's post-1930 room. The packing crate was opened in the presence of the British team and Shvidkovsky but after head-shaking from both the British and Soviet sides, it remained unexhibited, hidden downstairs in its box. Nonetheless, the work, *Fly, Swallows* (1964) by Mikenas Yozas was listed in the Soviet version of the catalogue so that, as Lynton explained, Shvidkovsky could "go back to Russia and say 'Look! This was shown'."[83] Although the scale of the Soviet withdrawals was much more visible, a Cold War narrative of Soviet censorship championed by the British press obscured the existence of curatorial vetoes on both sides.

Reception: "Russians Censor Room Full of Art"?

Critics found much to praise in *Art in Revolution.* Most remarked upon was Brawne's innovative installation: this immersive, lively design was celebrated for its attempt to capture the urgency, dynamism and euphoria of the brief revolutionary period.[84] The unusually extensive use of film in the exhibition (supplemented by a programme of Soviet film at the adjacent National Film Theatre), in particular, Becker's introductory three-screen film montage, was commended. The dramatic architectural and theatrical models were also singled out for praise. On the balcony of the gallery, the bright red Tatlin tower leaned diagonally over Waterloo Bridge, an impressive symbol of the exhibition, which temporarily transformed London's skyline.[85] It was celebrated by journalists of various political persuasions: the *Evening Standard* complimented this "Russian castle in the air on [a] London river" whilst the socialist *Morning Star* lauded it as a "Monument to the Future of Humanity".[86] There were calls to reflect upon and re-write wider Western art histories in the light of this impressionistic show: "It is not easy to grasp things, in perspective; to see that it is also a European movement".[87]

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83 BLSA, NLSC. Lynton.
84 TNA, FCO/34/106. Paul Overy. The Light That Failed. *Financial Times*, 2 March 1971; TNA, FCO/34/106. Dickson. Art in Revolution; Andrew Causey. Art in the Russian Revolution. *Illustrated London News*, 20 March 1971, 29.
85 TNA, FCO/34/106. Evan Anthony. Party Line. *Spectator,* 13 March 1971; Russell. London.
86 TNA, FCO/34/106. Russian Castle in the Air on London River. *Evening Standard*, 25 February 1971; TNA, FCO/34/106. Monument to the Future of Humanity. *Morning Star*, 26 February 1971.
87 TNA, FCO/34/106. Guy Brett. The Revolutionary Leap into Space. *The Times,* 26 February 1971, 11.

Despite this acclaim, positive responses to *Art in Revolution* were overshadowed by the perception that the Soviet Ministry of Culture had censored a British exhibition. This controversy resounded beyond the world of art criticism: in parliament, both the Commons and Lords raised concerns that the Soviet government had dictated the content of a British-funded event.[88] In the wider press, the Arts Council's actions were presented as a complete capitulation to Soviet demands. One journalist noted ironically, in reference to the Soviet veto of abstract Malevich works, that an exhibition without any Russian involvement would have created a truer representation of revolutionary Soviet art.[89] Elsewhere, more playfully populist Cold War stereotypes brought some humour to the situation: one newspaper cartoon by Marc depicted a shady Russian character in a fur hat peeking out from behind a bust of Lenin, offering an exhibition visitor a postcard of a "banned exhibit".[90]

More troubling to the Arts Council team was the hyperbole evident in the press. The scale of the withdrawals was exaggerated by many journalists, with *The Times* claiming that the Soviets had threatened to take home most of the items on display.[91] The banned *Proun Room* also swelled in journalists' imaginations until it became "a complete room" which was "rendered invisible" in response to an order from Moscow.[92] Bernard Levin lamented how it had been "papered over" as if it had never existed; others imagined the structure as an entire gallery full of vetoed abstract pieces by Lissitzky, Malevich and Tatlin.[93]

Lynton complained about such careless and negative press comments, thinking they could be damaging for the exhibition.[94] Whether as a result of a misunderstanding about the nature of the *Proun Room* or sensationalist Cold War journalism, he was anxious that the public did not stay away believing "all the

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88 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.3, Question concerning Art in Revolution. Hansard, 17 March 1971; TNA, FCO 34/106. Parliamentary Question, Mr Bruce-Gardyne, South Angus to Mr Anthony Royle, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 8 March 1971.

89 TNA, FCO/34/106. Brett. The Revolutionary Leap into Space.

90 Mark (Marc) Boxer. Psst Want to Buy a Postcard of a Banned Exhibit? *The Times*, 4 March 1971.

91 TNA, FCO/34/106. Peter Hopkirk. Russians Censor Room Full of Art. *The Times*, 26 February 1971.

92 TNA, FCO/34/106. John Mossman. Russian Order Blacks Out Art Display. *Daily Telegraph*, 27 February 1971.

93 TNA, FCO/34/106. Levin. Keeping an Exhibition Ideologically Germ-Free.

94 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.5, Lynton, Arts Council. Letter to Mr Leering, Stedelijk van Abbemuseum, Eindhoven, 26 March 1971.



Fig. 4: Marc (Mark Boxer): *Psst Want to Buy a Postcard of a Banned Exhibit?* The Times, 4 March 1971. Source: Estate of Mark Boxer

important works have been omitted”.[95] He rebutted the more extreme articles such as Levin’s searing attack on the exhibition in *The Times*, which claimed

95 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.3, Lynton, Arts Council. Letter to Evan Anthony. *The Spectator*, 10 March 1971.

that the Arts Council was a "passive recipient of a ready made show" of Soviet propaganda. He countered that around 80 % of the exhibition was as assembled by the Arts Council, arguing that "to some extent we have imposed our conception of the theme of the exhibition on the Ministry of Culture".[96] Other sympathetic voices that had assisted with the exhibition rallied in support of Lynton. Robin Milner-Gulland, scholar of Russian culture, pointed out that Levin's assertion that an exhibition of revolutionary Constructivism somehow represented the Soviet authorities' artistic point of view was ludicrous: "Try telling that to the Muscovites, and ask how many such exhibitions they have set eyes on".[97] However, their protests were outweighed by negative press reports focusing on Soviet transgressions.

Further controversy arose from the omission of any narrative explaining the fates of the avant-garde artists in the 1930s. This was not mentioned in the exhibition, partly because its end point – at least in the Arts Council's eyes – was 1927; yet, in response to Soviet demands, Lynton had also edited Frampton's essay in the Arts Council's catalogue to remove any reference to the repressive regime that followed.[98] Commentators also picked up on these absences: Levin's article made the connection between the disappearing *Proun Room* and disappearing persons explicit, complaining that the exhibition failed to explain how the subsequent Stalinist period had obliterated not just artistic experimentation but also many of the artists themselves.[99]

Other journalists were more reflective. Nigel Gosling lamented that the boarded-up *Proun Room* "feels like a memorial and I was tempted to leave a flower before its locked door".[100] Even critics who praised the exhibition as a whole were troubled by these absences.[101] Some commentators thought that the Soviets' own room of officially approved figurative art from the 1930s to the present day acted as an epilogue. One critic noted how it demonstrated "what we know already – that it was not to be".[102] Gosling wrote of the stark distinction between this room and the rest of the exhibition: "The gallery tingles with confidence,

96 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.7, Lynton, Arts Council. Minute to Secretary General of Arts Council, summarising telephone conversation with Mr Thom, 11 March 1971; AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.3, Lynton, Arts Council. Exhibition of Russian Art. Letter to *The Times*, 3 March 1971.
97 Robin Milner-Gulland. Review: Art in Revolution: Soviet Art and Design Since 1917. *Soviet Studies* 23, no. 4 (1972): 691.
98 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 2.6. Lynton, Arts Council. Letter to Kenneth Frampton, 26 March 1971.
99 TNA, FCO/34/106. Levin. Keeping an Exhibition Ideologically Germ-Free.
100 TNA, FCO/34/106. Nigel Gosling. Reflections of a Soviet Dream. *The Observer*, 28 February 1971.
101 Russell. London.
102 Peter Campbell. Collective Vision. *The Listener*, 4 March 1971, 285.

dash, imagination and vitality, right through till the last room. There, suddenly, we feel the current being switched off. We are back in a provincial Russian backwater…the dream is over".[103]

Those few critics who did respond to the post-1930 room explicitly identified the Soviet contribution contained within as socialist realism, setting it in opposition to the modernist narrative celebrated in the rest of the Hayward Gallery. As Betts has noted in relation to German fascist culture, during the Cold War, politicised figurative art was positioned as intrinsically antithetical and morally incompatible with modernism.[104] Frequently dismissed as mere propaganda and denigrated as lacking in artistic integrity,[105] both Nazi art and Soviet socialist realism was largely excluded from Western art historiography and museum collections for moral and aesthetic reasons because it seemed "premodern" or "antimodern".[106] Such reactions were evident in both the organisers' and critics' responses to *Art in Revolution*. Milner-Gulland argued that this "absurd" art had no place at the Hayward Gallery, not because it was "Socialist-Realist junk" but because it was "utterly irrelevant" to the exhibition's theme.[107] Gray had worried that the "dreadful" later works insisted upon by the Ministry of Culture would be a gift to anti-Soviet critics.[108] What Boris Groys describes as the West's "rejection through silence" of socialist realist art was reinforced by the exhibition's layout: the post-1930 Soviet contribution was confined to a small upstairs room. The British cultural attaché in Moscow recorded that it was frequently overlooked: "[so] insignificant was it that its function and even existence seems to have escaped the notice of the critics".[109]

103 TNA, FCO/34/106. Gosling. Reflections of a Soviet Dream.
104 Betts. The New Fascination with Fascism.
105 Christine Lindey. *Art in the Cold War: From Vladivostok to Kalamazoo, 1945–1962*. London: Herbert, 1990, 33.
106 Boris Groys. The Art of Totality. In *The Landscape of Stalinism: the art and ideology of Soviet space*, E. A. Dobrenko, Eric Naiman (eds.), 98–99. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003.
107 Milner-Gulland. Review: Art In Revolution.
108 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.6, Gray. Letter to Lynton, Arts Council, 17 January 1971.
109 TNA, FCO34/106. John Field, Cultural Attaché, British Embassy, Moscow. Minute on exhibition, 13 April 1971.

Impact: Exhibiting the Soviet Avant-garde in the Later Cold War

Art in Revolution was a landmark exhibition which made great progress in re-integrating the Soviet avant-garde into mainstream modernist art history, providing a grounding for subsequent exhibitions, that like *Paris–Moscou* (Centre Georges Pompidou, 1979), expanded its themes still further.[110] The British Foreign Office's report, cautious in the light of protracted negotiations, thought that on balance it had been a success.[111] Critics particularly praised its innovative presentation of Constructivism and later commentators have acknowledged the impact of exhibitions like *Art in Revolution* on the field of graphic design in the 1970s and 1980s, influencing genres from protest posters to record sleeve art.[112] However, visitor numbers in London only reached a relatively disappointing 58,000.[113] Lynton bemoaned the effects of the negative press response to the censorship controversy, believing it influenced attendance. The perception that a significant number of exhibits were withdrawn from *Art in Revolution* persists to this day.[114] Despite this, sympathetic critics noted that the bulk of the exhibition remained exactly as planned.[115]

British organisers were also buoyed by the large proportion of younger people who visited with Lynton estimating that around three quarters of the audience were under the age of 30.[116] Braun later surmised that this was partly because the exhibition, with its talk of revolution, experimentation and addressing issues of the social role of art and protest, appealed strongly to a youthful, radical audience, the "generation of '68".[117] Jeremy Dixon offers an personal account of the group of architects and students constructing the wooden "Tatlin Tower" in the empty Hayward Gallery at night. In scenes more evocative of a music festival or student sit-in than a conventional art exhibition, they lis-

110 Centre Georges Pompidou. *Paris-Moscou, 1900–1930*. Paris: Centre Georges Pompidou, 1979.
111 TNA, FCO34/106. Field. Minute on exhibition.
112 Elizabeth Guffey. *Retro: the culture of revival*. London: Reaktion, 2006, 138–143.
113 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.3, Report on Exhibitions: Art in Revolution, Arts Council Panel Meeting, 29 April 1971.
114 Guffey. *Retro*, 137.
115 Robert Melville. Around the Sealed Room. *New Statesman*, 12 March 1971.
116 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.6, Lynton, Arts Council. Letter to Gray, 15 April 1971.
117 Braun. Personal interview.

tened to rock music on giant speakers whilst friends dropped by with food, indicating that this generation was also integral to realising the exhibition itself.[118]

The exhibition's subject matter also reached wider audiences beyond the gallery. Those unable to travel to London may have seen Lynton's extensive, fully illustrated *Sunday Times* colour feature providing detailed information about "the most modern movement in modern art".[119] A subsequent touring version of *Art in Revolution*, two-thirds in size and minus the Soviet contribution, brought an edited version of the exhibition to audiences across North America and Europe during 1971 and 1972.[120] The Arts Council archive contains letters from Western scholars requesting photographs and slides of the previously inaccessible artworks for research and teaching,[121] whilst the architectural models have been re-used in subsequent exhibitions on the avant-garde.[122]

But to what extent was the modernist story presented by *Art in Revolution* a product of the ideological concerns of the Cold War?[123] It was the first Western exhibition on the Soviet avant-garde with any involvement from the Soviet authorities. This was unusual in the circumstances, though as this chapter has shown it was also highly problematic in the light of ongoing Soviet issues in accepting some forms of modernism. Although it may appear that the Arts Council attempted to involve the Soviet Ministry of Culture in co-creating a modernist art historical narrative despite the East-West conflict, this was arguably a side-effect of Gray's and Lynton's ambitious hope that the Ministry of Culture would supply the information and artworks they needed.[124]

Notwithstanding the willingness of a minority in the Soviet delegation to concur (unofficially) with the Arts Council's curatorial decisions, as the production of two separate catalogues suggests, the result was not a singular co-authored history. Instead, it generated two official, parallel art historical narratives, as indicated by the twin catalogues. These narratives were not

118 Dixon. Reconstructing Tatlin's Tower, 45.

119 TNA, FCO34/106. Norbert Lynton. Art in Revolution. *The Sunday Times Magazine*, 21 February 1971, 19 – 31.

120 AAD, ACGB 121/40. Files 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4. The exhibition visited cities including Bologna, Cologne, New York and Toronto.

121 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.3, correspondence. The Arts Council distributed a leaflet on the Soviet avant-garde to schools in the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA).

122 Architectural models from Art in Revolution are now at the Sainsbury Centre for Visual Arts, University of East Anglia. AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.3. Veronica Sekules, Deputy Keeper, University of East Anglia. Letter to Andrew Dempsey, Hayward Gallery, 1991.

123 TNA, FCO/34/106. Gosling. Reflections of a Soviet Dream.

124 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 2.4, Lynton, Arts Council. Letter to Dr Sarajas Korte, Department of Exhibitions, Helsinki, 22 April 1971.

granted equal weighting, though as Lynton admitted, even the more impressive Arts Council booklet was not as intended, containing edits to meet Soviet demands and minor errors resulting from being hurriedly compiled whilst the final exhibits remained unknown.[125]

More generally, responses such as the outcry from the press over heavy-handed Soviet intervention in an exhibition considered to be exclusively British, indicate a Western claim on ownership, not only of *Art in Revolution,* but also more broadly of the modernist narrative. A number of British critics explicitly called for the so-called "lost" Soviet avant-garde[126] in art and design to be more fully re-integrated into mainstream – that is, Western – histories of Modernism.[127] But as this chapter has shown, the exhibition also reveals the complexity of opinion between and within each side, both official and unofficial.

For a final word on the exhibition's impact, it is worth turning to the words of Camilla Gray, the exhibition's originator. In the months following *Art in Revolution* and shortly before her death aged only 35, she gave an alternative view from her new home in Moscow. Writing to Lynton, she described how her Soviet friends had received news of the exhibition: it was "considered of immense significance and everyone is agog for information on how the crafty British managed to pull off such a coup".[128] Such unofficial responses in the USSR give some indication of how an exploration of *Art in Revolution* can start to challenge binary East-West understandings of art historiography during the Cold War; with future research in the Soviet archives, an even more complex picture may unfold.

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125 AAD, ACGB 121/40. File 1.3, Lynton, Arts Council. Letter to Stephen Paine, Boston, 6 April 1971.

126 Kenneth Frampton. A Lost Avant-Garde. In *Art in Revolution: Soviet Art and Design since 1917*, Norbert Lynton (ed.), 21–29. London: Arts Council, 1971.

127 TNA, FCO34/106. Keith Dewhurst. This Exhibition of Russian Art […] *Guardian*, 24 February 1971.

128 AAD, ACGB/121/40. File 1.6, Gray. Letter to Lynton, 2 May 1971.

Ksenia Malich

“The Collective Approach Does Not Abolish the Individual”: Links between Soviet Avant-garde Experiments and Architectural Practice in the Netherlands during the Early Twentieth Century

The first steps of the European International Style[1] in architecture coincided with the time of extraordinary changes in Russian culture, caused by the 1917 Revolution. In the 1920s, though for a very short period, Russian constructivists had the opportunity to implement their most progressive ideas on a large scale. It is not surprising that the radical changes in Russian artistic life elicited a strong interest among many Dutch architects. In the 1920s and the 1930s, the Netherlands was at the forefront of the nascent architectural experiments of the Modern Movement. Furthermore, Dutch architects were among the pioneers of residential dwelling projects and social engineering methods, searching for ways to adapt and modernise urban planning. This was the area in which the interests of Dutch architects coincided with the research of their Soviet colleagues. Despite different economic and political circumstances, as well as the fact that many European artists did not accept Soviet ideology, there were close contacts between the two.[2] These contacts had their influence on Dutch architectural

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1 International Style is mentioned here as the main trend in the architecture of modernism. It includes Functionalism, Constructivism (USSR), The New Building (Das Neue Bauen, Germany and Nieuwe Bouwen, The Netherlands) and many other experiments of the early avant-garde architecture. After World War II it took on a more homogeneous form, becoming one of the leading styles in world architecture.

2 On the theme of Russian-Dutch relationships during the interwar period see: Johan van de Beek and Gerrit Smienk. *Ir. J.B. van Loghem b.i. architect*. Hilversum: De Boer, 1971; Gerrit Oorthuys. Architetti olandesi e avanguardie russe 1919 – 1934. In *Socialismo, città, architettura URSS 1917 – 1937.* Roma: il contributo degli architetti europei, 1971; I. V. Kokkinaki. O professional’nïkh svyazakh sovetskikh i gollandskikh arkhitektorov v mezhvoyennïy period. In *Problemï istorii sovetskoy arkhitekturï.* Sb. 3, S. O. Khan-Magomedov (ed.). Moscow: 1977, 36 – 42; Cor de Wit. *Johan Niegeman, 1902 – 1977: Bauchaus, Sowjet Unie, Amsterdam.* Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1979; Klaus-Jürgen Winkler. *Der Architekt Hannes Meyer. Anschauungen und Werk.* Berlin: Verlag für Bauwesen, 1989; Simone Rummele. *Mart Stam.* Zurich – Munich: Patmos Verlag GmbH & Co KG, 1991; Igor A. Kazus. Architektur- Avantgarde im Ural und in Sibirien. In *Avantgarde II, 1924 – 1937, Sowjetische Architektur*, Selim Chan-Magomedov, Christian O. Schadlich, Igor A. Kazus,

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practice and we should take them in consideration when talking about the post-WWII Reconstruction period in the Netherlands. This chapter examines the Dutch and Soviet architectural experiments and what forms of influence and exchange took place between the two.

New Trends and Classical Constructs

The development of Soviet constructivism was in many ways determined by the ideas of the pre-revolutionary period. Firstly, this concerns the development of avant-garde art, experiments of Russian abstractionism and attempts to produce three-dimensional structures from the suprematist explorations of Kazimir Malevich and his associates. The development of Dutch functionalist language was also determined by an affinity for Cubist, Futurist, and Suprematist experiments. In fact, it was the Dutch authors, such as the creators of Neoplasticism and founders of De Stijl group, Piet Mondrian and Theo van Doesburg, who took architecture down the path that had been laid out by abstract art. While in Paris, Piet Mondrian and Cornelis van Eesteren were friends with Le Corbusier, Fernand Leger, and Alexander Arkhipenko, attended lectures by Léon Jaussely and Louis-Georges Pinault at the Higher School of Urban Science (École des Hautes Études Urbaines), and had contacts with representatives of Neo-Cubism and Dadaism. The study of colour relations enabled the architects to develop a capacious and expressive artistic method. The projects created in the first half of the 1920s by van Doesburg, van Eesteren, Gerrit Rietveld, Robert van 't Hoff, and Jacobus Oud, can be rightly qualified as the most vivid and expressive works of that time.

The New Building was aimed at creating an empty space to discover things in their authenticity, for the sake of "a new sincerity", which Russian futurists defined as "going beyond the zero of creativity" and "beyond the ugliness of real forms." This was a consequence of the popular theosophical belief that behind our visible reality, there is a supreme divine harmony, the key to which is not an image, but mathematics. The architect Oud wrote to Mondrian in the

Boris M Kirikov, Barbara Kreis, Dietrich W. Schmidt, Juri P. Volcok, Igor N. Chlebnikov (eds.). Stuttgart: Verlag Gerd Hatje, 1997; Ivan V. Nevzgodin. Rossiysko-niderlandskiye arkhitekturnye svyazi pervoy treti XX veka v Uralo-Sibirskom regione. Phd thesis. Novosibirsk, 2002; Ivan Nevzgodin. *Het Nieuwe Bouwen in West-Siberië: architectuur en stedenbouw in de jaren 1920–1940*. Delft: Nevzgodin, 2004, 309–321; E. V. Konïsheva. Orsk i Magnitogorsk: naslediye "sotsgorodov" kontsa 1920-kh – pervoy polovinï 1930-kh godov na Yuzhnom Urale. *Arkhitekturnoye nasledstvo,* no. 52 (2010): 311–337.

summer of 1925 stating that the object should be expelled from art.[3] Therefore, Dutch functionalism began veering toward a radically reduced design. Iconoclastic hostility towards ornaments and details, among other things, resulted from the desire for a total control over the artistic process. But the history of the formation of an abstract visual language in Dutch architecture would be incomplete without mentioning the important role played by the Russian artist and architect El Lissitzky, who was one of the leaders of the Soviet avant-garde and a key figure in the history of Russian-Dutch cultural contacts in the 1920s.

El Lissitzky communicated regularly with van Doesburg in 1921–1922, participated in his training programme for the Bauhaus and in the arrangements for the Congress of Progressive Artists in Dusseldorf (1921). He was also involved in publishing. Thanks to Lissitzky, the Netherlands learnt about Kazimir Malevich's suprematist compositions, the potential of abstract geometry formations in a three-dimensional space, and elementarism, which according to Malevich presented "forms as moving signs." The concept of "projects for affirmation of the new," also known as PROUNs, was interpreted by Dutch colleagues as a new version of Berlage's *Gesamtkunstwerk*. In 1922, the *De Stijl* magazine dedicated a whole issue to Lissitzky followed by a special issue with reproductions of the architect's works.[4]

However, this interest in the Russian avant-garde was not limited to cooperation with El Lissitzky. In 1921, the Third Congress of the Communist International welcomed a delegation of Dutch artists led by Peter Alma. They met Vladimir Tatlin, Wassily Kandinsky, and Kazimir Malevich. In 1923, Alma brought the first Russian art exhibition from Berlin to Amsterdam. The Soviet architectural magazine *SA* (*Sovetskaya arkhitektura* – Contemporary art) published the work of Dutch colleagues, including the results of a competition for new standards of working-class housing.[5] In the summer of 1927 there was a large exhibition of modern architecture in Moscow, which included a lot of Dutch pieces, organised by the constructivist group OSA (*Ob'edineniye sovremennikh arkhitektorov* – Alliance of contemporary architects).[6]

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3 Harry Holzman and Martin S. James (eds.). *The New Art–The New Life: The Collected Writings of Piet Mondrian*. New York: De Capo, 1993, 198.
4 *De Stijl*, Amsterdam, no. 10–11, 1922, 82.
5 SA, Sovremennaya arkhitektura, no. 4–5, 1927, 142–147.
6 Christna Lodder, Maria Kokkori, and Maria Mileeva. *Utopian Reality: Reconstructing Culture in Revolutionary Russia and Beyond*. Leiden: Brill, 2013, 71.

Experiments conducted in the State Institute of Artistic Culture (Ginkhuk) in Petrograd/Leningrad and the Higher Art and Technical Studios (Vkhutemas)[7] in Moscow were in tune with the move into formalism by Dutch modernists. The first psychophysical laboratory was opened as early as 1921 at the Soviet State Academy of Arts. It was focused on issues such as the “Aesthetic perception of geometric figures and art paintings” and “The current state of colour transformation.” It was proposed that individuals perceive the dimensions of a room in different ways depending on the colour scheme. An issue of *Sovremennaya arkhitektura* (*Contemporary Architecture*) magazine published in 1929 was dedicated to this point. M. Ya. Ginzburg’s study “Colour in Architecture”, published in the collection, was based on constructivist explorations in this direction.[8] The aesthetic rationalism of the Soviet ASNOVA group (Association of New Architects) and analytical studies on perceptions of colour in architecture by members of the OSA (Union of Contemporary Architects) claimed that an architectural object was not only a volume that finalises a functional process, but also a work of art. The leader of the Leningrad constructivists, Alexander Sergeevich Nikol’skii emphasised, “A formal, that is, aesthetic assessment of an exterior form is a criterion of the functional method.”[9]

In the Netherlands of the 1930s, there was a clear disagreement between the disciples of traditionalism and functionalists. The theoretical foundation of the traditionalist movement (the Delft School) was provided by architect and professor at Delft University Marius Jan Granpère-Molière. In general, traditionalism arose from the achievements of Dutch architecture since the late Middle Ages. For functionalists, any return to or imitation of the past was unacceptable. The anti-historicism of the International style later led to tensions with the existing historical environments of European cities. Yet traditionalist approaches also prevented the harmonious development of the city because they did not take into account the impact of technical progress. Traditionalists were less obsessed with the new machine age because they believed that the primary aim was the restoration of the cultural significance of architecture. Following John Ruskin, they were looking for evidence of human experience in architecture. Traditionalists blamed their radical rivals for an excessive enthusiasm about technology. This

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7 GINHUK – State Institute of Artistic Culture, dealing with the questions of artistic culture’s theory and history in Petrograd, during 1923–1926. VKHUTEMAS – Higher Art and Technical Studios, Russian state art and technical school in Moscow. Opened in 1920, closed in 1930. From 1926 – VKHUTEIN (Higher Art and Technical Institute).

8 Sovremennaya arkhitektura, no. 2, 1929.

9 Archive of the State Russian Library. – Ф. f. 1037. – Д. d. 132. Л. l. 11.

sometimes morbid *neomania* was condescendingly regarded as a mistake and a frivolous fashionable trend.

Romanesque and gothic composition techniques and ornamental motifs evoked soothing nostalgic associations, intensified the religious feeling, and, no less important, created conditions for patriotic experience. Ironically, the national revival theme, beginning from the second half of the nineteenth century, was reinforced by the belief that new architecture would become a tool of exclusiveness, a symbol of a new path, a new life for the country. However, modernism, working at the borders of culture, both geographically and metaphysically, opposed the ethnocentrism of the classic era and elevated the concept of the *international* as culture-free. Hence European "neo-Gothic" and later also functionalism, soon known as the International Style, became international trends.

Following the futurists, who taught European artists to cherish the inspirational technologies of the first machine era, the leaders of functionalism placed the latest mechanisms on a pedestal. Everything new and progressive was considered as the highest good. The traditional system of ornament and architectural decoration contradicted the expressive tectonic qualities of new technologies and building materials. This is why Theo Van Doesburg saw the phenomenon of spiritual discipline in all machines: "The new spiritual artistic sensibility of the twentieth century has not only felt the beauty of the machine, but also taken cognisance of its unlimited expressive possibilities for the arts…"[10]

In contrast, adherents of the traditionalist Delft School believed that humankind had suffered from a state of general spiritual attenuation and religious apostasy and, naturally, an obsession with the machine age was considered to be a symptom of such apostasy. Advocates of the ideals of the Contemporary Movement were also in a search of their "golden age", the only difference was that they expected it in the future. Both traditionalists and functionalists were exploiting moralising rhetoric to fight for their ideals.

At the same time, the dispute between the supporters of various theories provides exciting material to prove their paradoxical kinship. Both traditionalists and functionalists were united by the common maxims of early modernism. In the 1910s and 1920s, the dream of a new world and the need to clean up old urban spaces was regarded as the main purpose of architecture, incorporating the expansion of historical cities and the construction of housing for socially unprotected citizens. Modernism as a movement began with these slogans, inherited from the romantic tradition of the nineteenth century.

10 Quoted in Reyner Bahnam. *Theory and Design in the First Machine Age*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1980, 151.

The relationship between the schools of traditionalism and functionalism in the Netherlands was paradoxically close to the situation in the USSR. The grandiose discoveries of Russian avant-garde art on the eve of the 1917 revolutions brought together a relatively narrow circle of like-minded people. The constructivist breakthroughs that came afterwards were possible due to far-reaching political and social reforms. While the 1920s was the period of influential constructivist experiments, the 1930s was the time of extensive neoclassical and retrospective revival in Russia. The reason why constructivism and neoclassicism diverged was the famous 1932 resolution of the Soviet Communist Party "On the Reconstruction of Literary and Artistic Organisations". Soviet authorities attacked the architectural avant-garde, and the constructivists were accused of "formalism", a major transgression at the time. In contrast, the official route of architectural development was determined to be the "rediscovery" of classical heritage. Summarising the results of the architectural competition for the Palace of the Soviets in 1932–1934, the official focus of architecture turned to learning from the classical heritage. Giving up the opportunity for an ongoing search was perceived as a tragedy by many artists. At the same time, the practices of this transition period, crucial for Soviet architecture, shows that contradictions had existed long before 1932.

Perhaps the most telling example of these contradictions can be found in the specifics of the new architecture in Leningrad. The development of Petrograd/Leningrad constructivism largely depended on the ideas which had already impassioned local artists and architects in the 1910s. It was not just about grandiose discoveries of the Russian artistic avant-garde. The architecture of Saint Petersburg was greatly influenced by Neoclassicism, a movement opposed to Art Nouveau and Eclecticism and interpreted by the architectural establishment as a way to preserve unique city ensembles.

Many architectural competitions of that time saw the triumph of a new Neoclassical elite: Andrey Belogrud, Yakov Gewirtz, Oscar Munz, Marian Peretyatkovich, Ivan Fomin and Vladimir Shchuko.[11] The retrospective character of the neoclassical tradition seems to be in contrast to the "neomania" of the pioneers of constructivism. However, the concept of the "Red Doric" ("proletarian classicism") of Fomin was about "purification" and concise lines, in some way close to the paradigms of constructivists. As such, the possibility of an unexpected symbiosis suggests that the architectural experiments of the early post-revolutionary decades were not only aimed at overcoming the artistic conventions of

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11 V. G. Bass. Peterburgskaya neoklassika 1900–1910-kh gg. Arkhitekturnye konkursy: zodchiy, tsekh, gorod. Saint Petersburg: "IPK NP-Print", 2005, 3.

the past, but also aspired to create a new universal creative method, a revolutionary transformation of man and the surrounding world. And then later, many of the Leningrad architects turned very easily back to retrospective styles in 1930s (or found themselves in the "conservative modernism" of Art Deco). Of course, one cannot draw a direct line between the classical heritage of Soviet art and Dutch traditionalism, but it is the case that several important trends in architecture stemmed from similar origins in the first half of the twentieth century.

Mutual Interests

The mutual interests of Soviet and Dutch avant-garde architects was based on more than the formal experiments of the International Style. There was also a common urge for idealistic social constructions and the use of architecture as the paramount tool for creating social well-being. In the first half of the twentieth century, architects were haunted by the fear of the city as shown in in *Metropolis* – a city that is uncontrollably expanding and destroying traditional human relationships. The towns seemed to be submerged in darkness, engulfed by the smoke of factories, filled with buzzing vehicles, crowded with multi-storied buildings, all swallowing masses of people. The genre of the city novel reflected this: *Stad* by the Dutchman Ben Stroman (1932) *Berlin Alexanderplatz* by the German Alfred Dublin (1929), and *Petersburg* by the Russian Andrei Bely (1913). A gloomy anti-utopian forecast drove architects to draw up plans to save the cities by applying universal rules for a new life. They were convinced that modern planning and well-designed interiors positively affected the emotional state of man and society as a whole. Society itself (*Gesellschaft*) was interpreted as an artificial union where people were unaffected by "relationships of mutual affinity," and this should be transformed into a new, superior form of community (*Gemeinschaft*).[12] Socialist ideas took the form of a new religion, treated not so much as a political doctrine but as a new aspiration. We find a similar programme led by the leader of the Delft School Granpré-Molière. The architect appealed to the "Golden Age" and the classical tradition of church architecture, as he dreamed of a cultural revival where Catholicism and socialism would become the main strongholds of a new Renaissance. In the discussion about future town planning, traditionalists adhered to the concept close to the British version of the "garden city". Their rivals relied increasingly on the idea

12 Ferdinand Tönnies. *Community and Association*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955, 87.

of functionalist planning (although the line between the two camps, especially before the 1930s, should be made very delicately).

In the Netherlands, the first projects of social housing were created under slogans such as The Promised Land by architect Michel de Klerk (1908).[13] De Klerk was co-originator of the famous Spaarndammerbuurt complex in Amsterdam, built with the patronage of the Social Democratic leadership of F.M. Wibaut and Salomon de Miranda. However, many experiments did not proceed from the drawing board, being too ambitious. The situation in the Soviet Union was similar, with the first steps having been made well before the revolution by industrialists and philanthropists such as Alexander von Stieglitz and Emmanuel Nobel. Following the revolution, one of the main problems was the lack of residential apartments for the new citizens and workers pouring in from the villages. Soviet artists and architects hoped for fundamental social reforms and believed that the new art was a prerequisite for the emergence of a new personality and a happy future. To promote "the socialist way of life", a special role was given to housekeeping, cultural work, and physical activity. New typologies of building were proposed: public pavilions, entertainment centres, palaces of culture, and factory kitchens. There was above all a high demand for standardised dwellings for workers.[14]

In the 1920s, both Dutch functionalists and Soviet constructivists hoped to conduct large-scale, unprecedented social experiments. Before World War II, however, it was hard to find ideal conditions that would have enabled Dutch architects to work "from scratch" and on a scale they dreamed of. Neighbourhood units for workers and the middle class such as those of Kiefhoek by Jacobus Oud in Rotterdam were a rare exception. Meanwhile in the Soviet Union the number of urgent tasks and the necessity for urban planning was pressing. Therefore, Soviet authorities invited foreign architects to implement their experiments in the USSR.

"We are Soviet architects" was how German architect Hannes Mayer passionately identified himself and like-minded colleagues who travelled from Europe to the Soviet Union at that time. Dutch architects Johannes van Loghem (1926), Mart Stam (1930), Lotta Stam-Beese (1930), and Johan Niegeman (1931) all made the journey, confident that they would contribute to the emergence of a new world. Dutch and German architects worked on standard residential

13 The first measures to support social housing were already arranged in 1901. See: Cor Wagenaar. *Town Planning in the Netherlands since 1800.* Rotterdam: nai010publishers, 2011, 210.

14 Evgeniya V. Konysheva. European architects at construction sites during their work in the USSR during the first five-year periods (day to day life). *Architecton: proceedings of higher education*, no. 32 (2010) http://archvuz.ru/2010_4/9.

neighbourhood units for workers in Magnitogorsk and other cities of the Urals and Siberia.

Fig. 1: Architects in front of the building site, Magnitogorsk. Circa 1932. Source: The Netherlands Architecture Institute (Het Nieuwe Instituut) collection (hereafter HNI), NIEG ph 232

In 1926–1927, van Loghem twice went to Siberia on the invitation of the Dutch communist and engineer Sebald Rutgers. Van Loghem designed Kemerovo as a "functional town" for 250,000 residents, preparing for the project by collecting statistical and demographic data, calculating the required number of square metres and the necessary availability of public facilities. His colleague Mart Stam, who came to the USSR as part of Ernst May's team from Frankfurt in 1930, developed projects for Magnitogorsk (1930–1931), Makeyevka (1932–1933) and Orsk (1933–1934). Johan Nigeman developed a large number of projects for Magnitogorsk and Kislovodsk (1934–1936).

While Van Loghem's proposed, functional urban environment for Kemerovo (Scheglovsk) for 250,000 citizens was never developed, it was van Loghen who

anticipated the concept of *sotsgorod* – soviet industrial city.[15] The first block-houses for miners in the Soviet Union were built according to his designs. Each unit was designed for one family and had a separate entrance, a very progressive idea for the USSR of the 1920s. Besides workers' settlements, there were also projects for recreational areas, health resorts, holiday hotels, but these were not carried out at the Ural or Siberian construction sites due to the prioritisation of residential neighbourhoods in the new industrial zones. These were all plans for creating functional cities with uncompromising social requirements. A persistent desire to reduce architecture to a strict formula, the sum of an abstract artistic experience and utopian rigorism, was based on the triumph of a "mystical cosmos" and "mathematical man".[16] El Lissitzky and Mondrian pursued the possibility of space-perspective transformations, and these parts of the functionalist doctrine led to drastic alterations of Dutch cities after World War II.

This rigorousness of architects trying to reduce architecture to a functional, limited geometrical abstraction did raise doubts at the time, and not only among traditionalists. Raymond Unwin drew attention to the fact that the essence of human existence was a *multisided* relationship between social and private spaces, where the private should always remain unique and inimitable: "Number 5062 in a straight 10-mile street is quite a vague type of house."[17] Housing blocks appeared line by line like endless ranks in a military parade. Mondrian himself commented in the first issue of *De Stijl* magazine that the life of contemporary man is gradually moving away from nature and becoming more and more "a-b-s-t-r-a-c-t".[18] These criticisms would take almost 40 years to gain ground in the Netherlands, and until that time, the minds of the architects remained in the grip of grand aesthetic and social utopias. Furthermore, they believed that the reason for their projects in the Soviet Union during the 1930s being unsuccessful was solely due to the Soviet political and economic system.

Nevertheless, the Dutch style was still given serious attention, as demonstrated by the 1932 exhibition of Contemporary Dutch Art held in Moscow,

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15 Ivan Nevzgodin. Novaya vekha mezhdunarodnogo fronta: rossiysko-niderlandskie arkhitekturnye svyazi 1920 – 1930. In *Architecture the Dutch way: 1945 – 2000*. Saint Petersburg: The State Hermitage Museum, 2013, 41.

16 The quoted concepts are from Rietveld's ode to the painting by Giorgio de Chirico in 1920. *De Stijl*. Leiden, no. 5, 1920, 46.

17 Conférence Internationale de l'aménagement des Villes, Amsterdam, 1924. Deuxième Partie. Compte rendu. Amsterdam, 1924, 19.

18 *De Stijl*. Delft, no. 1, 1917, 2.

Saint Petersburg and Kharkiv in 1932.[19] This show was organised by VOKS (The All-Union Society for Cultural Ties Abroad)[20] to promote the most progressive members of Dutch architectural modernism.[21] Functionalists dominated the exhibition, confirming their position as the ideological 'twins' for pre-1932 Soviet trends in architecture. The political views of the architects were not relevant for the organisers. Many Dutch architects shared socialist views but still worked in a traditionalist style and were not selected for the exhibition. Also, some, like van Loghem, were left out, despite their sympathy for the radical social reforms. The organisers focused on the new architectural typologies and bright images of the Modern Movement, with designs for schools (open-air school by Duiker, Montessori school by Groenewegen), prototypes for dwellings (standard blocks by van Esteren, Merkelbach, Karsten, Elling), sanatoriums (Duiker), sport arenas (Amsterdam Olympic stadium by Jan Wil), and industrial buildings (van der Broek, Van Tijen, van Esteren). Even bourgeois locations such as banks and private houses were shown (Brinkman, van der Vlugt). Thus, at the exhibition the audience were presented with the image of a new world that was to emerge in the Soviet republic, thanks to progressive architecture.

In fact the Soviet government wasn't interested in the ideology behind the Modern Movement. Instead, they desired quick and cheap results. That is why the most interesting projects were left unrealised. Planning new workers' cities, Dutch architects developed the entire living infrastructure including variable typologies for leisure time and public life – houses of culture, theatres, restaurants, stadiums, and playgrounds. The quick sketches for the restaurant in Kislovodsk from the Johan Niegeman archive are an example of this.

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19 In Saint Petersburg the exhibition took place at The State Hermitage Museum. Ekaterina Lopatkina and Ksenia Malich. To affect workers' minds and wills, especially with the architecture. On the history of "The Exhibition of Dutch Revolutionary Artists" in the Hermitage from 1932 – 1933. *Hermitage magazine*, no. 26, (2018), 72 – 77.

20 Ivan Nevzgodin. Perspective form the East: Rietveld's impact on the Soviet Union. In *Rietveld universe*, Rob Dettingmeijer, Marie-Therese van Thoor, Ida van Zijl (eds.). Rotterdam: Nai Uitgevers/Publishers, 2010, 224.

21 These included Johannes Brinkman, Johannes van den Broek, Jan Wils, Jan Duiker, Willem Marinus Dudok, Johan Groenewegen, Johannes Bernardus van Loghem, Benjamin Merkelbach, William van Tijen, Leendert van der Vlugt, Jan Emmen, and Cornelis van Eesteren.



Fig. 2: Restaurant in Kislovodsk. J. Niegeman. 1936. Source: HNI, NIEG 38.

An elegant cylindrical hall is almost flying above the hill slope. A glazed band cinctures the main volume, giving way to natural light filling the interior. A round stage for music performances is merged with a neat horseshoe-shaped bar rack. This was indeed a vision for the future, but these visions were perhaps too advanced for the time. Technical requirements in order to implement these sketches were high. Although the Modern Movement applied advanced technologies of reinforced concrete construction, buildings at new industrial sites were made from wood and bricks. Sometimes (like in Kemerovo), even the brick production had to be organised on site independently by the Dutch architects themselves. In these circumstances, Stam launched a “shock brigade” that gave classes about new European construction methods. To explain the construction technology for a block building, Niegeman used a specially designed mock-up.



Fig. 3: Instruction model of standardised housing for Soviet builders, Magnitogorsk, J. Niegeman. Source: HNI, MAQV 152.

The general Soviet public (supposed to be the main agent of the “new world”) neglected the constructivist experience as it was associated with very poor architecture and rigid living conditions. The language of classical order was much more comprehensible to them. Avant-garde was the best “new speak” of revolutionary propaganda. But as soon as the consequences of the

civil war were overcome, the officials made their choice in favour of more understandable classical instruments.

While in the USSR, Dutch architects lived and worked as ordinary Soviet architects, in cramped workshops with no place to store drawings and lacking sufficient office supplies. Critical responses to the Dutch projects had started appearing in the Soviet press in 1931–32. One Soviet official complained that for the Niegeman project for mass housing in Magnitogorsk[22] “the constructive part is absolutely undeveloped”, labelling it an impractical programme.


II) Планировка квартир в 2 и 4 комнаты менее удачна, особенно в 4х комн. квартире при наличии проходной комнаты.

III) Ввиду того, что в проекте совершенно не разработана конструктивная часть, и отсутствуют статические и теплотехнические расчеты и, что особенно важно для крупно-блочного строительства – отсутствует план организации работ, – проект подлежит дальнейшей разработке.

10/IV 1933г.

Заключение

к предложению т. Нигемана

по крупно-блочному строительству.

Fig. 4: Soviet functionary’s conclusion on Niegman’s project for housing for workers in Magnitogorsk. 1936. Source: HNI, NIEG-28.

By the mid-1930s, Dutch architects were giving up on their hopes and leaving the Soviet Union. Some architects left upon realising that low standards in the construction industry and poor infrastructure would never allow them to turn their ideas into reality. Some had to leave the country because of the ever-growing suspicions of Soviet society and the increasingly conservative reaction to all

22 Het Nieuwe Instituut. NIEG-28.

post-revolutionary experimental trends.[23] Mark Stam was accused of anti-Soviet activity, because he had considered Alma-Ata unsuitable for living, and refused to design anything for this territory. In 1934, he was sent by the Soviet Architects Union to London to prepare for the CIAM (Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne), but he was immediately arrested by Scotland Yard and deported to Rotterdam.[24]

Back from the USSR

Having returned to the Netherlands, these architects continued to pursue their plans. Stam sat on a jury for cheap housing for workers in Amsterdam (1936) and called for research on families' demographic composition and daily behaviour in "A scheme for apartment dwelling time distributed between family members," a document very similar to the well-known "Life schedule in the commune house" (1928–1929) of Soviet architect N. S. Kuzmin.[25] Until the end of his life, Stam had with him two copies of the book *Architecture: Works of VKHUTEMAS Faculty of Architecture 1920–1927*, designed by El Lissitzky and published in Moscow in 1927. In turn, Niegeman influenced the next generation of architects through teaching at the Instituut voor Kunstnijverheidsonderwijs (IVKNO, in 1968 renamed the Gerrit Rietveld Academie).

World War II did not put an end to their visionary dreams. On the contrary, it further exacerbated a painful sense of imperfection in the surrounding world and a desire to escape beyond the limits of traditional architectural discourse. In the words of one researcher of post-war Europe: "the greater the tragedy, the brighter the idea of paradise."[26] The overall enthusiasm prevailing in the Netherlands after the war was associated with expectations of an impending happy future, coupled with efforts to forget the tragedies as soon as possible. The government strengthened these public sentiments through propaganda. The ruins were reminders of the need to create a new world. A large number of photos taken in the late 1940s captured children playing on piles of bricks

23 M. G. Meerovich, Ye. V. Konïsheva, and T. Fril'. Kritika deyatel'nosti Ernsta Maya v SSSR. *Arkhitekton: izvestiya vuzov,* no. 37 (2012): http://archvuz.ru/2012_1/12
24 Ivan Nevzgodin. Novaya vekha mezhdunarodnogo fronta: rossiysko-niderlandskie arkhitekturnye svyazi 1920–1930, 43.
25 N. Kuzmin. Problema nauchnoy organizatsii bita. *Sovremennaya arkhitektura*, no. 3, 1930, 15.
26 Bogdan Tscherkes. "We Want to Eliminate All Traces of the War." Post-war Reconstruction in Soviet Posters. In *Happy Cities and Public Happiness in Post-War Europe,* Cor Wagenaar (ed.), 33. Rotterdam: nai010 publishers, 2004.

and construction waste as a symbolic image of youth "sprouting" from the wreckage of the past.[27]

For European architecture, the decades from the mid-1940s to the 1960s were a period of exceptionally complex demands and tasks. Cities were ruined, historical monuments destroyed, millions of people left homeless, and for many European countries economic recovery, industrial expansion and political stabilisation were questions of utmost importance. The period is usually called the Reconstruction.[28] Although this term does not usually have any artistic connotations, it is a suitable notion to explain the methods of the post-war architectural programmes. These expressed a common ideology that determined the development of post-war architecture. The experience of Dutch architects was quite peculiar in this respect. For the Netherlands, the period of Reconstruction turned out to be a time of significant and rapid change. A successful economic strategy, incorporating a strong focus on the industrial sector, laid the foundation for a "new nation". Reconstruction, especially at its final stages in the 1960s, is associated with the country's heyday.[29] Politically, the post-war period was influenced by ideas of a welfare state, and the government of Willem Drees produced major plans for the implementation of large-scale urban recovery projects. The Netherlands is essentially on man-made land: five thousand polders, the result of a reclamation system practiced for centuries, plus many docks and harbours. Centralised control over urban planning and coordinated decision-making proved useful after World War II in order to restore the country.

Dutch Reconstruction involved the most consistent application of approaches that were already proposed before the war, enabling the realisation of grandiose projects and the transition from the old to the new, which architects had dreamed of in the first half of the twentieth century. These conditions had partly been present in the Soviet construction projects of the 1930s. In their fantasies, functionalist architects invariably wanted to create an ordered space with stable regulation of both the environment and time – exactly what they had suggested for the new Soviet industrial cities. In this regard, the example of Rotterdam, destroyed by German bombing in 1940, is telling. The discussion of the city's reconstruction project was emotionally charged, with some comments ignoring sensibilities, like "Rotterdam had 'the privilege' to have been bombed!"[30]

27 Cor Wagenaar. Ruins. In *Happy Cities and Public Happiness in Post-War Europ*e, 27–31.
28 Alan S. Milward. *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, 16.
29 Sita Radhakrishnan. *Welfare Services in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.* New Delhi: Northern Book Centre, 1992, 46.
30 Geert Mak. *Amsterdam: A Brief Life of the City.* New York: Random House, 2010, 287.

Public officials mentioned that obsolete buildings, inherited from a less than exemplary past, could now be discarded.[31] Architect Samuel van Embden responded to the "Master Plan for Rotterdam Reconstruction": "Do you realise, people of Rotterdam, that many of the fondest memories of what was lost during the May days [of 1940] were intrinsically connected to what were, in fact, merely deficiencies of our old city? ....we will have to create an entirely new, well-fitting garment."[32]

To dismantle the ruins, forget the terrible past, start a new life, build the future: the paradigm seems absolutely clear and consistent during the restoration period following World War II. However, in the same period, the restoration of other destroyed Dutch cities such as Middelburg, Rhenen, Groningen, and Nijmegen was very different. In those locations, the lost monuments were recreated and carefully restored. In the course of restoration, traditionalist architects again brought up the question of a need to return to the ideals of the "Golden Age" in Dutch architecture. Sometimes, during the restoration of historical buildings, details from that golden past emerged that had not existed before, but were associated with the "golden" heritage. Thus, the idea of control as a guarantee of a flawless execution of the author's will was a core argument in early modernism in architecture. It was not only popular among functionalists, but also among those who promoted the Delft School's traditionalist ideals. The belief in an ability to create a Wagnerian *Gesamtkunstwerk* required a "tabula rasa" situation, where nothing could interfere with the realisation of the architect's plans.

Architecture Serving Social Engineering

If in the 1940s, general city-building problems and industrial growth were the focus of attention, by the early 1950s, the lack of housing stock became the most acute problem. The government did not give complete control over this sector to private investors. It wanted to avoid an increase in property prices and therefore all municipal housing was subsidised by the state budget. In the Netherlands, the post-war baby boom was the highest in Europe: 20 percent population growth against 7 percent in Europe in general. As a result, between 1950 and 1995, the country's population more than doubled.[33] A rapid restoration of the

31 Cornelis van Traa. Rotterdams nieuwe binnenstad. *Bouw*, no. 3, 1948, 206–209.
32 Kees Schuyt and Ed Taverne. *Dutch Culture in a European Perspective: 1950, Prosperity and Welfare*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 160.
33 Edward A. Cook, Jesus J. Lara (eds.). *Remaking Metropolis: Global Challenges of the Urban Landscape*. London and New York: Routledge, 2013, 160.

housing stock was only possible with the help of standardised serial production, while any mass housing, in turn, required approved norms and standards to calculate the cost of materials and labour forces.[34] Strict regulations on everyday life of town residents was typical for early modernist projects in the pre-war period. A typical experimental study, inherited from the time when Dutch architects used to work in the USSR, is an image of housing stock systematisation according to family composition (pic 8). The belief in the possibility of applying a common artistic formula to be embodied in new housing estates and the attempt to create conditions for a consistently happy and financially prosperous society turned into almost totalitarian techniques.

There was also a significant reappraisal of social values. Willem van Teijen, director of the Rotterdam Housing Department, wrote that the paradise on earth will come when each district has its own religious centre for all confessions, with social and teaching functions, involving the cooperation of all secular associations, non-governmental organisations, and medical facilities working with the young and the elderly.[35] For van Teijen, extreme individualism in a traditional city and the loss of contacts between its residents were the key problems in modern society. Architects had to reach a compromise between shared and private space, the city as a society and the house as a private area for each individual.[36] This rhetoric was close to pre-war Soviet discourse, as local architects had to develop new general plans not only for the new cities but also for an absolutely new way of life.

In the late 1940s, low-cost and pragmatic housing projects were assembled according to a special set of standards, from which local authorities and communities were able to choose options for their developments. Two-story buildings designed for one or two families were most common. New districts, built on the request of municipal authorities, grew very quickly. In Amsterdam alone, in the 1940s and 1950s, Lommer, Slotervaart, Osdorp, Hosenfeld, Bos, Pendrecht, Alexanderpolder, and Ommord were built up. Soviet veterans Mart Stam, Johannes Niegeman, and Lotta Stam-Beese participated in designing these famous experimental areas. Again, as before the war, the focus was on architecture as a tool for social engineering. Adapting the idea of a neighbourhood unit, Dutch architects tried at most to predict social interactions between mem-

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34 For example, the code “Instructions and recommendations for housing” (*Voorschriften en Wenken voor het ontwerpen van woningen*) was approved in 1951, but formulated already in the early 1940s by the Study group of housing architecture. (*Studiegroep Woningarchitectuur*).
35 A. Bos. *De stad der toekomst, de toekomst der stad: Een stedebowkundige en social-culturele studie over de groeiende stadsgemeenschap.* Rotterdam: Voorhoeve, 1946, 294.
36 Ibid.

bers of different communities and find ways to enable their integration. “The collective approach does not abolish the individual” was the signature-slogan under one of the images by Niegeman from 1946.[37]

Fig. 5: Communal block for singles and working couples, Amsterdam. J. Niegeman. 1946. Source: HNI, NIEG 54.

This project is very close to sketches made for Magnitogorsk in 1933 – simple low-rise buildings combined into several blocks assembled in lines, with very simple façades.

Industrialisation in the construction infrastructure and production of standard elements for the rapid development of new residential areas were essential parts of these large-scale government programmes. The earliest stage of this process can be most clearly seen in Pendrecht, one of the most famous experiments of the reconstruction era (image 7–8). Jacob Bakema and the Opbouw group, heavily influenced by Lotta Stam-Beese, put forward the idea of universal

37 Ivan Nevzgodin. Novaya vekha mezhdunarodnogo fronta: rossiysko-niderlandskie arkhitekturnye svyazi 1920–1930, 41.



Fig. 6: Housing for workers in Magnitogorsk. J. Niegeman. 1933. Source: HNI, NIEG. 28.

neighbourhood clusters (*wooneenheden*), similar to prints (*stempels*) which are infinitely reproduced and connected in various combinations.

The Opbouw members presented their concept at the CIAM conference in Bergamo in 1949. Designing a residential area, the authors tried to establish a universal urban hierarchy: from private apartments to a house, from the house to a quarter, from the quarter to a microdistrict and on to a megapolis. The city is formed around historical quarters, around which city regions centred on district public centres are organised. The same scheme is repeated at the level of neighbourhood units. The public area is in the centre of the Opbouw design for a neighbourhood cluster, and along the periphery there are low-rise elongated residential units. The district has an interconnected, well-developed infrastructure: schools, shops, cultural centres, everything to cater "from the cradle to the grave". The site would have low-rise, mid-rise and high-rise buildings, while the distribution of housing would not depend on social status or belonging to a certain social "pillar",[38] but the composition of a certain family. This scheme

38 Eng. *pillarisation*, Dutch. *verzuiling*). Pillarisation traditionally means the additional segrega-



Fig. 7: Preliminary research of different kinds of families for the design of Pendrecht, Rotterdam. Urban Development and Reconstruction Department, Rotterdam. 1948. Source: HNI, STAB d 18.



Fig. 8: Residential cluster in Pendrecht, Rotterdam. J. B. Bakema, and Dutch CIAM group *Opbouw*. 1949. Source: HNI, BROX t 4072.

went further and is already more complex than the Ural experiments of the 1930s, but at its base was the same idea of "microdistricts" as those applied in the Orsk general plan prepared by Mart Stam in 1933–1934.

It should be noted that the construction of new residential areas was not only for the outskirts of old cities, but also within the new man-made territories of drained polders where there had been no previous historical or landscape context. Before the war, traditionalist Pieter Verhagen tried to set standards for the developed lands in the Wieringermeer polder by calculating the width of roads and channels, the size of farmer plots, settlements and farms. Land unsuitable for agriculture was reserved for the greenbelt. Shortly after the war, most of the new residential areas were built up this way, and for the most part representatives of the Delft traditionalist school participated in this work. Despite its multifunctional tasks, the programme rested on the traditional structure of a pre-war Dutch village: about three hundred houses, three churches and

tion of society into communities of Protestants (Lutherans, Calvinists, Netherlands Reformed Congregations), Catholics, Socialists, and so on. The pillarised communities played a special role in citizens' life, as belonging to a certain pillar determined the key moments of everyday life (each group had its own schools, newspapers, churches, sports clubs, and cultural centres).

three schools depending on the number of local residents, a café-restaurant, a smith shop, a store, sports fields, a park and a cemetery.

Modernist groups such as Opbouw and De 8 received an outstanding opportunity to build an ideal modernist settlement in Noordoostpolder. The Noordoostpolder area (on the shores of the Ijsselmeer, a reservoir that was created in 1932 after the construction of the Afsluitdijk dam as part of the extensive Dutch sea defences plan) was drained, primarily in order to expand agricultural land. The Village of Emmelord became the administrative centre of this new community, and around it, based on a standard distance of 5 km for travel by bicycle or horse-drawn vehicle, other settlements were planned. The plots in the polder unsuitable for farming were allocated for forest areas. For the first time in Dutch residential construction, the decision was taken to build a separate village for workers and all the maintenance staff who were not directly involved in farming. The government assumed that there would be 50,000 farmers, agricultural engineers and small traders living in Noordoostpolder (10,000 in central Emmeloord and 2000 in peripheral villages).

The leading Dutch functionalists of the 1950s took part in the development of the village of Nagele: van Eyck and Rietveld, Bakema and van den Broek, Wissing and van Eesteren (33 participants in total). Niegeman and Stam were also included in the working team. Nagele became a manifesto of the modern settlement: social equality, standard accommodation modules, and residents' joint and active participation in public life. This was not only an example for suburbs and rural areas, but also for bomb-damaged cities where quarters were designed in historic centres. But Nagele, it turned out, was not a solution for a megapolis with a high population density. It was an attempt to implement a rather idealistic vision of the future, relying on schemes common to those elaborated in the 1930s for small working neighbourhoods. The architects tried to reach a compromise between the modern and traditional rural ways of life. There were almost no high-rise buildings; instead, space was provided for small private gardens, greenhouses and even chicken huts. Private cottages designed by Niegeman for Nagele, such as the Doctor's House, for example, repeated the scheme of "individual houses" that he proposed in 1935 for Magnitogorsk.

This is a very modest variation of a small, International style villa. The combination of two rectangular blocks (one single storey and one two-storey) made for a spectacular composition and perfect functional lighting. Yet this kind of detached house could not serve as a replacement for the lack of mass dwellings that the Netherlands had to solve in the 1950s. In new districts such as Noordoostpolder, municipal authorities also carefully selected future community residents, as the success of the "colonisation" of the newly drained areas entirely



Fig. 9: Doctor's House. J. Niegeman. 1953–1954. Source: HNI, BARB01.



Fig. 10: Individual house, type "D". March 25, 1935. J. Niegeman. Source: HNI, NIEG ph-110.

depended on farmers' experience and competences: the reputation of a family going after an exemplary house had to be impeccable.[39]

To prevent new tenants from "damaging" the architects' concept by bringing obsolete pieces of furniture and overloading apartments with non-functional and aesthetic objects, a special-purpose governmental training program was inaugurated. In 1948, in order to promote the new way of life that the happy and optimistic post-war Dutch society was moving forward to, the *Goed Wonen Stichting*

39 Cor Wagenaar. *Town Planning in the Netherlands since 1800*, 446–448.

(Good Life Foundation) was established. It promoted new ideas in design and home interiors – an art which, according to the foundation, every housewife should master. Helping townspeople to furnish their homes, where sometimes there was no space for their old bulky furniture, *Goed Wonen* arranged "show apartments" in new housing estates. Besides, it published an eponymous magazine covering issues of interior design and technical equipment for the modern home. The magazine dealt with everything that could be useful (and exotic): the history of interiors, traditions of Dutch households and even housing specifics among African tribes. It also included adverts for the latest advances in household appliances and gave advice on how to use such revolutionary innovations, such as a TV set or a vacuum cleaner. The foundation provided a kind of platform for cooperation between designers, artists, equipment manufacturers, and creative workshops.

Architects Mart Stam, Johan Niegeman, and Hein Salomonson worked together with the foundation. Many photo sessions were shot in new districts with happy new tenants and models posing for social advertising. The same methods would become popular in the Soviet Union at the end of the 1950s, when Nikita Khrushchev's fight against lush Stalinist neoclassical architecture began and a sweeping standardised dwelling programme was launched. There was even an operetta "Moscow, Cheryomushki" by Dmitri Shostakovich (1958) dedicated to life in cheap subsidised housing, followed by a movie, "Cheryomushki", shot in 1962 by Gerbert Rappaport. Khrushchev was not a fan of European functionalism. On the contrary, he was fighting against all kinds of abstraction and non-figurative art. His took rapidly arranging the production of cheap, mass dwellings as his main task. For this reason, in the mid-1950s the USSR again examined western architectural practices, but this time only for technical interest. During the latter part of the 1950s, the Soviet Union launched its own form of large-scale conveyer production of large blocks and elements needed for mass standard dwellings.

Not without reason, such an idealised and imposed "from above" method of allocation did not lead to the results that its creators had dreamed of. The creators of new residential areas tried to provide all kinds of care for their residents, but soon the projects faced criticism for a loss of a human dimension in simple everyday life. The typical unified residential quarters were criticised for their excessive monotony, with these reproaches being equally addressed to traditionalists and modernists. The residents moved to new districts from various places, causing them to be less bound by common traditions and habits, reducing joint social activities to lower levels than expected by the architects. The schemes of an ideal life were imposed from above too intensively. In the pursuit of the good for man, man himself was forgotten. Psychologists and sociologists pointed

out that the harmful effects of the living conditions in the new residential areas on human health were almost worse than those in the stuffy and cramped quarters of the old city, which modernists had fought so hard against. Health problems were often psychosomatic, caused by "specific environmental conditions".[40]

Varied Developments of Postwar Architecture

The experience of the post-war decades in the Netherlands showed that it was impossible to predict residents' behaviour, and it was even more difficult to inspire the required social life artificially through artistic techniques. As a result, by the late 1960s, a new generation of architects started to reject methods of social engineering. Most of the measures that the "Reconstruction generation" had promoted got rejected. The prospects for economic growth changed and the factors that were associated with progress and utopian hierarchy came under criticism. In this way the reconstruction programme was a way to overcome the elements of utopian philosophy and radical romanticism inherited from the art at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries up to World War II.

In the Soviet Union, the situation turned out to be slightly different. The housing stock was still a serious problem for several decades, and the house-building programme was carried out on a much larger scale. At the same time, there were almost no industrial opportunities to start large-scale construction until the late 1950s. In terms of approach, the International style was retrieved only after Nikita Khrushchev came to power. Yet, he was not an admirer of modernism, but was interested in the economic advantages of "simplicity". The search for an ideal neighbourhood unit ("microdistrict") began in the period of "rediscovery" of classical heritage. In 1955, however, the famous Resolution of the Soviet Communist Party "On elimination of excesses in design and construction" was published. It led to the abandonment of classical instruments for the sake of the International style language. Again, there was no consensus regarding this new official stance among Soviet architects. While the younger generation was happy to join the Western architectural mainstream, their professors were very sceptical about this new turn, explaining that "order" was the real beauty that shouldn't be hidden. Interestingly, some of these conservative pro-

40 Cor Wagenaar. *Town Planning in the Netherlands since 1800*, 492.

fessors had been famous leaders of the constructivist movement, such as Armen Barutchev and Evgeny Levinson.[41]

The history of the 1950 – 1960s is an exciting field for future research when it comes to the perception of official statements and real architectural tastes of Soviet architects and ordinary people. But the most important lesson about the practice and preferences of the postwar International style is that it was much more varied than it was typically considered to be. Stylistic diversity both before and during the Reconstruction leads to the conclusion that these decades can be characterised by the recognition of possibilities for simultaneous development. Modernism began with slogans inherited from the romantic tradition of the nineteenth century, and as a cultural phenomenon, it is broader than the concept of the artistic method alone.

41 Olga Yakushenko. Soviet Architecture and the West: The Discovery and Assimilation of Western Narratives and Practices in Soviet Architecture in the 1950s–1960s. *Laboratorium*, no. 2 (2016): 84.

Annette Vowinckel

The Berlin Wall: Photographic Diplomacy in a Globalised World

On August 13, 1961, the government of the German Democratic Republic started the construction of a wall between East and West Berlin and shortly after between East and West Germany. Only weeks later, the West German news agency dpa (Deutsche Presse-Agentur) designed a mobile photo exhibit in order to show the hardships of the civilian population, especially in the Western parts of the former German capital. At the same time, the United States Information Service (USIS, the international pendant to the domestic USIA or United States Information Agency[1]) produced its own mobile photo show, presumably similar to the one produced by dpa. The German Federal Office of Information was responsible for the distribution of this show. Yet, it also bought five copies of the American version of the Berlin Wall exhibit[2] and closely cooperated with the USIS regarding the marketing and worldwide distribution of the two shows. The aim of the exhibits entitled “Die Mauer” and “Berlin: A Wall Divides a City” respectively was to generate sympathy for the West, especially for the civilian population of West Berlin, and to condemn the Soviet-backed East German policy of separation.

The two exhibits travelled to more than 40 West German and US embassies all over the world, and in some cases they were also shown in local cultural institutions. The majority of Western countries eagerly adopted one of the two shows, while the Soviet Union, Cuba, and China were naturally left out of the equation. In various non-aligned countries and former colonies, to which the shows were also offered, they stirred reactions that were neither consistent nor in any way predictable. While Pakistan and Bangladesh both accepted, Myanmar, Iran, Senegal, Hong Kong, Libya and Saudi Arabia turned down the West German exhibition for very different reasons.

Drawing on archival material, I first define the term *visual diplomacy* and argue that the Berlin Wall show is a striking example of a cultural-political tool in the context of the Cold War. In the second part, I attempt to reconstruct the German dpa photo exhibit – for which, unfortunately, there is no catalogue –

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1 For reasons of consistency I refer to the USIS, not to the USIA, in the context of the exhibition, although archival sources sometimes mistakenly refer to the latter in this context.

2 Internal Memo [Federal Office of Information] by IV/1 for I/1, 24 July 1962, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (in the following: BArch), B145/3266.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110573169-004

and its various trips around the world. Thirdly, I discuss a selection of comments by German diplomats, many of whom were based in non-Western countries, among them non-aligned and post-colonial states that refused to show the exhibit for various reasons.

In the fourth and last part of this chapter, I speculate about the possible shape an East German counter-exhibit to the West German and American shows could have taken – and this may need some explanation. From a Western perspective, there was an absolute consensus that the East Germans, by building a wall, violated Human Rights, international law, and common sense. Yet my small experiment may demonstrate what kind of images a counter-exhibit – had it existed – could have displayed. Naturally, my intention is not to condone the construction of the Berlin Wall or to diminish the hardships it forced on the population, let alone take sides in a conflict that has long since become history. The idea is simply to show that there were different perspectives on what happened in August 1961 and only one was represented in the Western visual diplomacy campaign.

I will conclude by arguing that for both the USIS and the West German Federal Office of Information – two major players in the field of Cold War cultural diplomacy[3] – a photo exhibit was a perfect medium for displaying what seemed like documentary evidence while the Eastern Bloc had good reasons to qualify these photo shows as visual propaganda. Nevertheless both the Eastern and the Western "propagandists" (a term that both sides used in order to describe their own activities) helped establish a new kind of visual diplomacy in order to enforce their respective positions in the context of the on-going Cold War.

Cold War Visual Diplomacy

The term "visual diplomacy" leans on the term "cultural diplomacy," which was coined by US government institutions during the Cold War in order to label activities abroad that were not military, political, or conventional diplomacy. The largest state-funded American institution practicing cultural diplomacy was

3 For the history of the USIA and the German Federal Office of Information see Nicholas J. Cull. *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency. American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy 1945–1989.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Martin Morcinek. Von der Pressestelle zum Informationsdienstleister. Das Bundespresseamt zwischen Politik, Medien und Öffentlichkeit. In *Handbuch Regierungs-PR. Öffentlichkeitsarbeit von Bundesregierung und deren Beratern*, Miriam Melanie Köhler, Christian H. Schuster (eds.), 49–71. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006.

the USIA/USIS. Its task was "to understand, inform and influence foreign publics in promotion of the national interest, and to broaden the dialogue between Americans and US institutions and their counterparts abroad."[4] One of its most important projects was the radio station *Voice of America*, which was set up in 1942 to offer information about the course of World War II and which communicated Western perspectives to citizens in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.[5]

In a similar fashion, I would define "visual diplomacy" as the sum of visual activities that enhance sympathy and understanding for one state or community in the territory or in the sphere of influence of another state or community, based on the exchange or distribution of paintings, posters, illustrated magazines, photo books, exhibitions, graphic novels or any other visual media. Visual diplomacy is not a modern phenomenon; we can, for instance, identify earlier forms in the practice of exchanging paintings in order to prepare a marriage, which would in turn strengthen the ties between aristocratic families in early modern times.[6] More recent forms of visual diplomacy are practiced by nation states that prepare, for example, illustrated magazines in the language of another country in order to enhance tourism or cultural exchange; the Japanese magazine *Front* (published in English, Spanish, French, and German) and the British *Anglia* (in Russian) could here serve as examples.[7]

Although not a modern invention, visual diplomacy – as part of public or cultural diplomacy – saw a real boom during the Cold War. Its main protagonists were the USIS and the West German Federal Bureau of Information, along with institutions like the British Foreign Office, the Alliance Française, Soviet VOKS or the German Goethe Institutes. The particular agenda of Cold War visual diplomacy was to visually communicate a certain policy, ideology, way of life, and social imaginary by circulating pictures, often in combination with text. On the face of it, this communication addressed the "opposing" bloc – Capitalist or Socialist

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4 USIA: An Overview. http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/oldoview.htm#overview, 31 August 2017.

5 Cf. Arch Puddington. *Broadcasting Freedom. The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003; Simo Mikkonen. Stealing the Monopoly of Knowledge? Soviet Reactions to U.S. Cold War Broadcasting. *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 11 (2010) 4: 771–805.

6 Cf. Everett Fahy. The Marriage Portrait in the Renaissance, or Some Women named Ginevra. In *Art and Love in Renaissance Italy*, Andrea Bayer (ed.), 17–28. New York et al.: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2008.

7 Cf. Sarah Davies. The Soviet Union Encounters Anglia: Britain's Russian Magazine as a Medium for Cross-Border Communication. In *Beyond the Divide. Entangled Histories of Cold War Europe*, Simo Mikkonen, Pia Koivunen (eds.), 218–234. New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2015.

respectively. At the same time, visual diplomacy was a means to enforce the support of domestic groups inside the own bloc and to provide an agenda for potential critics. The resulting visual narratives were intended to demonstrate the superiority of the displayed political system by using "soft" arguments, for instance by showing cultural assets, cityscapes and consumer goods.

Even though, in theory, any picture could be used in this context, Cold War visual diplomats often chose to work with photographs and stressed their documentary quality. Photographs allegedly showed the world "as it is", not as it should be in order to match a certain program or ideology. This is crucial because there is an enormous difference between saying "we have produced wonderful washing machines" and showing a picture of a wonderful washing machine in a trade fair or in a private house; Khrushchev's and Nixon's Kitchen Debate, or more precisely the pictures framing the actual meeting, would be a case in point.[8]

At the same time it is obvious that only certain aspects of the world "as it is" would ever make it into a book or exhibition while pictures documenting poverty or mismanagement would be suppressed. Without this control, the idea of positively shaping an image would be obsolete. In fact, the construction of the Berlin Wall and the exhibit it prompted is a good example of how visual diplomacy played with what is and what is not shown in a public space.

Die Mauer – A Photo Exhibit Designed by dpa

My description of the Berlin Wall photo exhibit is based on two files from the German Federal Archives in Koblenz that include several hundred pages of correspondence, a few newspaper articles reviewing the exhibit in various places and a script listing 95 photographs to be mounted on 21 movable walls.[9] Unfortunately no catalogue came with the exhibit, and documentation, aside from the files in the Federal Archives, is scarce. The German *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), for instance, published only a single report about the exhibit in Santos (Brazil), summing up that "The Berlin Wall severely damages communism's prestige."[10]

8 Cf., for instance, Cristina Carbone. Staging the Kitchen Debate: How Sputnik Got Normalized in the US. In *Cold War Kitchen. Americanisation, Technology, and European Users*, Ruth Oldenziel, Karin Zachmann (eds.), 33–58. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009.

9 Fotoausstellung "Die Mauer" von United States Information Service (USIS) und Deutscher Presse-Agentur (dpa), BArch, B145/3266 and B145/5299; both files have no pagination.

10 Die Mauer in Santos (The Wall in Santos). *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 October 1962, 2.



Fig. 1: Photo Exhibit "The Wall". Source: United States Information Service (USIS) and Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa), BArch, B145/3266

An image shows some of the movable walls set up in the middle of a room. There is, however, no evidence regarding where this photo was taken. Judging by the interior (heating bodies, lamps, carpet, design of the ceiling) the picture shows a room somewhere in Europe or North America, maybe even in the Federal Office of Information in Bonn or in the USIA headquarter in Washington, DC. In this picture we can distinguish 16 to 17 photographs mounted on ten panels that are arranged in zigzag shape. More images are displayed on five horizontal plates that link the vertical walls at the lower ends and make them look like open booths. One very large photo covers two walls entirely (second booth from the left), others are smaller and appear like a collage (middle booth).

The subjects of the photographs range from the Brandenburg Gate to squads of soldiers, border scenes with barbed wire, a watchtower and a view over Potsdamer Platz, which had been a lively place in the very centre of Berlin before the construction of the wall turned it into wasteland. On two horizontal boards maps of Germany (far left) and of the city of Berlin (second from left) can be seen. We can vaguely guess that the former image shows a divided Germany within the borders of 1937, paradoxically locating Imperial Germany, the Federal Republic and the GDR on a single map – I shall address this later.

Taking this picture as a starting point, I tried to identify the photographs on display, yet this proved to be a difficult enterprise. Although it was easy to find hundreds of photographs taken during the construction of the Wall, I could only

identify one of the pictures in the exhibit, namely a view of Potsdamer Platz (image 2), which was taken by a photographer of the Associated Press (AP). The photograph is not the exact photo in the exhibit, yet it is clearly part of the same series since it is unlikely that another photographer would have taken a picture from the same odd angle as the one chosen for the exhibit. The photo is captioned: "The Wall cripples the city. These tracks, once guiding streetcars loaded with Berliners, now lead nowhere".[11] This AP photo taken at Potsdamer Platz was, however, the only one I could identify beyond doubt.[12]

Lacking identifiable images, I turned to the exhibition script again and tried to find photographs that at least come close to what was on display in 1961. In fact I found more than a dozen images that match the script quite well. The caption for photo no. 35/panel 10, for instance, reads: "Watchtowers, reminders of Concentration Camps," and there is a picture of a watchtower on the far right panel in the photograph mentioned above (image 1). Picture Alliance provides a photograph showing a very similar watchtower, which, however, stems from the archive of ADN-Zentralbild, the GDR's official and state-funded photo agency (image 3). It is quite likely that the exhibit picture was taken from a Western perspective, while this photo was taken from an Eastern perspective. Nevertheless, both show a similar if not the same watchtower.

Photo no 19/panel 6 is very easy to identify although it does not appear in image 1. The caption reads: "A 19-year old East German Sergeant, the first of 500 guards, jumps to freedom." This one is most certainly the famous picture of the East German policeman Conrad Schumann jumping over a roll of barbed wire separating the Soviet from the French sector of Berlin. Peter Leibing, a photojournalist for Conti Press in Hamburg, took the picture in August 1961, and it

11 Script for exhibition: 1, BArch, B145/3266.

12 Searching for the photos that we can identify in the exhibit, I first consulted the archive of dpa, one of the leading German news and news photo agencies, which, according to the files, also produced the 1961 exhibit. Today, dpa's stock is part of Picture Alliance, a photo agency founded in 2002, which also markets the archives of several other German and international agencies including AP. I further searched the online collections of the German Federal Archives and the Federal Picture Agency (Bundesbildstelle), which holds, among others, the records of the Federal Office of Information. I searched the online collections of the USIA/USIS at the National Archives, the Berlin state archive (Landesarchiv) and commercial agencies like Getty, Ullstein Bild, and Archiv für Kunst und Geschichte (akg). Since some of the images may not appear in digitised collections, it would be necessary to check the analogue archives as well; this would take a lot of time, funds, and effort.

Fig. 2: View of Potsdamer Platz, where new wall cuts off the street car tracks from west to east in Berlin, 27 August 1961. Source: AP/Picture alliance, no. 51081238.

soon became an iconic image of the Cold War in general and the German separation in particular.[13]

Somewhat more difficult to identify is photo 24/panel 7: "The windows of apartment houses facing into West Berlin are walled off." Since there were many photographers working in Berlin in August 1961, there are probably dozens of pictures showing various houses that were being bricked up. I found one in the stock of Picture Alliance, which stems from the archive of dpa and could thus have been among those chosen for the exhibit (image 4). The dpa caption reads: "An East German mason is working on a window of a house located at the border on Bernauer Straße in Berlin, Oct. 1st, 1961."[14] A similar case is photo 29a/panel 8 in the script, showing "[w]ooden barriers above the Wall [that] deny even visual contact to the people of the divided city." The picture matches a dpa photo taken at the corner of Schwedter Straße and Gleimstraße on 12 October 1961, yet

13 Cf. Elena Demke. Mauerbilder – Ikonen im Kalten Krieg. In *Bilder im Kopf. Ikonen der Zeitgeschichte*, Stiftung Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (ed.), 109 – 119. Cologne: DuMont, 2009.

14 Picture Alliance, photo no. 22317961 (my translation). The photographer remains anonymous.

Fig. 3: Berlin – Watchtower Teltowkanal 1961. Source: ADN Zentralbild provided by Picture Alliance, no. 29362502.

it is not possible to find out whether this was the exact picture used for the Berlin Wall exhibit.[15]

A whole series of photographs for the Berlin Wall exhibit (nos. 56 – 63, panel 13) was captioned "People in West Berlin use every device to communicate with relatives in East Berlin." One of them could have been a picture showing three men and a woman climbing ladders in order to wave to their friends in the East (image 5).[16] Another one could be a picture showing a family in West Berlin waving (according to the caption) "white flags" towards their relatives in the East.[17] This picture looks somewhat funny and the family members are smiling and cheering; in contrast, a picture matching the caption for photo no. 64 (panel 14) stresses the tragic dimension of the separation, which divided not only two states but also many families in the former capital. The script reads: "Mother could not come to the wedding." This caption matches a photo taken by a UPI photographer in September 1961 (image 6) that shows a "tear-stained Gisela Grotzke who is leaning on her husband of a few hours' standing" and "waving her bridal bouquet towards her parents who are standing at a distance of maybe 200 meters on the Eastern side of the Wall."[18]

A scene supposedly shown in photos no. 80 – 82 on panel 17 was even more dramatic: "Communists in the upper window struggle to pull back a 77-year old woman but her West Berlin rescuers help her to the street." This description matches a dpa photo (image 7), which was captioned: "An elderly woman has climbed out of a window in order to get down to the street which is part of West Berlin. A few men try to pull her back into a house, while a man on a lower window sill is coming to her help."[19] There is no evidence in the picture on whether the woman (in the narrative and/or in the picture) made it to West Berlin or not; yet there was another photograph in the exhibit, which seemingly continued the narrative of the same or a very similar event. The script for photo no. 79 on panel 16 reads: "A wreath of mourning for a woman who leapt from her third-story apartment;" this caption matches a picture (image 8), which illustrated the USIA publication *Wall of Tears* – a brochure describing and illustrating the separation of the city of Berlin in 1961.[20]

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15 Picture Alliance, photo no. 26186172.

16 Picture Alliance, photo no. 943179; the photo is also offered by Archiv für Kunst und Geschichte (akg images), nos. AKG72523 and AKG2755783.

17 Picture Alliance, photo no. 22216452.

18 Picture Alliance, photo no. 1480234; the original stems from a UPI photographer.

19 Picture Alliance, photo no. 2401187 (my translation).

20 ARC_5663843_Wall-of-Tears-Beirut.PDF

Fig. 4: Windows in Buildings at the Border are being walled off, Berlin, 1 October 1961. Source: dpa/Picture Alliance no. 22317961.

According to the script the last panel was blank "for an individual city map", asking the audience to think about what "If this Wall were to cut across your city … ." It is clear that the aim of the exhibit was to emphasise the dramatic personal

Fig. 5: West Berliners climbing ladders at the Wall, Berlin, October 1961. Source: Picture Alliance no. 943170.

and social consequences of the separation and that the audience was supposed to identify with the population of West rather than East Berlin.

Fig. 6: Wedding Couple at Berlin Wall, 4 Sept. 1961. Source: unknown photographer for UPI, Picture Alliance no. 1480234.

Fig. 7: Wall Construction – Bernauer Straße – Refugees. Source: undated (Aug. 1961), dpa/ Picture Alliance no. 2401187.

Fig. 8: USIA, Wall of Tears (1961). Source: National Archives Washington, DC, http://research.archives.gov/description/5663843.

Reactions by German Ambassadors Abroad

The correspondence between the Federal Office of Information, which was responsible for the worldwide distribution of the show, and the German embassies that launched it (or did not launch it) abroad gives us detailed insight into the needs, problems and complications emerging in various countries. In fact, not all embassies were expected to host the exhibit, and some refused for unexpected reasons. Undoubetedly, there were not exhibits in the embassies in socialist countries like the Soviet Union (the West German embassy re-opened in 1955) or Czechoslovakia and Poland, with which the Federal Republic did not yet have diplomatic relations in the 1960s.[21]

21 Cf. Hans Buchheim. *Deutschlandpolitik 1949–1972. Der politisch-diplomatische Prozeß*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1974, 149–150.

The most interesting partners for cooperation were without doubt the many member states of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which had been founded on initiative of the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Indonesian president Sukarno, and Ghana's president Kwame Nkrumah in 1956. One of the leading principles of the NAM was non-interference in domestic affairs and peaceful co-existence, which made it difficult for them to handle a photo exhibit so clearly partisan in the context of the Cold War.[22]

Bangladesh and Pakistan joined the NAM only later (in 1973 and 1979 respectively), and both countries showed the exhibit and marketed it in order to draw public attention.[23] In contrast, the German ambassador in Burma (today's Myanmar, a member of the NAM since 1961) telexed Bonn that "given Burmese neutrality, careful dosing was necessary in the field of public relations. Ambassador prepares launching the apolitical exhibit 'Children See Germany.' Since 'The Wall' has been treated excessively by our own and the American public relations institutions, I advise not to launch this exhibit in Burma."[24]

Likewise, the German ambassador in Teheran telexed Bonn: "events launched by foreign institutions in Iran, which might affect the country's relations to the Soviet Union, are generally seen critical by the Iranian authorities."[25] Although Iran, led by Shah Reza Pahlevi, did not join the NAM until 1979 the German ambassador in Teheran adopted the position of his colleagues in NAM member states. In March 1962, he wrote a telegram to the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic, in which he argued:

> Prime Minister Amini has taken our side outspokenly and repeatedly in speeches and interviews while visiting Germany. On return he published a press release in which he stated that the Berlin Wall was actually the wall, which separates the free man and the slave. (...) Amini's comments on the Berlin Wall have prompted a severe intensification of Soviet anti-Iranian propaganda and lead to massive personal attacks on Amini. There is no doubt that the Soviets would use the Berlin exhibit in order to sharply attack the Iranian govern-

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22 See, for instance: A. W. Singham. *The Nonaligned Movement in World Politics.* Westport, Connecticut: L. Hill, 1978; more recently: Nataša Mišković. *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi, Bandung, Belgrade*. London et al.: Routledge, 2014; Jürgen Dinkel. *Die Bewegung bündnisfreier Staaten. Genese. Organisation und Politik (1927–1992).* Berlin: de Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015.

23 Konsulat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Dacca an das Auswärtige Amt in Bonn, 17 October 1962, BArch B 145/5299.

24 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik in Rangun/Birma (Sell), Fernschreiben Nr. 22, 26 February 1962, BArch B 145/3266. Translations by the author.

25 Deutsche Botschaft in Teheran (Gehlhoff) an das Auswärtige Amt/Bundespresseamt Bonn, Fernschreiben, 28 February 1962, BArch B 145/3266 (lower case in original).

> ment or even officially protest against it. Soviet propaganda would at the same time have anti-German undertones and accuse the Germans of troubling Soviet-Iranian relations. Under these circumstances it seems doubtful that the benefit of the exhibit would outweigh its negative impact.[26]

On 5 March 1962, the German ambassador in Dakar sent a telegraph to the German Foreign Ministry, stressing the fact that Senegal (which did not join the NAM until 1964) was officially strictly neutral, even though its government showed great sympathy for the West Germans. If Senegal's government would display the Berlin Wall exhibit, it might see itself forced to support an East German equivalent as well in order to maintain its neutrality. The ambassador thus advised to abandon the idea of launching the exhibit.[27] Likewise, in 1962 the Senegalese government decided not to take part in the *Leipziger Messe*, East Germany's most important trade show.

The German consul general in the British colony of Hong Kong, in a similar fashion, argued that the British were "anxious to keep Hong Kong clear of any political activity, especially in the context of the Cold War, in order to not give China reason for complaints". The British government did not want a test case for other states like India and Indonesia that might want "to launch similar exhibits." In case the German foreign ministry insisted on launching the Berlin Wall show "the British would not oppose". The German ambassador argued, however, that the number of visitors would be low anyway, given the "political apathy of the Chinese population of Hong Kong."[28]

Dr. Beye of the German embassy in Libya (which, like Senegal, joined the NAM in 1964) declared that the country tried to "avoid anything that might encourage the countries from the Eastern bloc that maintained embassies there to launch their own propaganda." He particularly stressed the fact that the censorship office of the Libyan government had asked the embassy not to distribute the West German illustrated magazine *Berlin-Illustrierte* for "general political reasons" – it was obvious that he feared sanctions from the Soviets in case he seemed to lean towards the West.[29]

26 Telex from Teheran, no. 102, 22 March 1962, BArch B 145/3266.

27 Deutsche Botschaft in Dakar/Senegal (Reichhold) an das Auswärtige Amt, Fernschreiben, 5 March 1962, BArch B 145/3266.

28 Generalkonsulat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Hongkong an das Auswärtige Amt, 15 March 1962, BArch B 145/3266.

29 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik in Tripolis/Libyen (Dr. Beye) an das Auswärtige Amt, 20 March 1962, BArch B 145/3266.

The embassy in Beirut declared that the Lebanese foreign ministry generally rejected political exhibits.[30] The only feasible way to show the exhibit would be if the news agency dpa stepped up as its organiser. This suggestion, however, was rejected by the West German Foreign Ministry, which argued that as a consequence dpa's "image as a neutral source of information would be at stake in the Arab world."[31]

The most unusual justification for not showing the exhibit was that of the German ambassador in Saudi Arabia. He considered the show inappropriate because "the ban on images showing living creatures [was] still officially in effect."[32] Although images of human beings were published in newspapers, a photo exhibit would most likely not be accepted. This sounds like an awkward excuse, since the kingdom had long maintained close relations to the West. It is therefore difficult to judge whether the ban on images of human beings was a real cultural taboo or whether the Saudis just tried to remain neutral in this case – they had joined the NAM in early 1961. The fact, however, that a nephew of king Faisal actively intervened against the introduction of television in the gulf state in 1965 would indicate that a traditional ban on figurative images was still very influential. It is thus not altogether unlikely that parts of the ruling family really resented the photo show.[33]

In one case, the Berlin Wall exhibit did in fact stir trouble with Communist diplomats. The German embassy in Cyprus, independent since 1960 and a member of the NAM since 1961, displayed the show to the outspoken dismay of a Soviet journalist. As an employee of the TASS news agency he wrote a contribution for the Cypriot Communist paper *Haravgi* (*The Dawn*) and criticised the exhibit as an expression of "hateful anti-Soviet revanchism" and as an "attempt to draw Cyprus into Bonn's Cold War". The "Adenauer regime" was, as the author argued, "a superb member of the war-driven NATO, which has destroyed many peoples' right to freedom and sovereignty". Other nations in state of war –

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30 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik in Beirut/Libanon (Schwarzmann) an das Auswärtige Amt, 30 March 1962, BArch B 145/3266.

31 Auswärtiges Amt an das Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2 April 1962, BArch B 145/3266.

32 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik in Dschidda/Saudi-Arabien (von Richthofen) an das Auswärtige Amt, Ber. Nr. 141/62, 25 March 1962, BArch B 145/3266.

33 Cf. Alexander Bligh. The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participant in the Political System of the Kingdom. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17 (1985) 1: 41.

like, for example, Israel and Egypt – would "never dare to launch political 'exhibits'" in such a place.[34]

Likewise, although for different reasons, the Polish ambassador protested against the exhibit in Cyprus: He realised that the map displayed in the opening section showed Germany within the borders of 1937; unsurprisingly he was not amused.[35] In fact the map that we see on the far left of the image (image 1) is similar to – if not identical with – *Germany: Map of the Occupation Areas* (image 9), which marks the borders between the British, French, American and Soviet zones on German territory. Paradoxically it shows Germany within the borders of 1937, including formerly German territories in post-war Poland and the Soviet Union. These territories were only officially given up in the context of the Social Democratic *Ostpolitik*, a policy aiming at improving relations with the Eastern bloc in the early 1970s by accepting the post-war borders and intensifying communication.[36] Even though on the map in question the former German territories were labelled as "Polish territories" they still appeared to be part of a Greater Germany that had ceased to exist in 1945. And also, the outside border of 1937 is marked thicker than that between post-war Poland and the future GDR.

In hindsight it would have been more appropriate to exclude the Eastern territories entirely and to show the 1945 borders of Poland and the Soviet Union. Yet it is quite symptomatic that neither the dpa nor the Federal Office of Information, not to speak of the Foreign Ministry, had any objections to prominently displaying the map in 1962. (Even when I received my first school Atlas, which was edited and published in 1970, East Prussia was still marked as "temporarily under Russian administration."[37])

Archival files do not provide any evidence about the Federal Office of Information putting pressure on any embassy that refused to show the exhibit. In some cases, the staff proposed launching instead an exhibit about the "economic power of West Berlin with special regard to developing countries," which

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34 Die Ausstellung von Bonn, in: Haravghi, 20 June 1962, Übersetzung der Deutschen Botschaft, Anlage zu: Botschaft der Bundesrepublik in Nicosia/Zypern (Koenig) an das Auswärtige Amt, 12 July 1962, BArch B 145/5299.

35 Ibid.

36 Cf., for instance, Arne Hofmann. *The Emergence of Détente in Europe. Brandt, Kennedy and the Formation of Ostpolitik*. London et al: Routledge, 2007.

37 *Diercke Weltatlas*. Braunschweig: Westermann, 1970. 154th edition/66th edition of the revised edition of 1957: 20 – 21.

Fig. 9: Atlanta-Service Frankfurt/Main: Germany: Map of the Occupation Areas. Source: German Historical Museum, https://www.hdg.de/lemo/bestand/objekt/karte-besatzungszonen.html

would handle the political situation “en passant”.[38] An exhibit of this sort was held successfully in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan.[39]

Among the embassies and consulates that accepted the show were Cyprus, Turkey (Ankara and Izmir), Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, Cameroon, Pakistan, Kuala Lumpur, Bangladesh, New Zealand (Wellington and 15 other cities), and the United States.

From a photo in the file showing the exhibit in the former German colony Cameroon (image 10), we understand that here the exhibit was not displayed as movable elements but rather on the walls of a large room in the capital Yaoundé, which was specified as a 10 x 20 meter boxing hall in the accompany-

38 Afrikareferat des Bundespresseamtes (Hilgert) an das Auswärtige Amt, 27 March 1962, BArch B 145/3266.
39 Ibid.



Fig. 10: Photo showing the Berlin Wall exhibit in the former German colony Cameroon. Source: BArch B 145/3266.

ing letter. According to Dr. Döring, the author of the letter, the hall and its cement floor conveyed a "cold atmosphere corresponding with the aim of the exhibition." In order to further enhance this atmosphere of coldness, a 3 meters long and 1.8 meters high imitation of the Berlin wall with barbed wire on top was set up in the room. As we can tell from the photograph, the two maps of Germany (1937/1945) and Berlin (1945) by and large resembled those that the Polish journalist in Cyprus complained about.

Even though the show was open only for four days in April 1962, it was described a great success. Among the 20.000 visitors were president Ahidjo and many school children. An official report stated:

> Whenever the stream of visitors got too powerful the mobile movie theatre in the neighbouring boxing ground brought relief. Aside from the movies *German Football Players in Cameroon* and *Cameroon's Football Players in Germany* the cinema offered the movie *The*

> *Wall* – to the effect that even days after the exhibit closed young people came to the embassy in order to ask questions about it.[40]

In the context of the exhibition in Cameroon as well as in other countries, the embassies launched events featuring Cold War institutions like the Congress for Cultural Freedom, whose aim it was to fight Communist activities in the United States and worldwide, along with the Federal Office of Information, the German Foreign ministry and the USIS.[41] It was thus clear that the exhibit did not deal only with the individual hardships of Berliners on both sides of the wall; it was a weapon in the Cold War, which was fought not only with barbed wire and tanks but also with words and images. It was thus not surprising that Western capitalist states and their Allies were eager to display the Berlin Wall show, while Communist states and their Allies rejected it. For the rest, especially for the non-aligned states it was a matter of consideration: Which side would they prefer to offend? While Pakistan (at this time under military dictatorship and the world's first Islamic Republic) accepted the show, possibly in order to strengthen its ties to the political West, virtually all NAM member states rejected it and justified their decision with their very neutrality.

Berlin 1961: An Imaginary East German Counter-Exhibit

It is easy to understand why the West Germans and their American allies would be eager to show the hardships caused by the wall, and it is a historical fact that the show toured the world in 1962. Likewise it is somewhat surprising that the GDR did not react with an exhibit of its own – to the result that the Federal Republic has dominated the visual discourse until today. My aim here is not to unmask the Western exhibit as "propaganda" (even if contemporaries used the word in a rather positive sense) nor to politically judge the construction of the wall. Yet even in the absence of a contemporary exhibit we should not overlook the fact that the East German authorities designed their own and very different visual Wall narrative. It might thus be revealing to think about how an East German/Soviet exhibit would have looked like if it had existed.

40 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik in Jaunde/Kamerun (Döring) an das Auswärtige Amt Bonn, 4 May 1962, BArch B 145/3266.

41 Cf. Konsulat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Dacca an das Auswärtige Amt, 17 October 1962: 2, BArch B 145/5299.

In fact, Socialist countries did launch photo exhibits in order to communicate their view of the Cold War. In Russia, for instance, a recent exhibit named “Image Diplomacy”, curated by Anna Ilchenko for the Moscow Museum of Modern Art (MMOMA) in November 2017, has dealt with the photo shows that the Soviet All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) launched abroad during the Cold War.[42] It would obviously be worthwhile to compare these exhibitions to the Berlin Wall exhibition of 1961. However, lacking an East German counter-exhibit, I shall endeavor to describe a hypothetical exhibit, drawing on photographs circulated by ADN-Zentralbild in 1961.

In fact, there are plenty of photographs in the archives that would have suited such a venture. We may qualify them as “propagandistic,” as those who circulated them in the West did. Yet, the pictures taken from a Western perspective are “propagandistic” as well. Therefore, analysing the pictures from other perspectives enriches our understanding about how the Wall was perceived on each side.

First of all, an East German or Soviet curator would not have chosen a map showing the German borders of 1937, at least not without commenting on the fact that the former German territories in the East were now part of Poland and the Soviet Union respectively. After all, the East German government had early on accepted the loss of formerly German territories in Poland and the Baltic. Second, an East German official would have chosen pictures that underlined the “necessity” of the separation – for instance by depicting the wall as an “anti-fascist barrier” – and shown the positive aspects of life in East Berlin. Such pictures in fact circulated widely, be it in newspapers or magazines, or exhibitions like *Vom Glück des Menschen* (’Of Human Happiness’), shown in the GDR in 1967 as a belated counter-exhibit to Edward Steichen’s *Family of Man* exhibit of 1951, which was displayed in East Berlin in 1955 as part of a USIA-sponsored tour.[43]

Here are a few examples of the kind of images that an East Berlin photo exhibit could have displayed: On 13 August – the day the construction work started – Helmut Schaar took a picture for ADN-Zentralbild (image 11) showing a young man in a white shirt who distributed an extra issue of the regional newspaper *Leipziger Volkszeitung*. Three other young men and a middle-aged woman receive free copies. They all look cheerful or at least interested; the atmosphere conveyed is that of some dynamic youngsters spreading good news.

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42 Cf. http://www.vladislavshapovalov.com/Info 31 August 2017.

43 Cf. Sarah Goodrum. A Socialist Family of Man. Rita Maahs’ and Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler’s Exhibition “Vom Glück des Menschen.” *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History* 12 (2015) 2: 370 – 382.

Fig. 11: Helmut Schaar for ADN/Zentralbild: Distribution of an extra issue of *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, Leipzig, 13 August 1961. Source: BArch/Bildarchiv, no. 183–83561–0001.

On 15 August, another Zentralbild photographer took a picture at Heinrich-Heine-Straße in the city centre (image 12), showing a blond girl, maybe six or seven years old, and (probably) her mother and a few members of the East German police. Supported by her mother the girl is presenting a bunch of flowers to one of the policemen while two women in the background are chatting casually with the rest of the group. The message is clear: East German civilians thank their police for protecting them from western capitalism and imperialism.

On 23 August 1961, yet another Zentralbild photographer took a picture of three members of the border brigades playing chess (image 13). None of them is wearing a uniform and only the caption indicates that they are members of the border police. This picture shows three male professionals in an unprofessional setting, thus stressing their human and individual qualities rather than focusing on their vocational tasks – which could ultimately include shooting civilians at the border. It is especially striking that the men are playing. They have individual features yet at the same time they appear to be a group characterised by mutual trust, skill, and experience.

On 29 August, a Zentralbild photographer took a picture (image 14) of three men putting up a sign over the entrance of an apartment building stating: “Am

Fig. 12: Heidkamp for ADN/Zentralbild: East German civilians presenting flowers to policeman at Heinrich-Heine-Straße, 15 August 1961. Source: BArch/Bildarchiv, no. 183 – 85471 – 0001.

Fig. 13: Eckebrecht for ADN/Zentralbild: Members of the border brigades playing chess, 23 August 1961. Source: BArch/Bildarchiv, no. 183–85787–0009.

13. August gab's roten Pfeffer/für Brandt's Agenten und Riaskläffer" ("On 13 August we gave red pepper/to Brandt's agents and the barkers of RIAS" – Willy Brandt was the West German chancellor, RIAS (Radio im Amerikanischen Sektor) a West Berlin-based radio station and 13 August was the day on which the construction of the Wall began).

On 9 September 1961, Zentralbild photographer Heinz Junge documented a rally in Schwerin in the region of Mecklenburg (image 15). The picture shows thousands of East Germans standing in the local marketplace, holding flags (supposedly red, yet we cannot tell because it is a black-and-white photograph), portraits of Walter Ulbricht and two other persons who are difficult to identify (one could be Karl Marx), and a banner inscribed "II. Regiment FDJ Schwerin. Wir schützen unsere sozialistische Republik" (2nd FDJ Regiment Schwerin. We Protect our Socialist Republic.") The crowd appears to be watching and listening to a speaker who is probably standing next to the photographer in an elevated spot, probably a tribune, at the edge of a large open space. On the far right of the picture, some boys in shirts and ties who are not standing still can be seen; they may have been playing during the speech. Some people in the crowd – the majority of them male – are smiling and most of them look focused. There is

Fig. 14: Nosk/ADN-Zentralbild: East German citizens in Halle-Bitterfeld put up sign, 29 August 1961: “On 13 August there was red pepper / for Brandt‘s agents and the barkers of RIAS (Radio in the American Sector). Source: BArch/Bildarchiv, no. 183 – 85869 – 0001

virtually no sign of anything going wrong or of people opposing those on the tribune.

An East German counter-exhibit to the Berlin Wall show and a Soviet exhibition on poverty in the United States remains in the realm of fantasy. A counter-exhibit to the *Family of Man* show, however, was realised – possibly this was the lesson they learned from not reacting to the Berlin Wall exhibit in 1961. The East Germans quickly adapted to the idea of a Cold War visual diplomacy, which may not have been entirely new but which was adopted to meet the necessities of the on-going cultural Cold War.

Photographic Diplomacy

The Berlin Wall exhibition travelled across five continents and dozens of cities in 1962. It was produced by dpa, the leading West German news agency, in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Information. It was shown in embassies and major cultural institutions. It is therefore quite astonishing that it has been total-

Fig. 15: Heinz Junge for ADN/Zentralbild (East German Photo Agency): Rally at *Alter Garten* during local election, 9 September 1961. Source: BArch/Bildarchiv, no. 183–86198–0003.

ly forgotten: lacking a catalogue, it has stayed under the radar of historical research, yet it is a striking example of how visual diplomacy functioned in the heyday of the Cold War. Even though photography as a documentary medium always shows "what is there" it can be very manipulative – and the curators of the Berlin Wall exhibition knew that very well. Photographers can choose certain subjects and perspectives; they can focus on touching, scary or funny and cheerful scenes. Photo editors assign photographers not only by the quality of their work but also by their political views. Curators select images and neglect others; they create narratives, not least by adding captions that shape our perception. As long as a particular visual narrative is not balanced by a counter-narrative a photographic message is likely to be accepted.

Regarding the Berlin Wall exhibit of 1961, it is necessary to examine not only the exhibit, but also the various reactions and interpretations that it elicited in different parts of the world, as they are documented in the international correspondence. While West Germans and Americans as well as East Germans and the Soviets considered the antagonism between the superpowers and the division of Europe to be top priority, many non-aligned countries were eager not to offend either side while struggling with domestic social, economic and infra-

structural hardships. In fact, the "rest of the world" included a variety of views that did not correspond with either of the two superpowers and that helps us develop new perspectives on the Cultural and Visual Cold War.

Timo Vilén

"No More Memorials of War." Helsinki's Statue of Peace and the Struggle for Finnish Memory

In Helsinki's Eteläsatama (South Harbour), on a somewhat remote but beautiful site, stands a lone bronze figure. In contrast to Havis Amanda and other Helsinki's popular female statues, this statue, measuring 5,35 metres in height (and well over 8 metres including the red granite pedestal on which it stands) has remained astonishingly foreign to the locals, while only a few outside the Finnish capital seem to be aware of its existence.[1] No monument of course can speak for itself, but even by Finnish standards, a country famed for the reticence of its people, this mysterious lady appears to be exceptionally tight-lipped: it does not provoke, invite interaction, and if it once had a purpose, it has long since been rendered obsolete. And yet it could be argued that this statue, sculpted by Essi Renvall and named generically a "Statue of Peace", offers not only an interesting window into Cold War history, but is in many ways also unique within the larger context of memorial projects.[2] Or if such claim appears exaggerated, it has, at the very least, a fascinating story to tell about what Brian Etheridge has called "memory diplomacy": how state and non-state actors construct and use memory narratives to achieve and legitimate both domestic and foreign-policy objectives.[3]

I would like to thank the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Pia Koivunen for stimulating discussions and to Geoffrey Roberts for criticism, encouragement, and, finally, for sparking my interest in the World Peace Council.

1 Erik Kruskopf. *Veistosten Kaupunki: Taidetta Helsingin Katukuvassa*. Esbo: Schildt, 2000, 132–133; Eeva-Kaarina Ahonen. Rauha kanssanne. *Helsingin Sanomat* (hereafter HS), 18 June 1980.
2 A brief overview of the history of the Statue of peace can be found in Timo Vilén, Kirsi Ahonen, Marjatta Hietala, and Sampsa Kaataja (eds.). In Memory of a Cold War Friend: Monuments Commemorating the Finnish–Soviet Relationship in Helsinki and Tampere. In *Cold War Cities: History, Culture and Memory*, Katia Pizzi, Marjatta Hietala (eds.). Vol. 4 New York, NY: Peter Lang Ltd, 2016; For a good discussion on Finnish monuments and the politics of memory, see Liisa Lindgren. *Monumentum: Muistomerkkien Aatteita Ja Aikaa*. Vol. 782 Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2000.
3 Brian Craig Etheridge. *Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory*. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2016; Brian Craig Etheridge. The Desert Fox, Memory Di-

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110573169-005

Fig. 1: President of Finland Urho Kekkonen unveiling the Statue of Peace at Kaivopuisto park, Helsinki. Source: Finnish People's Archives, KansA112391. Photographer unknown, 09.04.1968

This chapter is an attempt to tell that story: how and by whom was this statue initiated? What purposes was it designed to serve? And, finally, to whom did it give voice and whose version of the past did it silence? Its inscription in Finnish, Swedish and Russian provides *one* clue as to what prompted its creation, and also as to why it has failed to inspire enthusiasm among the Finnish public: “This statue of peace was erected by the people of Finland as a symbol of the peaceful coexistence and friendship between Finland and the Soviet Union.” The inscription also contains a date – 6th of April 1968 – which indicates the specific historical event that the statue was aimed to celebrate: 20 years earlier Finland and the Soviet Union had signed the treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, whose Finnish acronym (YYA) captures for many the very essence of the Finnish Cold War experience.

What follows is a story about Finland’s complex and uneasy relation with its communist neighbour. It is a story about the ways in which this relationship was perceived and communicated during a period spanning from the immediate post-war years to the end of the 1960s. Also, since Finnish identity was to a considerable extent constructed around perceptions of this relationship, this is also a story about how the Finns understood themselves, and the world around them.[4] It is also, and perhaps predominantly, a story about resistance, and, as I reach the final section of this chapter, about the shift in Finnish political and cultural landscape that took place in the 1960s and was accompanied by the need for new public symbols to legitimate the Finland’s official foreign policy embodied by Finland’s long-time (1956–82) president Urho Kekkonen: “peace-loving neutrality” and active bridge-building policy towards the Soviet Union, as opposed to a more passive and conservative approach favoured by his predecessor, J-K Paasikivi.[5]

And yet this remarkable statue did not merely symbolise the Finnish-Soviet “friendship”, or as one might be tempted to say: the Finnish desire to stay out of

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plomacy, and the German Question in Early Cold War America. *Diplomatic History* 32, no. 2 (2008): 207–238. doi:10.1111/j.1467–7709.2008.00689.x.; The literature on the politics of memory is voluminous. For a good overview, see Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz. *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates.* New York: Fordham University Press, 2010.

4 Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* Rev. ed. London: Verso, 2006.

5 For general accounts of Finland’s history during and after World War II, see Henrik Meinander. *A History of Finland* [Finlands historia.]. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011; David Kirby. *A Concise History of Finland.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Max Jakobson. *Finland in the New Europe.* Vol. 175; 175. Westport (Conn.): Praeger, 1998; Osmo Jussila, Seppo Hentilä and Jukka Nevakivi. *From Grand Duchy to a Modern State: A Political History of Finland since 1809* [Suomen poliittinen historia.]. London: Hurst & Company, 1999.

the Cold War by relentlessly demonstrating its harmlessness and goodwill towards its superpower neighbour; it also paid tribute to the persistent efforts of the Finnish communists to create a new kind of a monument. Such a monument would have acknowledged their role in shaping the Finnish perceptions of the Soviet Union, while at the same time promoting collective forgetting of the darkest side of the Finnish-Soviet relationship: World War II and all that it entailed. Most of this chapter deals with this struggle that involved various pro-Soviet "memory activists", a term used by Carol Gluck to denote organisations actively involved in promoting and influencing various memory narratives,[6] and a number of prominent individuals, most notably Wäinö Aaltonen (1894–1966), the leading Finnish sculptor of the time.[7] In many ways, Aaltonen becomes the protagonist of the chapter, though not so much because of his own activism as the fact that all political parties ranging from Conservatives to Social Democrats and Communists sought to secure him as an ally in their struggle for the hearts and minds of the Finnish people.

In contextualising the debates that the statue of peace sparked – and did *not* spark – during its metamorphosis from a nation-challenging into a state-sponsored initiative, the chapter argues that this remarkable piece of art serves as an especially vivid example of what has been described as *Gegendenkmal* or a "counter-monument" but what, perhaps, could be more appropriately referred to as a "dialogic monument": a monument intended to challenge a specific, already existing monument and the historical narrative it represents.[8] In this case, what was being countered were, especially, memorials commemorating the Finnish soldiers who had fallen during the three conflicts – the Soviet-initiated Win-

6 Carol Gluck. Operations of Memory: "Comfort Women" and the World. In *Ruptured Histories: War, Memory, and the Post-Cold War in Asia*, Sheila Miyoshi Jager, Rana Mitter (eds.), 57. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007.

7 On Aaltonen, see e.g. Riitta Kormano and Suvi-Mari Eteläinen. Wäinö Aaltonen 1894–1966: Elämäkerta Valokuvina. In *Korkealta Katsoja = Betraktare Från Ovan*, Suvi-Mari Eteläinen, Johanna Seppä (eds.). Turku: Wäinö Aaltosen museo, 2008; Lindgren. *Monumentum: Muistomerkkien Aatteita Ja Aikaa*; On his role in the Finnish public diplomacy, see Elina Melgin. Propagandaa Vai Julkisuusdiplomatiaa?: Taide Ja Kulttuuri Suomen Maakuvan Viestinnässä 1937–52. Helsingin yliopisto; Some of the older biographies of Aaltonen are best described as hagiograhphies but shed interesting light on how he was perceived by his contemporaries. See e.g. Onni Okkonen. *Wäinö Aaltonen*. 2. p. ed. Porvoo: WSOY, 1951; Esko Hakkila. *Wäinö Aaltonen: Elämää Ja Taidetta*. Porvoo: WSOY, 1953.

8 Quentin Stevens, Karen A. Franck, and Ruth Fazakerley. Counter-Monuments: The Antimonumental and the Dialogic. *The Journal of Architecture* 17, no. 6 (2012): 951–972. The above article also serves as an excellent introduction into the sometimes confusing ways in which the term "counter-monument" has been used.

ter War, the so called "continuation war" (alongside the Germans) and the Lapland war (against the Germans) – which made up the Finnish World War II experience.[9] According to the prevailing patriotic narrative, these fallen soldiers were the necessary price Finland had to pay to maintain its freedom and democracy and, perhaps, even to achieve national reconciliation after the bloody civil war of 1918 – hence the seemingly contradictory but psychologically understandable idea of the outcome of the war as a "defensive victory".[10] The statue of peace was meant to supplement the existing body of Finnish monuments with a politically expedient alternative, but as the concluding section of this chapter suggests, it appears to have generated more resentment than friendship and reconciliation.

"Warmongering" under the Guise of "Reactionary" Monuments

In July 1965, the participants of the World Congress for Peace, National Independence and General Disarmament in Helsinki must have been pleasantly surprised by the announcement made by the Finnish PM Johannes Virolainen towards the end of his opening address: the Finnish government would set up a statue of peace to honour "the great and positive results that the development and strengthening of the policy of peaceful coexistence [with the Soviet Union] had given to our country in the years following the war". As a further gesture of mollification towards Moscow, Virolainen added that by erecting the statue the Finns also wanted to acknowledge the important work that the Soviet-funded World Peace Council (hereafter WPC) – one of the Kremlin's most impor-

9 For Finnish war memorials, see Riitta Kormano. Sotamuistomerkki Suomessa: Voiton Ja Tappion Modaalista Sovittelua. Turun yliopisto; Lindgren. *Monumentum: Muistomerkkien Aatteita Ja Aikaa*, 195–216.

10 On the politics of memory in post-war Finland, see especially Tiina Kinnunen and Markku Jokisipilä. Shifting Images of "our Wars": Finnish Memory Culture of World War II. In *Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations*, Tiina Kinnunen, Ville Kivimäki (eds.), 435–483. Leiden: Brill, 2012; Ville Kivimäki. Between Defeat and Victory: Finnish Memory Culture of the Second World War. *Scandinavian Journal of History* 37, no. 4 (2012): 482–504; Petri J. Raivo. "This is Where they Fought": Finnish War Landscapes as a National Heritage. In *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration*, T. G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson, Michael Roper (eds.), 145–164. London: Routledge, 2000; Tuomas Tepora and Aapo Roselius. *The Finnish Civil War 1918: History, Memory, Legacy.* Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2014.

tant vehicles of political propaganda and the organiser of the congress – had done for the advancement of peace and friendship between the nations.[11]

Virolainen's speech not only exhibited the flexibility of Finnish "peace-loving neutrality", but also obscured the fact that rather than coming up with yet another new initiative to win Moscow's confidence, the government was merely reviving an old idea promoted vigorously by the far-left for years – and opposed even more vigorously by the Finnish mainstream press and politicians. In fact, the first initiative for such as statue to be erected was undertaken as early as in 1947 by the communist-dominated Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society (FSFS), established in 1944 on the ashes of its predecessor, the 1940 banned Society for Peace and Friendship between Finland and the USSR.[12] The plan hatched by the FSFS proved to be a failure, but surfaced at regular intervals within the FSFS, the Finnish People's Democratic League (an electoral alliance dominated by the Finnish Communist Party, hereafter FDPL who remained in governing coalition from 1945 until the 1948 parliamentary elections),[13] and another prototypical front-organisation, the Finnish Defenders of Peace (also known as the Finnish Peace Committee, hereafter FDP), established in 1949 as a Finnish affiliate of the WPC or, as it was known until 1950, the Permanent Committee of the Partisans of Peace (PCPP).[14]

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11 Johannes Virolainen. *Pääministerinä Suomessa: Poliittisia Ratkaisuja Vaalikaudella 1962 – 66*. Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä, 1969, 217 – 218; On the WPC, known until 1950 as the World Partisans of Peace Movement, see Geoffrey Roberts. Averting Armageddon: The Communist Peace Movement, 1948 – 1956. In *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism*, Stephen A. Smith (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; Vladimir Dobrenko. Conspiracy of Peace: The Cold War, the International Peace Movement, and the Soviet Peace Campaign, 1946 – 1956. The London School of Economics and Political Science; Lawrence S. Wittner. *The Struggle Against the Bomb. Vol. 1, One World Or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993.

12 Kaisa Kinnunen. *Suomi-Neuvostoliitto-Seuran Historia 1944 – 1974*. Helsinki: Suomi-Venäjä-seura, 1998, 109 – 110; For an English overview of the FSFS, see Simo Mikkonen. The Finnish-Soviet Society: From Political to Cultural Connections. In *Nordic Cold War Cultures: Ideological Promotion, Public Reception, and East-West Interactions*, Valur Ingimundarson, Rósa Magnúsdóttir (eds.), 109 – 131. Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute, 2015.

13 It should be noted that in the March 1945 elections, the FPDL received 23.5 % of the popular vote, thus becoming the second largest party in the Finnish *Eduskunta* after the Social Democrats.

14 The FDP has not been subjected to scholarly scrutiny apart from Mikko Metsämäki's Master's thesis which deals with the relationship between the FDP and independent peace movement during the 1960's. Mikko Metsämäki. Taistelu Rauhasta: Sadankomitea Ja Rauhanpuolustajat 1960-Luvun Suomessa. Helsingin yliopisto, 2001; For brief overviews, see Jukka Seppinen. *Kivi Bolševikin Kengässä: Neuvostoliiton Tavoitteet Suomessa 1917 – 1970*. Helsinki: Minerva,

As the timing of the FSFS's proposal reveals, the initiative was, on the one hand, motivated by a desire to mark the signing of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union. Later that year, the FSFS also sponsored an equally failed attempt to set up a statue of Lenin to celebrate "Finnish-Soviet friendship and Lenin's role for Finland's independence" – another pet project of the far-left which,[15] however, never quite held the same emotional appeal as the idea of a monument designed especially (but not solely) to commemorate the signing of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet treaty, which provided the foundation on which the relationship between the two countries came to rest during the Cold War. Although the 1948 treaty opened the door for Soviet influence in Finnish domestic politics, it also acknowledged Finland's wish to remain outside great power conflicts, which in the Finnish reading was considered to mean neutrality. For over a decade, however, neutrality was little more than an unspoken aim of the Finnish foreign policy,[16] and even when it did become a reality – or something approaching a reality – the communists typically regarded it as synonymous with solidarity with the Soviet Union. This was also what they meant when talking about "peace": friendship – bordering on blind loyalty – with the Soviet Union, and, correspondingly, condemnation of US foreign policy, opposition to the widespread American and British influence in Finnish media and society, and, of course, the country's economic integration into Western Europe.[17]

2014, 322–333; J. Kaarnola. Rauhanliikkeet Ja Maanpuolustus. *Tiede Ja Ase* 26 (1968): 31–97; The FDP's long-time secretary General Mirjam Vire-Tuominen's booklet is unabashedly biased, but contains some useful information. Mirjam Vire-Tuominen. *Rauhaa Rakentavaa Työtä: Suomen Rauhanpuolustajien Viisi Vuosikymmentä*. Helsinki: Demokraattinen sivistysliitto, 2003.

15 Kinnunen. *Suomi-Neuvostoliitto-Seuran Historia*, 109–110. See e. g. Lauri Suosalo to the FSNS 5 November 1947; Lauri Suosalo to the Tampere City Council 6 November 1947, The records of the FSFS, 9–26 Muu aineisto (1945–1993), Lenin Patsas, The National Archives of Finland (herafter NAF).

16 The treaty bound Finland to repel any military aggression by Germany or its allies aimed at Finland or the Soviet Union and passing through Finnish territory, which could be done with the help of, or jointly with, the Soviet Union, but, in a rather sharp contrast to the Eastern European models of mutual assistance, only if both parties concluded that a direct military threat existed and that such assistance was indeed needed. On the nature of Finnish neutrality, see e. g. Johanna Rainio-Niemi. *The Ideological Cold War: The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland*. New York: Routledge, 2014; Jakobson. *Finland in the New Europe*.

17 A brief look at almost any issue of the FDP's bulletin *Rauhan puolesta* or its meeting protocols readily corroborates this. On American and British propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Finland during the Cold War, see Marek Fields. Reinforcing Finland's Attachment to the West: British and American Propaganda and Cultural Diplomacy in Finland, 1944–1962. University of Helsinki, 2015.

On another level, initiatives to erect a peace statue were aimed at countering the numerous Finnish war memorials – often referred to as "heroes' monuments – with a progressive alternative. As the fallen Finnish (approximately 95 000 in total) were not buried in the battleground but, as a rule, repatriated to their native parishes, such memorials were, indeed, in great demand – so much so that by the end of the 1950s, most of Finland's roughly 550 parishes had obtained their own monuments.[18] This development posed a major problem for the Finnish far-left. Indeed, as even a brief glance at the FDP's minutes and publications reveals, few topics generated as much concerned remarks during the 1950s and the 1960s as "the glorification of war" practiced under the guise of the war memorials.[19] "Glorification of war" and other similar expressions were, of course, codes that camouflaged the real problem, namely that the "heroes' statues" served to sustain the patriotic narrative from which they felt excluded. (Here it is worth recalling that many of the leading Finnish communists had either been imprisoned or underground during the war.) What was even more troubling from the far-left's point of view, however, was that even though the Finnish war memorials remained vague about the actuals details of the war, they, evidently, implied the victims, heroes, and perpetrators, and, in so doing, encouraged the silent hostility towards the Soviet Union that flourished behind the official veneer of friendship and cooperation.[20]

Another constant source of irritation for the Finnish far-left were the "reactionary" monuments raised in honour of Carl Gustaf Mannerheim. The wartime commander-in-chief of the Finnish armed forces, and, for a short period of time, the republic's sixth president, Mannerheim occupied a unique position within the Finnish culture. After the civil war of 1918, which left the country bitterly divided, he was both admired and hated intensively. For those on the right, Mannerheim, the leader of the victorious "White" army, was one of the greatest Finns of all time, whereas the Finnish left – the "Reds" – saw in him "the butcher of Finland's workers" and an antithesis of nearly all that they stood for. Although he continued to be relentlessly vilified by the far-left, World War II and the years after it saw Mannerheim being elevated to the symbol of Finland's long sought-after national unity. Strange as it may seem, the old white general and cosmopolitan aristocrat was portrayed as standing above political divides, and

18 Kormano. Sotamuistomerkki Suomessa: Voiton Ja Tappion Modaalista Sovittelua, 454.

19 See e. g. Mirjam Vire-Tuominen's speech at the meeting of the FDPs local secretaries 18 September 1964, the Records of the FDP, 1F8 SPR Cf 1952–53, The People's Archives (hereafter PA); the minutes of the FDP's annual meeting 8 May 1960, 1F8 SRP CA, PA. Also see, Kinnunen. *Suomi-Neuvostoliitto-Seuran historia*, 106.

20 Kormano. Sotamuistomerkki Suomessa.

even the Social democrats, whose relationship to Mannerheim was utterly complex, grudgingly came to acknowledge his role for national reconciliation.[21]

The high regard in which Mannerheim was held was reflected in the seriousness with which the Finns engaged with his equestrian statue, initiated in 1951 after his death and financed by a nationwide fundraising.[22] At first, it was generally assumed that the only Finnish sculptor capable of doing justice to a man of Mannerheim's stature would be Wäinö Aaltonen.[23] Noted, among others, for his sculpture of Finnish Olympic champion Paavo Nurmi and his statues in the Finnish Parliament House, Aaltonen had established himself as one of the principal architects of the Finnish interwar identity alongside with the composer Jean Sibelius and the famous Finnish architect Alvar Aalto. His significance for Finland's wartime cultural propaganda is hard to overestimate, while the immediate post-years witnessed his elevation to the pedestal of a cultural hero in the service of national reconciliation – a role that he willingly accepted.[24]

However, after two contests with over 100 entries, and much to Aaltonen's dismay, the monument was eventually commissioned from Aimo Tukiainen.[25] A rising star within the Finnish sculpture community, Tukiainen had made a name for himself as the sculptor of one of the first post-war monuments dedicated to the reds victims of the Finnish civil war, inaugurated in 1948 in Karkkila.[26] Tukiainen's involvement in the red memory production did, however, little to prevent his equestrian statue from becoming lambasted in the far-left press for stirring up "warmonger propaganda" and for jeopardising the Finnish-Soviet re-

21 See Ulla-Maija Peltonen. *Muistin Paikat: Vuoden 1918 Sisällissodan Muistamisesta Ja Unohtamisesta*. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2003, 94–98; Ulla-Maija Peltonen. Yhdistävä Ja Erottava Sankaruus: C.G.E. Mannerheim. In *Kirjoituksia Sankaruudesta*, Ulla-Maija Peltonen, Ilona Kemppainen (eds.), 89–126. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2010; Tuomas Tepora. Changing Perceptions of 1918: World War II and Post-War Rise of the Left. In *The Finnish Civil War 1918: History, Memory, Legacy*, Tuomas Tepora, Aapo Roselius (eds.). Brill, 2014, 364–400. doi:10.1163/9789004280717_013.

22 The idea of commissioning a statue of Mannerheim on horseback was first raised after the Civil war, but suspended because of Mannerheim's reputed lukewarmness towards the initiative. Riitta Konttinen. *Suomen Marsalkan Ratsastajapatsas*. Helsinki: Suomen marsalkka Mannerheimin perinnesäätiö, 1989, 25–26, 52–54.

23 Olli Valkonen. *Aimo Tukiainen, Kuvanveistäjä*. Helsinki: Painatuskeskus, 1993, 57.

24 Melgin. Propagandaa Vai Julkisuusdiplomatiaa?: Taide Ja Kulttuuri Suomen Maakuvan Viestinnässä 1937–52, 120–122; Okkonen. *Wäinö Aaltonen*; Hakkila. *Wäinö Aaltonen: Elämää Ja Taidetta*.

25 Mannerheim's tomb, inaugurated in 1954, was however commissioned from Aaltonen. Kruskopf. *Veistosten Kaupunki: Taidetta Helsingin Katukuvassa*, 72–73.

26 Lindgren. *Monumentum: Muistomerkkien Aatteita Ja Aikaa*, 196–201, 209–214; Kormano. Sotamuistomerkki Suomessa: Voiton Ja Tappion Modaalista Sovittelua, 286–396.

lations. Not unexpectedly, the People's democrats also boycotted the unveiling, organising instead a small demonstration, all of which served to underline that the dominant patriotic narrative as embodied by Mannerheim was not without its rifts.[27]

The "Master" and His Statue "Peace"

In addition to Mannerheim's statue, justifiably one of the most important Finnish twentieth century memorial projects, the early 1950s also witnessed the initiation of another notable, albeit much less known, memorial project: a campaign by the Finnish "peace-loving forces" to acquire a peace statue. Due to the scarcity of sources, it is difficult to ascertain whether the latter attempt was stimulated by the huge publicity surrounding the Field Marshal's statue; but there can be little doubt that with the statue of Mannerheim – and with the 5th anniversary of the 1948 treaty looming – the far-left's idea of a counter-monument had gained a new sense of urgency. Accordingly, at its 1952 annual meeting *Rauhantyön yhteisjärjestö* [Central Organisation of the Work for Peace], an organ involving the FSFS and several Finnish peace groups with the exception of the FDP, endorsed the idea of the acquisition of "a peace statue from the Finnish people". The meeting further concluded unanimously that the statue's "artistic creator" should be Wäinö Aaltonen who, as already mentioned, was regarded as a front-runner for the sculptor of Mannerheim's equestrian statue.[28] This was a cunning move, not only because of all the positive publicity generated by Aaltonen's desired attachment to the project but also because it would have made it much more difficult for the press to dismiss the initiative as mere communist propaganda.

Aaltonen's reply to *Rauhantyön keskusjärjestö* has not survived, thus leaving it an open question whether the abandonment of the project was due to his reluctance or to the lack of funds and public support. Assuming, however, that Aaltonen's response was indeed negative, it can be safely concluded that his refusal was not caused by his aversion to the communist-dominated peace movement. Quite the contrary: though not a communist himself,[29] Aaltonen's unrival-

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27 Lindgren. *Monumentum: Muistomerkkien Aatteita Ja Aikaa*, 196–214; Konttinen. *Suomen Marsalkan Ratsastajapatsas*, 191–195.

28 Rauhantyön keskusjärjestö to Aaltonen 21 March 1952, The Wäinö Aaltonen's Archives (hereafter WAA), A7, Ab 692.

29 At least some of his contemporaries perceived Aaltonen as a Social Democrat. See Savon Kansan toimitus to Aaltonen 13 May 1953, WAA, A8, Ab 746.

led position within the official Finnish commemorative culture masked the fact that he was what could be termed a "fellow traveller": a well-intended humanist inclined towards thinking that by supporting the Defenders of Peace movement, he would be merely engaging in a non-partisan and public-spirited venture. Aaltonen's spirituality further rendered him sympathetic for the FDP, as did his genuine aversion to war, although it must be said that his conception of peace ("tolerate other people and live in peace") set him somewhat apart from the approach pursued by the communists.[30]

The history of Aaltonen's involvement in the Partisans of Peace movement, hitherto conspicuously ignored by Finnish scholarship, dated back to the 1950 Stockholm appeal, a petition calling for absolute ban on nuclear weapons. Initiated by the WPC and promoted forcefully by the Kremlin, the petition was allegedly signed by 500 million people worldwide including the entire adult population of the Soviet Union and some 23 million signatures from France and Italy, two of Western Europe's biggest pro-communist countries which together accounted for about a half of the signatures coming from outside the Communist bloc. In Finland, too, nearly 1 million signatures were collected, which serves as a useful reminder of the fact that in the early 1950s, the "Struggle for Peace" found resonance not just among the People's Democrats, but appealed to a great many Finnish people outside the communist orbit.[31] One of the first Finns to sign the appeal was Aaltonen, whose name was only preceded by those of the then Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen and a handful of other cabinet ministers. Little wonder then, that when the FDP convened for its second national congress in late 1950, Aaltonen – or, as he was often referred to as, the "Master" – was invited to attend as a member of its "Honorary Presidium", an invitation which he gladly accepted.[32] Soon after, Aaltonen began to be targeted by the PCPP and other newly established international communist front organisations anxious to attract prominent non-communist intellectuals. In October 1950, for instance, he received an invitation from the president of the PCPP/WPC, Frédéric

30 On this, see e. g. HS interview of Aaltonen on the account of his Peace Medal. HS, 14 April 1953. Aaltonen's conservative admirers did, of course, their best to play down his "Communist" or far-left sympathies. As one of his hagiographies put it: "Aaltonen was a poor man, but never a proletarian. He is a child of the common people, but never a plebeian." Hakkila. *Wäinö Aaltonen, elämää ja taidetta*, 376.

31 On Stockholm appeal, see Roberts. Averting Armageddon: The Communist Peace Movement, 1948 – 1956, 326 – 328; Dobrenko. Conspiracy of Peace: The Cold War, the International Peace Movement, and the Soviet Peace Campaign, 1946 – 1956, 71 – 90. In the 1948 elections the FPDL had secured 375 000 votes.

32 Vire-Tuominen. *Rauhaa Rakentavaa Työtä: Suomen Rauhanpuolustajien Viisi Vuosikymmentä*, 51,78.

Joliot-Curie, to attend the World Congress of the Supporters of Peace. Aaltonen kindly declined,[33] but more invitations soon followed,[34] none of which, however, appear to have proved attractive enough to justify an interruption of his work.

There was, however, one exception: the WCP's plenary meeting in Budapest in June 1953, at which Aaltonen – together with such world-renowned luminaries as American scholar and civil rights activist W.E.B. Du Bois and the future Nobel laureate in literature, Halldór Laxness – was awarded the WPC's gold medal for his statue "Peace" following a nomination from the FDP.[35] Ironically enough, although initially intended as a peace statue by its creator (in a religious or spiritual sense),[36] the monument had been commissioned by the Finnish town of Lahti and set up in 1952 at the local heroes' cemetery to provide a platform for the very performances that the Communists routinely accused of instigating anti-Soviet sentiments. Nor was it usually known as "Peace" [*Rauha*], but, generally, referred to as "The Genius of Freedom" [*Vapauden Hengetär*], a name that carried with it echoes from the Finnish civil war, while at the same time suggesting that Finland's unequal struggle against the Soviet Union had been one for freedom against tyranny. Conservative and liberal newspapers, especially, preferred the latter name or the more generic "Lahti's heroes' monument",[37] whereas the far-left, anxious to exploit Aaltonen's perceived sympathies for their own cause, tended to call it "Peace".[38]

Great reconciliator that he was, Aaltonen himself stubbornly refrained from naming his statue, highlighting instead that the monument was open to multiple interpretations, including, apparently, the one promoted by the far-left.[39] Yet the conservatives with the backing of the liberals and Social Democrats had little intention to allow *their* "Genius of Freedom" to be turned into a vehicle for communist propaganda. Far from it. Thanks to Aaltonen's gold medal and his increasing activity in the FDP, the local newspapers, for instance, seem to have grown even more determined to strip Aaltonen's statue of any unfortunate con-

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33 Aaltonen to Joliot-Curie 30 October 1950, B1 (draft letters), WAA.

34 See the Secretariat of the WPC to Aaltonen 13 June 1955, A 8, (incoming correspondence), WAA; World festival of youth and students for peace (I. Bachov) to Aaltonen 3 July 1951, A 10 (incoming correspondence), Ab1029, WAA.

35 See e.g. *Iltasanomat* 13 April 1953; HS 14 April 1953; The minutes of the FDP's central committee 6 February 1952, 1F8 FDP, C6 Keskustoimikunnan pöytäkirjat 1949–1967, PA.

36 See e.g. Aaltone's interview in HS, 14 April 1953.

37 See e.g. *Uusi Suomi* (hereafter US), 5 April 1951, 3 June 1952; *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti* (Hereafter SSD), 5 April 1951; *Karjala*, 5 April 1951, 27 May 1952; HS, 5 April 1951; *Lahti,* 4 June 1952; Hakkila. *Wäinö Aaltonen: elämää ja taidetta*, 338–341.

38 See e.g. *Tänään* 1/1951, 15–17, 25; *Taiteen maailma* 1951.

39 See e.g. US, 5 April 1951.

notations of "peace", which the Finnish mainstream media routinely set within quotation marks when dealing with the communist initiatives.[40] As a result, and in part also due to the inability of the communists to press their case, the "non-communist" version of the name prevailed – or so it would appear –[41] which must have been a blow to the FDP who had attempted to construe Aaltonen's monument as Finland's first statue of peace.

"Professor Aaltonen's idea"

Whatever the reasons underlying the failure of *Rauhantyön Keskusjärjestö's* 1952 initiative, the next attempt to come up with a peace statue also came to be associated with Aaltonen's name. This time, however, he was not asked to sculpt it; instead, it was Aaltonen who proposed it, thus adding an entirely new dimension to the already multifaceted project.

The stage for Aaltonen's proposal was set by the first post-war exhibition of Finnish art in the Soviet Union in the late 1953, a year that marked the beginning of a new active phase in Finnish-Soviet cultural exchanges following Stalin's death.[42] Initiated by the FSFS and sponsored lavishly by Finnish and Soviet governments, the exhibition featured 375 works by over a hundred Finnish artists and was accompanied to Moscow by a large delegation comprising of art professionals, politicians, and other people associated with various Finnish front-groups.[43] Judging by the coverage of Soviet newspapers, the exhibition was deemed a success, which of course, was no surprise, given the nature of the exhibition, but also given the fact that, on request of the Soviet authorities, formal-

40 See e. g. *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat*, 30 December 1955, 2 January 1956, 25 July 1956, 26 October 1959, 1 August 1960.

41 Lahti Art Museum, for instance, refers to it as "Vapauden Hengetär". http://www.lahdenmuseot.fi/museot/fi/taidemuseo/kokoelmat/lahden-kaupungin-julkiset-veistokset/ retrieved 14 March 2018.

42 Antero Holmila and Simo Mikkonen. *Suomi Sodan Jälkeen: Pelon, Katkeruuden Ja Toivon Vuodet 1944 – 1949*. Jyväskylä: Atena, 2015; Melgin. Propagandaa Vai Julkisuusdiplomatiaa?: Taide Ja Kulttuuri Suomen Maakuvan Viestinnässä 1937– 52, 163 – 168; On East-West artistic interactions in general, see Simo Mikkonen and Pekka Suutari (eds.). *Music, Art and Diplomacy: East-West Cultural Interactions and the Cold War.* Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2016.

43 See e. g. *Työkansan Sanomat* (hereafter TKS), 30 November 1953, 1 December 1953; HS 2 December 1953, 9 December 1953; the Records of the FSFS, 391, 3_40 Asiakirjat (1951– 57), Suomalaisen taiteen näyttely Moskovaan.

ist and abstract works had been mostly excluded from the exhibition.[44] However, although the Soviet media seemed rather united in its praise of the Finnish artists, Aaltonen was always the focal point of Soviet publicity. The review in the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* is instructive. After commending Aaltonen's other famous monuments, the article went on to pass judgement on "Peace", which – as the writer did not fail to mention – had been awarded an "International peace prize." In this statue, the paper concluded, Aaltonen had succeeded in encapsulating the notion of peace into a female figure "who with a meaningful gesture of her raised hands urges us to resist the dark forces of war." This was what made Aaltonen's statue so significant, "especially as most works of Western artists tend to address fears and horrors of war without providing the common people with tools and determination to fight it. Aaltonen is not a messenger of such passive victimhood."[45]

It was against the backdrop of such praises that Aaltonen made his notorious proposal. This occurred at a "Friendship Evening" hosted, among others, by the Soviet Peace Committee and VOKS, the Soviet organisation for the promotion of international cultural contacts. It had been a long but an uplifting day: assurances of friendly relations between Finland and the Soviet Union had been exchanged and toasts proposed with such thoroughness that speeches of two Finnish delegates had been interrupted by an intervention of a well-meaning Finnish diplomat. Aaltonen, too, appears to have been in a splendid mood when preparing for his speech which, due to his deafness, was delivered by his son, architect Matti Aaltonen. It may not have stood out as a rhetorical masterpiece, but it concluded with a plea that was embraced enthusiastically by those present: that a monument bearing an inscription "Never again will there be war on this border" be erected on the Finnish-Soviet border.[46]

It seems to have taken a while for the Finnish far-left to grasp the full potential of Aaltonen's proposal. It was noted in passing in Communist and People's Democratic papers,[47] but not capitalised on properly until mid-December 1953,

44 For Soviet views, see e. g. *Ogoniok* 5/1954; *Iskusstvo* 2/1954; *Vecherniy Leningrad*, 17 December 1953; *Trud*, 26 November 1953. For Soviet wishes and requirements regarding the exhibition, see the Minutes of the Exhibition Committee 23 September 1953, Tapio Tapio-Vaara's papers, Dc Yhteiskunnallinen toiminta 41, PA.

45 *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 26 November 1953.

46 A vivid account of the event is given in Essi Renvall's autobiography, Essi Renvall. *Nyrkit Savessa*. Helsinki: Weilin + Göös, 1971, 145 – 146. Also see TKS, 26 November 1953, 27 November 1953; Vapaa Sana (hereafter VS), 15 December 1953. It could, perhaps, be speculated whether his idea may have been inspired by the peace monument raised on the Swedish-Norwegian border (Morokulien) in 1914 to celebrate the 100 years of peace between the countries.

47 See e. g. TKS, 30 November 1953.

when the FSFS's executive council issued a resolution reiterating its whole-hearted support for the initiative, while at the same time charging the Society's central board of trustees to take the necessary steps for the realisation of "prof Aaltonen's idea".[48] The resolution was immediately picked up by *Vapaa Sana*, the mouthpiece of the People's Democrats, which also welcomed the proposal made by "our great sculptor Aaltonen". In fact, the paper went on to state that Aaltonen's idea was so important that its significance far exceeded the Finnish-Soviet context:

> At a time when attempts are being made to artificially raise Cold War paper and "iron" curtains on the borders and when the centuries old bleeding scars of the past are being opened over and over again, this monument will also speak directly to all the peoples of the world in a lasting and impressive way. It will highlight in an honourable way the efforts that have been successfully embraced here in the North and that must be embraced even more successfully: aspirations to show to the whole world that in the North there is no "gap" between "East" and "West". The monument will express an aspiration for lasting peace in the whole world, an aspiration to the furthering of which Finland and the Soviet Union have committed themselves by virtue of their mutual Friendship and Cooperation pact. In this sense, broad segments of our people look forward to the realisation of this far-reaching proposition of our great artist most sympathetically and most warmly.[49]

The response of the mainstream press to "Aaltonen's idea" was distinctly lukewarm: it was mentioned without comments and too much enthusiasm, if indeed it was mentioned at all.[50] As should be evident, the reason underlying this silence was not indifference, but an unwillingness to provide a platform for ideas that were not seen worthy of promoting.[51] Communist-inspired "peace" initiatives fell, by definition, into this category, not to mention the most controversial aspect of Aaltonen's proposal: that, of all the places, a monument be set up on the Finnish-Soviet *border* – a border that had been moved significantly westwards as a result of Soviet invasion, leading to the loss of home and resettlement of some 430,000 Karelians. Yet the fact that the proposal had been made by Aaltonen did, mildly put, complicated the matter somewhat. A national hero, he was practically beyond all public criticism, but the impression among the con-

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48 HS, 14 December 1953; The minutes of the FSFS's council 13 December 1953, The Records of the FSFS, 1–2 Pöytäkirjat (1946–1973), NAF.

49 VS, 15 December 1953. See also TKS, 15 December 1953.

50 HS, 15 December 1953.

51 Fields. Reinforcing Finland's Attachment to the West: British and American Propaganda and Cultural Diplomacy in Finland, 1944–1962, 41; Esko Salminen. *The Silenced Media: The Propaganda War between Russia and the West in Northern Europe*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.

servative elite appears to have been that in seeking Finnish-Soviet reconciliation, Aaltonen had, sadly, again fallen into the communist peace trap.[52]

There was, however, another explanation for the press' muted reaction: the discreet self-censorship of the Finnish media. Indeed, although the conservative and social democratic papers did not mince their words when criticising the communists – and although indirect criticism of the Soviet Union was rather a norm than exception – overtly hostile attacks against Moscow were rare, and when they did occur, usually provoked a furious response from the agitated president Paasikivi (and later by Kekkonen).[53] It thus took a man of A.I. Virtanen's calibre, a Nobel laureate in chemistry and the head of the Academy of Finland, to openly go against Aaltonen's proposal. Well-connected both internationally and nationally, Virtanen was not only the undisputed leader of the Finnish academic community, but also a staunch anti-communist and an outspoken opponent of Kekkonen's foreign policy line.[54] In his reply to Aaltonen's proposal, published in *Helsingin Sanomat*, the country's leading daily, Virtanen asked whether it was appropriate to erect such a statue "on our present Eastern border". His answer was a categorical "No", as "due to this border, dictated to us, part of our people have been taken away the province they had turned into fields and cultivated, as well as their homes. To commemorate such a hard fate by a statue is hardly designed to further the cause of peace." On a more general note, Virtanen argued that there could be no real prospects for peace between the West and the Soviet Union until the latter had returned its conquests. In the Finnish case this meant, above all, Karelia, the reacquisition of which remained high on Virtanen's agenda despite the evident sensitivity of the issue.[55]

52 See Touko Perko. *Mies, Liekki Ja Unelma: Nobelisti A.I. Virtasen Elämäntyö.* Helsinki: Otava, 2014, 563–564.

53 Salminen. *The Silenced Media: The Propaganda War between Russia and the West in Northern Europe*; Fields. Reinforcing Finland's Attachment to the West: British and American Propaganda and Cultural Diplomacy in Finland, 1944–1962.

54 Perko. *Mies, Liekki Ja Unelma: Nobelisti A.I. Virtasen Elämäntyö*, 459–605.

55 HS, 17 December 1953. According to his biographer, Virtanen first offered his article to the Conservative Coalition Party's *Uusi Suomi* daily newspaper, which had often provided a platform for his controversial critiques. The paper's editor-in-chief Lauri Aho considered Virtanen's contribution to the debate as "excellent and highly important", but fearing a furious response by his party colleague, president Paasikivi, refused regretfully to publish it. Perko. *Mies, Liekki ja Unelma*, 563.

With a Little Help from My Friend

Virtanen’s reply provided much needed ammunition for the debate which otherwise would have been swept under the rug sooner rather than later. The Communist *Työkansan Sanomat*, for instance, suggested that were the leadership of Finland trusted in the hands of Virtanen and the like, Finland would soon find itself caught in another disastrous war, while at the same time branding Virtanen as “Nazi professor”.[56] This accusation was not without its irony, as Virtanen, a committed anglophone, had never hidden his profound contempt for the Nazis.[57] By contrast, Aaltonen, whom the far-left now attempted to portray as the figurehead of Finland’s “peace loving forces”, had been one of the founding members of *Suomen Valtakunnan Liitto* (Federation of the Finnish Realm), a marginal but openly National Socialist organisation established during the continuation war.[58] Yet as the fates of Aaltonen and Kekkonen suggest, flirtations with the far-right were sins that could be forgiven, provided that the persons concerned demonstrated an open mind and a willingness to embark upon a new friendly relationship with the Soviet Union.

The culmination of the far-left’s campaign occurred, fittingly enough, at Christmas, the festival of peace and joy, with both *Vapaa Sana* and *Työkansan Sanomat* stepping up their efforts to mobilise popular opinion. *Vapaa Sana*, for example, devoted an entire page to Aaltonen’s proposal featuring prominent communist intellectuals such as Hella Vuolijoki and the sculptor Essi Renvall, all singing their praises of the ingenuity of Aaltonen’s idea. As the paper’s chief editor, a versatile intellectual Jarno Pennanen observed, the fact that Aaltonen’s idea had been rejected by some individuals “haunted by the past” only served to underline its importance, for “it is the very purpose of the monument to obliterate the death ideas of the past, lethal feelings.” Other interviewees also speculated as to whether the monument – which many envisaged should come about as a result of collaboration between Finnish and Soviet artists – should be erected on the Finnish-Soviet border or in two separate locations (Helsinki and Leningrad). Or whether, indeed, it would be better to set up a single statue, a group of statues, or, in view of the future Finnish-Soviet cultural cooperation, an entire statue park?[59]

56 TKS, 18 December 1953.
57 Perko. Mies, Liekki ja Unelma, 550.
58 Henrik Ekberg. *Führerns Trogna Följeslagare: Den Finländska Nazismen 1932–1944*. Helsingfors: Schildt, 1991, 233.
59 VS, 23 December 1953. See also TKS, 17 December 1953, 20 December 1953, 23 December 1953.

Amid general enthusiasm, the Communist secretary general of the FSFS Toivo Karvonen nevertheless struck a more cautious note. Having elevated the promotion of "Aaltonen's idea" to one of the FSFS's main foci for 1954, Karvonen remarked that for the monument to have the desired impact, it should reflect "the will of the vast majority of the people".[60] Yet how this could be achieved in an atmosphere that was becoming increasingly hostile to the communist peace movement remained unclear.[61] Not only did the campaigns of the FSFS and the FDP become more and more linked with communism in the popular mind; the WPC too was becoming increasingly delegitimised. The Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, in particular, triggered an internal crisis within the communist peace movement and led to the departure of a great number of prominent Western intellectuals from the WPC.[62] Aaltonen was one of them. Appalled by the failure of the WPC to condemn the Soviet invasion, he returned his medal, stating that his conscience did not permit him to have it in his possession since the WPC "has not been doing anything for the benefit of the Hungarian people in their struggle for liberty and in their sufferings".[63]

It is interesting to note that Aaltonen's breach with the WPC did not, however, prevent his election to an honorary Member of the Soviet Academy of Arts in 1958, a clear indication of his importance for the Soviet (and Finnish) cultural propaganda. This is not to say that his departure would not have caused any awkwardness for Soviet (and presumably also Finnish) authorities, as the following episode, played out during a small but a high-profile ceremony (the guests included Kekkonen) organised in honour of his membership in Helsinki, illustrates: after lauding Aaltonen's contribution to the Defenders of Peace movement, the representative of the Soviet embassy noted that his statue "Peace" "was awarded a gold medal of peace".[64] The formulation allowed the interpretation that, for whatever reason, Aaltonen might no longer possess the said medal,

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60 VS, 23 December 1953; A memorandum written by Toivo Karvonen in 1954 (Lähemmistä toimenpiteistä rauhanpatsasasiassa) for the Cadre Division of the Finnish Communist party, The Toivo Karvonen papers, 5, B, Undated manuscripts, PA.

61 On the press' stiffening attitude towards communism and Moscow, see Fields. Reinforcing Finland's Attachment to the West: British and American Propaganda and Cultural Diplomacy in Finland, 1944–1962.

62 Dobrenko. Conspiracy of Peace: The Cold War, the International Peace Movement, and the Soviet Peace Campaign, 1946–1956, 144–152; Roberts. Averting Armageddon: The Communist Peace Movement, 1948–1956, 333–336.

63 Aaltonen to the Secretariat of the WPC 19 November 1956, B (draft briefs), WAA.

64 A translation of the Soviet speech in Aaltonen's archive, A 28, Esitelmiä, puheita, käsikirjoituksia jne., WAA.

and may have raised some eyebrows among those knowledgeable about Aaltonen’s decision to return his prize.

In any case, despite their best efforts, the campaign inaugurated by the FSFS quickly ran out of steam – only to resurface with the tenth anniversary of the 1948 treaty approaching, as indicated by a memorandum written in 1957 by Sylvi-Kyllikki Kilpi, the president of the FSFS and People’s Democratic MP. In her memorandum, Kilpi bemoans that after the Finnish exhibition, little, if any, progress had been made in the field of the Finnish-Soviet artistic cooperation. What was particularly worrying for Kilpi was that the Soviets had turned a blind eye to the Finnish hopes of organising an exhibition of Soviet art in Finland – and all this at a time when cultural contacts between the Soviet Union and the West appeared to be increasing rapidly. Based on information gleaned during her recent trip to Moscow, Kilpi also claimed to have worked out the reason for the Kremlin’s disinterest: the regrettable fate of Aaltonen’s proposal.[65]

This conclusion was, perhaps, exaggerated; but it justifiably highlights the fact that although efforts to acquire a peace statue were, to a large extent, driven by Finnish actors, they received subtle – and at times ample – encouragement from Moscow who had a vested interest in the project. Kilpi was also quick to point out that for several reasons, the time was ripe for a renewed attempt. One such reason was that after much diplomatic manoeuvring behind the scenes, the Kremlin had prematurely returned the Porkkala military base, which Finland had been forced to lease to the Soviet Union after the war. The Soviet concession obviously came at a cost – a renewal of the 1948 treaty for another twenty years – and was, above all, aimed at showcasing Moscow’s peaceful intentions towards its neighbours; but it nevertheless removed one barrier to increased cooperation. Another reason for Kilpi’s optimism were the upcoming visits of Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin to Finland, which obviously would have set an ideal stage for a new campaign on behalf of a “statue of friendship and peace”. Or, more accurately, on behalf of *statues* of “friendship and peace”, as the idea at this point was to sculp two identical statues to be erected in Finland and the Soviet Union respectively.[66]

Kilpi’s memorandum led to the formation of a Finnish-Soviet committee in 1957,[67] but it is not clear from the records whether it was ever convened or whether any other measures were taken towards the implementation of the updated

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65 Kilpi’s undated memorandum, A 28, Esitelmiä, puheita, käsikirjoituksia yms., WAA.

66 Ibid. On the return of Porkkala, see e.g. Kirby. *Concise History of Finland*, 250.

67 The minutes of the FDP central committee 1 April 1957, The records of the FDP, 1F8, 6C 1949–67, PA.

statue plan. Similarly, it is not known whether Aaltonen was thought to have played some role in the project, although it does seem clear that he was, at the very least, made aware of it.[68] Either way, neither the Finnish far-left nor the Soviet authorities had given up the hope that Aaltonen, now aged 70 and with his health deteriorating, could yet again be persuaded to lend his name to the statue cause. In this regard, a letter sent in 1964 to Aaltonen by his old acquaintance, the Executive Secretary of the Soviet Peace Committee Mikhail Kotov, is of particular interest. In it, Kotov writes that on his recent trip to Finland, the issue of a peace monument had been brought up again. Then, after beating around the bush for a while, he finally gets to the point: would not Aaltonen be willing to reintroduce his "excellent idea" to the Finnish people?

Seemingly unaware of or indifferent to the most controversial aspect of Aaltonen's proposal, Kotov further suggested that "such monument could, for example, be erected on the Finnish-Soviet border by the Saimaa canal [an important waterway linking the lake system of Eastern Finland to the Baltic, part of the ceded Karelia], which would become a border of peace".[69] Apparently, the time was again propitious, as thanks to a leasing agreement signed in 1963, Finland had regained access to the canal. However, in his response Aaltonen politely evaded Kotov's request, thereby making it clear that, while still supportive of the "policy of friendship", he was no longer keen to serve as a figurehead for the project that had once carried his name."[70]

"One Has A Lot to Reminisce about Even Without Any Statues"

At the time of Kotov's visit, designed, no doubt, as much as an opportunity to guide his friends as to gather intelligence,[71] Finland appeared far different than when Aaltonen had made his proposal. With the coming of age of the post-war baby-boomers, the famous conversion of the Finnish social democrats, and the formation of a popular front style alliance (Centre-Agrarians, social democrats and the People's Democrats) in 1966, the country had entered an era in which all major political parties declared allegiance to the Kekkonen line. As

68 Kilpi's undated memorandum, A 28, Esitelmiä, puheita, käsikirjoituksia yms., WAA.
69 Kotov to Aaltonen 4 March 1964, A4 (incoming correspondence), WAA.
70 Aaltonen to Kotov 10 April 1964, B2 (draft letters), WAA.
71 On the dual task of the Soviet Peace Committee delegates, see Dobrenko. *Conspiracy of Peace*, 160 – 161.

Fig. 2: Sculptor Essi Renvall working on Statue of Peace. Source: Finnish People’s Archives, KansA108013. Photo by Yrjö Lintunen, 19.10.1966.

a result, most aspects of Finland’s political life became gradually subordinated to the policy of friendship. Self-censorship increased, while internalisation of the official YYA liturgy and close contacts with the Soviet embassy became self-evident attributes of every self-respecting politician. This, in short, is what is encap-

sulated in the term "Finlandisation", a period during which submissiveness and conformity became a "new normal".[72]

While Finlandisation – which in many ways coincided with Finland's "Americanisation" and the country's transformation into a prosperous, Scandinavian style welfare society – can be said to have reached its peak during the 1970s, many of its consequences were beginning to be noticeable around the mid-1960s. To take one telling example, in 1965, the FDP, long delegitimised and isolated from mainstream political debates, were for the first time granted a small state subsidy, and soon evolved into a semi-official organ of the government for the maintenance of friendly relations with Moscow.[73] Mirroring these developments, the manner in which the Finns remembered their past wars was also undergoing a substantial transformation, prompted by the publication of Väinö Linna's popular novel the *Unknown Soldier* (1954) that dealt with World War II from the point of view of ordinary soldiers.[74]

In addition, the period around the mid-1960s saw the launching of new far-left-initiated memorial projects – such as the memorial to the red victims of the Finnish civil war in Helsinki (1970) – and, conversely, projects designed to counter or neutralise them.[75] The aborted plan to acquire a statue of Väinö Tanner, the long-time social democratic leader, Finland's wartime foreign minister and a tireless critic of the Soviet Union and Kekkonen, provides an example of a such (anti-communist) counter-monument.[76] That Aaltonen had sculpted a bust of Moscow's arch-demon Tanner in 1951 to mark his seventieth birthday was altogether fitting;[77] nor should it come as a surprise that Aaltonen, who seemed to be everywhere during the 1950s and 1960s, was first appointed as the sculptor of the aforementioned "Red" memorial, which, as Tuomas Tepora has rightly pointed out, can, in turn, be seen as countering Mannerheim's equestrian statue. However, as the old master passed away in 1966, the National Red Memorial was commissioned from his young pupil, Taisto Martiskainen.[78]

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72 For the Finnish debate on Finlandisation, see Timo Vihavainen. *Kansakunta Rähmällään: Suomettumisen Lyhyt Historia*. Helsinki: Otava, 1991.

73 Mirjam Vire-Tuominen's unpublished survey of the history of the FDP 1979, The Mirjam Vire-Tuominen papers, Cf Käsikirjoitukset, Da, PA.

74 See e.g. Tepora. Changing perceptions of 1918, 391–396; Kinnunen and Jokisipilä. Shifting images of "our wars."

75 Tepora. Changing perceptions of 1918, 389–390.

76 SSD, 1 May 1966, 29 November 1966.

77 See e.g. SSD, 16 March 1951.

78 HS, 31 August 1970, 5. Unveiled in 1970, the memorial was sponsored, symptomatically, by the Finnish state and the city of Helsinki, along with a large number of workers' organisations etc. Tepora. Changing perceptions of 1918, 389–390.

Aaltonen, thus, did not live long enough to witness the realisation of the peace statue he had once come to propose. Back in 1953, his proposal had been shot down or, rather, ignored, by the establishment, but in the new atmosphere of the time, the Finnish leadership had every reason to support "Aaltonen's idea" to educate the often ignorant or hostile public and, primarily, to demonstrate to Moscow that the Finns took seriously the rhetoric of peaceful co-existence. Despite being initiated by the communists in the tumultuous post-war years, this aspect of the project was, understandably, erased from the official accounts, nor was there any reference to Aaltonen's controversial proposal.[79]

The Defenders of Peace, by contrast, viewed Renvall's statue as an epilogue to a story – *their* story – and a long-overdue public recognition of their efforts to shape Finnish perceptions of the Soviet Union. In fact, from the FDP's perspective, what was about to happen was of deep historical significance: the world appeared to be moving from an era of wars and suspicion to an era of peaceful co-existence – and an era of peace statues – spearheaded by Finland's "peace-loving forces". As the FDP's Moscow-loyal secretary general Mirjam Vire-Tuominen put it:

> [W]hat is most important here is that for the *first time* a statue of PEACE will be erected in our country… [T]he statue is designed to symbolise the peaceful co-existence and good relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. The members of the People's Democratic movement know more than well that the positive development of the post-war Finnish-Soviet relations has not come about without continued and persistent efforts to counter deep-rooted prejudices and hostility. These efforts truly merit a monument. The statue is designed to honour the tens of thousands of men and women who, in spite of difficulties, have struggled for good neighbourly relations and peace.[80]

It could, of course, be argued that from the point of view of the Finnish leadership, the Finns were never asked to like the initiative; merely to subscribe to it and, if this was too much to ask, to abstain from openly criticising it. This they duly did, even if opposition towards the statue could be read between the lines of the indignant letters sent to the statue committee housed at the

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79 On the "official" version as expressed by the president of the statue committee, see e. g. *Hufvudstadsbladet* (hereafter HBL), 23 December 1965, 29 March 1968; The minutes of the FDP's annual meeting 30 May 1966, Vire-Tuominen's account of the origins of the statue idea, the Records of the FDP, 1F8, CA, PA.

80 KU, 20 January 1966. Also see KU, 6 January 1966, 4 April 1968; Suomen rauhanpuolustajien tehtävistä rauhanpatsaskeräyksessä (On the tasks of the FDP regarding the fundraising for the peace statue) 1966, The Records of the Peace Statue committee, Yhteenvedot tehtävistä, keräys, PA.

Fig. 3: Head of the Peace Statue Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahti Karjalainen receiving 4000 kg of bronze as a gift from Soviet Peace Committee from Soviet ambassador Kovalev. Others from left, chairman of Finnish-Soviet Society Göran von Bonsdorff, Mayor of Helsinki Lauri Aho. Source: Finnish People's Archives, KansA76 – 1997. Photographer unknown, 31. 5. 1967

FDP's headquarters,[81] or, to take another example, the mordantly satirical columns in the Finnish newspapers. For instance, writing for *Helsingin Sanomat*, the paper's popular columnist Origo noted that the locals had started to call Renvall's and Virolainen's statue "Tiltu" inspired by the Nobel Prize winning author F.E. Sillanpää's novel *Tiltu and Ragnar.* For those not familiar with the history of Finnish literature, it is worth noting that the title of Sillanpää's novel was *Hiltu and Ragnar*, whereas, in fact, "Tiltu" was a nickname for a notorious Soviet

81 The Records of the Peace statue committee include a great many of such letters. See Peace Statue Committee, Incoming correspondence 1967, 1F8, PA.

World War II propaganda broadcaster and later entered the Finnish lexicon as a synonym for clumsy political propaganda.[82]

But, above all, scepticism and opposition towards the statue and the narrative it represented manifested itself in the evident unwillingness of the Finns to contribute to what the government insisted was a matter for the entire nation.[83] Indeed, despite repeated appeals, the campaign designed to bring funds and attention to the statue proved a failure. The contrast with the fundraising organised 15 years earlier to collect money for Mannerheim's equestrian statue is telling: while the latter had yielded approximately 2.5 million euros in today's (2018) currency from over 700,000 donators within only a month, the peace statue campaign – which had been running for nearly 1,5 years – only managed to bring in a sum equalling 184,000 euros from, allegedly, 200 000 contributors.[84] This fell considerably short of what was expected, and placed both the Finnish government as well as the FDP in an awkward situation, to say the least.[85] However, after intense manoeuvring behind the scenes, and with generous contributions from the government, the city of Helsinki, Finnish municipalities, the state-run or state-owned "big business", and, last but not least, the Soviet Peace Committee under Kotov, the statue could be erected on time and unveiled on April 6, 1968 with due pomp and ceremony – and, obviously, with no mention of the lukewarm response of the Finns to the initiative.[86]

The centenary's main celebrations later in the evening proved equally solemn and offered few surprises. The Finns spoke beautifully about their commitment to peaceful coexistence and neutrality, while the speech of the First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Kiril Mazurov, too, was entirely con-

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82 Suurvaltapolitiikkaa. HS, 7 March 1966. Also see Kaadettuja patsaita. US, 14 October 1966; Pylvään päässä. SSD, 22 August 1968; Paasikivelle kivi. HS, 11 December 1968; Muistomerkkikysymys. HS, 11 August 1965.

83 See e.g. HBL, 23 December 1965, SSD, 3 December 1966, 5 March 1966.

84 Financial Statement 1966–31 December 1968, The Records of the Peace statue committee, Outgoing correspondence, organisations, societies, 1F8, FDP, PA; Konttinen. *Suomen marsalkan* ratsastajapatsas, 61–62.

85 See e.g. Minutes of the FDP's central committee, 1 November 1966, C6, 1F8, FDR, PA; The minutes of the Peace statue committee, 11 November 1967, The Records of the Peace statue committee, 1F8, FDP, PA.

86 See e.g. US. Kaksi patsashanketta Helsingissä. 15 June 1967; SSD, N-liitto lahjoittaa rauhanpatsaan pronssin. 12 January 1967; KU, H:gin kaupunki kustantaa rauhanpatsaan jalustan. 22 December 1967; SSD, Rauhanpatsas katsoo suomalaisiin silmiin – Pääministeri Mauno Koivisto: sopimus rauhan takeeksi eikä ketään vastaan. 7 April 1968; HS Rauhanpatsaan paljastus juhlisti ystävyyspäivää. 7 April 1968; undated translation of Kotov's letter to the committee, The Records of the Peace statue committee, Incoming correspondence, 1F8, FDP, PA.

ventional in language and tone: having affirmed the Kremlin's peaceful intentions and having accused Finland, not too subtly, of starting the Winter War (the official Soviet interpretation), he went on to denounce the imperialism of the US and the alleged resurgence of Nazism in West-Germany. Yet the thrust of his criticism was directed at the Finnish "anti-Soviet" forces, who, in Mazurov's view, were doing their country a grave disservice by opposing Kekkonen's policy of friendship.[87]

It thus seemed evident that despite their hard-won propaganda victory, the struggle of the Finnish "peace loving forces" against anti-Soviet sentiment and old prejudices was far from over. More efforts and, indeed, more "dialogic memorials" were needed to challenge the dominant historical narrative, or, to quote once more the words of Jarmo Pennanen, "to obliterate the death ideas of the past, lethal feelings".[88] As a result, the 1970s, in particular, witnessed the erection of several monuments celebrating the Finnish-Soviet friendship, but just how successful they were in promoting genuine sympathy for Finland's giant neighbour remains a matter of debate. In fact, more often than not they seem to have had an adverse impact, and, consequently, generated more resentment or cynicism rather than friendship and reconciliation. A note sent to the statue committee by the vicar of Virolahti, a small municipality bordering the Soviet Union, is illustrative of such feelings, maintained and cherished by many common people as well as elites: "I carry in my body scars from two hails of bullets, my brother fell at the war, the church that was built under my guidance in Alattu in Suistamo was burnt down by the Russians, and there remains also the home I had recently set up. One has a lot to reminisce about even without any statues."[89]

87 Ibid.; KU, Rauhanpatsas on Suomen ja NL:n ystävyyden vertauskuva. 7 April 1968.
88 VS, 22 December 1953.
89 The vicar of Virolahti to the Peace statue committee 22 April 1967. The records of the peace statue committee, Incoming correspondence, 1F8, FDP, PA.

Astrid Shchekina-Greipel

Lev Kopelev and His Role in German–Soviet Cultural Relations

The Soviet German philologist and literary critic, Lev Kopelev played an important role in promoting cultural relations between (West) Germany and the Soviet Union. Not only did he propagate German literature and culture while living in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), he also opened his home to European journalists[1] so that they could meet unofficial cultural personalities and gain a broader understanding of the Soviet intelligentsia. It was, and still is, very difficult to gain profound insights into the ways in which culture-related decisions were made in the USSR.[2] Meetings between decision-makers were held behind closed doors, and protocols were not discussed openly. Thus, Kopelev was (and still is through his books) of major significance for gaining a more profound insight into this.[3]

Kopelev's friendship with the German Nobel prize winner Heinrich Böll influenced Böll's career as a popular writer in the Soviet Union as well as Böll's commitment to Soviet dissidents. This chapter shows how Kopelev influenced Böll, both as a writer and as a supporter of those who were persecuted by the Soviet government for political or cultural reasons. Kopelev himself wrote many biographic works,[4] in which he showed his transformation from being a Stalinist – a true believer in communist ideology, the party and the Soviet

1 From 1955 onwards, there have been a growing number of German journalists in the USSR: e. g. Hermann Pörzgen (for FAZ, 1955 – 1976), Klaus Mehnert (ARD), Walter Brell (dpa, 1956 – 1957), Gerd Ruge (ARD), Bernd Nielsen-Stokkeby (dpa, 1957 – 1963), and since 1961, many journalists have been accredited, such as Klaus Arnsperger (SZ), Heinz Schewe (Die Welt), Heinz Lathe (Ruhr-Nachrichten), etc. For more information, see Julia Metger. *Studio Moskau. Westdeutsche Korrespondenten im Kalten Krieg*. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016, 31, 38.
2 For a review of the difficult nature of communication with Western journalists, see Metger. 2016, 86 – 89.
3 Today, Kopelev's written legacy can be found in Germany (Ost-European Institute in Bremen) and Russia (RGALI in Moscow), but a substantial number of documents detailing how the literature transfer took place either do not exist or are not available, and records about important meetings may have never existed.
4 See Lew Kopelew. *Aufbewahren für alle Zeit!* Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1976; Lew Kopelew. Verbietet die Verbote! In *Moskau auf der Suche nach der Wahrheit*. Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1977; Lew Kopelew. *Und schuf mir einen Götzen. Lehrjahre eines Kommunisten*. Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1979; Lew Kopelew. *Tröste meine Trauer. Autobiographie 1947 – 1954*. Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1981.

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Union – to a dissident who was harassed by the government, eventually leading to him losing his Soviet citizenship. A detailed biography of Kopelev can be found in Reinhard Meier's[5] *Lew Kopelew: Humanist und Weltenbürger*[6] and Wolfgang Eichwede's *Jahrhundertbiographie*, in which he describes Kopelev as the Russian thinker and writer with the most impact on political culture and the public in Western Germany.[7]

Together with his wife, Raissa Orlova, Kopelev published many books about their life in Moscow and later Germany.[8] The book *Von Moskau an den Rhein. Der Humanist Lew Kopelew in Nordrhein-Westfalen*[9] features numerous articles focusing on different aspects of Kopelev's life as a scientist, author and civil-rights activist as well as his activities after moving to Germany. Different collections of letters[10] have also been published, of which *Briefwechsel: Heinrich Böll – Lew Kopelew*[11] is especially important in the context of this work. This chapter, however, focuses on an aspect that has thus far received only scant attention: the influence of Lev Kopelev on Heinrich Böll, Kopelev's role in the distribution of West German literature in the USSR and his general contribution to West German–Soviet cultural relations.

Lev Kopelev and the Soviet State

In speaking about Lev Kopelev, it is important to consider the reason why his involvement in cultural relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as in German literature, is so special from a biographical point of view. He was born in Kiev on 9 April 1912 and worked as a journalist at a steam engine man-

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5 Reinhard Meier served as a correspondent for over 20 years for the Swiss newspaper *NZZ* in Moscow. See Reinhard Meier. *Journal 21.ch*. Accessed 14 November 2017. URL: www.journal21.ch/autoren/reinhard-meier

6 See Reinhard Meier. *Lew Kopelew: Humanist und Weltenbürger*. Darmstadt: WBG, 2017.

7 See Wolfgang Eichwede. Jahrhundertbiographie. Lev Kopelevs Erbe. In *Aufrechter Gang. Lev Kopelev und Heinrich Böll,* Manfred Sapper, Volker Weichsel (eds.), 5. Berlin: BWV, 2012.

8 See Raissa Orlowa and Lew Kopelew. *Wir lebten in Moskau*. Munich, Hamburg: Albrecht Knaus Verlag GmbH, 1987; Raissa Orlowa and Lew Kopelew. *Wir lebten in Köln*. Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1996.

9 Lew Kopelew Forum, (ed.). *Von Moskau an den Rhein. Der Humanist Lew Kopelew in Nordrhein-Westfalen*. Nümbrecht: Kirsch, 2008.

10 See, e.g. Tanja Walenskij (ed.). *Sehnsucht nach Menschlichkeit: Der Briefwechsel*. Göttingen: Steidl, 2017; Raissa Orlowa and Lew Kopelew. *Briefe aus Köln über Bücher aus Moskau*. Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1987.

11 See Elsbeth Zylla (ed.). *Briefwechsel: Heinrich Böll – Lew Kopelew*. Göttingen: Steidl, 2011.

ufacturer in Kharkov, becoming a dedicated communist. He was sent from his company magazine to Mirgorod to support the collectivisation of agriculture and encourage farmers to deliver their grain to the municipal administration.[12] From 1933, he studied, first in Kharkov, then in Moscow, graduating from the German language faculty of the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Languages in 1935. After 1938, he taught literature and history at the Moscow Institute of Philosophy. There, he did his PhD on Schiller. A fluent speaker of German, he fought as a propaganda officer against the Nazis during WWII. Although he was of Jewish ancestry and some of his family had been killed in Babi Jar[13] in 1941, he tried to prevent cruelties against the German civilian population. Because of this, he was denounced and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, accused of bourgeois humanism and compassion towards the enemy.[14]

In the prison camp of Marfino, he met Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who portrayed Kopelev as the communist philologist and teacher Rubin in *V kruge pervom* [*In The First Circle*]. After Stalin's death and the period of the first Thaw, Kopelev was released. After his rehabilitation in 1956, he worked as a lecturer and research fellow at the Moscow Polygraph Institute from 1957 to 1968 and, from 1960 to 1968, at the Institute for the History of Arts.

One might think that, after the hardship endured from trying to protect others, he would not dare stand up for others again. However, after Brezhnev became the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1964, and hardliners began to gain the upper hand, Kopelev dedicated himself to fighting for the rights of dissidents and the politically persecuted and campaigned for human rights and against censorship.[15] He explained his actions by referring to his conscience, as can be seen in his comments on Yuli Daniel's[16] works in

12 In the years 1932–1933, a man-made famine, the *Holodomo*r, took place. Millions of people starved to death during this time, and Kopelev's actions helped to take grain away from the farmers. Due to his communist beliefs, he was convinced that he was doing the right thing for the victory of communism. Later on, his conscience tortured him in light of these actions. See Reinhard Meier. *Lew Kopelew.* Frankfurt am Main: Theiss Verlag, 2017, 49, 58–59.

13 At this place, 33,771 Jews were killed by the Nazis. For more information, see Holocaust-Referenz. Argumente gegen Ausschwitzleugner. *Das Massaker von Babi Jar "... fanden sich über 30 000 Juden ein"*. Accessed 5 November 2017. URL: www.h-ref.de/krieg/sowjetunion/babi-jar/babi-jar.php

14 See Lew Sinowjewitisch Kopelew. Lebensdate. In *Von Moskau an den Rhein. Der Humanist Lew Kopelew in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, Lew Kopelew Forum (ed.), 17. Nümbrecht: Kirsch, 2008.

15 See Brief an das Präsidium des IV. Kongresses des Allunionsschriftstellerverbundes der UdSSR, 23 May 1967. In Kopelew, 1977, 44–45.

16 Yuli Daniel published under the pseudonym Nikolai Arshak and was sentenced to five years in camp imprisonment. See Kopelew. 1977, 122.

1966.[17] This is also evident in his letter to the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union[18] against the trials of Galanskov,[19] Ginsburg,[20] Dobrovolski[21] and Lashkova[22]:

> Every citizen, and even more every member of the Communist Party, bears responsibility for everything that happens in the name of the Soviet state. Conscious of this responsibility, I consider it my duty as a citizen and party member to write to you. Although all my earlier appeals have been left without reply, I cannot act otherwise.[23]

This letter was followed by a great number of other protest letters against the exclusion of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,[24] Lidia Chukovskaya and Vladimir Voinovich and many others from the Writers' Union.[25]

Kopelev understood with sorrow that improvements in Soviet life brought by the Thaw would not be permanent and that Stalin was partly rehabilitated, especially as a wartime hero. Therefore, he decided to make his fears public by publishing a 1968 article – "Ist eine Rehabilitierung Stalins möglich [Is a rehabilitation of Stalin possible]?"[26] – in the Viennese newspaper *Tagebuch* about the possibility of Stalin's rehabilitation. This resulted in his expulsion from the Communist Party. He also lost his job and was banned from publishing any of his writings.[27] He was not, however, expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers. This was due to his friendship with Heinrich Böll, as will be shown later in this chapter.

17 See Für Rechtsberatungsstelle Nr. 1 des Perwomajskij – Rayons der Stadt Moskau vom 05.06. 02.1966. In Kopelew. 1977, 39–43.
18 Vgl. Text in: Kopelew. 1977, 54–56.
19 The editor of the illegal magazine *Phönix 66* was sentenced to seven years camp imprisonment in 1968. He died there. See Kopelew. 1977, 117, FN 4.
20 Alexander Ginsburg wrote the protocol to the trial of Siniavski and Daniel. He was sentenced to five years of camp imprisonment. See Kopelew. 1977, 123, FN 67.
21 Alexei Dobrowolski worked for *Phönix 66*. He was sentenced to two years' camp imprisonment. See Kopelew. 1977, 123, FN 68.
22 Vera Lashkova worked for *Phönix 66* and was sentenced to one year of imprisonment. In Kopelew. 1977, 123.
23 Kopelew. 1977, 54.
24 To the Administration of the Writers' Union of the USSR, 14 November 1969. In Kopelew. 1977, 78.
25 To the Moscow Organisation of the Writers' Union of the USSR, January 1974. In Kopelew. 1977, 81–83.
26 Text printed in Kopelew. 1977, 46–47.
27 See Marin Gräfin Dönhoff. Ein später Tolstoj. Preis der Deutschen Akademie für Lew Kopelew. *Zeit*, 16 May 1980. Accessed 15 August 2017. URL: www.zeit.de/1980/21/ein-spaeter-tolstoij

Thereafter, he worked as a freelance writer and scientist, lecturing in provincial universities, though this was quite difficult. Several publishing houses, including the prestigious Iskusstvo and Progress, annulled their contracts with him in 1968. Furthermore, his work *Tolstoy and Goethe* was removed from the anthology *Yasnapolyansky Sbornik,* and after 1974, he was forbidden from cooperating with theatres.[28] Nevertheless, his support for dissidents did not cease. He continued to fight for the amnesty of political prisoners, such as Andrey Tverdochlebov and Sergey Kovalyov, and demanded that ideological opponents should only be fought with ideological weapons.[29] For these activities, he was finally expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers in 1977.

Around 1977, Kopelev described himself and his motivation to help others:

> Today I do not belong to any party or political direction. I do not consider myself a dissident. I do not believe in any revelations, programmes or charters. But I am firmly convinced that for all the peoples of my country and those countries whose history I know, laws, which protect the security and the right of all men and individuals unconditionally and without restriction, are vital. The effective compliance with these laws is not conceivable without a genuine public, without real freedom of the word. Real freedom, that means freedom for oppositionists, for other believers, to speak and to publish. Without these laws, without publicity and tolerance, a healthy society cannot exist, none of the deadly dangers that threaten the whole of mankind can be averted. This conviction determines everything I say or write. Only my conscience can be guide, censor, and judge.[30]

He was repeatedly treated with hostility for his commitment to and relationship with foreigners. For example, in the satirical short story *Judas in the Role of Don Quixote,* which was published in *Sovyetskaya Rossiya* in February 1980, Kopelev was described as an "enemy of the party and the state". He was accused of "loving, almost traitorous relations with the West German Embassy in Moscow and with the Federal Republic of Germany in general."[31] This text was also published in newspapers of other towns and was broadcast on radio.[32] According to the West German TV correspondent Gerd Ruge, these were very dangerous claims against Kopelev because they were akin to the accusations that brought him a ten-year sentence after World War II. Thus, Kopelev was expecting another ar-

28 For further information, see Kopelew. 1977, 86 – 88.

29 Brief an das Politbüro des ZKs d. KPdSU, 9 April 1975. In Kopelew. 1977, 89.

30 Kopelew. 1977, 23. This and all other translations are from Astrid Shchekina-Greipel.

31 Gerd Ruge. Der unbeugsame idealist. In *Von Moskau an den Rhein. Der Humanist Lew Kopelew in Nordrhein-Westfalen*, Lew Kopelew Forum (ed.), 127. Nümbrecht: Kirsch-Verlag, 2008.

32 See Kopelev's comment on "Eine Erklärung von Andrej Sacharow", in *Worte werden Brücken. Aufsätze/Vorträge/Gespräche. 1980 – 1985*, Lew Kopelew (ed.). Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1985, 244.

rest.[33] These activities against Kopelev have to be seen in a broader domestic political context: The KGB intensified restrictions against dissidents shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. Consequently, many popular human rights activists were arrested, and the famous physicist, Andrey Sakharov, was expelled to Gorky.[34]

None of this stopped Kopelev from signing another protest letter in support of Andrey Sakharov. As a result, his wife, Raisa Orlova, was expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers. One might ask why Kopelev was not imprisoned again or declared mentally ill and put in a mental hospital, which was the case with many Soviet dissidents at the time. Most likely, the Soviet government was cautious because Kopelev was an internationally renowned figure and had friendships with several Western writers and other personalities. The Soviet Union wanted to avoid another scandal, so it decided on another strategy: After Kopelev and his wife were allowed to go on a one-year-study trip to Western Germany, they were stripped of their Soviet citizenship and declared persona non-grata in 1981, even though the Soviet government had promised German officials that they would not take this step.[35]

Following this, Kopelev and his wife decided to remain in Cologne. However, if the Soviets had hoped that this would end the Kopelevs' commitment to Soviet dissidents and the persecuted, they were hugely mistaken. His support for them grew even stronger, and he repeatedly drew general attention to the fate of such people in the Western media. For example, he authored an anthology *Für Sacharow. Texte aus Russland zum 60. Geburtstag am 21. Mai 1981*, in which he brought the fate of the famous physicist Sakharov to the attention of German readers. He also published in prestigious magazines, like his article "Neue Verhaftungswelle" in *Die Zeit*.[36]

In Germany, his commitment to German culture and human rights was honoured with various awards. In May 1980, he received an award from the German Academy for Language and Poetry (Deutsche Akademie für Sprache und Dich-

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33 See Ruge, 1985, 127.

34 For further information, see Alexander Daniel. Russland. In *biographisches Lexikon. Widerstand und Opposition im Kommunismus 1945–91*, Bundesstiftung für Aufarbeitung (ed.). 2016. Accessed 6 November 2017. URL: dissidenten.eu/laender/russland/oppositionsgeschichte/11/

35 It remains unknown why Kopelev and Orlova were allowed to leave the USSR for their one-year trip. Meier suggests that, on one hand, the intervention of Böll, Marion Dönhoff (publisher of the *Zeit*), former Chancellor Willi Brandt and others had an impact, but on the other hand, he also suggests that the Brezhnev government planned to get rid of Kopelev this way. See Meier. 2017, 204–205.

36 See Lew Koplew. Neue Verhaftungswelle. *Die Zeit*, 4 September 1981. Accessed 1 August 2017. URL: www.zeit.de/1981/37/neue-verhaftungswelle

tung) in Darmstadt and, in 1981, the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade. His commitment to helping his colleagues in the Soviet Union went so far that he even used awards in his aim to help other dissidents. Klaus Bednarz, for example, described Kopelew in the preface to *Zeitgenossen. Meister. Freunde:*

> In context with the Gundolf Prize we requested an interview. Lew Kopelev agreed – on one condition: that he could mention names in front of the camera. Names of persecuted German philologists in Kiev and Riga, in Tbilisi and Leningrad. Names that none of us knew, names unknown even to colleagues in foreign countries. Years later, already in the Federal Republic, Kopelev gave interviews under the condition of mentioning names. The name of Andrey Sakharov, who was exiled to Gorky, the names of innumerable political prisoners in camps and prisons.[37]

Kopelev also strongly supported human rights movements such as the members of the Helsinki Group,[38] and was in contact with many intellectuals and important personalities in the West, such as Max Frisch, Willy Brandt and Heinrich Böll. He died on 18 June 1997 in Cologne, Germany.[39]

Kopelev was an important intermediary who has largely been forgotten today. There are several reasons why he should not be forgotten, beginning with his role as a defender of the German civilian population, even though he was a Soviet Jewish officer. For this, he paid a high price. Further, as demonstrated below, his role as a literary and cultural mediator between Germany and the Soviet Union was very important. Finally, his role as fighter and defender of Soviet dissidents and the politically persecuted made a difference.

Kopelev's Role in German–Soviet Cultural Relations

One of Kopelev's most important roles was that of a literary mediator.[40] His aim was to popularise German literature and culture in the Soviet Union. He trans-

37 Klaus Bednarz. Namen nennen.... In *Zeitgenossen. Meister. Freunde*, Raissa Orlowa, Lew Kopelew (ed.), 9. Munich and Hamburg: Albrecht Knaus Verlag, 1989.
38 Lew Kopelew. Ist Freiheit in Rußland möglich? In *Worte werden Brücken. Aufsätze/Vorträge/Gespräche. 1980–1985*. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1985, 80–99. See also Bürgerrechte und Menschenrechte als. Prüfsteine einer freien Gesellschaft. In *Freiheit, was ist das?* Dietrich Wellershoff (ed.). Herford: Mittler Verlag, 1984, np.
39 See Lew Sinowjewitisch Kopelew. Lebensdaten. In *Lew Kopelew Forum*, 2008, 16–18.
40 Marijan Dović uses the term literary mediator as "one of the constituent pillars of intra-systemic communication" in consideration of Bourdieu's model of the literary and cultural field.

lated and commented on many German writers, such as Anna Seghers, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Heinrich Böll. He was the author of a major biography of Brecht, a book on Goethe's *Faust* and a historical overview of German theatre science from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. Furthermore, he wrote prefaces to various works, such as Heinrich Böll's *And Never Said a Word* [*Und sagte kein einziges Wort*], and worked as a translator for Böll's *Die unsterbliche Theodora*[41] [*Bezmertnaya teodora*] (1962). During the Stalin era, very little foreign contemporary literature was translated. Afterwards, the works of Kopelev and other translators became all the more important for Soviet readers: it was the first chance to come in contact with the Western world and to understand how people in the capitalist world lived and thought.

Even more important was Kopelev's work as a reviewer of Western German literature. The magazine *Sovremennaya khudozhestvennaya literatura za rubezhom*, despite its low circulation (its highest readership was achieved in 1983 with around 16,000 copies), was very important. The reviews in it discussed unpublished works in the Soviet Union and were read by publishers and journalists to form initial opinions about different works. This could lead to future publications.[42] Kopelev worked for this journal, writing many reviews, for example, for Heinrich Böll's *The Clown* [*Ansichten eines Clowns*], under the title *Razmyshleniya klouna*, (1963/9), which will be elaborated on later, Martin Walser's *Die Gallistl'sche Krankheit* (1972/6), Heinrich Böll's *Group Portrait with Lady* [*Gruppenbild mit Dame*] (1972) and many others.

In addition, Kopelev published in the most important literary journals of the country through the 1960s. These included *Novy Mir* and *Inostrannaya literatura*, for which he wrote about Böll's *End of a Mission* and translated Rainer Rilke's poems into Russian. In 1968, he published an encyclopaedia article on German literature in *Kratkaya literaturnaya Entsiklopediya*. These works helped to popularise West German literature among Russian readers and increased their understanding of the Western world through literature. This may sound trivial, but it is important to recall that the Soviet view of the capitalist world was strongly col-

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Marijan Dović. Who Chooses? Literature and Literary Mediation. *Primerjalna književnost* 22, no. 2 (2010): 167. In the context of this paper, the term is used to describe a person who puts all his efforts into popularising the works of a foreign (here Western German) author in the literary field.

41 Genrich Bëll. Bezmertnaja teodora [Immortal Theodora]. *Isvestija*, 25 September 1962.

42 See Bibliograficheskiy ukazatel' 1972–1993. Sovremennaya Khudozhestvennaya Literatura za Rubezhom – Diapazon [bibliographical reference of the journals Sovremennaya Khudozhestvennaya Literatura za Rubezhom and Diapazon 1972–1993]. *Vestnik inostrannoy literaturï,* no. 4 (1994): 8.

oured ideologically and that it was very difficult to obtain neutral information through mass media or travel. Therefore, Western literature provided a rare chance to access alternative views on life outside the Soviet Union. His work as a literary mediator, however, was disrupted by the publishing ban from 1968 onwards.

Kopelev also played a major role as a cultural mediator.[43] He brought the German public closer to Russia and researched the nature of the relations between Russia and Germany. In his memoirs, he vividly portrayed Soviet culture and way of life. For example, in *We lived in Moscow*[44] and *Zeitgenossen, Meister, Freunde,*[45] not only is the life of the Kopelev family portrayed, but also the broader dissident scene in the USSR.

His project *West-östliche Spiegelungen*[46] played an important role in explaining German–Russian relations. This ongoing project examines the German perspective on Russians and Russia, and vice versa, by exploring the history of relations between the two countries. The project was initiated by Kopelev at Wuppertal University in 1982, and he led until his death. It deals with the origin of foreign images and their transformation over the centuries.

Finally, he played the role of "door-opener" between East and West. According to the Russian author Vladimir Kornilov, it was quite risky for a Soviet citizen to be in contact with foreign people and far worse to speak of bringing them into his/her home. Therefore, many Soviet citizens were very hesitant about foreign connections because of the risk.[47] Kopelev's importance to foreigners in the Soviet Union can be best described in the words of journalist Fritz Pleitgen: "Lev

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43 The term cultural mediator is here used as analogous to the German understanding of "Kulturvermittler", but without the aspect of school-based education. It is used to describe Kopelev's attempt to bring greater insight about German culture to Soviet Russia and vice versa. For more information on the term "Kulturvermittler" in German-speaking areas, see Carmen Mörsch. "Kulturvermittlung" as a collective term in German-speaking areas. *Time for Cultural Mediation* (Institute for Art Education of Zurich University of the Arts [ZHdK]). Accessed 5 November 2017. URL: www.kultur-vermittlung.ch/zeit-fuer-vermittlung/v1/?m=1&m2=1&lang=e

44 See Orlowa and Kopelew, 1987.

45 Orlowa and Kopelew, 1989.

46 For part A, see *Russen und Rußland aus deutscher Sicht:* Fink Verlag: west-östliche Spiegelungen Reihe A. URL: www.fink.de/katalog/reihe/west_oestliche_spiegelungen_re-1.html and for part B *Deutsche und Deutschland aus russischer Sicht:* Fink Verlag: west-östliche Spiegelungen Reihe B. www.fink.de/katalog/reihe/west_oestliche_spiegelungen_re.html

47 Vgl. Wladimir Kornilow. Ein stürmisches und paradoxes Leben. In *Einblicke – Lew Kopelew. Ein photographisches Portrait,* Bernd-Michael Maurer (ed.), 23–27. Cologne: no information, 2002, 25. Original in Russian language: Kornilov, Vladimir: burnaya i paradoksal'naya zhizn' L 'va Kopeleva. Lechaim, 2001. ELUL 5761–9 (113). Accessed 15 August 2017. URL: www.lechaim.ru/ARHIV/113/kornilov.htm.

Kopelev was considered a source for insider tips among the knowledgeable foreigners in Moscow. [...] He had endless knowledge about Russian culture, history and contemporary issues. Many generations of correspondents and diplomats have benefitted from that."[48] This kind of exchange, however, was beneficial not just to German correspondents. The significance of these meetings had far greater meaning.

> Lev Kopelev, as well as Bogatyrov[49], broke through this wall of fear and alienation, a wall no less impenetrable than the Berlin wall. He brought together well-known Western personalities – writers, journalists, and television broadcasters – and Russian dissidents and writers. Through these contacts, manuscripts and letters of the human rights movement reached the West, and support from the West came for arrested dissidents. Kopelev was a friend of half of Moscow, and in his home, East and West met each other for the first time in Russia in a lively exchange. [...] In his home met people with a variety of different views.[50]

Certainly, Kopelev was neither the first nor the last person to be in contact with foreigners, to love German literature and to support dissidents. Yet, his contacts, along with his enthusiasm, energy and will to achieve his aims, made him an extraordinary personality. He was the liaison facilitating the exchange between the German public, journalists, cultural workers, politicians and dissidents, offering them an unofficial platform to present their concerns and problems. Without him, the Western public might not have been able to gain such a strong insight into unofficial cultural life in the Soviet Union, and many dissidents would have been left without support from the West. In her work about journalists from West Germany, Metger points out that Kopelev was the "grand seigneur" of the liberal Soviet *Intelligentsiya*, having had contact with journalists.[51]

As his biography shows, Kopelev's actions were often followed by restrictions on him and his family. This finally ended both his and his wife's careers in the USSR. He was certainly aware of the risk, maybe even afraid, but this did not stop him. This makes Kopelev unique and important, even today.

48 Fritz Pleitgen. Ein Russe am Rhein. In *Lew Kopelew Forum*, 2008, 9.

49 Konstantin Bogatyrev (1925 – 1976), soviet translator, literary scholar and dissident, who died under unclear circumstances. For more, see Wolgang Kasack. Konstantin Bogatyrev i ego druz′ya. In *Poet-Perevodchik Konstantin Bogatyrev. Drug nemetskoy literaturï*, Wolfgang Kasack, (ed.), 11 – 20. Munich: Otto Sagner, 1982.

50 Kornilow. 2002, 25.

51 See Metger. 2016, 157.

Heinrich Böll's Encouragement from the USSR and His Friendship with Kopelev

The foreigner who probably had the most significant impact on Kopelev's life, and vice versa, was the 1972 Nobel Prize winner Heinrich Böll. They met in September 1962, when Böll came to Moscow with a writers' delegation. Their relationship quickly transformed into a profound friendship. As a Böll admirer, Kopelev was enthusiastic about everything Böll wrote and often recited his works and letters at home in front of his circle of acquaintances, a majority of whom were part of the Moscow intelligentsia. He repeatedly asked Böll for proofs or other forms of still-unpublished manuscripts so that the translation of his works could be initiated. Thus, Kopelev wrote about *The Clown*, published in Germany in 1963 under the title *Ansichten eines Clowns:*

> Please, please, let us get the booklet of "the clown" faster. As for the translation and the edition, I will do all that is in my power so that nothing is done against your will, and if you do not agree to any abridgements of the text, then it is better to postpone the task.[52]

This shows his enthusiasm to put a publication through and his will to do everything in his power to secure this. As mentioned earlier, an instrument aimed at improving the chances of being published was to review a work in the magazine *Sovremennaya Khudozhestvennaya literatura za rubezhom*. Kopelev reviewed *The Clown*, about which the following assessment can be found:

> This is a book about love, so powerful and unhappy, about the artistic torments of a human and honest artist, about the arrogant meanness of educated hypocrites who call themselves "progressive Catholics". And finally, it is a book about how cruel and inhumane the rich, self-complacent life of successful bourgeois in today's West Germany is, and how directly their whole social and private existence is connected with the spiritual legacy of the Hitler period.[53]

This estimation of the work fully corresponds with the ideological requirements of the Central Committee on Foreign Literature. In 1958, this committee had critically commented on the work of Soviet publishers regarding their failure to do enough for the authorities to achieve their aim of using foreign fiction to show

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52 Brief 3/63 Lew Kopelew an Heinrich Böll vom 2 Juni 1963. In Zylla, 2011, 51.
53 Lev Kopelev, Genrich Bëll. Razmyshleniya klouna. Heinrich Böll, Ansichten eines Clowns. Roman [The Clown]. In *Sovremennaya khudozhestvennaya literatura za rubezhom* (1963/9): 20.

the Soviet reader "the inevitable destruction of all capitalist systems, and the deadly influence of imperialism on the fate of men".[54]

One can therefore assume that Kopelev, who wanted to see the work published, deliberately chose these formulations to increase the likelihood. The aim of this review was not to show his honest ideas about the text, but to write an assessment, which would make it easier for the publisher to release this novel. This intention was obviously successful, as the publishing house Progress published the work in 1965. Progress certainly followed *Sovremennaya khudozhestvennaya literatura za rubezhom*, since the journal informed publishers and was one of the few sources of information about works not previously translated into Russian. As pointed out, Kopelev maintained his promise to Böll to do everything in his power to publish his work. However, he was unable to prevent omissions and other acts of censorship against the text.

But how did the transformative process of Lev Kopelev, from an acknowledged expert of German literature to a "disruptive factor" and a dissident, influence relations between Heinrich Böll and Soviet cultural institutions? At Kopelev's request, Böll supported the cause of persecuted writers in the USSR, writing protest letters as a private individual and as the president of the International PEN-Club. Böll also publicly supported Kopelev, for example, in *Plädoyer für einen Freund* in 1968.[55] At that time, the support expressed by Kopelev and his friends for persecuted writers in a protest letter exposed them to accusations from the secretariat of the Moscow Writers' Union. In his article, Böll appealed to German–Soviet friendship:

> It is just my translator, Kopelev, whom I count among my friends, and his friends, who have practiced understanding and peace through their existence and communist self-understanding. It would be a huge blow to Kopelev's friends, including Anna Seghers, Erwin Strittmatter, and John Updike, if he and his friends were jeopardised in their existence – it would be "water on the mills of the worst opponents of the Soviet state".[56]

With the last sentence, Böll referred to the accusations of the Writer's Union that Kopelev and his friends had worked against the USSR by writing this protest letter. Kopelev remembered the effect of this article:

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54 Aymermakher, N., Afiani, V. Yu., Bayrau, D., Bonvetsh, B. & Tomilina, N. G. (eds.) *Ideologicheskiye komissii TsK KPSS 1958–1964: Dokumentï* [Department of Culture of the CPSU Central Committee 1958–1964]. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998.

55 See Heinrish Böll. Plädoyer für einen Freund. Die Verfolgung der sowjetischen Intellektuellen: Wasser auf die Mühlen der Gegner vom 10.05.1968. *Die Zeit*, 10 May 1968. Accessed 25 August 2017. URL: www.zeit.de/1968/19/plaedoyer-fuer-einen-freund

56 Heinrich Böll, 1968.

> I was expelled from the party in 1968. But I was not excluded from the Writers' Union. Why? Because Heinrich Böll at that time spoke on the radio and published his article "Plädoyer für einen Freund" in *Zeit*. So, I only got a reprimand. It has also been given to others who were known abroad. For a long time, it remained a kind of reinsurance.[57]

In addition, during Böll's presidency of the International PEN-Club (1971–1974), the Soviet Germanists Efim Etkind, Lev Kopelev and Nikolay Lukash were admitted to the PEN-Club in Germany in recognition of their contributions to German language and literature. This also offered some protection to them. When asked in an interview with René Wintzen what motivated him to support known and unknown Soviet people in need, Böll answered:

> I went to the Soviet Union for the first time in 1962, as a member of an official delegation of the Federal Republic [...] I formed immediate personal friendships with some Soviet colleagues, proper personal friendships. Many things have developed out of these friendships, and friendships with others. I then dealt with the problems of non-published writers in the Soviet Union [...] After becoming the president of the international PEN club, I felt obliged to become active. [...] The subject became more intense, because real personal friendships arose. It is a different matter, whether you are writing, signing telegrams or signing for anyone, when you are personally acquainted with him and are friends with him. There is a different dimension that makes a stronger engagement, and this fierce commitment is of course also useful to unknown people.[58]

These examples show that the Soviet Union did pay attention to foreign opinions and that it tried to avoid scandals. This is due to the fact that the Soviet Union was very interested in establishing good relationships with the West, especially in the economic sphere. Political factors and diplomacy also played a major role. Böll, a famous author, was widely respected internationally, and he had good connections, not only in the cultural sphere but also in the political field. Clearly, his criticism had to be taken seriously because his opinions did resonate. Furthermore, in his position as the president of the International PEN-Club, the Soviet Union had its own plans for Böll: The USSR Writers' Union wanted to be included as a collective member in the PEN club.

Yet, despite his influence, he was not always able to have his way with the Soviet Union. Another person who played an extremely important role in Böll's "status" in the Soviet Union was Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Böll met him in Moscow in 1970, against the wishes of the Soviet Writers' Union. This contact is also

57 Heinrich Böll, Lew Kopelew and Heinrich Vornweg. *Antikommunismus in Ost und West*. Cologne: Bund Verlag GmbH, 1982, 12.

58 Heinrich Böll. *Eine deutsche Erinnerung. Interview mit René Wintzen*. Cologne: dtv Verlagsgesellschaft, 1978, 85–86.

attributable to Kopelev, who had known Solzhenitsyn since their time together at the Marfino prison camp. When Solzhenitsyn was forced to leave the Soviet Union in 1974, he first stayed with Böll. For Böll, this had extreme consequences. The translator Evgeniya Kazeva remembers that from this point onwards, the publication of Böll's works in the Soviet Union was strictly forbidden, and his name could only be recorded in general surveys.[59]

The fact that Böll was nevertheless allowed to enter the Soviet Union in 1975 is to be seen in the context of his presidency of the PEN-Club. However, after he rejected the Soviet petition for collective membership in PEN, the Soviet government decided to change its approach to Böll. This becomes clear from a letter written by the secretary of the Soviet Writers' Union to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party:

> In our opinion, it is advisable for all Soviet organisations to show towards Böll an underlined coldness at this time, to make critical comments about his unfriendly behavior, and to indicate, that the only right course of action for him is to refuse to cooperate with the anti-Soviets, as this cooperation casts a shadow over the humanist writer's name and leads him to an ideological and creative impasse.[60]

As Kopelev was already excluded from the Writers' Union, regarded as a dissident and also known to be Böll's closest friend in the Soviet Union, thus keeping Böll informed about everything happening in the USSR, it is highly probable that Kopelev was considered one of these "anti-Soviets", even though he was not mentioned by name.

It appears obvious that Böll's commitment to the Soviet Union was influenced by his friendship with Kopelev, who had made him aware of the fate of his colleagues. For Böll's reputation as a writer in the USSR, this friendship had a positive impact at the beginning, but became costly over time. However, it must be said that Böll was probably aware of this risk and was willing to face the consequences of helping Soviet intellectuals in peril.

The indefatigable work of Lev Kopelev has had significant implications, up to the present day. After his death, the Lew Kopelew Forum was founded in 1998.

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59 Jewgenija Kazewa. Heinrich Böll in der Sowjetunion. In *Literaturen in der "Sowjetunion". Deutsch-"sowjetisches" Schriftsteller- und Schriftstellerinnen-Treffen*, Heinrich Böll-Haus Langenbroich, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (ed.), 120. Cologne: Die Stiftung, 1991.

60 Sekretar′ Pravleniya SP SSSR. CK KPSS. 24 February 1975 g. Nr. 5/38 (Without title). In Sergey Zemlyanoy. Tselesoobrazno proyavlyat khholodnost. Genrich Bell′pod nadzorom sovetskikh pisateley. [It is advisable to show coldness. Heinrich Böll under the supervision of Soviet writers]. In *Politicheskij zhurnal* no. 23 (2005). Politicheskij zhurnal Archiv no. 23(74) / 27 June 2005. Accessed 23 July 2011. URL: www.politjournal.ru.

The association set itself the task of keeping the memory of Lev Kopelev and his work alive and implementing his convictions, as demonstrated on in its official homepage:

> It is through the realisation that education, a profound knowledge of the culture and history of "the other" is the best means of countering negative stereotypes that the convergence between people and nations occurs, providing incentives for continuity, development and the lasting existence of good relations between the countries [...].[61]

The Forum provides numerous materials on Kopelev and his work, but the personal contact between groups and institutions is also an important pillar of its work. It is committed to the expansion of cultural, scientific and economic relations with Eastern Europe. Since 2001, it has awarded the annual Lew Kopelew Prize for Peace and Human Rights. This prize salutes people, projects or organisations that act in the spirit of Kopelev. The aim of the prize is to ensure that the work of prize winners reaches a wider public. Prize winners have included, among others, the Russian human rights organisation "Memorial" (2002).

It is clear that Kopelev played an important role in making German literature known in Russia, but he also made an important contribution to educating German society about life and problems in the Soviet Union. He increased awareness of the dangers facing those who thought in ways that deviated from the official party line. Without people like him, the cultural-political exchange would have been limited to the purely official version, since it would have been simply impossible for German civil and governmental organisations to penetrate this network of dissidents. His involvement in the faith of many dissidents changed their lives for the better. The support of the West saved them from the arbitrariness of Soviet trials, provided them with medical help and gave them a possibility to share their work with Western publishing houses. Kopelev performed a crucial role as a cultural mediator, providing a channel through which the concerns and problems of Soviet dissidents could become visible to the people, the media and the political leadership of Germany.

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61 The quote from Kopelev was given without any footnotes or further explanation regarding its origin. Lew Kopelew Forum. *Das Lew Kopelew Forum*. Accessed 30 July 2017. URL: www.kopelew-forum.de/lew-kopelew-forum-geschichte.aspx.

Natalia Tsvetkova

Universities during the Cultural Cold War: Mapping the Research Agenda

Universities and education systems were at the epicenter of the ideological competition between the superpowers. Institutions of education swayed the orientation of the elite in their respective countries during the Cold War, and the elite's political loyalty to either ideological bloc, whether that of the United States or the Soviet Union, contributed to their country's promotion of either US or Soviet political, military, and economic aims. The superpowers considered such institutions, particularly universities, to be effective transmitters of values, political culture, and models of education and thus included them in their systems of national security and foreign policy.

At universities outside the United States and the Soviet Union, both Washington and Moscow orchestrated transformations patterned on US or Soviet models by establishing new departments in the fields of liberal arts and Marxist philosophy, by revising study plans for academic degrees, by introducing new disciplines in political science, Marxism, American studies, Soviet history, English, and Russian, and by re-educating teaching staff so that all such changes contributed to the modernisation and either the Americanisation or Sovietisation of national education in their countries. However, all of those transformations encountered some degree of opposition from academic communities, which instead wanted to sustain local traditions and did not always admire the Americanisation or Sovietisation of their national universities. At the universities of divided Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, such so-called "unfriendly" academic communities, typically referred to as the *conservative professoriate* in both US and Soviet documents, resisted the implementation of either US or Soviet models of education and research and thereby hindered the cultural diplomacy of both superpowers.

However, cultural Cold War studies have not yet proposed a comprehensive analysis of these hidden relationships between the USA/USSR and key universities in different regions. Neither has the behaviour of the professoriate as a staunch defender of the national and sometimes archaic traditions of their university systems that restrained both modernisation and/or Americanisation/Sovietisation received serious scholarly attention. The experience of the universities that endured the cultural influence of either Washington or Moscow and the consequences of the superpowers' transformations and impositions should be incor-

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porated into the studies of Cold War cultural diplomacy/public diplomacy and beyond.

Hence, this chapter illustrates the contribution of professors in diminishing the Americanisation or Sovietisation of different universities around the world during the Cold War. The first section of the chapter reviews the works that deal with American or Soviet educational policies around the world. The second section introduces cases of the superpowers' policies at universities in countries such as Turkey, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Germany. The section consists of two parts; one discusses the transformations proposed by the US or Soviet governments for universities in Turkey, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Germany, whereas the other analyses the reactions and attitudes of the local professoriate to reforms proposed by US or Soviet advisors, visiting professors, and governmental officials. The third section discusses theoretical frameworks for studying the university policies of both superpowers in order to clarify what kind of conceptual frameworks can be used to understand the research agenda and, by extension, how the studies that result can alter traditional theoretical and methodological approaches to research on the cultural Cold War.

Universities in Cultural Cold War Studies

Examining the policy of both United States and the USSR towards universities during the Cold War, most scholars have emphasised transformations that occurred inside national American or Soviet universities, neglecting the influence of both superpowers on higher educational institutions located in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia.[1] Despite a wide corpus of archival sources, this external part of educational policies of both superpowers has been overlooked by scholars of the history of education, of the cultural Cold War, and of international relations. However, as some previous investigations touched the policies of both American and Soviet governments at universities abroad to some extent, they must be noted here. The discussions about American and Soviet policies of transformations at foreign universities can be found among numerous books and papers on academic exchanges, foreign assistance, cultural diplomacy, university-to-university partnership, and so on.

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1 David C. Engerman. *Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America's Soviet Experts*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009; Graham Loren. *Between Science and Values*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981; Noam Chomsky. *The Cold War and the University*. New York: New Press, cop., 1997; Tim Mueller. The Rockefeller Foundation, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities in the Cold War. *Journal of Cold War Studies* 15 no. 3 (2013): 108 – 135.

American and Soviet policies toward universities all over the world are mentioned in numerous scholarly writings about academic exchanges. The exchanges between professors and students sponsored and managed by the governments are reviewed from different perspectives. Some scholars interpret the state-to-state educational exchanges as a political instrument for shaping a favourable elite, other researchers look at them as a driver for university cooperation, while a third group views the exchanges between academics to be a source of new knowledge and technologies.[2]

Examples of American/Soviet reforms at universities of different countries have been studied, with American policies definitely having been studied more profoundly than the Soviet ones. The most illustrative example is a study on the Americanisation of universities in Great Britain. The authors conclude the Americanisation has been rolled back, and national traditions have survived.[3] This group of studies also includes the establishment of American colleges and universities abroad. The American University of Beirut, American colleges in Turkey, the American University in Cairo, etc. are still the most common themes in the scholarship.[4] In addition, the scholarship is enriched by the investigations into the establishment of institutions such as the Free University in Berlin and the Free European University in Exile in Strasbourg. A recent shift in the scholarship has been the study of the cultural Cold War in relation to the exis-

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2 Yale Richmond. Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: How the West Won. *American Communist History.* 9, no. 1 (2010): 61–75; Giles Scott-Smith. Mapping the Undefinable: Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Exchange Programmes Within International Relations Theory. *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008): 173–195; Liping Bu. Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War. *Journal of American Studies* 33, no. 3 (1999): 393–415; Zachary Abuza. The Politics of Educational Diplomacy in Vietnam. *Asian Survey* 36, no. 6 (1996): 618–631; Giles Scott-Smith. Networks of Influence: U.S. Exchange Programs and Western Europe in the 1980s. In *The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History*, Kenneth Osgood, Brian Etheridge (eds.), 345–370. Boston, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010; Chay Brooks. "The Ignorance of the Uneducated": Ford Foundation Philanthropy, the IIE, and the Geographies of Educational Exchange. *Journal of Historical Geography* 48 (2015): 36–46; Igor Czernecki. America and Human Capital Formation in Communist Europe: Aspirations, Reactions and Results. *International Review of Social Research* 4, no. 2 (2014): 61–74; Guangqiu Xu. The Ideological and Political Impact of U.S. Fulbrighters on Chinese Students: 1979–1989. *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 26, no. 3 (1999): 139–157.

3 Jean Bocock, Lewis Baston, Peter Scott, and David Smith. American Influence on British Higher Education: Science, Technology, and the Problem of University Expansion, 1945–1963. *Minerva: A Review of Science, Learning & Policy* 41, no. 4 (2003): 327–346.

4 Betty Anderson. American University of Beirut: Arab Nationalism and Liberal Education. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012.

tence of dissident universities in the countries of Eastern Europe like the Flying University in Poland and some universities-in-exile.[5]

The Soviet transformations of foreign universities have been studied by researchers whose research interests include development aid or foreign assistance during the Cold War. As a rule, the researchers analyse only special cases of Soviet educational policy abroad. The most illustrative example is the research by German scholars about Soviet preparatory departments established at the universities of client countries during the Cold War. The authors have found that these departments trained several generations of doctors, engineers, and builders, and the Soviet educational policy contributed more to the development of economics than to implanting Soviet ideology.[6]

Two views on the cultural diplomacy of the superpowers in the Third World dominate recent scholarship. The first view argues that the development aid proposed by the American/Soviet governments for universities abroad instilled the locals with solely American or Soviet ideologies. The second approach is more balanced and argues that both powers contributed to the development of national economies through their university policies. However, all similar studies neglect the reception and attitudes of the local academic corps toward the imposed transformations and revisions that occurred at national universities under the control of either American or Soviet experts.

Studies examining the fate of national universities in the countries enduring the military occupation by the Americans and Soviets are also present in recent historiography, focusing on occupied Japan, Germany, Korea, and so on. The scholars detail how the powers were responsible for interfering in national educational systems and the resulting resistance from the university administrations against the imposed models of teaching.[7]

The introduction of new disciplines such as American studies/Soviet history, English/Russian languages, Political Science/Marxism, etc. are also sub-

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5 Giles Scott-Smith. The Free Europe University in Strasbourg. *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 2 (2014): 77–107; Hanna Bucznska-Garewicz. The Flying University in Poland, 1978–1980. *Harvard Educational Review* 55, no. 1 (1985): 20–33.

6 Tim Kaiser, Tobias Kriele, Ingrid Miethe, and Alexandra Piepiorka. Educational Transfers in Postcolonial Contexts: Preliminary Results from Comparative Research on Workers' Faculties in Vietnam, Cuba, and Mozambique. *European Education* 47, no. 3 (2015): 242–259; Tom G. Griffiths and Euridice Cardona Charon. Education for Social Transformation: Soviet University Education Aid in the Cold War Capitalist World-System. *European Education* 47, no. 3 (2015): 226–241.

7 Esra Pakin. American Studies in Turkey during the Cultural Cold War. *Turkish Studies* 9, no. 3 (2008): 507–524; Natalia Tsvetkova. Americanisation, Sovietisation, and Resistance at Kabul University: Limits of the Educational Reforms. *History of Education* 46, no. 3 (2017): 343–365.

jects of study by scholars.[8] The most popular theme is the introduction of American Studies to European universities. The previous scholarship did not look closely at the same situation that surrounded the introduction of this field at universities in Africa, Latin America, and Asia that fell under American influence.

The final group of studies that can be referred to deal with the theme of American/Soviet policies towards students. Active and open positions of the students towards both American and Soviet actions at universities have survived in documents, accounts, memoirs, and so on, that have opened wide prospects for historians to reconstruct a policy of both the American and the Soviet sides toward the students. Hence, the relationship between the students, on the one hand, and the American or Soviet political powers, on the other, have been well documented by historians.[9] However, numerous questions relative to the behaviour of the professoriate and everyday communication between American/Soviet visiting experts and the local university community, are still beyond the sight of current studies of the cultural Cold War.

To sum up this overview of American and Soviet policies towards universities around the world during the Cold War, we can identify several important issues. Firstly, the reaction and behaviour of the professoriate toward the activity of both superpowers is still rarely examined, with little attention paid to the response, reaction, and behaviour on the part of the academic community who resisted and successfully restrained either the Americanisation or Sovietisation of their local educational institutions. Professors at universities in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia turned out to be the primary defenders of national university traditions. The reaction of the professoriate was not as open and active as that of the students, but it was much more effective at eventually undermining the efforts of both superpowers to alter the curricula of universities located in various countries. Secondly, archival records of the American and Soviet agencies mentioned above hold a number of reports about sabotage, ignorance, and harsh statements from local professors against the US- and Soviet-inspired reforms, but these have been ignored by the scholarship. Moreover, recent the study of Cold War universities needs to be chronologically expanded. Most of the studies have cen-

8 Natalia Tsvetkova. *The Failure of American and Soviet Cultural Imperialism in German Universities, 1945–1990*. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2013.

9 John Connelly. East German Higher Education Policies and Student Resistance, 1945–1948. *Central European History* 28, no. 3 (1995): 259–298; Oscar Garcia. A complicated Mission: The United States and Spanish Students during the Johnson Administration. *Cold War History* 13, no. 3 (2013): 311–329.

tred on the era of the 1950s and 1960s, neglecting the period of the 1970s and 1980s when the transformations proposed by both powers were actually rolled back at local universities. Finally, scholars have focused their studies on the cultural Cold War in Europe, neglecting other regions and crucial countries where the United States struggled with Moscow for dominant influence. Vietnam, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Guatemala, are a few of the countries where both Washington and Moscow encountered negative reactions of professors against prospective reforms at their local universities. A comparative historical analysis of the university policy of both superpowers can demonstrate the extent to which the rival states sought to exploit opportunities to implant their ideologies in oversees societies and the degree of success they achieved at revising local traditions at universities.

The following section of the chapter discusses the cases of Turkey, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and East and West Germany with regard to the relationship between American/Soviet advisers, visiting professors, and governmental officials, on one hand, and the local professorate, on the other. To investigate the university policies of the United States and Soviet Union in other countries during the Cold War, documents retrieved from the Records of the US Agency for International Development and the Records of the Soviet Ministry for Higher Education were used. The archives contain reports, letters, memoirs, and other formal and informal documents prepared by US and Soviet advisors and visiting professors who served as reformers of universities of client countries and faced first-hand conflicts over and resistance to their activities from local university personnel. Advisors recorded their impressions of the transformations, along with their successes and failures as agents of those transformations, in a variety of documents sent to either Washington or Moscow.

US and Soviet Transformations at Universities around the World: Different Values, One Approach

During the Cold War, universities in countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union played a key role in implementing the US brand of liberal democracy and the Soviet brand of Marxist socialism, as well as in equipping the up-and-coming generation with new systems of thinking for a new political culture. In those countries, both superpowers devised special education policies aimed at transforming client universities, in order to get them to accept US or Soviet political culture. Despite differences in their political systems and culture,

however, both superpowers pursued similar political ends by influencing the orientation of local academic elite towards either the US or Soviet value systems and models of education. Moreover, both US and Soviet policies primarily targeted the same components of university life: organisational structures, statutes, rectors, curricula, the student body, student units, holdings in university libraries, teaching methods, and, above all, the professoriate.

From that last vital component, however, the United States and the Soviet Union faced unanticipated criticism of revisions of university statutes. Among other actions, teaching staff resisted the introduction of new departments for the disciplines of, for instance, political science or Marxism, did not want to have to shift their traditional research interests to American studies or the history of proletarian revolutions, and refused to deliver classes in English or to study Russian. That segment of university faculty, often called the *conservative professoriate* by both superpowers, became the "gravediggers" of numerous reforms sought by Washington or Moscow, and, more importantly, the saviours of some local traditions of university education.[10]

To illustrate the contribution of professors to diminishing both Americanisation and Sovietisation during the Cold War in countries outside the United States and the Soviet Union, examples from universities in Turkey, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Germany, and many others are included here. The cases were selected in light of the availability of archival documents with detailed coverage of both US and Soviet transformations at universities, including reactions to the reforms from local academics. The most striking examples of such transformations involve the introduction of the English or Russian languages and political science or Marxism at the universities.

Introducing English and Russian languages

Competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in promoting English or Russian, respectively, at foreign universities was not only cultural but political as well. In particular, the United States had developed plans to introduce English as the language of instruction and research at foreign universities in

10 See for instance the following reports from occupied Germany. Higher Institutions. OMGUS Land Wuerttemberg-Baden [sic] (SEP), 1946. NARA. Record Group 260. Records of US Occupation Headquarters. World War II. Württemberg-Baden. Records of Education and Cultural Relations Division, 1945 – 1949. Box 913; Report. Implementation of the Plans by the Educational Division at the Soviet Military Education Division. 1947. State Archive of the Russian Federation Record Group P–7317. The Files of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. Inventory 55. File 3: 95.

countries where it had established close political partnerships. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Turkey was one such country, and its largest universities, Ankara University and Ataturk University, thus became primary targets for the US project. The US government had evaluated the introduction of English as a primary catalyst for the rapprochement of models of US and Turkish university education and, more importantly, for fostering a new and pliable elite in Turkey.

However, in the first round of negotiations regarding language reform during the mid-1960s, the Turkish Ministry of Education and universities under its purview expressed frustration with the implementation of English at institutions of higher education in the country. Although representatives of the teaching staff and the administration of the universities had rejected the idea of teaching courses in English and of revising their courses to suit the US model, the US team of professors from various US universities tasked with installing the reforms believed that such reluctance would dissolve. They even reported to Washington that "apathy, tradition and a strongly entrenched faculty are the main obstacles –– but they can be overcome by a combination of US know-how, direct-hire and contract assistance."[11] Despite resistance from academics in Turkey, the US government decided to proceed with the reform. Professors from Georgetown University drafted manuscripts for the new textbooks, titled *An Intensive English Course for Turks* and *Speaking English in Turkey*, which would be used to teach English at Turkish universities. In Turkey itself, the Mission of the Agency for International Development in Istanbul established a special department at both Ankara and Ataturk Universities to improve the English-language proficiency of teaching staff members who could feasibly begin delivering classes in English.[12] However, when US diplomats tried to convince the Turkish government that English needed to be introduced as the primary language of instruction at all Turkish institutions of higher education, the Turkish government, under pressure from local professors who wanted to maintain the primacy of native languages at their universities, blocked further US action. The publication of the textbooks was cancelled, and the Turkish Ministry of Education officially declared to the US team that

11 Report. USAID/Turkey, 1965. National Archive Records Administration (NARA). Record Group 286. USAID Mission to Turkey. Education Division. Box 1.

12 Contemplated Projects Under Study by the Education Division. Report. Education Division. USAID/Ankara, 1966. NARA. Record Group 286. USAID Mission to Turkey. Education Division. Box 1.

it would never publish the textbooks and that the English-language reform at Turkish universities would have to be terminated.[13]

In their final report, visiting US professors stated that Ankara was to blame for the failure, specifically that "the conservatism of Turkish academic circles has hampered efforts to make Ataturk University into a modern institution."[14] Discussing the reasons of their failure, the US team considered that the chief problems stemmed from the powerful positions of Turkish professors who exerted influence on teaching models at their universities and would not cooperate with Americans. The team also cited the instability of the Turkish political system and the numerous changes to its leadership, particularly in the Ministry of Education, which had handicapped the partnership between the US team and Turkish universities. Lastly, the team mentioned the failure of US staff serving at Turkish universities to account for the full scope of differences between the conditions and personnel at Turkish universities and those in US institutions of higher learning.[15] Only at the end of the final report did the US team allude to what can presumably explain all of the problems concerning transformations sought by the United States and the Soviet Union: the scarcity of "knowledge of the Turkish education system, understanding of the Turkish philosophy of education, and appreciation for the goals and objectives of Turkish education."[16] As the case exemplifies, all proposed US or Soviet transformations for foreign universities had been implemented by powers without any profound understanding of local traditions or the internal affairs at local universities.

The Soviet Union faced similar problems when it tried to introduce the Russian language at non-Soviet institutions of higher education. However, a crucial difference from the US approach was that the Soviet plan did not seek to make Russian a language of instruction but merely the topic of compulsory courses for students. For the Soviets, the major problem was re-educating, if not training from square one, a corpus of qualified teaching staff who could teach the Russian language. The development of Russian classes proceeded at a snail's pace due to the lack of teachers sufficiently proficient in Russian, even in countries such as East Germany where control over education was rigid. Although the out-

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13 Review of the Status of English Teaching in Turkey: Up-dating of Doran Report. Memorandum. Education Division, USAID/Ankara, n/d. NARA. Record Group 286. USAID Mission to Turkey. Education Division. Box 1.

14 Report. USAID/Ankara to Department of State, 1967. NARA. Record Group 286. USAID Mission to Turkey. Education Division. Box 2.

15 Ankara Technical Assistance Project: History and Analysis Report, 1968. NARA. Record Group 286. USAID Mission to Turkey. Education Division. Box 3.

16 Ibid.

look for Russian education in East Germany had slightly improved by the end of the 1960s, namely once German specialists in Russian had been trained in the Soviet Union, visiting Soviet professors in East Germany bemoaned their situation in a report to Moscow in the early 1970s. They noted that "new textbooks of Russian are absent, classes outside the university have never been arranged; students and their professors speak Russian very seldom, and their knowledge is very weak; students are admitted to Slavic departments without entrance examinations due to the low popularity of the Russian and the shortage of students."[17] During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet government attempted to improve the situation by increasing the number of requisite hours allocated to Russian-language studies in Departments of Humanities and Departments of Applied Science at East German universities. Visiting Soviet professors there introduced a new curriculum, published new textbooks, and developed extracurricular activities to encourage German students to speak Russian. Every year throughout the 1970s, roughly 100 Soviet teachers arrived at seven East German universities to improve the teaching of Russian but without any significant success. Consequently, in the mid-1980s, the Russian-language programs at the universities were terminated due to their inefficiency and lack of financial resources.

Promoting Political Science or Marxism at Universities

Another proposed initiative in universities outside the United States and Soviet Union was the introduction of political science courses by the US and the Soviet introduction of courses on Marxism. During the Cold War, the introduction of political science was considered to be an effective way to promote the US style of democracy in countries such as West Germany where ideological rivalry with the Soviets was strong. Conceived as a primary vehicle for fostering Germans with democratic values, political science was reportedly introduced at all West German universities. US experts also believed that introducing political science at German universities would prompt a fundamental change in the university ideology and, in time, would replace overly abstract philosophical disciplines with the study of how to practically manage a liberal society and be a citizen in that society. The wide-scoped plan for the introduction of the discipline was pre-

17 Reports of Soviet Professors on their Visits to the Universities of East Germany, 1975. State Archive of Russian Federation. Record Group 9563. Ministry of Education of the USSR. Inventory 1. File 2609. P. 40.

sented at a series of special conferences arranged for German professors in the early 1950s. Although attendees initially seemed to consent to the US plan, the senior professoriate sabotaged the introduction of political science at German universities by stating that the field, given its multidisciplinary approach, amounted to quasi-science. Consequently, although the study of political science at German universities existed on paper, it was not delivered to students for quite some time.[18] During the 1960s, experts at the US Department of State admitted that the status of political studies at German universities was far from satisfactory and that the universities regularly had vacant chairs in their Departments of Political Science.

To activate the discipline without encountering opposition, US officials proposed to establish new institutes and departments. They wrote that

> the older German universities looked too traditional and conservative and the founding of new ones could be more effective for the democratisation of the German university system: new institutions and universities might be the theater in which American and other visiting professors could make the most useful contributions, since it will be probable that such new institutions will less bound to tradition than the older ones and that theirs teaching staff will be more receptive to changes and improvements...[19]

The establishment of independent institutes at the universities and beyond, where disciplines such as political science were introduced by visiting professors and delivered by junior German staff, became a more or less effective means of countering the opposition of the older professoriate to new disciplines at German institutes of higher education. However, only when a new generation had taken power at German universities did political science become a major discipline in academic plans of study there.[20]

For their part, the Soviets attempted to instill universities abroad with disciplines that maintained a value consensus between those universities and Moscow—namely, courses on Marxist theory that promoted ideas about socialism and the Soviet model of the political system. However, as cases in East Germany

18 Memorandum on the State of Political Science at Western German Universities. Department of State, n/d. NARA. Record Group 59. International Information Administration. Field Program for Germany. Box 2.

19 Organisations benefited by Exchange Program. Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, A-757-A, Frankfurt, 1951. NARA. Record Group 59. Central Files 1950–54. Box 2451.

20 See, for example: Stephan Paulus. The Americanisation of Europe after 1945? The case of the German Universities. *European Review of History 9*, no. 2 (2002): 241–253; Tsvetkova. *Failure of American and Soviet Cultural Imperialism.*

and other countries illustrate, the Soviet reforms had limits as well. Although courses such as Fundamentals of Scientific Socialism, Historical Materialism, and Dialectical Materialism were designed to have an impact on students and to transform research methodologies in the studies of philosophy, history, sociology, pedagogy, literature, and music, they faced resistance from German professors. The opposition convinced the Soviets to postpone introducing the study of Marxism at East German universities until the late 1950s. Even after its formal introduction, however, it turned out that the professors were not in fact delivering any lectures on the discipline. Though the discipline existed on paper, Marxism was not taught in separate courses but included in a general course, Philosophy. Visiting Soviet professors reported to Moscow that "among the faction of *reactionary professors* [italics added], there is a tendency to limit and isolate Marxist disciplines, to not allow the penetration of Marxism into the teaching of any of the scientific disciplines, and into history, biology, the history of law, and philosophy in particular."[21] A Soviet professor sent to East Germany to deliver courses at the country's universities reported that "German professors, among whom only 8% are communists, consider that their duty is to prepare specialists, not true Marxists."[22] Another Soviet professor stated, "we have met resistance from professors who maintain the German traditional system of higher education. <...> It is necessary to talk with such professors and to convince them of the necessity to introduce proper ideological education among students."[23] Such complaints were documented during the entire period of the Cold War.

In many cases, students were the chief obstacle to the dissemination of Marxism in non-Soviet universities. Students sent to study at Soviet institutions of higher education openly resisted studying the discipline and complained to their embassies about Marxist indoctrination. The ambassadors of Indonesia, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and China demanded representatives of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reduce the number of ideological disciplines taught at their universities or else face the termination of educational exchange agree-

21 Reports on German Higher Educational Institutions, 1949. State Archive of Russian Federation. Record Group 7317. The Soviet Military Administration in Germany. Inventory 54. File 12. P. 60.

22 Reports of Soviet Professors on their Visits to the GDR, 1959. State Archive of Russian Federation. Record Group 9396. Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR. Inventory 19. File 36. P. 55.

23 The Correspondence between the Soviet Embassy in East Germany and the Soviet Central Apparatus on Cultural Cooperation, 1966. State Archive of Russian Federation. Record Group 9518. The Committee on Cultural Affairs with Foreign States at the Council of Ministries of the USSR. Inventory 1. File 883. P. 25.

ments. As another result, Cambodia, Algeria, Ceylon, Zambia, Rwanda, and Guinea interrupted the studies of their students at Soviet institutions. Students from East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Vietnam also refused to complete courses on Marxism and effectively forced the Soviets to diminish the amount of academic coursework allocated to Marxism. The students' victory was the cancellation of a final examination for a course on Marxism that Soviet students were required to complete, which allowed international students to waive the final classes for the course and thereby avoid Marxist indoctrination. Only in 1988 did the Soviet government decide to enforce such ideological education by increasing the required number of course hours dedicated to studying the discipline and by making the mentioned final exam compulsory. By then, however, it was too late to Sovietise the student body. The documents attest that the Soviet policy of imposing the study of ideological disciplines faced more criticism from academic communities than the US one. International students at US universities and students at universities under the influence of US reforms were often more inclined to submit to US values, disciplines, and research approaches. Americanisation seemingly did not excite such open, fierce opposition at foreign universities as did Sovietisation.

Sabotage and Resistance from Professors: Protecting Universities from Americanisation and Sovietisation

Both Washington and Moscow recognised that the key to success for their reforms at foreign universities was the favourable attitude of the people there, particularly the professoriate. For both powers, professors at foreign universities were often viewed as conservative forces that resisted change. These "old professors" were described as "reactionary professors of advanced age whose typical mood appears to be aloof, suspicious, expectant, and sceptical with respect to everything new,"[24] and as professors who were "in general those most resistant to change, most wedded to the old curricula, most attached to traditional methods of teaching, least cognisant of training students for effective citizenship, least aware of the social responsibilities of higher education, and least democrat-

24 Political Views of Intelligentsia in Germany, 1946. State Archive of Russian Federation. Record Group 7133. The Office of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, Sachsen-Anhalt. Inventory 1. File 273. P. 305.

ic in general."[25] Such arrogant evaluations from US and Soviet experts were common in reports on academic communities in Afghanistan, Germany, Ethiopia, and Turkey. The Cold War empires considered themselves to be the products of developed countries that offered foreign academics modernisation in the form of new tools, methods, and knowledge. University instructors who failed to absorb the so-called progressive ideas of liberal democracy or Marxism or to submit to the modernisation of their universities according to US or Soviet models were labelled as conservative, reactionary, and old.

Afghan Professors: Sabotage, Passivity, and Ignorance

The attempted transformations of non-US and non-Soviet universities to reflect US and Soviet educational systems, as well as the efforts of both powers to re-educate the teaching staff there, provoked a variety of oppositional behaviours. The most popular among professors were passivity, slowness, and reluctance to implement specific US or Soviet projects of education reform. For example, during the 1960s and 1970s, when the US government tried to introduce engineering education in Afghanistan, the project met the silent resistance of local professors who did not want to be re-educated in order to become able to teach US approaches. Although Afghan professors participated in US projects, they reluctantly supported US proposals to change methods of teaching, to introduce more practical classes, and to make students read more specialised books. In 1968, visiting US professors in a report to the US Department of State claimed to "have been trying to promote engineering research here [in Afghanistan], haven't had much success for five years. We could get the teachers to work if they were paid in addition, but if not, they will do nothing."[26] The Afghan teaching staff agreed with all the ideas proposed by the Americans but resisted implementing them in practice; professors postponed follow-up meetings, did not honor agreements, and did not introduce agreed-upon revisions into curricula, the study of disciplines, or the methods of teaching.

Soviet advisors often encountered more hostile reactions to their reforms at institutions of higher education, especially from the professoriate, than did

25 Report. University Education Section, 1948. NARA. Record Group 260. Records on U.S. Occupation Headquarters. Office of OMGUS. Box 915.
26 USAID/Afghanistan, 1968. NARA. Records Group 286. USAID Mission to Afghanistan. Education Division. Box 3.

Americans to theirs. At Afghan universities, lecturers trained in the Soviet Union did not cooperate with the Soviets when they returned home, and some even engaged in anti-Soviet activities.

Above all, the most difficult problem for both superpowers was the open or covert mobilisation of academics in organisations, groups, and societies dedicated to stalling either US or Soviet transformations at institutions of higher education. The Soviets, for example, could not block the activity of various Islamic organisations at Kabul University in Afghanistan beginning in 1983. The most popular was the Union of Professors and Students, whose members initiated demonstrations, disorder, sabotage, and even terrorism in the university's buildings. Kabul University became the center of Islamic resistance to the Soviet occupation of the country, and Soviet advisors were forced to report to Moscow that "there was considerable diversity in clandestine student and professor organisations: radicals, leftists, extremists, and Islamic conservative ones. They act against the Soviet Union."[27] The activity of the opposition impeded and ultimately upended all Soviet transformations at the university.

German Professors: Keeping Academic Freedoms and Traditions

In East Germany, professors were highly predisposed to resist Soviet reforms, as articulated by the specific stance of East German university professors throughout the Cold War. To mitigate hostile attitudes, the Soviets required all professors specialising in the social sciences and applied disciplines to expand their lectures in order to address Marxism–Leninism by the end of the 1960s. However, the results of their efforts were dismal. Some professors openly refused to introduce additional segments devoted to Marxist–Leninist philosophy in their lectures, while others who did address Marxist–Leninist philosophy did so without any personal conviction, as Soviet experts noted.[28] The experts additionally reported that those academics did not want to change their beliefs but preferred to maintain longstanding German traditions of education, including academic freedom and the separation of the university from politics, the latter of which es-

27 A Political Situation in Kabul University, 1983 – 1987. State Archive of Russian Federation. Record Group 9606. Soviet Ministry for Higher Education. Inventory 11. File 354. P. 26.

28 Reports on Cooperation between Pedagogical Institutes of the USSR and the GDR, 1984 – 85. State Archive of Russian Federation. Record Group 9563. The Ministry of Education of the USSR. Inventory 1. File 4974. P. 36 – 37.

pecially ran counter to Soviet policy. According to the reports, the Soviets had no idea how to manage German professors who were against the social order of East Germany and the USSR: "Many representatives of intelligentsia openly expressed their disappointment in the public system of the GDR and professional dissatisfaction and, therefore, aspire to flee to the Federal Republic of Germany."[29] As the problem continued unresolved, Moscow came to recognise that all of its efforts to sway Germany's professoriate to believe in the communist ideology had failed. The ideology of Marxism never became a deep, personal belief for German professors.[30]

In the far calmer West German context, the United States faced severe opposition from professors, who generally disapproved of the interference of the United States in German university education. German professors lost powerful faculty positions during the 1950s and 1960s, when they had to share administrative and decision-making positions with midlevel academic staff, nonacademic employees, and students. Furthermore, they had to tolerate reforms such as the replacement of rectors who served one-year terms with presidents who served for five to seven years, and finally, the establishment of departments in place of large faculties. In order to recoup their influence, German professors established two influential groups, the Emergency Committee for a Free University and the Alliance for Freedom and Science. The groups successfully lobbied for a bill on higher education that would ultimately reinstate the power of professors and their freedom to make decisions about academic programs and curricula, which conversely diminished the power of pro-US reformers. US diplomats in the country were exceptionally frustrated by the stance of the old professoriate at German universities and informed Washington that the prospects for the enactment of the bill had become "favourable for professors and unfavourable for us."[31]

The reluctance of local professors to cooperate and communicate on a daily basis with visiting professors and advisors from either the United States or the

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29 Letters from the Embassy of the Soviet Union in the GDR, 1982. Russian Archive of Modern History (former Archive of the Communist Party of the USSR). Record Group 5. Central Committee of Communist Party. Records of the Education and Science Commission. Inventory 88. File 208. P. 1.

30 Increasing Efficiency of the International Cooperation in the Field of Higher Education and Improving Quality of Soviet Specialists to Be Sent to Foreign Educational Institutions: Challenges and Objectives, 1986. State Archive of Russian Federation. Record Group 9563. The Ministry of Education of the USSR. Inventory 1. File 5186. P. 44.

31 Letter. U.S. Mission Berlin to Department of State, 1974. NARA. Record Group 59. Culture and Information. Box 403.

Soviet Union was another headache for the superpowers. The introduction of new disciplines demanded new instructors who could start delivering lectures on, for example, political science and American studies or Marxism and Soviet history. To accelerate the adaptation of new US or Soviet disciplines at universities, both powers recruited professors at home to give classes abroad that could convince foreign academics to realign their traditional areas of research and methodological approaches. The number of visiting US or Soviet professors at such universities often exceeded that of local teaching staff, especially in new departments and institutes, and visiting professors often served as chairs, both of which frequently aroused criticism from local university communities. Documents register waves of complaints and purge policies against visiting US and Soviet professors during the late 1960s and 1970s.

Ethiopian Professors: Protecting the Local Teaching Staff

The case of Ethiopia illustrates the negative consequences of such purges for the development of universities. US professors from the University of Utah created Haile Selassie I University in Ethiopia in 1961, where they established new Departments of Education and Law, as well as new administrations to train teachers and specialists. They also renovated the campus, opened a university library and named it after US President John F. Kennedy, and generally contributed to the development of scientific, intellectual, and cultural life in Ethiopian higher education.[32] Indeed, Haile Selassie I University became the most developed institution of higher education in the region. All of those and other transformations and developments demanded a highly qualified university teaching staff, which initially included only 30 Ethiopian professors. The US government trained 200 new junior professors and sent an additional 300 US professors to teach more than 6000 students at the university.[33] Despite the positive contributions of the visiting US professors to the development of the university, in the early 1970s the rector initiated the "Ethiopanisation" of the teaching staff and expelled all US professors, which disastrously affected the teaching and flow of funds at

32 Information for Foreign Staff, 1971. NARA. Record Group 286. USAID Mission to Ethiopia. Education Division. Box 4.

33 Technical and Other Assistance to Ethiopia, 1970. NARA. Record Group 286. USAID Mission to Ethiopia. Education Division. Box 4.

the university, as well as students' studies.[34] Many masters of arts programs were eliminated, the library holdings were depleted, the number of students decreased, and, consequently, the university lost its place as an intellectual center of Africa in the late 1970s.

The Soviet Union faced a similar problem in Ethiopian higher education, marked by the widespread unemployment of Ethiopians who had graduated from Soviet institutions and sought positions in universities, the government, and other segments of the public sector. During 1974–1987, the Soviet Union educated roughly 7500 Ethiopian citizens, most of whom became teachers qualified to begin academic careers at universities. However, few were able to find work with their Soviet diplomas. Soviet experts noted, "only a modest number of our graduates is working in the University. Those in powerful positions are mostly children of petty bourgeois families who studied in Western countries and maintained caste isolation and aversion to new cadres."[35] While the local professoriate sought to purge their universities of visiting US professors, junior staff members trained in the Soviet Union had few opportunities to work at Ethiopian universities upon their return home.

Altogether, both the United States and the Soviet Union encountered significant opposition from professors who admired and were willing to defend the local traditions of their universities. The professoriate's actions, often in the form of silent resistance, proved to be highly effective in curbing the Americanisation and Sovietisation of study plans, academic disciplines, and research methodologies. The professoriate believed that both Americanisation and Sovietisation undermined the traditions of local university life and politicised their teaching as well as research. Ultimately, academic communities in various countries were able to retain certain traditional features of their university systems throughout the Cold War. Neither US nor Soviet advisors could overcome such resistance due to their failure to account for local university traditions and the attitudes of professors.

The American and Soviet transformations at universities abroad and the resistance of local academic communities that this caused need to be placed within the context of the wider study of the cultural Cold War. Do these developments fit within the available models? The following section addresses this question.

34 Memorandum. University Development Briefing, 1973. NARA. Record Group 286. USAID Mission to Ethiopia. Education Division. Box 5.

35 Documents on the Foreign Graduate and Alumni of Soviet Higher Educational Institutions, 1988. State Archive of Russian Federation. Record Group 9661. State Committee on Education. Inventory 1. File 337. P. 30.

Theoretical Discussion: Cultural Imperialism, Americanisation, Sovietisation, or Response Theory?

Conceptual frameworks for studying the government-sponsored international education policies of both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War often refer to well-known concepts such as cultural imperialism and relative theses about hegemony as well as about Americanisation and Sovietisation.

The most general of those concepts is cultural imperialism, which traditionally refers to the policy of a power that exalts and spreads its culture in a foreign country at the expense of the native culture or cultures.[36] During the Cold War, the concepts of Americanisation and Sovietisation were applied as surrogates for cultural imperialism in order to carry out US and Soviet cultural diplomacy. In the 1990s, the concepts of westernisation, globalisation, and cultural transfer replaced the concept of cultural imperialism in scholarly discourse, although the concept has reappeared in scholarship in the early 2000s. Today, scholars of cultural imperialism focus on notions such as liberal imperialism in addition to Pax Americana and Pax Sovietica.[37] All of those concepts refer to hegemony and often surface in debates on ideology and education or ideological incorporation and education, as well as political indoctrination and education. Researchers who have studied the relationship of education and political power have argued that ideologies and values are transmitted via the content and process of schooling that support the hegemony of either pre-existing or newly established dominant groups.[38]

The other conceptual framework often employed in analysing the cultural Cold War embraces other well-known notions about Americanisation and Sovietisation. The traditional definition of *Americanisation* denotes the implantation of values or norms of US society in another country. The concept is frequently applied by scholars who examine the cultural and economic policy of the United

36 Jessica Gienow-Hecht. Academics, Cultural Transfer, and the Cold War – a Critical Review. *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 3 (2010): 465–494.

37 Peter van Ham. Power, Public Diplomacy and the Pax Americana. In *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Jan Melissen (ed.), 47–66. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

38 Michael Apple. *Education and Curriculum*. New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004; Antonio Gramsci. *Selections from the Prisons Notebooks*. New York: International Publishers, 1971; Natalia Tsvetkova. International Education during the Cold War: Soviet Social Transformation and American Social Reproduction. *Comparative Education Review* 52, no. 2 (2008): 199–217.

States toward Europe, during the Cold War.[39] When scholars turn to Soviet cultural diplomacy, they apply the well-known concepts of Sovietisation and Russification, which are typically viewed in a far less flattering light than the concept of Americanisation. Sovietisation, bound to ideas about Soviet cultural imperialism, implies the implantation of Soviet models in the economic, political, educational, and cultural systems of another country.[40] Most research that refers to Sovietisation addresses the countries of Eastern Europe, where scholars have observed varying levels of Sovietisation.[41]

All of the above concepts can be justified to explain the informational, cultural, and educational policies imposed by both United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, in most cases, the concepts of cultural imperialism, Americanisation, and Sovietisation proposed by scholars do not take into consideration the behaviour, attitudes, and resistance of local university people to the policies of cultural imperialism/Americanisation/Sovietisation. The cases of US and Soviet transformations at foreign universities illustrate that the advisors of both countries were able to change university structures, introduce new management, and develop a new infrastructure for students and teaching staff. However, they could not transform traditional ways of teaching, force the professoriate to teach new courses, or compel students to study new subjects.

The professors and students were not passive recipients of such policy but resisted the values imposed by the superpowers. In a range of countries, neither superpower could subdue the localism and conservatism of universities that undermined US and Soviet cultural pressure and, according to my analysis, preserved some traditional, local features specific to local universities. Professors resisted their subordination silently and openly in different forms, although most notably in sabotage, ignorance, and open mobilisation. All of those

39 Volker Berghahn. The Debate on "Americanisation" Among Economic and Cultural Historians. *Cold War History* 10, no. 1 (2010): 107–130; Richard Kuisel. *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanisation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993; Stephan Paulus. The Americanisation of Europe after 1945? The Case of the German Universities. *European Review of History* 9, no. 2 (2010): 241–253.

40 Nigel Gould–Davies. The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy. *Diplomatic History* 27, no. 2 (2003): 193–214; Simo Mikkonen. Winning Hearts and Minds? Soviet Music in the Cold War Struggle against the West. In *Twentieth-Century Music and Politics: Essays in Memory of Neil Edmunds*, Pauline Fairclough (ed.). Farnham: Ashgate, 2013; Balasz Apor, Peter Apor, and E.A Rees. *The Sovietisation of Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on the Postwar Period*. Washington, D. C.: New Academia Publishing, 2008.

41 John Connelly. *Captive University: the Sovietisation of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945–1956*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

forms of resistance successfully deterred the impact of both US and Soviet transformations at foreign institutions of higher education.

More broadly speaking, professors proved to be the principal cause for the success or failure of any reforms brought to their universities by the superpowers during the Cold War. Both silent and open resistance on the part of the university community undermined US and Soviet cultural influences, and thus their policies of reform eventually failed. Both superpowers were forced to recognise that universities had only formally acquiesced to the imposed revisions and that a large part of university communities did not believe in the ideas stressed by US or Soviet powers. Hence, the concepts of cultural imperialism, Americanisation, and Sovietisation can be redefined to mean the implantation of US or Soviet revisions of structures, but not the minds, within systems of education.

Scholars who have applied response theory and shifted the focus of research on the topic from the policies of superpowers to reactions and attitudes on the receiving end of such policies perhaps better approximate the realities of the cultural Cold War. Theses on the resistance of local societies to values from other countries have been put forward in reception studies that have introduced the theory of resistance or response theory.[42] Reception studies have shifted from the theme of cultural expansion to the theme of local reactions to it and seem to challenge the concepts of cultural imperialism, Americanisation, and Sovietisation, which envision a one-way street of hegemonic domination, and suggest instead a project of intentions without guaranteed outcomes.[43] However, such investigations remain rare, and professors, the chief agents of resistance to both US and Soviet transformations that were sought at universities abroad, have been neglected in studies on the cultural Cold War.

Moreover, response, reception, and resistance studies can perhaps best explain the essence of cultural or educational policies during the Cold War. Such studies illuminate the consequences of the policies of the superpowers as reflected in behaviour on the receiving end of such policies. Conceptual frameworks relating to cultural imperialism, Americanisation, Sovietisation, or soft power explain only part of the picture—namely, the political and cultural plans, intentions, strategies, and actions of the United States and the Soviet Union—at foreign universities. This neglects the reactions of and feedback

42 Bassam Tibi. Culture and Knowledge: The Politics of Islamization of Knowledge as a Postmodern Project? The Fundamentalist Claim to De-Westernization. *Theory, Culture & Society* 12 (1995): 1–24.

43 Barbara Reeves-Ellington. Vision of Mount Holyoke in the Ottoman Balkans: American Cultural Transfer, Bulgarian Nation-Building and Women's Educational Reform, 1858–1870. *Gender & History* 16, no. 1 (2004): 146–171.

from policy recipients—professors, students, and administrative staff—which limits any scholarly understanding of what happened at universities under the influence of the United States or the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The exploration of their reactions and receptions, however, can overcome one-sided approaches in studies on the cultural Cold War. Despite knowledge of how the United States and Soviet Union influenced information and its accessibility, as well as the culture and education, in other countries during the Cold War, hardly anything is known about how target communities responded to the imposition of the cultural Cold War or limited its impact. In that light, my research of the superpowers' policies of Americanisation or Sovietisation at universities around the world marks a first step toward revisiting the ideological rivalry of the United States and the Soviet Union during the cultural Cold War.

Cold War in the Universities

Further theoretical and empirical research needs to be carried out in the field of the higher education policies of the superpowers at universities around the world during the Cold War. In terms of theoretical and methodological implications, the theme lies at the crossroads of cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, development aid, cultural studies, education, international relations, and foreign policy. Moreover, the theme can make use of such concepts as cultural imperialism/Americanisation/Sovietisation/response theory based on the anthropological approaches developed in history and cultural studies. The macro- and micro-level analysis proposed by recent work[44] is also very appropriate for evaluating the different layers of US and Soviet policies. The first layer was the official policy proposed by the superpowers, while the second represents the local level of the receiving institutions and their national educational programmes.

The aim of this chapter is to offer a new perspective in the study of the cultural Cold War by examining the ideological contests that took place over higher education. Comparative historical analyses that make use of new archival documents that open a window on everyday communications between American/Soviet visiting experts and the local teaching staff and students, and the attitudes and behaviour of local university people, can open up a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of the cultural Cold War. It will be worthwhile to further study

44 Simo Mikkonen and Pia Koivunen (eds.). *Beyond the Divide: Entangled Histories of Cold War Europe*. N. Y.: Berghahn Books, 2015, 14.

the reactions of local university officials toward the imposed reforms brought by Washington and Moscow to the universities of different countries. The research of the phenomenon of resistance by the inhabitants of the "ivory tower" could also explain the motives of the university staff to preserve conservative traditions of local education against modernisation, which came along with the American and Soviet reforms. We can conclude that a comprehensive comparative study of both American and Soviet policies at key universities in European, African, Latin American, and Asian countries could alter our understanding of how the cultural Cold war, as a realm of contesting discourses and narratives on modernisation, affected individuals and institutions in the field of education in different ways around the world, triggering different responses in turn.

Sergei I. Zhuk

Soviet Americanists and American Visual Media in the USSR during the Brezhnev Era

Soviet Americanists as Cultural Mediators

Besides studying American history, politics and culture, and advising Soviet politicians on political issues and international diplomacy, Soviet Americanists (Soviet experts in US/Canadian history, politics, culture and economy) also played an important role as so-called mediators between American and Soviet cultures, especially in the sphere of visual media (cinema and television). Paradoxically, these Americanists were not only affected, themselves, by American movies, which to some extent shaped their academic interests, but they also contributed (by various means) to the spread of different forms of American visual media among their Soviet co-citizens. "Soviet Americanists, together with Soviet journalists, who traveled frequently to the United States after Stalin, always played a very important role of mediators (*posrednikov*) between American and Soviet cultures, especially during the détente of the 1970s," Leonid Leshchenko, a Soviet scholar of US history from Kiev, Ukraine, noted a few years ago.

During this time, following the new KGB requirements, in their academic reports, all Soviet Americanists made practical recommendations not only about US politics and diplomacy, but also about various American cultural products and innovations, which could be brought to the Soviet audiences. As a result of these recommendations, the Soviet authorities not only incorporated new American cultural elements and forms in radio, television, film and publishing, but also included a significant number of Soviet Americanists in the editorial boards of various literary and film journals. This produced a mass influx of new cultural practices from America (from literature to films and television) that resulted in a real ideological confusion, especially in Soviet provincial closed society. As a result, as cultural mediators between American and Soviet civilisations during détente, Soviet Americanists travelling back and forth be-

I devote this essay to the memory of my teacher and dear friend, Soviet Americanist Nikolai Bolkhovitinov (1930–2008).

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tween America and the USSR, indirectly contributed to this ideological and cultural confusion in Soviet society, especially during the Brezhnev era.[1]

To some extent Leshchenko paraphrased the old idea of historian Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, one of the founders of American studies (*Amerikanistika*) in the Soviet Union, who had interpreted the mission of these "cultural mediators" as "people's diplomacy," "improving the mutual understanding" between American and Soviet people. As Bolkhovitinov explained, "even the KGB people who prevailed among Soviet Americanists contributed to this kind of mutual understanding."[2]

Arnold Shlepakov, another Soviet-era scholar of US history from Ukraine, also stressed this role of Americanists as mediators:

> Soviet Americanists not only produced scholarly books about American civilization after visiting the US. They also became instrumental in bringing new American cultural products and ideas back home, offering a new format for Soviet television shows with American popular music, promoting Miles Davis "cool jazz" records, helping to organise concerts of Duke Ellington and bluesman BB King in Leningrad and Moscow, negotiating to buy US movie *China Syndrome* in 1979 for the Soviet audience to discuss the dangers of nuclear power.[3]

Using contemporary periodicals, personal interviews[4] and archival documents, this chapter examines the "cultural" roles of Soviet Americanists as active participants and academic/political advisors in "academic détente" (especially by means of Soviet-US academic exchanges), and as "cultural advisors" for the Soviet leadership, acting as mediators between American and Soviet cultures, especially during the Brezhnev era (1964–82). In doing so, it provides a new perspective on the problems of Western-Soviet cultural and academic dialogue after Stalin.[5]

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1 Interview with Leonid Leshchenko, 23 July 2012, Kiev. I emphasise the role of Americanists as voluntary mediators, who promoted mostly American films for Soviet domestic consumption.
2 Interview with Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, 12 May 1996, Moscow.
3 Interview with Arnold M. Shlepakov, 4 April 1991, Kiev.
4 My interviews trace the significant changes in the mental world of post-Soviet intellectuals. In the 1990s, they demonstrated an obvious idealisation (even fascination) of American realities, whereas after 2005 they expressed anti-American feelings, sometimes rejecting their previous pro-American notions.
5 Robert English. *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000; Vladislav M. Zubok. *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia*. Cambridge, Mass.; The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009; Alexei Yurchak. *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005; Anne Gorsuch. *All This Is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after Stalin*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011; Andrei

Many prominent Soviet Americanists advised the Soviet leadership not only on US history and politics, but also on American cultural products "appropriate for consumption" by Soviet citizens. In addition to literary and musical items, Soviet experts also recommended various forms of American visual media for cultural consumption, especially US motion pictures and television shows.[6] The crucial influence of U.S cinema and television on Soviet society and their role in the westernisation of Soviet visual media deserves more attention, especially during the periods of détente.[7] Most works have overlooked the role of the Soviet experts on the US (the "Americanists") in making recommendations to the Soviet government as to which films and other cultural products to buy and release to the Soviet public.[8] This scholarly analysis also describes the role of Soviet Americanists in the cultural consumption of American visual media products in the Soviet Union. Paradoxically, Soviet Americanists (unknowingly)

Kozovoi. *Par-delà le mur La culture de guerre froide soviétique entre deux détentes*. Paris: Complexe, 2009; Andrei Kozovoi. Eye to eye with the "Main enemy": Soviet youth travel to the United States. *Ab Imperio*, no. 2 (2011): 221–236.

6 Richard Stites. *Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society Since 1900*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Ellen Propper Mickiewicz. *Media and the Russian Public*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981; Anne White. *De-Stalinization and the House of Culture: Declining State Control over Leisure in the USSR, Poland and Hungary, 1953–89*. London: Routledge, 1990; Dmitry Shlapentokh and Vladimir Shlapentokh. *Soviet Cinematography 1918–1991: Ideological Conflict and Social Reality*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993. On Indian films in the USSR, see Sudha Rajagopalan. *Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas: The Culture of Movie-going After Stalin*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009.

7 See Kristin Roth-Ey. *Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War*. Ithaca, New York, and London: Cornell University Press, 2011, 12. See also the recent research on a history of Soviet television in: Christine E. Evans. *Between Truth and Time: A History of Soviet Central Television*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016; Tony Shaw and Denise Youngblood. *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010. See also the recent study about Soviet-U.S. competition in the interpretation of the Russian literary classics: Denise Youngblood. *Bondarchuk's War and Peace. Literary Classic to Soviet Cinematic Eimage* Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014.

8 See especially Marsha Siefert. Allies on Film: US—USSR Filmmakers and The Battle for Russia. In *Extending the Borders of Russian History,* Marsha Siefert (ed.), 373–400. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003; idem, Meeting at a Far Meridian: American-Soviet Cultural Diplomacy on Film in the Early Cold War. In *Cold War Crossings: International Travel and Exchange in the Soviet Bloc, 1940s–1960s,* Patryk Babiracki, Kenyon Zimmer (eds.), 166–209. College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2014.

functioned as Soviet agents of US "soft power" in this process of cultural consumption, and ultimately in the success of US cultural diplomacy.[9]

American Popular Cultural Influences on Soviet Americanists

The pioneers of American studies in the Soviet Union, scholars such as Georgi Arbatov, Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, Nikolai Sivachev and Robert Ivanov from Moscow, Aleksandr Fursenko from Leningrad, and Arnold Shlepakov from Kiev, who represented the post-war generation of Soviet historians, have noted that American "trophy" films such as 'Westerns' and American jazz music triggered their interest in American culture and history. Some acknowledged how impressed they were by American music performed by the Glenn Miller orchestra in the film *Sun Valley Serenade* that they watched in Moscow in the late 1940s – early 1950s. Fursenko, Sivachev, and Shlepakov especially emphasised how the dynamic and attractive visuals of American adventure movies about pirates starring Errol Flynn influenced their interest in literature about Anglo-American pirates and the colonisation of America, and stories and visuals from the films *Mr. Deeds Goes to Town* and *The Roaring Twenties* that they watched during their childhood pushed them later towards contemporary US history.[10]

9 See especially Joseph S. Nye. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. One of the many interpretations of this concept fits very well our description of the Soviet Americanists' "cultural roles": "Unlike hard power, which is concentrated in the hands of those at the source, soft power is dispersed and malleable. The allure of effective soft power lies in its capacity for requisition and reuse by foreign recipients to advance their own interests, but in ways that ultimately benefit the donor nation." Greg Castillo. *Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010, 12.

10 Interviews with Aleksandr Fursenko, Moscow, 19 March 1991; Marina Vlasova (about Sivachev), Moscow, 20 March 1991; Arnold Shlepakov, Kiev, 29 August 1991; Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, Moscow, 18 May 1992; Robert F. Ivanov, Moscow, 21 May 1992. They referred to so-called "trophy films" as the movies which were brought from Germany by the Soviet administration after WW II. The collapse of Soviet film production during the war led to a decline in the number of Soviet movies available for domestic consumption – eighteen films in 1949, ten in 1950, and nine in 1951. This vacuum was filled with the "cinematic spoils of war," which included 1531 American, 906 German, 572 French, and 183 British films. See Shaw and Youngblood. *Cinematic Cold War*, 40; Sergei Kapterev. Illusionary Spoils: Soviet Attitudes towards American Cinema during the Early Cold War. *Kritika* 10 (4) (2009), 783, 790; and the details in chapter 3 of this book.

Many years after, the next generation of Soviet Americanists who grew up during the 1970s and who were students of the pioneers of American studies like Bolkhovitinov and Sivachev also noted that American movies and music influenced their tastes and scholarly preferences. As Viktor Kalashnikov and Andrei Znamenski have said, "Westerns" stimulated their interest in the social and cultural history of American Indians. American movies such as *Mackenna's Gold* and *Little Big Man*, shown in the Soviet movie theaters during the 1970s, provided them with the exotic images of "indigenous Americans" fighting against "the greedy white imperialist Americans."[11]

During the same period of time, images from popular American films on the Soviet screen such as *It's a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad World*, *The Sandpit Generals*, *They Shoot Horses Don't They, The New Centurions, Bless the Beasts and Children, The Domino Principle, Oklahoma Crude, Alice Doesn't Live Here Anymore* and *Three Days of the Condor* presented a leftist criticism of the American realities which contributed to their growing interest in contemporary US history, especially in the history of labour, politics and political parties in the United States. Many young Soviet historians, representatives of the generation of détente from the 1970s and students of Bolkhovitinov and Sivachev such as Marina Vlasova, Vladislav Zubok and myself, became inspired not only by the new American movies, but also by the sound of new American music from Miles Davis, B. B. King, the Doors, Creedence Clearwater Revival and Grand Funk Railroad.[12] It is noteworthy that the overwhelming majority of Soviet and post-Soviet Americanists in both Russia and Ukraine whom I have interviewed have emphasised the special role of US feature films in shaping their academic imagination about America and US history.

Cultural Détente

Détente, and especially the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed in Helsinki by the Soviet leaders together with 34 other heads of states on August 1, 1975, provided the context for cultural exchange

11 Telephone interview with Andrei Znamenski, Muncie, Indiana, 4 December 2010, and 5 February 2015.

12 Interviews with Marina Vlasova, Moscow, 20 March 1991, and Vladislav Zubok, Muncie, Indiana, 25 September 2012. Compare with my book: Sergei I. Zhuk. *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 1960–1985*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press & Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010, especially chapter 8 and 9 about the movies from the West on the Soviet screen.

and the opening of Soviet society to new Western influences through various forms of media. During this period Soviet authorities bought the official licenses for manufacturing popular music records from the West, and officially licensed movies were screened (more than 150 feature films from 70 countries in 1973 alone), Soviet TV broadcast the concerts of Western popular musicians (from January 11, 1977, a special Soviet TV show "Melodies and Rhythms of Foreign Estrada" was shown on a regular basis); Western rock and disco music was incorporated into official Soviet television shows (with a range of music – from the light dancing tunes of ABBA, the Beatles, Boney M, Paul McCartney and Smokey, arias from *Jesus Christ Superstar* to the heavier beat of Slade, Sweet, Led Zeppelin, Deep Purple, Nazareth, Queen and UFO), Western pop stars such as Cliff Richard, BB King, Boney M, Elton John and others performed live for Soviet publics and fragments of these concerts were shown on Soviet television.[13] There were also important changes in the distribution and consumption of American films and the appropriation of certain American cultural practices. A very important role in this process belonged to Soviet Americanists. During the 1970s, around 600 of them became active participants in the various political, cultural and academic exchanges between the US and the USSR.[14]

During détente, the questions from "the KGB survey" – the final reports of Soviet scholars who travelled abroad – became more varied. In the 1970s, these questions not only addressed the political situation in capitalist countries, but also the most popular cultural products in the West. As Nikolai Bolkhovitinov explained, "suddenly, after 1974 before our trips to America, our KGB supervisors began asking us to make notes during our travel of the movies, books and plays that we could recommend to the Soviet government to bring to the Soviet public. As a result, during the 1970s in my final travel reports, I always included the titles of American fiction, plays and movies, which I considered important."[15] To some extent, "the best representatives of contemporary American literature" were bought, translated and published in the Soviet Union following these rec-

13 See Leonid Parfenov. *Namedni. Nasha era. 1971–1980.* Moscow: KoLibri, 2009, 215 (1978).
14 Robert English. *Russia and the Idea of the West.* Of course, in their appropriation of American cultural practices, they focused on those which exposed the "anti-human capitalist nature" of US politics.
15 Interview with Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, 21 May 2001, Moscow. Some researchers suggest that when it comes to Soviet TV and radio, this practice was common already at the turn of the 1950s-60s. See Simo Mikkonen. Stealing the Monopoly of knowledge?: Soviet reactions to US Cold war broadcasting. In *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 11 (4) (2010).

ommendations, and Soviet journals, such as *Inostrannaia literatura* and *Vsesvit*, published more varied American literary products than before.[16]

The most direct impact of Soviet Americanists on cultural consumption became obvious in Soviet movie theaters. As Arnold Shlepakov and Bolkhovitinov have recalled, during the spring of 1965, a few Soviet experts in US politics and culture, along with other Soviet scientists, were invited by officials from the Central Committee of CPSU for a special "closed screening" of two American antiwar movies to decide if they were appropriate for Soviet audiences: Stanley Kramer's *On the Beach* (1959) and Stanley Kubrick's *Dr. Strangelove* (1964). Although all Soviet Americanists who attended the screening recommended these films for a wider release, they were never shown in the Soviet Union due to being deemed "too intimidating for a normal Soviet viewer with the graphic results of nuclear war." Other, "less intimidating" American films did make it to the screens of all major movie theatres in Moscow.[17]

Nikolai Bolkhovitinov has recounted how during 1977 Evgenii Zhukov, a director of the Institute of World History, arranged a special meeting with the director of *Goskino* (USSR State Committee for Cinematography), Fillip Ermash, who asked the prominent Soviet Americanist, who had recently returned from a research trip to the United States, about US feature films which could be recommended for Soviet audiences.[18] Aleksandr Fursenko also recalled that Soviet scholars put film titles they recommended in their travel reports and held special meetings with officials from the organisation responsible for the acquisition and distribution of foreign films, *Soveksportfilm*. "Of course, these officials interviewed film specialists like Shestakov and Baskakov from the Institute of Cinematic History and Theory, who traveled with us. They were the experts. I recalled how we were invited to recommend recent American films that could be included in the program of Moscow Film Festivals during the 1970s." He added, "I remember that for many years I recommended to buy *Gone with the Wind*. But they had never purchased this, probably because it was too expensive for *Soveksportfilm*."[19] Viacheslav Shestakov, a Soviet film critic, and Vladimir Baskakov, his su-

16 I paraphrase Robert Ivanov in his interview of 21 March 1991.

17 Interviews with Arnold Shelpakov, Kiev, 29 August 1991, and Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, Moscow, 10 July 2004. See also Robert English. *Russia and the Idea*, 106.

18 Interview with Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, Moscow, 15 December 1995. Both Robert Ivanov and Sergei Burin confirmed this information.

19 Interview with Aleksandr Fursenko, Moscow, 19 March 1991. On the US film business: S. A. Karaganov. Amerikanskaia kinopromyshlennost. *SEPI*, no. 1, 1975, 71–80; about the role of Hollywood films in the cultural life of the US in the 1970s: I. E. Kokarev. Vzlioty i padeniia Gollivuda. *SEPI,* no. 8, 1976, 40–52.

pervisor, who visited the US in 1974 – 75, were also instrumental in making recommendations regarding the selection of American movies.[20] As early as 1971, Soviet visitors to the United States also returned with technical recommendations, having discovered new American video recording technology.[21]

Soviet film experts also sought to recommend independent film producers. The normal practice was to invite these American producers to participate in the Moscow International Film Festival (MIFF), in this way justifying the future purchase of a particular film. Following "very positive evaluations" and recommendations by Nikolai Sivachev, *The Comedians* was bought by *Soveksportfilm* immediately after its release in the United States in 1967. Directed and produced by Peter Glenville and based on the Graham Greene novel of the same name, it starred Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor, and was considered an "anti-imperialist critique" by Soviet experts and was officially released in the Soviet Union as early as 1969.[22] During the same time, the film that was recommended the most by all Soviet Americanists, Stanley Kubrick's *2001: A Space Odyssey,* was never purchased. It was shown as part of the official program of the Moscow International Film Festival in July 1969, but only for a closed audience on one day.[23]

During 1971, three films directed by leftist American film-makers and recommended by Soviet Americanists were praised by the Seventh MIFF – *Little Big Man* (Arthur Penn, 1970), *The Sandpit Generals* (aka *the Defiant*, Hall Bartlett, 1971), *They Shoot Horses Don't They* (Sydney Pollack, 1969) – and were later

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20 Library of Congress (manuscript collection), IREX. RC 228, F 43, about visit of Viacheslav Shestakov (November 1974–April 1975) from the Institute of Cinematic History and Theory of the State Committee for Cinematography. Compare with Vl. Baskakov. Klokochushchii ekran Ameriki. *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 11, 1971, 14– 15. For Shestakov's academic report about his American travel (with recommendations) see V.P. Shestakov. Puteshestvie v kinematograficheskuiu Ameriku. *SEPI*, no. 1, 1977, 45 – 53. Compare with the recommendations by Shestakov's colleagues: I. E. Kokarev. Itogi kinematograficheskogo goda. *SEPI*, no. 3, 1977, 56 – 63; Yu.A. Komov. V Amerikanskom institute kino. *SEPI*, no. 8, 1977, 55 – 62; V.P. Shestakov and T.G. Il'in. Politicheskoe kino: itogi desiatiletiia. *SEPI*, no. 1, 1981, 38 – 50; E.N. Kartseva. "Malyi sotsium" na bol'shom ekrane. *SEPI*, no. 9, 1983, 40 – 54. See also about Baskakov in Mlechin, *Furtseva*, 348 – 349. For a brilliant popular analysis of so-called "New Hollywood" see Viacheslav Shestakov. "Novyi Gollivud": taktika i strategiiia. *Iskusstvo kino*, no. 9, 1976, 126 – 143.

21 On the impact of video see the discussion between Grigorii Kozintsev and Stanislav Rostotskii in *Sovetskiy ekran*, 1971, no. 10, 16 – 17.

22 R. Orlova. Chiornoe i beloe. *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 24, 1966, 14 – 15, and 19. See in ibid., no. 24, 1966, 19; A. Anikst. V tiskakh terrora; ibid, no. 5, 1970, 16 – 17; and my interviews with Sergei Burin, Vadim Koleneko, and Marina Vlasova, 18 April 1992, Moscow, Institute of World History. Vlasova was a former student of Sivachev.

23 Both Bolkhovitinov and Fursenko complained about this, interview, 21 March 1991.

put on general release.[24] The most popular US movie at that festival was Stanley Kramer's *Bless the Beasts and the Children* (1971). 6000 Soviet movie fans "gave a rousing ovation" to Kramer after the screening of his film. As a result of this popularity, it was screened all over the Soviet Union by late 1972.[25] In 1973, Stanley Kramer's *Oklahoma Crude*, only recently released in the US, was awarded with the Golden Prize at the Eighth MIFF, and received wide distribution thereafter.[26] In 1974 six US films were released, and American and Soviet film makers began a collaborative project, *Blue Bird,* starring Elizabeth Taylor, Jane Fonda and Ava Gardener. Directed by George Cukor, it was shot on the premises of the *Lenfilm* studios in both Leningrad and Moscow, with music by the famous Soviet composer Andrei Petrov and script by the prominent Soviet screenwriter Aleksei Kapler that was based on a play by the Belgian Maurice Maeterlinck. *Blue Bird* was simultaneously released in both the United States and the USSR in April 1976.[27]

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24 *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 17, 1971, 1–2. Arthur Penn's film was shown in the festival program "Obraz sovremennika na ekrane" (A Contemporary on the Screen) and it received awards from the International Federation of Film Press and the Soviet Peace Fund. Hall Bartlett's movie won a Special Prize from the Organisational Committee of MIFF. Sydney Pollack's film was awarded the "Pamiatnyi priz" (Memorable Prize) by the USSR Union of Cinematographers. *The Hellstrom Chronicle* (Walon Green, 1971) was also awarded with a special diploma by the Organisational Committee of MIFF. The US delegation, led by Marc Spiegel, brought 21 American films to screen. See *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 17, 1971, 2; S. Chertok. Stanley Kramer: Protiv bezumnogo mira, and Ia. L'vov. Slovo o chistote i muzhestve: Blagoslovi zverei i detei (SSHA). In *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 22, 1971, 14–15. The British-American film *Punishment Park* (Peter Watkins, 1971) was also shown during this festival in Moscow. See in E. Kartseva. Kinofantastika oblichaet. *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 8, 1972, 16–17.

25 See *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 17, 1971, 2; S. Chertok. Stanley Kramer: Protiv bezumnogo mira, and Ia. L'vov. Slovo o chistote i muzhestve: Blagoslovi zverei i detei (SSHA). In *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 22, 1971, 14–15; U.S. Movies praised in Moscow. *The Montreal Gazette*, 27 July 1971. I still recall vividly, as a thirteen-year-old boy, how I saw this movie in December of 1972 in a local Palace of Culture in Vatutino, my hometown, in Zvenigordka district of Cherkasy Region, together with my school friends.

26 It was released in 1974. See A. Babikov. Stenli Kramer: V poiskakh pravdy o cheloveke. *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 13, 1973, 15–16; ibid., no. 17, 2; Ia. Varshavskii. Posledovatel'nost'. *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 19, 1973, 3. In 1973 MIFF also awarded prizes to two other US movies, *Solo* and *Tom Sawyer*, see *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 17, 1973, 2. Special film exchanges were organised with professional support from Soviet film critics, some of whom, like Shestakov, became regular visitors to the US. A. Borodin. My mozhem dat' drug drugu mnogo tsennogo… *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 16, 1971, 16–17.

27 A.S. Aleksandrov. Snimaetsia "Siniaia ptitsa." SEPI, no. 9, 1975, 70–72; Semen Chertok. Skazka o schastie. Sovetskiy ekran, no. 13, 1975, 10–13. This was the fifth screen adaptation of Maeterlinck's play. For a positive review see Romil Sobolev. Naiti to, chto ob'ediniaet. Sovetskiy ekran, no. 24, 1976, 4–5.

Personal Experience of a Soviet Americanist: Nikolai Bolkhovitinov

According to Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, during his long American visit in 1976, he was very Homesick, missing his home in Moscow. As a result, he played tennis and watched a lot of films in the local movie theatres to distract himself. Bolkhovitinov recalled seeing the latest releases in November 1976, such as *Rocky* (directed by John Avildsen, 1976). As he revealed later, he liked this movie because of its realistic portrayal of the life of ordinary American people, including the main character in the film, amateur boxer Rocky Balboa from Philadelphia. Bolkhovitinov was shocked that American film makers did not hide "the level of poverty of the American lower classes and the spread of crime in the big American city, as shown in the film." But at the same time he was moved by "the sincere sympathy for the ordinary American city folks depicted by the Hollywood filmmakers."[28]

After his first visits to US movie theatres in 1976, Bolkhovitinov realised that the admission price for new films was rather expensive for his travel budget. For this reason, he began frequenting movie theaters located on university campuses, which showed older films with a much cheaper admission. Bolkhovitinov therefore managed to view "relatively good films released either in 1975, or early 1976," including *Hard Times* (Walter Hill, 1975), *Soldier Blue* (Ralph Nelson, 1970), *Alice Doesn't Live Here Anymore* (Martin Scorsese, 1974), *Jaws* (Steven Spielberg, 1975), *Three Days of the Condor* (Sydney Pollack, 1975), *One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest* (Miloš Forman, 1975), *Marathon Man* (John Schlesinger, 1976), *Taxi Driver* (Martin Scorsese, 1976), *All the President's Men* (Alan J. Pakula, 1976) and *The Omen* (Richard Donner, 1976).[29]

From this experience Bolkhovitinov realised that his spoken English "improved significantly" and he "understood almost all of the characters in those films, despite some issues regarding dialect and other problems with pronunciation."[30] Films became a "good school of colloquial American English" for this visiting Soviet scholar. During this visit, Bolkhovitinov also watched the classic *Gone with the Wind*, recommended to him by Aleksandr Fursenko, when it made its television debut on NBC on 7–8 November.[31] He had never read Margaret

28 Interview with Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, Moscow, 15 December 1995.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Anthony Slide. *The New Historical Dictionary of the American Film Industry.* New York: Routledge, 1998, 45.

Mitchell's novel, but this first historical movie produced on American historical material about the Civil War was "a cinematographic sensation" for him. Bolkhovitinov was so impressed that in December 1976, when he returned to Moscow and wrote a travel report for the international department of the Institute of World History (IVI), he began by praising "a masterpiece of American historical film making – the movie *Gone with the Wind*."[32]

In January 1977, Bolkhovitinov was invited by Zhukov, the IVI director, to a special reception followed by a dinner with the legendary director of *Goskino*, Fillip Ermash. Zhukov introduced Bolkhovitinov as a Soviet scholar who had visited the US several times. Ermash asked Bolkhovitinov about the most important American feature films, which could be recommended for purchase and release, and the scholar prepared a long list of films he had seen, beginning with *Gone with the Wind* and finishing with *Rocky*. Ermash never contacted Bolkhovitinov afterwards, but in late 1977 Zhukov told him that not only was his research into the beginning of Russian-American relations highly regarded, but also that his cinematic tastes were equally "appreciated by individuals from the CPSU Central Committee and personally by Ermash."[33]

The Godfather and Fascination with American Movies in the 1970s

IN 1974 readers' surveys of the most popular film magazine in the Soviet Union, *Sovetskiy ekran*, selected "as the best" among foreign films the American motion pictures such as *Mackenna's Gold* (J. Lee Thompson, 1969) and *The New Centurions* (Richard Fleischer, 1972). In 1975 it was *The Day of the Dolphin* (Mike Nichols, 1973) and *How to Steal a Million* (William Wyler, 1969).[34] In 1977 *Soveksportfilm* released 63 films from socialist countries and 67 movies from capitalist countries, including 12 American films, and after 1979 it continued releasing on average eight US movies annually until 1982. Even in 1984, during the anti-American ideological campaign, the most popular foreign films among the Soviet public were still *The Deep* (Peter Yates, 1977), *The China Syndrome* (James Bridges, 1979), *Kramer vs. Kramer* (Robert Benton, 1979), *Three Days of the Condor* (Sydney Pollack, 1975), and *Tootsie* (Sydney Pollack, 1982).[35] All these films

32 Interview with Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, Moscow, 15 December 1995.
33 Ibid. Both Robert Ivanov and Sergei Burin confirmed this information.
34 *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 10, 1975, 6, and ibid., no. 10, 1976, 18.
35 *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 24, 1984, 17–18.

had been recommended by Soviet academic visitors to the United States, because of their criticisms of US capitalism.

Not all recommendations were accepted by the Soviet authorities. The most popular and recommended US films by many Soviet experts were *The Godfather* (Francis Coppola, 1972) and *Love Story* (Arthur Hiller, 1970). Francis Coppola's film in particular had a "cult following among many Soviet Americanists who watched this movie during their research trips to the West."[36] But Soviet officials rejected the numerous suggestions to buy these films, and they were never shown to a wide audience in the Soviet Union. During the same time, the Ukrainian Americanist Arnold Shlepakov became a member of the editorial board of the Ukrainian journal *Vsesvit*, which began regular publication of American bestsellers in Ukrainian translation. As a frequent visitor to America, he supported the publication of two novels that had been adapted for the screen: *The Godfather* by Mario Puzo and *Love Story* by Erich Segal. *The Godfather* was published in Ukrainian translation by *Vsesvit* during 1973–1974 and caused a sensation. *Vsesvit*, under its new editor Dmytro Pavlychko, a writer from the Western Ukrainian city of Lviv, was the only Soviet periodical to publish a good translation and informed criticism of the novel.[37] Russian-speaking readers from across the Soviet Union tried to obtain copies of *Vsesvit* to read the famous novel, which became legendary because of the release of Coppola's film in the US and the popularity of Nino Rota's theme music.[38] Coppola's film was forbidden in the USSR but became popular through the Ukrainian periodical, which put Marlon Brando as the Godfather on the cover.[39]

The movie version of *Love Story* was known to Soviet audiences through the title theme ["Where Do I Begin"] composed by Francis Lai. Erich Segal was also known to Soviet fans as one of the script-writers for the Beatles cartoon film *Yellow Submarine* (George Dunning, 1968), popularised by Soviet media since 1968

36 Both Arnold Shlepakov and Aleksandr Fursenko mentioned this in interviews. The film was praised in various Soviet reviews: Ian Bereznitskii. Marlon Brando, odinokii beglets. *Iskusstvo kino*, no. 5, 1974, 166–190; V. Siliunas. "Krestnyi otets", bludnye synovia i pasynki Ameriki. *Iskusstvo kino*, no. 3, 1975, 145–165.

37 Almost all classmates (40 from 43) of my class 7-B in Vatutino secondary school read these issues of *Vsesvit*.

38 Both Robert Ivanov and Aleksander Fursenko mentioned this.

39 See Brando's picture in *Vsesvit*, 10, 1973: 107. The novel was published in *Vsesvit*, 10, 1973: 109–167; 11: 155–201; 12: 120–176; 1 (1974): 85–154 – as Mario P'iuzo, *Khreshchennyi bat'ko*, translated by Viktor Batiuk and Oleksandr Ovsiuk and edited by Yurii Lisniak. See also my interview with Leonid Leshchenko, 23 July 2012, Kyiv. On a "Brando cult" in Soviet film studies see: Yan Berznitskii. Marlon Brando, odinokii beglets. *Iskusstvo kino*, no. 5, 1974, 166–192.

as the "most progressive anti-imperialist product of the western pop culture."[40] During one editorial meeting at *Vsesvit* in 1975, based on the popularity of Segal for Soviet audiences and American "progressive critics," Shlepakov insisted on publishing *Love Story*. His KGB connections helped, and this novel was published in Ukrainian translation in December 1976.[41]

According to contemporaries, the most important advisors to buy US films and review them for Soviet audiences were the experts at ISKAN (the Institute of the USA and Canada, the USSR Academy of Sciences). These individuals published highly-acclaimed books on US cinema during the 1970s and made recommendations regarding the most popular and "progressive" American films to the Soviet leadership.[42] In 1976 the Institute of Cinematic History and Theory of the State Committee for Cinematography sponsored a special two-day conference with ISKAN to discuss not only the problems of American cinema but also "what kind of US films should be recommended for the program of Moscow International Film Festivals."[43] During this conference, which involved 27 representatives of other research institutes from Moscow, Viacheslav Shestakov delivered a special report about the recent "democratic progressive" trends in Hollywood and recommended that the leaders of *Goskino* buy films by Francis Coppola, Martin Scorsese, Sydney Pollack and other "talented" American film directors. Yuri Zamoshkin and other Soviet participants of IREX[44] programs joined Shestakov in his criticism of "lack of professionalism" of Soviet film critics who "reject-

40 The Beatles cartoon film *Yellow Submarine* was glorified as a cultural "protest against imperialistic war and sufferings of the people and a hymn to beauty of this world, pleasures of simple life and love" in M. Aleksandrova. Zheltaia submarina. *Rovesnik* no. 7, 1969, 17.

41 Eric Sigel. Istoria odnogo kokhannia. *Vsesvit*, 12, 1976: 11–72, translated by Mar Pinchevs'kyi and Oleksandr Terekh. See my interview with Arnold M. Shlepakov, 4 April, 1991, Kiev. A very negative review of *Love Story* as "cheap melodrama" appeared in a prestigious Soviet film magazine: K. Razlogov. Mekhanizm uspekha. *Iskusstvo kino*, no. 11, 1973, 141–149.

42 The most popular books about US cinema were: Viacheslav P. Shestakov. *Amerika v zerkale ekrana: Amerikanskoye kino 70-kh godov*. Moscow: Soiuz kinematografistov SSSR, 1977; I. E. Kokarev (ed.). *Na ekrane Amerika* Collection. Moscow: Progress, 1978; A. S. Mulyarchik and V. P. Shestakov (eds.). *Amerikanskaya khudozhestvennaya kul'tura v sotsial'no-politicheskom kontekste 70-kh godov 20 veka*. Moscow: Nauka, 1982. Also, their recommendations such as Shestakov. *Puteshestvie v kinematograficheskuiu Ameriku*.

43 Konferentsiia po problemam amerikanskogo kino. *SEPI*, no. 9, 1976, 75–76. See about this conference in Valery Golovskoy. Amerikanskoye kino – "za" i "protiv" (konferentsia 1976 goda), idem. *Eto bylo nedavno... Izbarannye publikatsii za 30 let*. Baltimore, MD: Seagull Press, 2010, 156–163. See also his essay. Amerikanskie fil'my na sovetskikh ekranakh (1957–1980), Golovskoy. *Eto bylo nedavno*, 169–177. E-mail correspondence with Valery Golovskoy, 10–11 May 2013.

44 The International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) is one of the US funding agencies.

ed all, even anti-capitalist progressive, American films as mere bourgeois propaganda."[45]

According to participants, during this conference it became obvious that all professional Soviet film critics took "the firm anti-American and anti-bourgeois ideological position" regarding the release of US feature films. Yet the participants were divided. All Soviet Americanists present at this conference supported a mass release of American movies and rejected "teeth-crushing anti-Americanism" of their colleagues.[46] Some participants of this conference recalled how the chair of the *Goskino*, F. Ermash, and others discussed the possibility of a Soviet release for *The Godfather* and *Apocalypse Now*, which were shown for "selected audiences" in Moscow during the late 1970s.[47] I. A. Geievskii of ISKAN also emphasises the positive and talented portrayal of the "capitalist realities" in such masterpieces of American cinema as *The Godfather*. After this conference, Soviet experts in American film became the most important figures in establishing personal contacts with American film critics and film historians, filmmakers and movie stars, especially during the MIFF.[48] In May 1977, Vladimir Baskakov, a representative of "the official Soviet film criticism establishment," organised a special roundtable to discuss "the struggle of ideologies and problems of American cinema" at the editorial office of the Soviet theoretical journal *Art of Cinema* (*Iskusstvo kino*). Despite his attempt to "stop dangerous idealisation of US movies' humanism" a majority of Americanists from ISKAN and MGU (Moscow State University) insisted on the official "promotion" and "mass screening of the most progressive representatives of American cinema."[49]

As a direct result of Soviet Americanists' recommendations, some of those films discussed during the 1976 conference and 1977 round table were granted a wide release. In 1976, among many commercial but already obsolete US blockbusters such as *The Great Race* (Blake Edwards, 1964), Goskino released Martin Scorsese's comedy-drama *Alice Doesn't Live Here Anymore* (1974) and *Conrack*

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45 Valery Golovskoy. Amerikanskoye kino, 161–163; Library of Congress. IREX. RC 228, F 43, "about visit of Viacheslav Shestakov (Nov. 1974–April 1975) from the Institute of Cinematic History and Theory of the State Committee for Cinematography," and RC 237, F26 on the visit of Yuri Zamoshkin from ISKAN, November-December 1977.

46 E-mail correspondence with Valery Golovskoy, 9 January 2015.

47 See Valery Golovskoy. Amerikanskoye kino, 158–159.

48 See for instance V. Shestakov's interview with US actress Ellen Burstyn, during MIFF in 1977: Ellen Burstin, Vernite zhenshchinu v iskusstvo. *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 13, 1977, 16. See also Konferentsiia po problemam amerikanskogo kino. *SEPI*, no. 9, 1976, 75–76.

49 The record of this roundtable can be found in Bor'ba ideologii i problemy amerikanskogo kinematografa: "Kruglyi stol" v redaktsii "IK". *Iskusstvo kino*, no. 8, 1977, 118–152. See especially Viacheslav Shestakov's presentation, 142–148.

(Martin Ritt, 1974), starring Jon Voight.[50] *Goskino* eventually also bought (in 1981) and released *Three Days of the Condor* (1975), an anti-CIA thriller by Sydney Pollack.[51] After 1979, with access to the new American video tape recording techniques, special screenings of new US movies were held at ISKAN on a regular basis. These Americanists played an instrumental role in the mass release of the majority of US movies in the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev era.[52]

Problems of Nuclear Catastrophe and the End of Détente

Unlike in the West, in the Soviet Union the fear of a nuclear war was not fuelled by feature films, largely because the Soviet government kept films on the subject at bay. Nikolai Bolkhovitinov's recollections concerning *On the Beach* and *Dr. Strangelove* in 1965 have already been mentioned above.[53] During the 1970s, however, after visiting the United States, Soviet Americanists raised questions about the dangers of nuclear power and nuclear weapons in the US. Special attention was given to *The China Syndrome*, directed by James Bridges and starring Jane Fonda, Jack Lemmon and Michael Douglas, which portrayed the danger posed by a nuclear reactor and subsequent attempts to cover this up. Just twelve days after the general release of the film in the US, on 28 March the worst nuclear accident in United States history occurred at Three Mile Island near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The real-life incident was, in many ways, identical to the plot of the movie. An incorrect reading of equipment at Three Mile Island made the plant's operators think, in error, that there was more water covering the core of the power plant than there actually was – just exactly what we see unfold on screen in *The China Syndrome*.[54] Soviet Americanists urged the Soviet government to buy the film immediately. There was no Soviet film about "the real danger of nuclear catastrophe" for humankind.[55] As early as the summer of 1979, the

50 Aleksandr Doroshevich, Gde zhivet Alisa? *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 21, 1976, 4–5.
51 *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 24, 1981, 15.
52 E-mail correspondence with Vladislav Zubok, 28 May 2013.
53 Interview with Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, Moscow, 10 July 2004; Robert English. *Russia and Idea of the West*, 106. From 1965 onwards all Soviet film experts recommended buying Kubrick's film for screening in the USSR. On Kubrick's "progressive humanism" see R. Sobolev. Apokalipsis po Stenli Kubriku. *Iskusstvo kino*, no. 9, 1974, 145–153.
54 SShA: Energeticheskie problem. *SEPI*, no. 7, 1980, 117–125.
55 Interviews with Aleksandr Fursenko, Moscow, 19 March 1991, Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, Moscow, 21 May 2001, and Arnold M. Shlepakov, Kiev, 4 April 1991.

organisers of the Moscow International Film Festival asked the director of *The China Syndrome* to give it a special screening.[56] After its release in the USSR in 1981, this American movie became a sensation and was used not only for traditional criticism of American imperialism but also for serious discussions about problems of energy, ecology and conservation.[57]

The end of political détente did not stop Soviet fascination with American movies. In 1979, the Soviet government released 237 films: 128 Soviet movies, 58 from socialist countries, and 51 from capitalist countries, including 8 US films: *The Vikings* (Richard Fleischer, 1958), *Robin and Marian* (Richard Lester, 1976), *Fun with Dick and Jane* (Ted Kotcheff, 1977), *Stunts* (Mark L. Lester, 1977), *Cleopatra* (Joseph L. Mankiewicz, 1963), *Song Without End* (Charles Vidor, 1960), *Breakout* (Tom Gries, 1975), and *The Domino Principle* (Stanley Kramer, 1977).[58] At the end of 1979, under the leadership of V. Maiatskii, head of *Soveksportfilm*, a group of Soviet film makers, including Georgiy Daneliia, Liudmila Gurchenko and Natalya Gundareva, visited the United States, presenting new Soviet films such as *Osennii marafon* and *Sibiriada* to American audiences, and brought back to the Soviet Union "positive good impressions from their American visit and communications with ordinary Americans."[59] In 1980, according to the *Sovetskiy ekran* statistics, the most popular foreign films (among the Soviet film goers) were the US movies *Stunts* (Mark Lester, 1977) and *West Side Story* (Robert Wise and Jerome Robbins, 1961). At the twelfth MIFF in July 1981, *Escape to Victory* (John Huston, 1981) was shown as part of the official competition, and *Midnight Cowboy* (John Schlesinger, 1969), *The Electric Horseman* (Sydney Pollack, 1979) and *Gloria* (John Cassavetes, 1980) received a non-official public screening.[60]

During July 1983, despite the worsening diplomatic relations, US feature films and American film-makers and movie stars still played a significant role at the 13th Moscow International Film Festival.[61] The most significant event of

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56 V. Shitova. Sil'nee sily. *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 20, 1979, 16–17.

57 *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 17, 1981, 19; no. 24, 15, and Gennadii Frolov. Dzhein Fond. ibid., 1980, no. 2, 16–17.

58 *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 24, 1979, 15.

59 Quoted in A. Markov. Na dalekom meridiane (komandirovka za rubezh). *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 2, 1980, 18.

60 *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 18, 1981, 16–17. Two American films were selected as the winners of the childrens' movie category: *The Black Stallion* (Carroll Ballard, 1979) and *Kartinki iz zhizni*. [I was unable to identify an original English title of this movie.] See in *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 18, 1981, 2.

61 I.E. Kokarev. Amerikantsy na Mezhdunarodnom kinofestivale v Moskve. *SEPI*, no. 11, 1983, 75–81. *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 24, 1983, 15.

the festival was the thematic screening of seven Stanley Kramer films, including *On the Beach* (1959), *Inherit the Wind* (1960), and *Ship of Fools* (1965), no doubt adding to the international tension of that year.[62] As Kramer declared to journalists in Moscow in 1983, he came to MIFF "worrying about a dangerous development of the international situation and increasing international tensions." "I arrived in Moscow", Kramer said, "because I must tell to the young generation of film makers of the world, who attend this largest cinema forum, to all normal and sensible people – despite all contradictions, we must survive together, rather than perish together!"[63]

All recommended American films for screening at the festival displayed leftist criticisms of American social and political realities, including *Francis* (Graeme Clifford, 1982) starring Jessica Lange, which won a special prize. Francis Coppola presented two films, *The Outsiders* (1983) and *One from the Heart* (1982). Martin Scorsese and Robert De Niro presented *The King of Comedy*, which together with *Tootsie*, directed by Sydney Pollack, offered "a negative and very critical picture of the American television business" that matched Soviet propaganda clichés. But despite support from Soviet experts, censorship did not allow a wide release for most of these films. *On the Beach* was not supported because of the "graphic portrayal of nuclear war," *Ship of Fools* was rejected due to its "apparent pro-Jewish theme". Only *Tootsie* was recommended for "immediate release, because of its humanism and exposure of the commercial character of television in the US."[64]

Television, New Video Technologies and Soviet Espionage Series

Soviet television did not escape American influence. During the 1970s, Soviet Americanists, especially those from ISKAN, together with Soviet journalists in the United States, provided recommendations for the "modernisation" of Soviet

62 Interview with Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, 21 May 2001, Moscow; e-mail correspondence with Valery Golovskoy, 10 – 11 May 2013.

63 I. E. Kokarev. Amerikantsy na Mezhdunarodnom kinofestivale v Moskve, 75.

64 Quoted in I. E. Kokarev. Amerikantsy na Mezhdunarodnom kinofestivale v Moskve, 80 – 81. At the same time, there was a gradual increase of ideological conservatism and a more cautious evaluation of "progressive humanism". Soviet film experts criticised especially *The Deer Hunter* (Michael Cimino, 1978) as "a libel against our brotherly people of socialist Vietnam." See Liudmila Mel'vil'. Militarizatsiia ekrana i otvetstvennost' kritiki. Eshche raz o fil'me 'Okhotnik na olenei. *Iskusstvo kino*, no. 8, 1980, 154 – 162.

radio and television.[65] Almost on a monthly basis, Soviet Americanists published special surveys of technical and ideological innovations in American television, including the cable infrastructure and new video recording techniques.[66] Soviet scholars together with the young Soviet journalists-*mezhdunarodniki*, such as Ekaterina Tarkhanova, Vladimir Pozner and Igor Fesunenko, contributed to the slow westernisation of Soviet radio and TV, using various technologies for broadcasting popular music.[67] "As far as I remember," Nikolai Bolkhovitinov explained, "my fellow-Americanists recommended that their supervisors include talk shows, live TV, variety shows with elements of American jazz and beat music in Soviet television programs as early as the 1970s. And some of these recommendations were implemented in various TV shows."[68] The American TV series such as *Daktari*, broadcast in the USSR from June 1973, *Lassie* (from January 1974), *Adventures in Africa* (from August 1976), recommended by both Soviet scholars and journalists, became the most popular television shows with Soviet children.[69] American situation comedies inspired the production of the first original Soviet mini-series, *Day After Day* (1971–72), which covered the life of ordinary residents of one Soviet communal apartment. Originally broadcast on 9 December 1971 it became the most popular Soviet TV show.[70]

In their reports and professional analysis, Americanists such as N.A. Goliadkin paid special attention to a variety of genres of American television mini-series, including criminal police dramas such as *Kojak* (Abby Mann, 1973–78), Westerns like *The Virginian* (Morton Fine, 1962–1971), and action crime (detective)

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65 *SEPI*, no. 1, 1973, 84–85; N.A. Goliadkin. Profili amerikanskogo radio. *SEPI*, no. 9, 1977, 43–54, and idem, Obshchestvennoe televidenie SShA: mezhdu kul'turoi, biznesom i politikoi. *SEPI*, no. 2, 1979, 50–70; N. S. Biriukov. Televizionnaia imperiia. *SEPI*, no. 2, 1976, 8–95.

66 A.S. Dangulov. Magnitnaia "pamiat" sistemy "Ampeks". *SEPI*, no. 9, 1974, 107–113; E.V. Perfilova. Nastoiashcheie i budushcheie kabel'nogo televideniia. *SEPI*, no. 7, 1977, 46–55; N. A. Goliadkin. Gollivud i TV: ot konfrontatsii k sotrudnichestvu. *SEPI*, no. 1, 1980, 46–57; Yu. M. Kagramanov. Ostorozhno: televidenie, SEPI, no. 9, 1980, 60–64; S. I. Gus'kov. Televidenie i sport. *SEPI*, no. 8, 1982, 51–54.

67 Fedor I. Razzakov. *Gibel' sovetskogo TV: Tainï televideniya ot Stalina do Gorbacheva. 1930–1991.* Moscow: EKSMO, 2009, 7–260, 461 ff; and especially N.A. Goliadkin. Profili amerikanskogo radio, 52–54.

68 Interview with Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, 12 May 1996, Moscow. This collaboration of Americanists and journalists produced, according to Aleksandr Fursenko, "the official invitations to American musicians like BB King, and various American theatrical groups to tour in the USSR." Interview with Aleksandr Fursenko, Moscow, 19 March 1991.

69 Razzakov. *Gibel' sovetskogo TV*, 71; interview with Robert F. Ivanov, Moscow, 25 June 1991.

70 Razzakov. *Gibel' sovetskogo TV*, 73–76. The overwhelming majority of the seventy people, whom I interviewed, noted a tremendous popularity of all 17 episodes of the mini-series *Den' za dniom*.

drama such as *Charlie's Angels* (Ivan Goff and Ben Roberts, 1976–1981).[71] During the 1970s, they recommended creating similar Soviet television shows, "filling them with the socialist cultural humanistic content."[72] Americanists suggested using American television "novels," which could be based on famous literary bestsellers familiar to a majority of Soviet spectators. These experts explained how such mini-series "could hook" the audience for "promoting the important ideological message" and "educating the ordinary viewers in various topics of history." Soviet Americanists and journalists especially praised three "historic novel-based dramas" broadcast as mini-series: *Roots* (Marvin J. Chomsky, 1977, 1979, 1988), based on Alex Haley's novel *Roots: The Saga of an American Family*; *Washington: Behind Closed Doors* (David W. Rintels, 1977), based on John Erlichman's book *The Company*; and *Holocaust* (Gerald Green, 1978).[73] Some Soviet Americanists even described these television shows as "a significant phenomenon not only in popular culture, but also in social-political life of the entire civilised world." Eventually, this format was used for numerous so-called "historic epic" miniseries such as *Teni ischezaiut v polden'* (Shadows Disappear at Midday, Valery Uskov and Vladimir Karasnopol'skii, 1970–71) and *Vechnyi zov* (Eternal Call, Valery Uskov and Vladimir Karasnopol'skii, 1973–83).[74]

Soviet experts also recommended the incorporation of video clips in TV music shows. As early as 1974, they referred to the new video recording technology and recommended using a "combination of pre-recorded video clips and new American magnetic video tapes for recordings."[75] Millions of Soviet fans of Western pop music were pleasantly surprised that after a traditional long

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71 N.A. Goliadkin. Obshchestvennoe televidenie SShA: mezhdu kul'turoi, biznesom i politikoi. N. S. Biriukov. Televizionnaia imperiia. N. A. Goliadkin. Gollivud i TV: ot konfrontatsii k sotrudnichestvu. *SEPI*, no. 1, 1980, 46–57; Yu. M. Kagramanov. Ostorozhno: televidenie. *SEPI*, no. 9, 1980, 60–64. For a negative description of American television: Melor Sturua. *S Potomaka na Missisipi: Nesentimental'noye puteshestviye po Amerike*. Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 1981, 38–41.

72 N. A. Goliadkin, "Gollivud i TV," and interviews with Robert Ivanov and Aleksandr Fursenko, 21 March 1991, Moscow.

73 On the history and analysis of American television (in Ukrainian) see Evgen Rosenko. Svitlotini amerikans'kogo teleekranu. *Vsesvit*, no. 7, 1981, 190–206.

74 Interview with Nikolai Bolkhovitinov, 4 May 1997, Moscow; Evgen Rosenko. Svitlotini amerikans'kogo teleekranu, 196–197.

75 A.S. Dangulov. Magnitnaia "pamiat'' sistemy "Ampeks", 107–113; E.V. Perfilova. Nastoiashcheie i budushcheie kabel'nogo televideniia, 46–55. Ironically, the Soviet authorities sometimes ordered a release of US television films for Soviet cinemas rather than for Soviet television. In 1980 Soviet officials allowed the release of *Black Market Baby* (aka *A Dangerous Love*, 1977), directed by Robert Day, which was shown all over the Soviet Union as *Ne kradite moego rebenka*. See *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 11, 1980, 19.

and boring *Novogodnii Ogoniok* show in the early morning of 1 January 1975, the central Soviet TV station broadcast an unusually long concert by Western pop music stars using video, including the most popular performers from Soviet discotheques such as ABBA, Boney M, Dowley Family, Donny Osmond, Silver Convention, Joe Dassen, Amanda Lear, Smokey and Baccarat. From 1975, Soviet TV aired similar shows at least once a year, usually late at night. On 11 January 1977 the first broadcast of "Melodies and Rhythms of Foreign Estrada" took place that included the most popular stars of Western rock and disco music. Until perestroika this was the only way millions of Soviet fans could see their idols on the TV. During the 1970s, Soviet TV also broadcast variety shows which included covers of the most popular western hits in Russian. The "TV Benefit Performances" of famous Soviet film stars such as Larisa Golubkina (1975) and Liudmila Gurchenko (1978), and Evgenii Ginzburg's show "Magic Lantern" (1976), offered cover versions of songs from the British rock opera, *Jesus Christ Superstar*, as well as Soviet rock bands such as Vesiolye rebiata from Moscow and Poiushchie gitary from Leningrad performing the Beatles and Paul McCartney.[76] Vladislav Zubok later recalled that his father, Martin Zubok, son of the legendary Soviet Americanist Lev Zubok, worked as a cameraman and video engineer at Ostankino television studio at this time. Martin Zubok adored Ginzburg's television shows and took a very active part in their preparation. In conversations with his young son, he especially praised "Magic Lantern" as "the most revolutionary variety show" on Soviet television. Soviet authorities, afraid of its influence, ensured it was shown only during the spring of 1976 on Easter night "to distract Soviet youth" and "prevent them from visiting" Easter celebrations in the church.[77]

It is noteworthy that all of Ginzburg's shows used the stories and songs from *My Fair Lady* (George Cukor, 1964), another US "cult" film, which became notorious for an entire generation of Soviet film makers and television producers. Models of American musical film such as *My Fair Lady*, *Sound of Music* (Robert Wise, 1965), and *Oliver!* (Carol Reed, 1968), released in the Soviet Union during 1970 – 1971, became the most popular cultural form used by Soviet television for variety shows through the entire 1970s.[78] By the end of the 1970s, young Soviet television journalists incorporated many American innovations in video and

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76 Sergei I. Zhuk. *Rock and Roll in the Rocket City*, 239 – 240.

77 E-mail correspondence with Vladislav Zubok, 1 January 2015.

78 A. Anikst. Razvlechenie – delo serioznoie. *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 12, 1970, 6; no. 19, 9; *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 24 1971, 19; no. 10, 1972, 18. Soviet scholars Bolkhovitinov and Fursenko (Russia), Shlepakov and Leshchenko (Ukraine), and former rock music fans and businessmen from Ukraine such as Eduard Svichar and Mikhail Suvorov all noted the role of American musical films as a model for Soviet television variety shows.

audio technologies to produce one of the most popular variety shows of music parodies and social criticism – *Vesiolye rebiata* (Funny Guys). First broadcast on 26 February 1982, this show “became a video clip revolution in Soviet visual media.”[79]

Another important American influence on Soviet TV was the depiction of espionage. The most popular Soviet spy movies included *Dead Season* (Savva Kulish, 1968), *The Resident’s Mistake* (Venyamin Dorman, 1968), *The Resident’s Fate* (V. Dorman, 1970), and *Zemlya, do vostrebovaniya* (V. Dorman, 1972).[80] Soviet film-makers produced the anti-American movies *Incident at Map Grid 36–80* (Mikhail Tumanishvili, 1982) and *Solo Voyage* (Mikhail Tumanishvili, 1986). Soviet spies were shown fighting the Whites during the Civil War (*An Adjutant of His Excellency,* 1969–70) and the Nazis during the Second World War (*Seventeen Moments of the Spring,* 1973). These series were replaced in 1984 by *TASS is Authorized to Announce* (Vladimir Fokin, 1984), which portrayed the KGB’s patriotic officers fighting against American spies.[81]

TASS is Authorized to Announce was made in the best tradition of international spy fiction, but from a different ideological perspective than the novels of John Le Carré or Frederick Forsyth. Soviet writer Yulian Semionov based one script on real-life events. In 1977, when the KGB tried to arrest a CIA spy code-named “Trianon”, he poisoned himself. This spy was Aleksandr Ogorodnik, a Soviet official from the American Department at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Semionov used this story for his novel and film, mixing fiction and the memoirs of his friend, the KGB General Viacheslav Kevorkov portrayed in the film as KGB officer Slavin. In the movie, when the CIA officer under diplomatic cover is caught engaging in espionage red-handed, the US ambassador is summoned to the Soviet foreign ministry in Moscow and confronted with the evidence. He agrees to have the CIA operation against the pro-Soviet African regime in Nagonia called off in return for silence on the part of the Soviets. *Izvestiya* is later able to report: “TASS is authorized to declare that Soviet counter-intelli-

79 Fedor I. Razzakov. *Gibel’ sovetskogo TV*, 109–110. More than sixty people whom I interviewed, mentioned “video revolution.” On the influence of video (which first entered the USSR through contacts between Finnish television and Estonia) see Sergei I. Zhuk. Film review of *Disco and Atomic War*. Dir. Jaak Kilmi and Kiur Aarma. Brooklyn: Icarus Films, 2009. *Slavic Review* 70 (2011): 902–903.

80 Tony Shaw and Denise Youngblood. *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010, 52, 237.

81 Ibid., 190–201; Stites. *Russian Popular Culture*, 152; Elena Prokhorova. Fragmented Mythologies: Soviet TV Mini-Series of the 1970s’. Doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2003.

gence has uncovered and neutralised a CIA operation aimed against the USSR and Nagonia."[82]

To some extent, this movie was a direct Soviet reaction to the popularity of the American anti-CIA films widely shown in the USSR during détente. Two anti-CIA thrillers – *The Three Days of the Condor* and *The Domino Principle* – generated a negative perception of America and "Western imperialism" among Soviet audiences. *TASS is Authorized to Announce* was made during the regime of Yuri Andropov, the former KGB Chief who succeeded Brezhnev in 1982. It glorifies the KGB but at the same time portrays the CIA as an intelligent and praiseworthy rival. As one film critic noted, "it depicts Americans as very worthy enemies - American agents of the CIA are presented here with big respect which means that the Soviets respected themselves. And this goes in contrast to most Hollywood productions shot during the Cold War where the Soviets were depicted simply as morons."[83] The most popular Soviet movie stars such as Vyacheslav Tikhonov and Yuri Solomin were invited to participate. The film became a television blockbuster following its first showing on Soviet television during 30 July – 10 August 1984. It also included the first public portrayal on Soviet television of a video cassette player, and was known for the experimental music of composer Eduard Artemiev who mixed electronic sounds with western progressive rock music. The film triggered a new western fashion combination: American jeans, sneakers, leather jackets and T-shirts, worn by the KGB characters in the movie, became a modern dress code suited for both Soviet youth and middle-aged people.[84]

82 I. Peretrukhin. *Agenturnaya klichka – Trianon. Vospominaniya kontrrazvedchika*. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2000, 46–98.

83 Oleg Kotov. O chiom ne byl upolnomochen zaiavit' TASS. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 5 March 2004; Marina Efanova. Vladimir Fokin smotrit televizor spinoi k ekranu. *Vechernii Khar'kov*, 2 March 2013.

84 Razzakov. *Gibel' sovetskogo TV*, 115, 259. The movie is still one of the most popular Soviet television films among post-Soviet Russian audiences. See also Sergei Zhuk. TASS Authorized to Announce. In *Directory of World Cinema: Russia 2*, Birgit Beumers (ed.), 230–231. Bristol: Intellect Ltd., 2014.

The Impact of American Visual Media on Soviet Society

Soviet Americanists also brought rare TV films based on classical foreign literature from capitalist countries to Soviet TV.[85] Based on the records of five 'summer school diaries' during the 1970s, Soviet children were able to watch not only the ice hockey matches between the Soviet Union and Canada but also *Lassie* and BBC mini-series like *David Copperfield*. One sixteen-year-old rock music fan reacted to this cultural détente on television: 'It's amazing to see what is going on in our television: since 1975, we have watched an American movie about Lassie, various broadcasts about Soviet-American space flights of *Soyuz-Apollo* and scientific exchanges between us and Americans, then we have seen an English detective movie *The Moon Stone,* and finally, on Soviet television the official political show *Mezhdunarodnaia panorama* is introduced by the [unannounced] melody of *One of These Days* from Pink Floyd's album *Meddle*.'[86] Meanwhile, adult Soviet audiences fell in love with the BBC series *The Forsyte Saga* based on John Galsworthy's novel and other Western television movies, like the Italian film *The Life of Leonardo da Vinci* by Renato Castellani. According to Soviet film critics, such movies were the most popular Western feature films shown on Soviet TV during the 1970s.[87] As one contemporary observer summarised: "It was a real Western cultural invasion in the Soviet Union. Since 1975 the Soviet audiences had been exposed to the massive attacks of images and sounds from the capitalist West on television, in the movies, in radio, in music records, and of course on the dance floor."[88]

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85 Fursenko mentioned a discussion on "ideologically reliable" TV mini-series in his academic reports. Eventually the Soviet Ministry of Culture agreed to purchase television films based on classical literature such as Charles Dickens and Jack London. Interview with Aleksandr Fursenko, Moscow, 19 March 1991; Aleksandr Anikst. Bez vdokhnovenia. *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 24, 1975, 4.
86 Summer School Diary, Aleksandr Gusar, Pavlograd, Dnipropetrovsk Region, 1970 – 1977: 8 November 1977.
87 Interview with Askold B., the son of a head of the tourist department, Dnipropetrovsk Trade Union branch, Dnipropetrovsk University, 15 April 1993, *Novyny kinoekranu*, 1970, no. 2, 14. For a review of the BBC adaptation of *David Copperfield:* Aleksandr Anikst. Bez vdokhnovenia. *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 24, 1975, 4. For a negative review of *The Moon Stone:* Aleksandr Anikst. Kamen' okazalsia ne dragotsennym. *Sovetskiy ekran*, no. 20, 1975, 4. See also Leonid Parfionov. *Namedni*, 232, 286.
88 Interview with Suvorov.

This cultural détente did create some ideological confusion, especially in the Soviet provinces. On 4 March 1972, a communist leader from an Ukrainian industrial region complained to local Komsomol ideologists: "It is too much capitalist West on our Soviet television screens today… Television shows about American music and films, about western fashions prevail on our central channel from Moscow. It looks like a kind of Americanisation! It confuses our Soviet youth who try to imitate these foreign images in their behavior… We need to stop it!"[89] Ten years later, in 1982, a local newspaper still complained about "Americanisation on Soviet screens."[90] Based on my analysis of the TV sections of local newspapers from the Kiev, Cherkasy, Zaporizhie, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk Regions in Ukraine, the number of shows containing "material from the capitalist West" increased from 7–10 per week (10 percent of the broadcast time for "informational programs" such as *Mezhdunarodnaia panorama*, and the occasional "capitalist" movie like the French *Count of Monte Cristo*) in 1968, to 14–18 per week (including music shows like *Ogoniok* with 20 percent "capitalist", specials about Angela Davis, BBC feature films and Italian television series) in 1972. This reached a peak in 1978 with 24–27 shows per week (30 to 40 percent of total broadcast time).[91]

Local party leaders in provincial Ukrainian cities did protest about this "westernisation of TV images" and tried to produce local "counter-propagandist anti-capitalist" TV shows that criticised the material shown on "a central Moscow channel."[92] Paradoxically, because of the centralisation of Soviet television, local authorities were unable to prevent this westernisation. The central channel of Soviet television, a crucial creative mechanism for promoting an All-Union identity in the provinces, therefore became instrumental in spreading western popular culture and so added to (and confused) the "visual matrix" of Soviet identity.[93]

Local TV viewers were also bemused by the changes. As one high-school student from a small provincial Soviet town wrote in his diary in 1976:

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89 DADO, f. 22, op. 19, d. 2, ll. 135–145, especially 142–143; interview with Igor T., KGB officer, Dniepropetrovsk, 15 May 1991; Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Vyshchykh Organiv Vlady ta Upravlinnia Ukrainy (hereafter – TsDAVOVUU), f. 4915, op. 1, d. 3438, ll. 4–9.

90 E. Iakovlev. Navazhdenie (kinoobozrenie). *Dneprovskaia Pravda*, 4 February 1982, 3.

91 I used local periodicals as *Ukrains'ka Pravda*, *Shevchenkiv krai*, *Vechernii Donetsk*, *Dnepr vechernii* etc.

92 DADO, f. 22, op. 19, d. 2, ll. 135–145, d. 156 (for 1973), l. 10, ll. 10ob–11, and TsDAVOVUU, f. 4915, op. 1, d. 3438, ll. 4–9.

93 Ellen Propper Mickiewicz. *Media and the Russian Public*. 73–78; Kristin Roth-Ey. *Moscow Prime Time*, 281.

> What is going on with our television? A few years ago a Moscow TV channel presented rock music as "sound of capitalist degeneration and of cultural crisis." Now they include western rock [music] in every show. It is like our own Soviet Westernisation!!! A year ago (1975), in *Benefis* of Larisa Golubkina they permitted Soviet musicians to cover "Mrs. Vandebilt" by McCartney and the Wings. This year in one show *Volshebnyi fonar'* I noticed at least four Russian covers of arias from rock opera *Jesus Christ Superstar*, including my favorite "King Herod's Song", two covers of the Beatles songs like "Octopus's Garden" and "Let It Be", and Russian covers of music from American films *Godfather, Love Story* and *My Fair Lady.*[94]

A year later, another student noted:

> It is amazing how this international détente has changed our television... On a channel of the Central television, our family recently watched the concerts of western music featuring ABBA and Smokey... My mom watched tonight the television shows and films only from the capitalist West. She was so frustrated by this "*capitalist invasion*" in our culture that she called this situation "*the détente's new cultural revolution.*"[95]

American Visual Media Shaping the Soviet Way of Life

Soviet "cultural détente" did have an explicit anti-capitalist, anti-American bias, and the American films recommended by Soviet Americanists did generate negative responses. A college student who loved American rock music and western movies, noted after watching *The Domino Principle, Oklahoma Crude,* and *The Three Days of the Condor* in August 1982: "we perhaps do not have enough products in our food stores and have fewer cars on our roads, but our youth have much brighter futures than those Americans."[96] Another commented in his diary after watching the American police drama *The New Centurions:* "it is good to live in the West when you have money and power, but it is very dangerous to live there if you are just an ordinary poor man. I would rather stay in my own country."[97] The anti-CIA thrillers (*Three Days of the Condor* and *The Domino Principle*) were influential in generating a negative perception of America and "western imperialism" among Soviet college students: "The military industrial

94 School diary of Vladimir Solodovnik, Sinel'nikovo, Dnipropetrovsk Region, 7 December 1976.
95 School diary of Oleg Grin, Vatutino, Cherkasy Region, 16 January 1977.
96 Summer School Diary, Oleg Grin, Kiev, 29 August 1982.
97 School Diary, Aleksandr Gusar, 5 July 1975.

complex and the intelligence agencies rule the West. After watching Pollack's and Kramer's films, we understand that capitalist America has no future."[98]

This was the outcome hoped for by Soviet ideologists and the KGB. During détente, the KGB tried to develop an interpretation of the negotiations with the West for the Soviet audience. Western powers, especially the United States, were presented not just as the class enemies of the Soviet Union, but also as very unreliable political and economic partners in the long term. To some extent, academic studies, including American film studies, reminded Soviet audiences of this unreliability while at the same time promoting the principles of détente. Soviet television shows, like the miniseries *Seventeen Moments of Spring* in 1973, emphasised the "unreliable" position of the Western Allies during WWII.[99] Nevertheless the influx of cultural products from the capitalist West, stimulated by détente, intensified the ideological confusion in Soviet society during the 1970s. Soviet Americanists served as mediators between American and Soviet cultures, playing very important roles in this process of cultural confusion. A phenomenon known as "cultural fixation" on American cultural practices and products became common among both elite and ordinary Soviet consumers. Limited access to such cultural forms in societies with strong ideological controls inevitably produces an intense idealisation. As entries in personal diaries testify, American films attracted Soviet filmgoers not only because they were fun to watch, but also because they displayed elements of modern Western technology and machinery that were absent in Soviet everyday life. "It is fantastic how they use machines in America!" one Soviet spectator wrote, "Everybody drives cars and can operate different machines. And what machines! It looks like everything – cars, music records, jeans – is available for everybody. How I dream just to live in such a society! It is easy living in the West!"[100] In this idealised world, the real social problems portrayed in American movies were supplanted by more attractive and memorable details of everyday life that looked very different from the traditional images of the capitalist "oppressive" West in Soviet propaganda. This "strengthened this feeling of the easy, careless living in the West." As a result, the Soviet viewer developed negative impressions of the difficult realities of Soviet everyday life, "when people worked hard, earned a little, and lived without convenient modern Western machines."[101]

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98 School Diary, Andrei Vadimov, Dnipropetrovsk, 5 December 1978.

99 Bolkhovitinov and Fursenko noted, and Ivanov and Leshchenko agreed with this in their interviews.

100 School Diary, Andrei Vadimov, Dnipropetrovsk, 27 June 1974.

101 Interview with Vitalii Pidgaetskii, Dnipropetrovsk, 10 February 1996.

The cultural Cold War in visual media also contributed to generating new film genres and television shows, such as the historical epic drama, the Western, musical, spy film, sitcom, soap opera, and TV mini-series. Recommended by Soviet Americanists and promoted by the Moscow international film festivals, American cinematic practices, together with technological innovations such as video recording and video clip compilations, "westernised and modernised" images on both cinema and television screens during the 1970s and 1980s. This also demonstrated the unique possibilities for ideological manipulation and mobilisation through visual media. Even if it is true that Hollywood was at its best when depicting crime and corruption in the US, which after all is the stuff that thrillers are made of, it is remarkable how Soviet propaganda managed to separate, in the heads of citizens, the images of high US living standards and the US as an intrinsically bad society. Soviet citizens seem not to have drawn the conclusion that a system that is criticised openly from within might be more democratic than one where such criticism could not be voiced. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these lessons from the cultural Cold War about the possibilities of visual media would be successfully implemented by Russian President Vladimir Putin, among others, to control the post-Soviet space.

Evgeniya Kondrashina

Soviet Music Recordings and Cold War Cultural Relations

When exploring cultural exchange between the USSR and the West, Cold War historians tend to focus their efforts between the 1950s to 60s. Many studies have shown that the Thaw years were key in the development of artistic exchanges between the two sides of the Cold War divide, especially after the Lacy–Zarubin cultural exchange agreement between the USA and the USSR of 1958.[1] The tendency of academics to focus on state structures and musicians as agents of cultural movement has further intensified research activity on the 1950s–60s, when these official agreements led to various cultural tours and exchanges. Far less attention has been paid to the 1970s so far.[2] Relations between the West and the Soviet Union changed from 1964, when Leonid Brezhnev came to power. The ten years from 1969 are often referred to as "Détente," when a power balance was acknowledged between the USA and USSR. Simo Mikkonen and others have noted the increased importance of personal networks and relations during cultural exchanges in that period: "in contrast to the Thaw, when state-to-state-level connections rapidly expanded, the expansion during the Brezhnev era

1 For selected studies on 1950s and 1960s cultural exchanges, see David Caute. *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; Pauline Fairclough (ed.). *Twentieth-Century Music and Politics: Essays in Memory of Neil Edmunds*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013; and Simo Mikkonen and Pekka Suutari (eds.). *Music, Art and Diplomacy: East-West Cultural Interactions and the Cold War*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2016. For details of the Lacy–Zarubin agreement, see Danielle Fosler-Lussier. *Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015, 170 – 174; Yale Richmond. *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain*. University Park, Penn.: Penn State University Press, 2003, 14 – 20; or Cadra McDaniel. *American–Soviet Cultural Diplomacy: The Bolshoi Ballet's American Premiere*. London: Lexington Books, 2014, 10 – 19.

2 Many chapters in Fairclough. *Twentieth-Century Music and Politics* and Mikkonen and Suutari. *Music, Art and Diplomacy* analyse various case studies of music exchanges in the Cold War. Other books on this topic include Felix Meyer, Carol J. Oja, Wolfgang Rathert, and Anne C. Shreffler (eds.). *Crosscurrents: American and European Music in Interaction, 1900 – 2000*. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2014; Cameron Pyke. *Benjamin Britten and Russia*. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2016; Kirill Tomoff. *Virtuosi Abroad: Soviet Music and Imperial Competition during the Early Cold War, 1945 – 1958*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015; and Harlow Robinson. *The Last Impresario: The Life, Times, and Legacy of Sol Hurok*. New York: Penguin Books, 1995.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110573169-009

took place in the less visible realm of people-to-people and other informal connections."[3]

Apart from the need to study individual and corporate, non-government artistic connections during the Détente era further, another vital and largely neglected area in East-West cultural relationships is the role of material objects.[4] The two most important physical objects that carry representations of musical works are scores and gramophone recordings. Colin Symes, Robert Philip, Michael Chanan, Timothy Day and others have analysed the latter as cultural artefacts, looking at the participants, connections, and the cultural, economic and social implications of the invention of music recording for Western societies.[5] The introduction of stereo sound reproduction technology in 1958 dramatically improved the quality of the listening-at-home experience, which for classical music was a much more significant factor compared to other music genres.[6] The market for high-quality LPs of classical music took off, with music lovers investing in sophisticated listening equipment and paying a premium for stereo recordings of classical music that would deliver a high fidelity listening experience, mimicking the live performances at a concert hall or opera house.[7] This led to the rise of the home music lover and record collector, a key phenomenon of Cold War society.

In studies of Cold War cultural relations, recordings have been mentioned as a by-product of musicians' tours to the West.[8] Mikkonen has recognised that they were much more than that and has considered how the export of music record-

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3 Simo Mikkonen. Changing Dynamics: From International Exchanges to Transnational Networks. In *Reconsidering Stagnation in the Brezhnev Era: Ideology and Exchange*, Dina Fainberg, Artemy Kalinovsky (eds.), 165. London: Lexington Books, 2016.

4 Benjamin Piekut. Actor-Networks in Music History: Clarifications and Critiques. *Twentieth-Century Music* 11 (2014): 191–215. Erica Cudworth and Stephen Hobden. Of Parts and Wholes: International Relations beyond the Human. *Journal of International Studies* 41 (2013): 430–450.

5 Michael Chanan. *Repeated Takes: A Short History of Recording and Its Effects on Music*. London: Verso, 1995; Timothy Day. *A Century of Recorded Music: Listening to Music History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000; Robert Philip. *Early Recordings and Musical Style: Changing Tastes in Instrumental Performance, 1900–1950*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Colin Symes. *Setting the Record Straight: A Material History of Classical Recording*. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 2004.

6 Richard Burgess. *The History of Music Production*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 63.

7 Pekka Gronow and Ilpo Saunio. *An International History of the Recording Industry*. London: Cassell, 1999, 113.

8 The few discussions of music recordings within Soviet–West cultural relations include Meri Herrala. Pianist Sviatoslav Richter: The Soviet Union Launches a "Cultural Sputnik" to the United States in 1960. In *Music, Art and Diplomacy*, Simo Mikkonen, Pekka Suutari (eds.), 102 Farnham: Ashgate, 2016; and Tomoff. *Virtuosi Abroad*. 140–142.

ings in the 1950s helped to expand the influence of Soviet classical music abroad.[9] Records were much more widespread and accessible for the public across the West, including the USA and the UK, than the concerts of Soviet musicians. From the 1950s, technological advancements in music recording led to a widespread practice of listening to and collecting records in both the West and the Soviet Union. Mass sales of records led to a dissemination of classical music across the West, including the UK. Musicians' tours could only cover several major cities in a country, while recordings sold in shops and played on the radio reached far and wide across geographical territories.

This chapter brings together the two key areas identified above: consideration of private, non-government agents in the East-West cultural relations of the Détente period, and the vital role played by material objects – in this case, classical music records.[10] I consider the agents of a long and productive relationship, and its material output: the interactions between the Soviet Union and EMI, one of the largest Western record companies in the world in 1968–82. The focus of this chapter is on Soviet classical music recordings in the West, particularly the UK.[11] I examine the motives and actions of a private Western corporation in its dealings with the Soviet Union to license Soviet classical music recordings to the UK. Of key importance is the licensing agreement, which started in the late 1950s but really took off ten years later, continuing throughout the 1970s. It was part of a vast network of licensing contracts signed by the Soviet Union with Western European and American record companies in the 1960s and 1970s, which set out to promote Soviet classical music and monetise the popularity of Soviet performers following their active touring during the Thaw years. I show how the British agreement exposed listeners to a wide and diverse repertoire of Russian and Soviet classical music and performers from the USSR.

EMI's relationship with the Soviet Union was commercial; hence, not all materials are freely available to researchers. EMI's own archive in Hayes, Middlesex

9 Simo Mikkonen. Winning Hearts and Minds? Soviet Music in the Cold War Struggle against the West. In *Twentieth-Century Music and Politics*, Pauline Fairlought (ed.), 139–140.

10 I would like to thank Tamsin Alexander and David Patmore for their expertise and comments on this chapter.

11 I use the words "record," "recording" and "vinyl" interchangeably to talk about the material object of the vinyl record. I use the term "Soviet recordings" to signify the body of recordings that were made in the USSR; the works that were recorded on these vinyl records were composed in different time periods and geographies: Russian (pre-1917), Soviet (1917 onwards) and, less often, Western classical music. The term "LP" means "long-playing record." This was the main format for high-quality classical music recordings in the 1960s and 1970s.

has been effectively closed to researchers since 2008. The archives of EMI's key counterpart in the Soviet Union, the Soviet trade organisation Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga (MK, or International Book), are classified.[12] I have relied on trade press publications, EMI's annual reports and the British Library Sound Archive, which contains a copy of recordings produced by EMI under the licensing agreement with MK. I have also used interviews and documents of the key people involved in that relationship: Tony Locantro, the EMI business manager who dealt with all business transactions relating to Soviet records (MK and Melodiya), and member of EMI's International Classical Division (ICD); Michael Allen, General Manager of Angel Records, EMI's US subsidiary, 1974–77 and deputy General Manager of the ICD in 1968–74 and 1979–97; John Pattrick, General Manager of the Classical Division of EMI Records (UK) in 1975–84; and Michael Letchford, member of the Classical Division of EMI Records (UK) from 1976, responsible for marketing and selling the licensed Soviet vinyl recordings in the UK.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that state-sponsored cultural tours of the 1950s and 1960s familiarised the public (on both sides of the East-West divide) with foreign artists and led to a demand for their recordings. Western record companies, including EMI, recognised the commercial potential and actively sought to establish licensing agreements with Soviet partners. These agreements facilitated further recordings by Soviet classical music performers to be made directly in the West. I reveal that EMI was interested in exploiting solely Soviet (including pre-Soviet Russian) classical music, whereas the Soviet side exposed its listeners to a variety of Western music recordings beyond the classical, including pop, jazz and rock. Together, cultural diplomacy and demand from Western consumers – supported by technological innovations – triggered the first wave of recordings by Soviet classical performers made or imported into the West in the late 1950s.[13]

The 1970s were the golden era for Soviet classical music recordings in the West, when a vast and diverse repertoire was licensed, manufactured as LPs, and distributed across the various countries of the West. Although companies like EMI were eager to expose audiences to young Soviet artists and composers, state ownership of recording facilities in the USSR meant that internal Soviet decisions on who was offered the opportunity to record determined which Soviet performers and composers the Western audiences got to hear. I demonstrate

12 The entire MK archive (Fond 940) is kept at RGAE, *Rossiskiy gosudarstvenniy arkhiv ekonomiki* [Russian State Archive of Economics]. It is not listed in the archive's public catalogue and the archivists acknowledged its classified status in our conversation on 7 April 2017.

13 The three key technological developments that triggered accelerated growth in the record industry after the Second World War were the invention of magnetic tape recording, the vinyl long-playing disc and stereo sound reproduction.

that the record companies regarded Soviet performers as part of the global classical music business.

Cultural Diplomacy Paves the Way for Commercial Record Deals

Cultural exchange and trade between the USSR and the West was scarce during the Stalin years. The exchange of physical objects, like scores and recordings, was also limited. Until 1957, VOKS, the Soviet state body for cultural relations with the West, was responsible for all exchanges of musical artefacts and the promotion of Soviet culture abroad.[14] Since Soviet recording technology and quality of materials lagged behind Western equivalents, scores were the main musical objects VOKS sent to friendship societies and individuals in the West.[15] Developments in recording technology coincided with the noticeable warming of relations between the West and the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin in 1953. VOKS actively engaged with its foreign partners in the exchange of scores and recordings both of nineteenth century Russian music and contemporary compositions. For instance, on 26 June 1954 VOKS sent its representatives in London five boxes of recordings weighing 62 kg "to pass onto the Society for Cultural Relations between the People of the British Commonwealth and the USSR," which included works by Pyotr Tchaikovsky, Mikhail Glinka, Nikolay Miaskovsky, Alexander Glazunov, as well as miscellaneous Russian romances and folk songs.[16] A further selection of recordings, this time including works by con-

14 VOKS is *Vsesoyuznoe obshestvo kulturnoy svyazi s zagranitsey* [All-Russian Society for Cultural Relations Abroad].

15 A variety of scores were sent to the West, including works by Nikolay Miaskovsky, Vissarion Shebalin, Dmitri Kabalevsky, and Dmitri Shostakovich. For a concert of contemporary Soviet music held by the Society for Cultural Relations between the People of the British Commonwealth and the USSR (SCRSS), in April–June 1932 VOKS sent works by Alexander Mosolov, Alexander Goedicke, Boris Lyatoshinsky, Dmitri Shostakovich, Nikolay Miaskovsky and Leonid Polovinkin. Source: *Kvartalniye i mesachniye otcheti muzsekzii za 1930–33 godi* [Quarterly and monthly reports of the music section of VOKS for *1930–33*], GARF (State Archive of the Russian Federation: *Gosudarstvennïy arkhiv rossiskoy federatsii*), f. 5283, op. 12, d. 223.

16 *Perepiska s upolnomochennïm VOKS v Anglii ob obmene delegatsiyami, organisatsii fotovistavok, o posilke literaturi, not, gramplastinok i po drugim voprosam.* [Correspondence with VOKS representative in England regarding exchange of delegations, photo exhibitions and sending books, scores, recordings and regarding other issues], GARF, f. 5283, op. 15, d. 599, II.

temporary composers Dmitri Shostakovich, Aram Khachaturian and Dmitri Kabalevsky, was sent only three months later on 29 September 1954.[17]

From 1958, VOKS was replaced by SSOD, the Union of Soviet Friendship Associations, and complemented by the more powerful GKKS, the State Committee for Cultural Ties Abroad, which in 1967 was incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The GKKS reported to the Party Central Committee and negotiated cultural agreements with Western countries, with the American Lacy–Zarubin agreement being the most well-known.[18] These agreements opened the door for many performing artists and groups to tour on both sides for the next 30 years, with the focus at first being on classical musicians.[19]

In the 1970s Détente period, the Soviet Union continued to export classical music both in the form of tours and by undertaking active licensing of its recordings to a variety of Western partners. The classical music tours of the previous decade had generated a wide interest in the performers, creating demand for the sale of their recordings. Consequently, the late 1960s saw several deals formalised by the Soviet Union with American and European partners, including Capitol Records in the USA in 1966, EMI Records in the UK in 1967, Ariola-Eurodisc in West Germany in 1965 and Le Chant du Monde in France.[20] With the growth of popular music culture, the focus of performing arts exchange from the West shifted from classical music to more commercial genres, including country and jazz.[21] The Soviet Union became the receiver of foreign popular music tours and recordings, primarily from the US.[22]

Musicians' touring activities were accompanied by a movement of material objects in the form of scores, followed by recordings. The emergence of the phenomenon of the private record collector led to a growing demand for records in the West. By the 1960s, the increasing familiarity of the Western public with So-

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17 Ibid.

18 Mikkonen. Winning Hearts and Minds, 141.

19 Richmond. *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War*, 125 – 126.

20 For Ariola-Eurodisc deal, see Partner "Melodia": Ein gespräch mit Werner Vogelsang über Schallplatte und Musikleben in der UdSSR. *fono forum*, 15 December 1965, 566 – 568. The precise date of the French deal is unknown, but there is a recording of Tchaikovsky's music by Richter with the Leningrad Philharmonic under Yevgeny Mravinsky (LDX 78711) licensed by Le Chant du Monde from the USSR in 1959.

21 Mindy Clegg. When Jazz Was King: Selling Records with the Cold War. *The Journal of American Culture* 38 (2015): 250. For a detailed account of American jazz musicians touring the Eastern Block, see Penny Von Eschen. Improvising Détente. In *Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War*, Penny von Eschen (ed.). Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004.

22 Von Eschen. *Satchmo Blows up the World*, 92 – 120.

viet classical musicians through cultural exchange tours developed a market for Soviet recordings in the West, including the UK.

A Western Record Company Pierces the Iron Curtain

The Gramophone Company, the principal predecessor of EMI, enjoyed excellent relations with the Russian Empire before the 1917 revolution: not only did it have an office in Saint Petersburg, but from 1903 it opened a record-pressing factory in Riga, Latvia, to satisfy the Russian demand for records. Before 1910, Russia was one of its largest markets both in terms of recording artists and record sales.[23] EMI recorded such notable Russian opera stars as Feodor Chaliapin, Nikolay and Medea Figner, and Leonid Sobinov.[24] After the Bolshevik Revolution, all assets of The Gramophone Company, seised by the newly created Soviet state, acted intermittently as recording and production facilities, among other uses.[25] From the 1920s to 1940s, when Soviet artists were mostly walled off from contact with the West, EMI actively recorded Russian émigré musicians, including Vladimir Horowitz and Jascha Heifetz.

The First Licensing Agreement of the Late 1950s

Opportunities to record Soviet performers came during the Thaw as a consequence of cultural exchange programmes and musicians' tours to the West. In the USSR, the state monopoly recording company Melodiya, created in 1964, controlled the recording of music and the mass production of records. Foreign agreements regarding sales of Soviet recordings were administered by Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga (MK), the books-, stamps- and records-trading body of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. EMI was one of the largest record companies in the Western world, diverse both geographically and in the range of products it manufactured.

23 Peter Martland. *Since Records Began: EMI – the First 100 Years*. London: Batsford Ltd., 1997, 69 – 70.

24 Panteleymon Grunberg and Valentin Yanin. *Istoriya nachala gramzapisi v Rossii* [History of early recording in Russia]. Moscow: Rossiyskiy Fond Fundamentalnikh Issledovaniy, 2002, 266.

25 The Soviet government also seised assets of other foreign record companies: the French Pathé Records, the German-founded Extra Records and American Columbia Records. Alexander Zhelezniy. *Nash drug gramplastinka* [Our friend the gramophone record] Kiev: Muzichna Ukraina, 1989, 40 – 54.

By 1960, half the group's turnover came from record sales.[26] EMI was keen to pursue negotiations with their Soviet counterparts to secure access to Soviet performing artists. During the Thaw years, David Bicknell, head of the International Artistes Department at EMI, cultivated relationships with MK and the Ministry of Culture that resulted in the first licensing agreement of 1956 to issue Soviet recordings in the UK under the Parlophone label.[27] Each record carried the phrase "Recordings from the U.S.S.R." The series comprised a diverse selection of music, including Russian nineteenth century works (Glinka, Mussorgsky, Borodin and Tchaikovsky), as well as contemporary pieces by Shostakovich, Prokofiev and Shaporin. The performers were all heavyweights of Soviet classical music: soloists of the Bolshoi Theatre, as well as David Oistrakh, Emil Gilels, Sviatoslav Richter, Lev Oborin and Mstislav Rostropovich. However, the agreement was terminated in the early 1960s. A likely reason could have been that the actual number of released titles was much lower than agreed in the contract.[28]

This first licensing agreement led to the establishment of relationships between EMI and its Soviet counterparts, and helped EMI secure the right to record Soviet artists on their visits to the West. However, it was the subsequent American and British licensing agreements of the 1960s and 1970s that brought these performers into the Western classical music market and established them as superstars on par with, if not above, their Western peers.

The American Licensing Agreement of the 1960s

Classical music had always been a key market for EMI. By 1961, it had accumulated a classical record catalogue of almost 2,000 titles, which boasted leading Western performers and conductors. The classical music business was also very profitable.[29] Unsurprisingly then, EMI was keen to re-establish licensing arrangements with the USSR. This time the trailblazer for EMI was the Angel label, part of its US subsidiary Capitol Records. In August 1966, Angel entered into a

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26 Electric and Musical Industries Ltd., "Annual Report and Accounts," 1959 – 60, 14.
27 Peter Andry. *Inside the Recording Studio: Working with Callas, Rostropovich, Domingo, and the Classical Elite*. London: The Scarecrow Press, 2008, 37, also confirmed by the personal notes of Tony Locantro.
28 Tony Locantro interview for British Library Sound Archive, 7 December 2016. A search through the Parlophone label catalogue between 1958 and 1962 produced 18 recordings in the "Recorded in the U.S.S.R." category.
29 Martland. *Since Records Began*, 200 – 201.

licensing agreement with MK. At the time, the Angel label was positioned as a premium, top-quality brand that issued only the best of the classical repertoire. The record licensing agreement with MK was hailed by *Billboard* magazine as "the latest dent in the cultural Iron Curtain, and marks the first time the Soviet government has provided an American record company with carte blanche distribution rights to its artists."[30]

The music was released under the newly created label Melodiya/Angel from January 1967. The equal label exposure and pricing demonstrate the belief of the American producers in the demand for Soviet recordings in the US market, and their treatment of Soviet classical music performers and their repertoire as being on a par with their Western peers. The head of Capitol Records at the time, Alan Livingston, consulted with the US State Department before flying to Moscow to initiate the deal.[31] Like the subsequent UK agreement, the US deal envisaged that the recordings would be made in Moscow because, as stated by *Billboard*, "recent improvements in Soviet recording techniques" made them equal to "those of the US manufacturers."[32] A similar view was shared by another specialist industry magazine, *High Fidelity:* "The technical standard of Soviet recordings has improved almost out of recognition within the last few years."[33] Licensing was also a much cheaper way of producing recordings, as the Western record company did not have to incur the major cost of making the master tape, which included paying the fees to the orchestral musicians and other personnel, as well as studio and recording equipment costs.

The Capitol–MK agreement was exclusive: Capitol Records was the only record company allowed to license Soviet classical music recordings in the US. In fact, the agreement gave Capitol exclusive distribution rights in the whole of North and South America. This gave the company a unique position in the American record market, which in several years resulted in *Billboard* admitting that the Melodiya/Angel label catalogue "represents the most complete collection of Russian music to be found in the US market."[34] In terms of repertoire, the plan was to divide the collection equally between new and more established works.[35] Indeed, the first year of the deal saw the issue of works by Soviet composers Rodion Shchedrin, Dmitri Kabalevsky, Sergey Prokofiev and Dmitri Shos-

30 Cap., Red Deal Cuts the Classical Curtain. *Billboard*, 27 August 1966, 1.

31 Capitol Pierces Soviet's Classical Curtain – Snares a Key Contract. *Billboard*, 27 August 1966, 8.

32 Ibid.

33 The Russians Have Arrived thanks to Melodiya/Angel. *High Fidelity*, March 1967, 67.

34 Melodiya Under Contract. *Billboard*, 5 October 1974, 40.

35 Melodiya/Angel Drive Rolls with 6 LP Releases. *Billboard*, 13 May 1967, 43.

takovich, as well as the music of Russian composers Pyotr Tchaikovsky, Alexander Borodin, Modest Mussorgsky and Alexander Scriabin. The bestseller in the first year was Shostakovich's *Execution of Stepan Razin* and Symphony No. 9 by the Moscow Philharmonic under Kirill Kondrashin, which by September 1967 had been in the *Billboard* Top 40 classics chart for over half a year.[36]

The British Licensing Agreement of the 1960s

Following in the steps of its US subsidiary, EMI signed a similar agreement for the UK in late 1967.[37] This exclusive licensing agreement allowed EMI to release a vast and varied repertoire of Soviet recordings in the UK. There seems to have been no involvement, direct or otherwise, from the UK government.[38] The music was recorded in the Melodiya studios and issued on its LPs within the USSR. EMI was provided with lists of the recorded master tapes, and it chose the ones it wanted to release in the UK and placed its orders. The recordings from the Melodiya master tapes were then transferred onto lacquers at EMI's Abbey Road Studios, and then pressed as LP vinyl records in EMI's main production facility in Hayes, Middlesex.[39] EMI chose the sleeve cover image and sleeve notes for the UK-distributed vinyls, which were different from those chosen by Melodiya to accompany the same recordings for distribution in the USSR. EMI had exclusive rights to sell the Soviet recordings in the UK, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand.

The licensing agreements were extended every three years until 1982. They made EMI a key decision-maker on the Soviet classical music recordings that were brought to the British listener, how they were presented, the choice of sleeve image and cover notes, and where they were sold across the country.[40]

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36 In the Top 40 for 28 weeks, according to the *Billboard Best Selling Classic LPs* list, *Billboard*, 9 September 1967.

37 First Release in Melodiya Agreement. *Record Retailer and Music Industry News,* 28 August 1968, 6.

38 Tony Locantro email, 23 May 2017.

39 Tony Locantro interview for British Library Sound Archive, 7 December 2016; Andry. *Inside the Recording Studio*, 132–133.

40 EMI UK was the only UK record company that had a productive licensing deal with the USSR. United Artists record company (UA) concluded a licensing agreement with MK for a group of recordings in 1977, but was bought by EMI in 1979 (Melodiya: Only Slow Progress. *Billboard*, 27 October 1979, 76). Five licensed recordings were produced by UA in December 1978 under the Cadenza label.

Motivation Behind the Licensing Agreements

The EMI–MK licensing agreement stipulated the use of the Melodiya/HMV double logo as well as the phrase "Recorded by Melodiya in the U.S.S.R." This condition, requested by the Soviet side, signals a desire to increase international recognition and awareness of the excellence of Soviet culture in the West, already noted by researchers as a key motivation behind Soviet performing artists' tours to the West.[41] Soviet leaders aspired to promote the best the USSR had to offer to show off the achievements of communism. As Mikkonen has argued, for the Soviet Union, "the aim was not so much to spread communism as to use cultural influencing to make the Soviet Union look less a threat and appear in a more positive light."[42] Supposedly being a "universal language," instrumental music in particular was regarded by Western and Soviet cultural officials as one of the most effective soft power tools.[43] The perception was that, similarly to dance, music in many instances was a form of art without a strong verbal component, which is why "it appeared to stand apart from politics in a way that literature did not," leading to its presumed effectiveness as a cultural promotional tool.[44] This meant that the USSR deemed the promotion of Soviet classical music more important than financial gain. Consequently, Soviet classical music recordings were actively sold abroad at low prices in the late 1950s. As Mikkonen has shown in relation to that time, "the distribution of Soviet recordings for the USSR was primarily an ideological issue rather than a financial one."[45]

Soviet motivation shifted from being ideologically-driven in the 1950s to being more financially-driven in the 1970s. By then, the Soviet government constantly needed foreign currency to cover its growing import demands, and it took any opportunity to earn money from the export of Soviet goods.[46] In 1977, the USSR's Ministry of Culture acknowledged the importance of record sales as an income source in its note to the Central Committee of the Communist Party: "Leading Western firms eagerly buy Soviet recordings of symphonic and instrumental music, which brings the state considerable foreign currency revenues."[47]

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41 Tomoff. *Virtuosi Abroad*, 4–5; Fosler-Lussier. Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy, 170.
42 Mikkonen and Suutari. *Music, Art and Diplomacy*, 157.
43 Tomoff. *Virtuosi Abroad*, 6.
44 Fosler-Lussier. Music in America's Cold War Diplomacy, 166.
45 Mikkonen. Winning Hearts and Minds, 139–140.
46 Philip Hanson. The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR 1945–1991. London: Routledge, 2003, 122.
47 *Zapiska Ministerstva kul'turï SSSR v TsK KPSS o sozdanii simfonicheskogo orkestra Vsesoyuznoy firmi gramplastinok "Melodiya"* [Memorandum of Soviet Ministry of CC CP on the creation of

EMI's motivation for engagement with Soviet recordings was consistently commercial. Apart from earning money on the exclusive licensing of Soviet recordings, the company was eager to record Soviet soloists in the West. The prolific touring activities of Soviet classical music superstars during the Thaw era had familiarised the Western public with their names by the 1970s, creating a demand for their recordings in the West. The EMI–MK licensing contracts envisaged the provision of priority, preferably exclusive, access for EMI to these artists.[48] Most record companies at the time aimed to create exclusive associations with successful performers to retain the artists on their books. This ensured the record company's access to the artists for future profitable recordings. EMI was no different. Not a single Soviet musician was presented in the EMI artists roster in the 1956–57 annual report to shareholders.[49] This is not surprising given the limited number of recordings made by Soviet musicians in the West until that time. Already by 1959, however, EMI eagerly boasted Gilels, Richter, Rostropovich, and David and Igor Oistrakh on its artists list.[50] By 1960, these artists had made only a few recordings for the company, except Richter, who had made none. This illustrates EMI's willingness to signpost Soviet artists as theirs, even before they were really established as such.

Michael Allen has explained that the motivation behind the licensing relationship with MK was to gain access to the recordings of the great Russian artists and also to have them record in the West. According to him, EMI's idea was to first obtain access to the Soviet recordings of those artists, and then record the performers in the West.[51] Tony Locantro, in a separate interview, confirmed this desire of EMI to secure the Soviet artists.[52] Once the company had recorded the artist, the record label possessed all copyright to that recording in the West for the next 50 years. Rights in the communist countries, meanwhile, were owned by MK. In the long run, this was commercially very appealing to the record company and guaranteed a stream of revenues from this recording without incurring any more substantial costs to produce it. For instance, one of EMI's absolute bestsellers in its entire classical music catalogue of the 1970s was Beet-

a symphony orchestra for the all-union record firm "Melodiya"], S.D. Tavanets. *Kul'tura i vlast' ot Stalina do Gorbacheva: Apparat TsK KPSS i Kul'tura 1973–1978: dokumenty* [Culture and power from Stalin to Gorbachev: Central Party Committee and Culture 1973–1978: documents] Moscow: Rosspen, 2012, 88.

48 Tony Locantro interview for British Library Sound Archive, 7 December 2016.

49 Electric and Musical Industries Ltd., "Annual Report and Accounts," 1956–57, 22–24.

50 Electric and Musical Industries Ltd., "Annual Report and Accounts," 1957–58, 28–29.

51 Michael Allen interview for British Library Sound Archive, 2 February 2017.

52 Tony Locantro interview for British Library Sound Archive, 7 December 2016.

hoven's *Triple Concerto* recorded by Oistrakh, Rostropovich and Richter with the Berlin Philharmonic under Herbert von Karajan. Its widespread sales success stood in stark contrast to the soloists' own attitude to the result: later in life, Richter remarked that "it's a dreadful recording and I disown it utterly."[53] The combination of three Soviet superstar soloists and a leading Western conductor and orchestra evidently created an irresistible appeal in the eyes of the consumers and produced profits for the record company.

The 1975 Reciprocal Licensing Agreement

From August 1975, the licensing agreement between EMI and MK became reciprocal: it was envisaged that EMI would also license its recordings to MK for manufacturing and distributing Western music across the USSR.[54] Until the Soviet Union joined the Universal Copyright Convention in 1973, there was no way for Western artists to claim royalties from sales of their music in the country. In the 1960s, recordings of various Western artists by Melodiya, including the Beatles, were an infringement of international copyright. Once the USSR joined the convention, however, licensing music to Melodiya – with its access to one of the largest consumer markets in the world – became a lucrative business for Western record companies.

The Soviets' main interest lay in EMI's classical catalogue. The Soviets' choice was driven (as from EMI's side) by names of superstar performers: recordings of singers Victoria de los Angeles, Elisabeth Schwarzkopf and Nicolai Gedda, instrumentalists Jacqueline du Pré and Arturo Benedetti Michelangeli, and conductors Daniel Barenboim, Otto Klemperer and Riccardo Muti were released to the Soviet market. However, tours of the USSR by musicians from pop, jazz and rock also paved the way for the cautious release of non-classical Western music in the country. In pop, Melodiya licensed music by the Beatles, Salvatore Adamo and the Dutch pop duo Maywood; in jazz, old recordings by Sidney Bechet (released in the USSR in 1983, recorded by EMI in the 1930s and 1940s) and Nat King Cole (USSR release 1981, recorded in the 1950s); and in rock, the band Smokie (USSR release 1980, recorded in 1977). Although the music licensed into the USSR from Western rock, jazz and pop was mostly from back catalogues, this still demonstrates the diversity of musical genres

53 Bruno Monsaingeon. *Sviatoslav Richter: Notebooks and Conversations*. London: Faber & Faber, 2005, 118.
54 Two-way Deal with Russia. *Music Week*, 23 August 1975, 29.

that infused the USSR in the 1970s from the West. A real breakthrough in relations between the West and the Soviet Union was the tour by Cliff Richard (an EMI artist) in 1976 to Moscow and Leningrad. One of the Leningrad concerts was broadcast on Soviet television.[55] The USSR also licensed music from EMI's subsidiaries in other countries: for instance, Edith Piaf's song repertoire, which was hugely popular in the USSR, was acquired from EMI's French subsidiary Pathé-Marconi.

EMI was not the sole licensee of foreign records to the Soviet Union. Melodiya steadily increased its releases of foreign artists from the mid-1970s.[56] In August 1974, it concluded a similar reciprocal agreement with its US partner CBS Records, releasing music by jazz musicians Ray Conniff, Miles Davis, Ella Fitzgerald and Duke Ellington, together with classical music recordings of orchestral performances with Bruno Walter and Leonard Bernstein.[57] The German record company Polydor signed a reciprocal deal with MK in early 1975 and licensed both classical and pop music to the USSR.[58] Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Melodiya licensed from a variety of Western record companies, the most active being Ariola-Eurodisc (GDR), Polygram (Netherlands and Germany), Hispavox (Spain), CBS Records and ABC Records (US), plus Decca (UK) from 1984, when the EMI exclusive licensing agreement ceased.[59] These examples demonstrate that the licensing of recordings was a two-way stream. Classical music was the dominant genre exported by the Soviet Union, while in exchange the USSR imported a variety of music beyond classical. In both instances, there was a direct link between the touring of musicians and the subsequent sale of recordings either by them or from their genre of music.

Analysis of the Melodiya/HMV Repertoire

During the 15 years of the EMI–MK licensing agreement, EMI issued around 210 LPs and LP sets under the Melodiya/HMV label in the UK.[60] Russian and Soviet

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55 Cliff Richard in Russia. *Music Week*, 23 August 1975, 1–4.

56 Melodiya Increases Foreign Talent Exposure in Russia. *Music Week*, 28 June 1975, 10.

57 Jazz Flavour to First CBS–Melodiya Releases. *Music Week*, 18 January 1975, 10.

58 Polydor Signs Deal with East Europe Countries. *Music Week*, 27 February 1975, 1.

59 Music Chink in the Iron Curtain. *Music Week*, 31 May 1975, 20; John Bennett. *Melodiya: A Soviet Russian L.P. Discography*. London: Greenwood, 1981; and online Melodiya discography http://records.su/, accessed 25 May 2017.

60 The British Library Sound Archive holds EMI UK recordings, of which the LPs under the Melodiya/HMV label are a sub-set. EMI assigned an ASD number to each of the LPs in its stereo full-

composers dominated the repertoire, with almost 90 % of all the music. In choosing which works to license from Melodiya's catalogue, EMI focused on the Russian and Soviet repertoire, following the perception that musicians possess a special authenticity of interpretation when performing the music from their native land (in this case, Soviet artists playing Russian and Soviet repertoire). This was in some respects applicable to Soviet music of the time, since Soviet performers had a level of access to the composers lacked by their foreign peers. For instance, the Borodin String Quartet enjoyed a close working relationship with Shostakovich over many years. Valentin Berlinsky, the quartet's cellist since its founding days, described the relationship in an interview in 1992: "The 'Borodins' never played a Shostakovich quartet publicly without first asking the composer to comment on our interpretation. (I have kept a number of his letters. In one of them, he raves about our interpretation and sends best wishes for future performances)."[61] The Borodin String Quartet performed with Shostakovich on many occasions, and recorded all his string quartets. This complete recording was one of the highlights of the Melodiya/HMV series (SLS 879).

Among the Russian and Soviet composers in the Melodiya/HMV series, most items recorded were works by Dmitri Shostakovich, Pyotr Tchaikovsky and Sergey Prokofiev. These were followed by Sergey Rachmaninoff, Alexander Glazunov, Nikolay Rimsky-Korsakov, Alexander Scriabin and Mikhail Glinka. The remaining music by Russian composers consisted of a large variety of names, both from nineteenth and twentieth century Russian and Soviet compositional schools; however, each of the composers in this group had fewer than six works in the series, and often just one LP.

Figure 1. Russian and Soviet composers (Melodiya/HMV label)

Nineteenth century	Pre-revolutionary and/or emigrated	Soviet	Young Soviet (1950s onwards)
Pyotr Tchaikovsky* Mikhail Glinka*	Sergey Rachmaninoff* Alexander Scriabin*	Dmitri Shostakovich*	Rodion Shchedrin Andrey Petrov

price high-quality classical category, and the Soviet-licensed records were intermingled in its ASD series with other records by Western classical musicians. The box sets were labelled with SLS numbers, and each LP in the box set had its own ASD number. I would like to thank Jonathan Summers, the British Library Sound Archive classical music curator, for providing access to the Melodiya/HMV set and sharing his expertise.

61 Irina Nikolskaya. Shostakovich Remembered: Interviews with His Soviet Colleagues (1992). In *A Shostakovich Casebook*, Malcolm Hamrick Brown (ed.), 163. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2005.

Figure 1. Russian and Soviet composers (Melodiya/HMV label) *(Continued)*

Nineteenth century	Pre-revolutionary and/or emigrated	Soviet	Young Soviet (1950s onwards)
Nikolay Rimsky-Korsakov* Modest Mussorgsky Mily Balakirev Vasili Kalinnikov Anton Rubinstein Alexander Borodin Alexander Dargomyzhsky	Alexander Glazunov* Anatoly Liadov Anton Arensky Mikhail Ippolitov-Ivanov Sergey Lyapunov Alexander Spendiaryan Sergey Taneyev Nikolay Medtner Alexander Gretchaninov Igor Stravinsky	Sergey Prokofiev* Dmitri Kabalevsky Aram Khachaturian Yuri Shaporin Moisey Weinberg Georgy Sviridov Nikolay Miaskovsky Reinhold Glière Vladimir Kryukov Alexander Arutiunian Alexander Aleksandrov Isaak Dunayevsky Vasili Solovyov-Sedoy	Alfred Schnittke

* Among the top eight most prolific Russian and Soviet composers issued by the Melodiya/HMV label (by number of recordings).

Figure 1 demonstrates the diversity of repertoire under the Melodiya/HMV label, a balance of Soviet-era and traditional Russian nineteenth and early twentieth century works brought by EMI to the British listener. At the same time, music by the youngest generation of non-official Soviet composers like Sofia Gubaidulina, Edison Denisov and Arvo Pärt was not represented in the series. Their semi-official status in Soviet music in the 1970s precluded performances and recordings of their works; it was not until the early 1980s that Melodiya started making recordings of their music. The exception to this was one recording of Alfred Schnittke's *Prelude in Memory of Shostakovich*, which was combined with works by Shostakovich and Prokofiev recorded by the young stars violinist Gidon Kremer and pianist Andrey Gavrilov in 1978 (ASD 3547). It is likely Schnittke's work was included as a homage to Shostakovich, who had died three years earlier, but also due to the influence of Kremer and Gavrilov, who could, to a certain extent, choose their own repertoire.[62] A contemporary of

62 For instance, according to Peter Schmelz, the performance of Schnittke's Concerto Grosso No. 1 in November 1977 took place thanks only to the soloists: "The reason that piece was per-

the semi-official Soviet composers, the officially approved composer Rodion Shchedrin, features much more prominently in the Melodiya/HMV series with five recordings. The sub-division of composers into official and semi-official within Soviet musical circles, and the concentration of all recording power in the hands of the state monopoly company, prevented some Soviet classical music from being recorded and heard both within the USSR and beyond. The Soviet state, as represented by Melodiya and the Ministry of Culture, was the gatekeeper of the main recording facilities, and it took decisions on which works were recorded and by whom. This had a knock-on effect on which repertoires and performers the Western audience got to know through the licensed recordings.

In contrast to the young composers, who were often experimenting with techniques that went beyond the official state doctrine of socialist realism and whose promotion within the system was not encouraged (although never openly forbidden), system-loyal talented young performers were given high levels of support and opportunities within Soviet musical circles. This spilled over into the licensing relationships with Western record companies. The Soviet Union was keen to exhibit its best performing talents to the West, while the Western partners wanted to be the first to secure a deal with the rising stars. EMI realised this as early as 1967, when the US subsidiary made plans to record and promote rising Soviet artists.[63] The UK followed some years later. In 1976, EMI, MK and Goskonzert established the "Young Artists Scheme," a three-year development plan for rising Soviet artists. It included the production of recordings, concerts, TV and radio broadcasts, and publicity in the UK. The performers were violinists Vladimir Spivakov and Victor Tretyakov, and pianists Dmitri Alexeev and Andrey Gavrilov and the young conductors were Vladimir Fedoseyev, Dmitri Kitayenko and Yuri Temirkanov.[64] EMI took it upon itself to make at least two LPs of each of the instrumentalists in the three years of the agreement, and to use conductors for recordings when appropriate.[65] The young artists were given exposure on the Melodiya/HMV series, as well as being recorded by EMI in the West. For example, Andrey Gavrilov, who won the International Tchaikovsky Competition in 1974 at the age of 18, recorded two LPs for EMI in the UK, and two more of his recordings were licensed from Melodiya in the five years to 1979.

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formed was not Schnittke, it was Kremer." Peter Schmelz. *Such Freedom, If Only Musical: Unofficial Soviet Music during the Thaw*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 206.

63 Melodiya to Plug New Talent. *Billboard*, 13 May 1967, 43.

64 Soviet Artists to Record for EMI under New Deal. *Billboard,* 30 October 1976, 54.

65 Tony Locantro interview and notes, 1 February 2017.

The soloists themselves, both established and young, preferred to record their performances directly in the West as opposed to making LPs for Melodiya in the USSR. Consequently, only a fifth of the vinyls in the Melodiya/HMV series has a work played by an instrumental soloist, including only four LPs of Richter (three of these are duets with Oistrakh), another five of Oistrakh and a mere three with Rostropovich. According to Michael Allen, the Russian superstar instrumentalists did not like recording for Melodiya because they were badly paid for the internal recording sessions and made no royalties on the sales. They preferred to record in the West due to higher fees, which comprised both official income and "under the carpet" payments from Western producers. Western recordings were also much more widely circulated, which offered the instrumentalists broader exposure. Thus, they tried to save their best playing and repertoire for the Western sessions.[66] This might explain why out of the 45 LPs on the Melodiya/HMV series that feature a soloist, very few are by the superstars of the Soviet classical music world.

In contrast, the orchestral performers on the Melodiya/HMV series were the best of the established Soviet classical music scene: the Leningrad Philharmonic with Yevgeny Mravinsky, the Moscow Philharmonic with Kirill Kondrashin, the Moscow Radio Symphony Orchestra with Gennady Rozhdestvensky, the USSR Symphony Orchestra with Yevgeny Svetlanov, the Bolshoi Theatre Orchestra with Boris Khaikin, and other conductors, including Rudolph Barshai and Maxim Shostakovich, performing with several of the above orchestras. Given that Soviet orchestras did not tour the West as heavily (or at all) like the soloists did, the only way for EMI to get recordings of Soviet orchestras was through the licensing agreement.

Despite the promotion of Soviet musicians both within the USSR and abroad, their musical careers still depended on their loyalty to the Soviet system. In 1979 Gavrilov looked set for success, with his involvement in the Young Artists Scheme as well as EMI's investment in him. His international career, however, was abruptly interrupted in December that year. Gavrilov was due to record with Herbert von Karajan in Berlin, but he failed to appear for the recording session: the KGB seised his passport and placed him under house arrest in Moscow for anti-Soviet remarks and behaviour.[67] He was not allowed to travel outside of the Soviet Union until 1984, when he emigrated to the West. The wider political

66 Michael Allen interview, 1 November 2017.

67 Andrei Gavrilov. *Andrei, Fira and Pitch: Scenes from a Musician's Life*. London: Asteroid Publishing, 2017, 135 – 140.

climate, diplomacy and security issues thus influenced musicians' concert tours and the production of their recordings in the West.

The classical music represented on the Melodiya/HMV label, licensed by EMI from Melodiya, reflects the variety of decision-making agents involved. Their aims were sometimes congruent and at other times different, which then determined the output of musical works, composers and performers.

EMI Distributes Soviet Recordings Across the UK

A final aspect of the EMI–MK relationship to consider is the spread of the licensed Soviet recordings across the UK. EMI does not give access to its financial information, therefore the answers to these questions can only be approximately inferred. In 1960, the two main record companies in Britain, EMI and Decca, each held market shares of circa 40%.[68] By 1975, EMI's share had dropped substantially due to more intense competition from newly created record companies and American entrants into the British market. However, it still held roughly 16% of the British LP market, almost twice as high as the next two competitors: CBS with 9% and Decca with 8%.[69] Being the largest record company in the UK meant that EMI had a well-developed distribution network, which spanned the country and catered to large numbers of record lovers.

By the 1970s, EMI UK pressed vinyl records in the factory at Hayes and shipped them to five national depots, from where they were delivered to local record dealers. Retail chain stores, including HMV, WH Smith and Our Price, also stocked vinyl records. EMI was powerful enough to "coerce retailers to order records in large quantities, forcing the retailer to carry more risk on new releases, the sales potential of which was often unclear."[70] For EMI, the production costs of LPs were much lower than the sales prices, and if licensing royalties were low, as they were in the case of Soviet recordings, it took selling a relatively small number of units to cover the costs of producing a licensed vinyl.[71] The ease of covering costs – even with low-volume sales – might be one of the reasons that EMI undertook to license and manufacture such a wide range of both popular and obscure Russian and Soviet classical music: the record company could afford to issue specialist repertoire since it was still likely to make money even at

68 Kevin Tennent. A Distribution Revolution: Changes in Music Distribution in the UK 1950–76. *Business History* 55 (2012): 331–340.

69 The British Phonographic Yearbook 1976, 197.

70 Tennent. A Distribution Revolution, 338–340.

71 Tony Locantro interview and notes, 1 February 2017.

low sales volumes, which was guaranteed by the power and reach of its distribution network. In some respects, EMI played a role not unlike state subsidies in the modern world: the company's low cost base and ability to sell the required minimum number of LPs to make manufacturing worthwhile led to the production of a wide range of Russian and Soviet classical repertoire, including works that were not at all widely known in the West at the time – for example, the choral hymns by Dmitri Bortniansky (1751–1825) that were released on the Melodiya/HMV vinyl *Russian Choral Music of the 17th and 18th Centuries* (ASD 3102).

In addition to its wide distribution reach across the UK, EMI aimed to bring Soviet recordings to new audiences. In the 1960s, in addition to its high-quality standard LPs with the ASD catalogue number, EMI developed more budget series and mail order delivery, which led to a further expansion of its customer base.[72] EMI incorporated some of the Soviet recordings into its various cheaper series, including "Classics for Pleasure," an inexpensive series sold by non-specialist retailers such as supermarkets and booksellers, and the "HMV Concert Classics" series, which launched in 1959.[73]

Finally, in 1975, EMI launched an aggressive marketing push to promote the Melodiya/HMV releases to British listeners. The campaign was called "Forward with HMV Melodiya." It featured four-page inserts in the key industry magazines: *Billboard*, *The Gramophone*, *High Fidelity* and *Music Week*.[74] In the adverts, EMI always referred to the music, artists and recordings as "Russian," not "Soviet": "Presenting all that is greatest in Russian music-making: Russian music, Russian artists, Russian recordings."[75] To launch the campaign, EMI issued a record entitled "Forward with HMV Melodiya," which included sample music from the Melodiya/HMV repertoire. Presumably, this LP was intended to showcase the best of the music in the series. EMI chose to include 11 items: two each by Tchaikovsky and Shostakovich, one each by Rimsky-Korsakov, Rachmaninoff, Glazunov, Glier and Shchedrin, and one hymn by Bortniansky. This demonstrates a distribution of repertoire over three centuries, with five Soviet-era and six pre-revolutionary creations. However, EMI purposefully chose to position the entirety of this music as Russian, commenting on the back of the LP that the Melodiya/HMV series brings to the UK listeners "many great performances of mainly Russian music, both old and new." The emphasis on "Russian" rather than "Soviet" positions the recordings as originating not from a hostile communist nation in

72 Martland. *Since Records Began*, 245–246.
73 Ibid., 290.
74 *Billboard,* 20 August 1975, *High Fidelity,* August 1975, *The Gramophone,* August 1975, *Music Week,* 19 July 1975.
75 *The Gramophone,* August 1975, 317–320.

possession of nuclear weapons called the Soviet Union, but from the image of pre-revolutionary Russia, a friend of Europe and Britain.

The marketing push complemented the all-Russian focus of EMI's classical releases for August 1975. All 14 of EMI's new classical releases that month were Russian and Soviet music under the Melodiya/HMV series, including repertoire released in the UK for the first time ever: a box set of all 15 Shostakovich symphonies (SLS 5025), Mussorgsky's opera *Khovanshchina* (SLS 5023) and Prokofiev's ballet *The Stone Flower* (SLS 5024).[76] A ceremonial launch took place in London in the presence of the Soviet ambassador, who was entrusted with the Shostakovich box set to be given to the composer.[77] This elaborate marketing campaign demonstrates EMI's commitment to distributing the Melodiya/HMV recordings across the UK and the importance attributed to the sale of records under this label. As a commercial organisation, EMI's decision-making was guided by the potential for profit. The promotional efforts allocated to the Melodiya/HMV label indicate EMI's belief that financial gains could be made from Soviet record sales.

Everything Comes to an End

By the early 1980s, the UK and most of the world were in an economic recession. This meant a decline in consumer spending on leisure goods, including the gramophone record. The recording industry had also experienced signs of a slowdown from the mid-1970s. The first signs of trouble in EMI's business in the UK were reported in 1975, when the profits for 1974–75 declined by 25 % compared to the previous year.[78] EMI was not alone: due to a decline in consumer spending, the whole of the British record industry was affected, including EMI's main competitor Decca.[79] By 1980, most of the UK record industry was showing losses, primarily due to active home-taping by consumers, competition from imports and the general economic downturn.[80] In addition to these industry-wide problems that severely undermined EMI's business, there were tensions in EMI's relationship with MK.

76 Shostakovich Box Set Heads HMV–Melodiya August Releases. *Music Week*, 19 July 1975, 43, 45.

77 EMI Presentation to Shostakovitch [sic]. *Music Week*, 10 August 1975, 12.

78 EMI Turnover Increases but Music Profit Down. *Music Week,* 11 October 1975, 1.

79 Industry LP Cutback Revealed. *Music Week,* 20 December 1975, 1.

80 Martland. *Since Records Began*, 252–257 and Record Industry in the Red – BPI. *Music Week*, 15 May 1982, 1.

Capitol Records, EMI's US subsidiary, did not renew its agreement with MK during the first recession of 1974–75, and CBS Records stepped in to be the primary record licensing partner of the USSR in the USA.[81] The EMI–MK relationship in the UK lasted much longer but, eventually, both industry-wide problems and agreement-specific issues led to its termination in 1982.[82] The recession had made EMI more attuned to the commercial success of each recording it was issuing: it was impossible now to cover the cost of many interesting but not massively successful LPs with one or two large hits, which were the recordings by the superstar performers. EMI had to concentrate only on licensing the hit recordings, and there were difficulties in obtaining those in sufficient amounts. Political risks, as exemplified by Andrey Gavrilov's detention, further impeded access to the best artists. EMI also found its exclusive access to the superstar performers undermined by competitors, especially Deutsche Grammophon. Then there was the question of technology. From the early 1980s, EMI gradually started switching all its recordings to the digital format, which was not something Melodiya was able to provide with its technological capabilities. The only two Melodiya recordings issued by EMI under the licensing agreement in 1982 in digital format were produced in Moscow with the aid of the Victor Musical Industries of Japan.[83]

EMI's relationship with MK and Melodiya is a powerful illustration of the importance of non-government players in Cold War cultural relations. Private individuals and corporations actively engaged with Soviet representatives on their own terms while pursuing their specific aims, which had little to do with cultural diplomacy. This is especially so in the case of record-making, a global profitable business that was at its peak in the 1970s. For both record companies and their Soviet counterparts, the popularity and public performances of the Soviet musicians meant the creation of demand for their music outside of the concert hall. Their records were a source of income for both sides of the licensing agreement. While it is impossible to refer to concrete numbers here, the longevity and repertoire diversity of the licensing contract serve as evidence of its possible profitability for the British and Soviet parties.

Although the non-government players were not concerned with cultural diplomacy aims, it was state cultural policy that provided the opportunities for their engagement and facilitated their actions. This case study demonstrates the long-lasting consequences of the cultural diplomacy of the Thaw years:

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81 Capitol Continues Handling Melodiya under Contract. *Billboard*, 5 October 1974, 40.

82 Tony Locantro interview and notes, 1 February 2017.

83 This is indicated on the back of the LPs (ASD 4271 and ASD 4272).

there would have been very few record sales or recording sessions in the West without the concert tours of the Soviet soloists, the most important instrument of Soviet cultural diplomacy. Similarly, in the USSR, the tours of non-classical Western musicians acquainted the Soviet audience with their works and facilitated the sales of their gramophone records. Whereas demand for Soviet musicians' records in the West was directly created by their tours, it is possible that Western records would have sold in the USSR even without the musicians' tours given their novelty and demand, which outstripped supply due to the sheer size of the Soviet population. However, it was tours by Western musicians that opened the doors to produce those records in the Soviet Union in the first place.

A key consequence of the record licensing agreements between the USSR and Western record companies was the access that the latter obtained to record the Soviet classical music performers themselves. It would be important to investigate the kind of repertoire that they recorded in the West and whether it was different from their Soviet recordings, in what ways and why. Further research is also required to analyse the critical reception of both the Soviet recordings and of the records made by Soviet soloists in the West, to determine whether these cultural products were assessed based solely on the artistic qualities of the work and recording, or whether there were political or ideological biases that were reflected in the reception of the Soviet recordings in the West.

Viktoria Zora

New Directions in Soviet Music Publishing: Preslit, Am-Rus Music Agency and Anglo-Soviet Music Press Between 1944–48

Cultural diplomacy was extensively mobilised in the early Stalinist era, during the Great Break (1928–31), in order to facilitate positive Soviet reception in the West and "to show results [which were] [...] closely connected to a shift in the levels of hostility and competition with [...] the bourgeois West".[1] During that period, foreign visitors to the Soviet Union were regarded as "hard-currency foreigners" who added financial as well as political and cultural value to the Soviet regime.[2] While the early Stalinist period has been well researched, the existing literature on cultural exchange during the decade following it, the 1940s, is limited and predominantly addresses cultural exchanges with foreign visitors or other cultural interactions between Soviet and Western cultural organisations.[3]

The present chapter aims to shed light on exchanges of music scores and publication of Soviet music in the USA and the UK during the 1940s. In particular, the chapter traces the establishment of Am-Rus Edition, the series of Soviet music publications by New York's Leeds Music Corporation, and the foundation of the Anglo-Soviet Music Press. Both were new publication initiatives, that emerged from wartime cultural exchanges and provided significant opportunities to publish newly-composed Soviet compositions outside the Iron Curtain. The dissemination of Soviet music in the early- and mid-1940s offered new opportunities for cultural interactions between the wartime allies, and, as this chapter demonstrates, these contacts survived and continued despite the tense political relationships, maintaining cultural contacts between the Soviet Union, Britain and the US also during the Cold War.

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1 Michael David-Fox. *Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy & Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921–1941*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 175.

2 Ibid., 176.

3 Pauline Fairclough. Detente to Cold War: Anglo-Soviet Musical Exchanges in the Late Stalin Period. In *Twentieth-Century Music and Politics: Essays in Memory of Neil Edmunds*, Pauline Fairclough (ed.). Farnham: Ashgate, 2013; Oliver Johnson. Mutually Assured Distinction: VOKS and Artistic Exchange in the Early Cold War. In *Music, Art and Diplomacy: East-West Cultural Interactions and the Cold War*, Simo Mikkonen, Pekka Suutari (eds.). Farnham: Ashgate, 2016.

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Besides publication companies in the USA and UK, the role of the Soviet organisations involved in cultural musical exchange (Union of Soviet Composers, VOKS Music Section) and Soviet copyright organisations (Preslit, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga) is discussed. Subsequently, the chapter discusses Anglo-American businesses involved in exchange of music scores in detail (New York's Am-Rus Music Agency, Leeds Music Corporation, London's Boosey & Hawkes) alongside the mechanisms and channels for dissemination of Soviet music.

In summary, the main focus of the chapter is to articulate the exchanges of music scores and business publication models (Am-Rus Edition, Anglo-Soviet Music Press) that were established between the Soviet Union, UK and the US in the 1940s. Despite several obstacles, Soviet Union was able to establish business partnerships with Britain and the United States in music publishing, a move that benefitted both countries. The chapter concludes in the year 1948 with the culmination of the anti-formalist campaign in the Soviet Union, and offers a brief discussion of political changes that occurred after the end of World War II. The chapter ends by historically contextualising the dissemination and publication of Soviet music in the USA and the UK during most of the 1940s.

Dissemination of Soviet Music

During World War II, cultural relations were fostered between the Soviet Union, the US and the UK. Relevant communications were conducted via respective embassies – including the Soviet Embassy in London, the British Embassy in Moscow, the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the American Embassy in Moscow – and the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS). Formed in 1925 and dissolved in 1958, VOKS's aim was to facilitate cultural exchanges internationally, but also to control and censor these cultural exchanges.[4] Dissemination included distribution of Soviet journals, books, music, and any other Soviet propaganda materials abroad. Additionally, VOKS was also the recipient of foreign cultural material, such as foreign magazines, books, literature and music, thereby making cultural exchange effectively reciprocal to and from the Soviet Union.[5]

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4 In 1958 VOKS was restructured into the Union of Soviet Associations of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SSOD), which lasted until 1992. GARF (State Archive of Russian Federation) f. 9576.

5 Simon Morrison. *The People's Artist: Prokofiev's Soviet Years*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 476; Pauline Fairclough. Detente to Cold War, 38.

Correspondence held in the VOKS archive (GARF f. 5283) shows that the main administration of VOKS, located in Moscow on 17 Bol′shaya Gruzinskaya Street, was organised into departments and sections: enquiries from the USA were directed to VOKS American department, enquiries from the UK to VOKS English department. Apart from the foreign departments, the VOKS administration was further divided into scientific or cultural sections.[6] All music enquiries were considered by VOKS Music Section, which was founded in 1939.

Throughout the 1930s and the 1940s, the collaboration between VOKS and the Union of Soviet Composers enabled dissemination of Soviet music scores abroad. The 1930s were a crucial period for Soviet institutionalisation as the Resolution of the Central Committee undertaken on 23 April 1932 banned different associations and mandated the creation of new organisational "creative unions". In music, local chapters of the Composers' Union were soon established in both Moscow and Leningrad, and the creation of an all-encompassing Union of Soviet Composers was finally achieved in 1939, which, in musical matters at least, largely superseded the Committee of Arts Affairs founded in 1936.[7]

The first head of the VOKS Music Section was Sergei Prokofiev (1939 – 41) who willingly shared with his colleagues his knowledge of foreign international musical life. In 1941, Prokofiev was evacuated from Moscow and subsequently, in 1942, Shneyerson was appointed as Head of VOKS Music Section, a position he held until 1948. The VOKS Music Section's committee consisted of Moscow's major composers and musicologists and worked in close collaboration with the Foreign Bureau of the Union of Soviet Composers.

The main roles of the VOKS Music Section firstly was to retain and facilitate contacts with foreign musicians and conductors, and secondly, facilitate rentals of Soviet music scores abroad. The VOKS Music Section also received foreign mu-

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6 Terminology "department" and "section" comes from Russian respective translation of "otdel" and "sektsiya". However, researchers may encounter different terminology e.g. in the NARA archive VOKS department is referred as "American Section of VOKS".

7 Kiril Tomoff. *Creative Union : The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939 – 1953*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, 13 – 14, 19 – 21; Meri E. Herrala. *The Struggle for Control of Soviet Music from 1932 to 1948 : Socialist Realism vs. Western Formalism*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2012, 46 – 56. Even before the establishment of VOKS Music Section in 1939, the Union of Soviet Composers maintained cultural ties with the West. For example, in 1934 the Union of Soviet Composers hosted a concert of French Music by Poulenc, Tomasi and Ravel. From 1936 Grigoriy Shneyerson held the post of secretary of the Foreign Bureau of the Union of Soviet Composers, and from 1939 onwards acted as a consultant of VOKS Music Section. In 1939 another concert of French modern composers was organised with collaboration of VOKS and the Union of Soviet Composers. See eg. Simo Mikkonen. *Music and Power in the Soviet 1930s: A History of Composers' Bureaucracy*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009, 126.

sical journals, newspaper clippings that covered Western performances of Soviet works, as well as foreign music scores and these were then passed on to the Union of Soviet Composers.[8]

The Union of Soviet Composers maintained ties not only with Europe, but also with their American colleagues. With the 1941 Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, cultural propaganda became central in the strengthening of military ties. Music and art became a common language that promoted understanding and good relations between the nations. Thus, already in 1942, Soviet composers cabled their American colleagues – the League of Composers – informing them of their determination to join in the cultural fight against fascism. The telegram, signed by Myaskovsky, Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Muradeli, Khachaturian, Shaporin, Glière and others stated:

> Composers of the USSR considering themselves mobilised for the relentless struggle against bloody fascist barbarity which has plunged half of Europe into utter gloom and desolation appeal to American composers with friendly greetings and ardent call to muster still closer the international ranks of defenders of culture in the joint struggle against the common foe by means of the great art of music.[9]

Dissemination of music scores and music recordings from and to the Soviet Union became a means of establishing cordial relations with new allies. In 1944, VOKS coordinated two concerts of English-Soviet and American-Soviet music on 20 and 21 May in the Great Hall of Moscow's Conservatory. The audience included representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NKID), Soviet and foreign journalists, composers and Moscow's artistic elite.[10]

All foreign music-related enquiries sent to VOKS Chairman or Vice-Chairman, or to the Board of Directors, were forwarded to VOKS Music Section. The second Head of VOKS Music Section, Shneyerson, corresponded with Prokofiev throughout his war evacuation. On 22 July 1943, Shneyerson informed Prokofiev

8 Grigoriy Mikhaylovich Shneyerson. *Stat'i o Sovremennoy Zarubezhnoy Muzïke: Ocherki, Vospominaniya*. Moscow: Sovetskiy kompozitor, 1974, 333 – 336; I. V. Nest'yev and G. Ya Edelman (eds.). *Sergey Prokof'yev: Stat'i i Materialy.* 2-e dop. i perer. izd. Moscow: Sovetskiy kompozitor, 1965, 263 – 266; M.A. Mendel'son-Prokof'yeva. *O Sergeye Sergeyeviche Prokof'yeve: Vospominaniya. Dnevniki. 1938 – 1967,* E. V. Krivtsova (ed.). 185 (f.102). Moscow: Kompozitor, 2012.
9 League of Composers/ISCM records (New York Public Library Archives, USA) b. 6, f. 73 "Myaskovsky, Shostakovich and others."
10 RGALI (Russian State Archive of Literature and Art, Moscow, Russia) f. 1929, op. 1, ed. khr. 964, l. 29 – 31; GM (Glinka State Museum of Musical Culture, Moscow, Russia) f. 385, No. 5222, l. 6.

about the arrival of American recordings of his works under Koussevitzky and about Western interest in his music:

> An enquiry for the music of War and Peace also came from Stockholm. For the time being I am sending everyone 8 scenes of piano score (Muzfond[11] edition). They [Muzfond] are promising to publish soon the remaining 3 [scenes]. [...] We sent the Second [String] Quartet to the USA – from there we have many enquiries. Yes, I forgot to inform you that we have started to multiply the music scores typographically. This is not much more expensive than writing out copyist manuscripts, but instead of 1–2 copies we can have 50–60. In this way we are printing the score of Alexander Nevsky, Second [String] Quartet, Seventh [Piano] Sonata especially for abroad. I am expecting a lot from this [printing method] for the promotion of the Soviet music abroad. Otherwise – despair, we can send nothing.[12]

The source describes an active cultural exchange towards the end of World War II, also demonstrating a clear interest in Soviet music from the United States. Moreover, it illustrates the infrastructural challenges that the Soviet organisations (VOKS, Muzfond) experienced during wartime. Indeed, World War II brought new difficulties for music publishing in the Soviet Union as the State Music Publishers (Muzgiz) and Muzfond experienced tremendous shortages in manuscript paper, copyists, engravers, and in editorial and publishing infrastructure. After the end of the war, Muzgiz publishers were to make use of German publishing facilities in Leipzig, producing more than 300 classical music works between March and November 1946; but during World War II, it was challenging to satisfy internal demands for classical music along with managing the international dissemination of Soviet music scores.[13] Thus, it was significant that VOKS's Music Section was not only associated with the Union of Soviet Composers, but also had access to Muzfond publications and could play a key role in disseminating Soviet music scores abroad. Another important role of VOKS Music Section was its association with Preslit.

11 Muzfond, Music Fund of the USSR was an organisation attached to the Union of Soviet Composers and founded in 1939. Its main activity was to support composers to create new works in countryside houses on full maintenance and to actively promote new works by organising events and concerts. Additionally, Muzfond organised and funded copying of manuscripts and published scores, many of which were sent abroad for the first performances of Soviet music.

12 RGALI f. 1929, op. 1, ed. khr. 750, l. 3, 3 verso. Author's translation.

13 R. Maslovataya. *Izdatel'stvo 'Muzïka*. Moscow: Muzïka, 1987, 23.

Soviet Copyright Organisations: Preslit, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga

According to information sent by the American Embassy in Moscow to the US Department of State in April 1947, Preslit was an agency which "procures and sends works of Soviet authors abroad on the request of foreign writers." The letter then explained that the "Embassy does not believe that a distinction between a 'purely' scientific literary agency and one that is merely a propaganda organisation [...] is valid since it is a demonstrable fact that all Soviet organisations of every character are to a greater or lesser degree propaganda agencies."[14] Despite the aforementioned description, it remains unclear when Preslit was formed and to which particular Soviet committee it was attached. Furthermore, my research did not find any information about Preslit in secondary literature on music. The only mention of Preslit was found in a collective publication (2013) in the context of literature studies. The relevant passage reads:

> The policy shifts of the early 1930s were consolidated in the new Stalinist concept of socialist realism [...]. All the resources of state publishing, state libraries, and the new Union of Soviet Writers were devoted to the production of this literature and to its dissemination, at home and abroad. The organization known as VOKS [...] came under increasing pressure to manufacture support for the regime [...]. Although its origins are unclear, it seems [...] that a central literary agency to sponsor foreign publications was set up, and so the Press and Publisher Literary Service, Moscow, known by its ubiquitous Soviet shorthand as 'PresLit', came into being.[15]

The GARF archive (VOKS f. 5283) holds material that explains some of Preslit's functions and how it supported Soviet music publishing during the 1940s. Preslit is an abbreviation of Press and Publisher Literary Service, but was commonly known as the Literary Agency or even as the Literary-Musical Agency. Despite the incoherence of its full name in GARF, Preslit's main address was the same as that of VOKS' – 17 Bol′shaya Gruzinskaya Street. GARF correspondence suggests that Preslit was an independent agency and not a VOKS department, but one that worked in close collaboration with VOKS. Moreover, Preslit's association with VOKS indicates that this agency was part of the Soviet cultural ex-

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14 NARA (National Archives and Records Administration, Archives II, College Park MD, USA) b. 4809, f. No 811.42761/4 – 147, loc. 59.250.37.9.2.

15 Ian Patterson. The Translation of Soviet Literature: John Rodker and PresLit. In *Russia in Britain, 1880 – 1940 : From Melodrama to Modernism*, Rebecca Beasley, Philip Ross Bullock (eds.), 188 – 189. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

change apparatus and as a consequence implies that Preslit was engaged in some form of state censorship. It can be confidently established from an examination of the correspondence that Preslit's Director was M. Rosenzweig, and that Preslit took on the legal responsibility of representing all Soviet composers, according to the telegram of 28 July 1944.[16] In fact, a 1945 contract reveals that Preslit was the sole owner of all musical works of any genre – chamber, symphonic instrumental, choir, songs, musico-dramatic works etc. – composed within the USSR.[17] Moreover, based on Preslit's agreements with the Soviet composers, Preslit held all publication and rental rights to all Soviet-produced music everywhere in the world.[18]

The correspondence held at the GARF that involves or concerns Preslit is limited, and mainly consists of telegrams and cabled messages, which usually include only the names of the recipient and sender; in some telegrams even the date is missing.[19] However, Preslit's function is certainly connected with VOKS, as many Preslit telegrams are signed by both Rosenzweig (Preslit's Director) and by A. Karaganov (VOKS Vice-Chairman), which points to the important role that Preslit had in international music score exchanges and provides an insight into the superiority of VOKS. Though most telegrams from abroad are addressed to "Rosenzweig, Preslit, Moscow",[20] there are other telegrams addressed to Shneyerson, who was Head of VOKS Music Section, as follows: "Mr. Grigori Shneerson, Literary-Musical Agency, Preslit, Moscow, USSR."[21]. The latter suggests that Preslit functioned as a support agency to VOKS Music Section. Preslit possibly provided music scores to the VOKS Music Section for subsequent approval by VOKS's chief executives (e. g. the vice-chairman) for international dissemination.

The correspondence indicates that Preslit operated only in the 1940s, plausibly either between 1944–48 or 1943–51, since by December 1951, Preslit was incorporated into Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga ("International Book") as the following letter of 24 December 1951 reveals: "Please be advised that Literary-Musical Agency/Presslit/ has been incorporated in V/O 'Mezhdunarodaja Kniga' and the

16 GARF (State Archive of Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia) f. 5283, op. 14, d. 165, l.13.
17 GARF f. 5283, op. 15, d. 176, l. 151.
18 Ibid., l. 104.
19 Telegrams and cables form GARF archive, quoted in present chapter, often include idiosyncratic spelling. All quotations follow the original text of the primary source.
20 GARF f.5283, op. 15, d. 176, l. 32, 111.
21 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 411, l. 129.

latter has obtained all the functions of Presslit as well as its rights, duties and property."[22]

Preslit and V/O Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga had very similar roles as both were Soviet agencies which administered copyrights of Soviet works. The copyright system itself was also subject to changes in the 1930s. The central administration for copyright protection between the late 1930s until the end of the Stalin period was VUOAP, which, however, "did not decide all matters that related to the practical workings of the royalties system. On particularly touchy issues, VUOAP administration preferred to defer to other institutions."[23] While the literature does not specify which "other" Soviet institutions administered copyright protection, it is evident that Preslit and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga were two among them during the mid 1940s in the music sphere.

Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, founded in 1923, was the first agency to represent all Soviet literary and musical works.[24] It seems that Preslit, when created (probably sometime around 1943–44), temporarily supplanted Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga's remit for music, as during Preslit's existence Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga retained and represented only the copyright for literary, non-musical, Soviet works.[25] The functions of both Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and Preslit becomes apparent when examining the foundation and function of the Am-Rus Music Agency.

American-Soviet Musical Exchange: Am-Rus Music Agency and Leeds Music Corporation

The Am-Rus Music Agency was an American private company based in New York, which represented Soviet music in the US. In the early 1940s Mr and Mrs Rubin, Harriet L. Moore and David J. Grunes founded a private company called Am-Rus Corporation, which signed a contract with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and built a substantial rental library of Russian music, and produced publica-

22 Am-Rus Literary Agency Records (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, USA) b. 29, f. 5 "Mezhdunarodnaja Kniga 1951–1960". Letter of 24 December 1951.
23 Kirill Tomoff. *Creative Union*, 227–228. VUOAP: All-Union Administration for the Protection of Authors' Rights.
24 Until the foundation of VAAP in 1973 Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga continued to represent the copyright of all Soviet works. VAAP, the All-Union Agency for Authors' Copyright, functioned between 1973–91.
25 Exception to that were music records/matrices and published Soviet music (pre Preslit), both of which remained under Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 165, l. 20.

tions of Russian music. However, in 1942 the contract between Am-Rus and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga expired and the latter rejected a renewal. Thus, between 1942–44, Am-Rus was not able to continue its work efficiently and the company was dissolved in 1944. In 1944, Miss Helen Black established contact with Preslit and through negotiations founded a second Am-Rus, entitled the Am-Rus Literary Musical Agency. Helen Black became the company's director.[26] The new Am-Rus agency signed an agreement with Preslit, which empowered Black as the sole representative of the Soviet Music in the Western hemisphere. A telegram dated 28 July 1944 from Rosenzweig (Director of Preslit) to Helen Black declares: "Whereas Preslit accepted service of Soviet composers we hereby empower Miss Helen Black as Preslit representative to place hire et-authorise for public performance musical works by Soviet composers also to protect their copyright et-represent their interests in courts et-other state organs."[27]

Moreover, Black was authorised to collect all possessions from the first Am-Rus Corporation while Preslit arranged in Moscow all necessary transitional agreements between the first Am-Rus and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. Extended rights were given to Black, empowering her with all necessary copyright for publications and performances in the Western Hemisphere, excluding Canada. Preslit's second telegram to Black of 28 July 1944 confirms this:

> We authorise Helen Black take possessions from Am-Rus files and materials unpublished music. Liquidation of relations cum Am-Rus concerning other music will be done par Mezh Kniga. We can offer you exclusive north et south American representation except Canada for hiring and publishing Sov Music including performance rights unpublished works already received and to be received futurewise.[28]

This passage exhibits the powers that the Preslit agency enjoyed within the Soviet apparatus for disseminating Soviet music abroad. From Moscow, Preslit was able to initiate and terminate business agreements and administer both Soviet domestic copyright with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and international copyright. The initial exclusion of Canada was amended in November 1944, as Black reported to Preslit in a telegram, on 2 February 1945: "Contract signed Leeds November 24th north et south American rights including Canada. Impossible musically separate Canada ex United States. Uni-States conductors, soloists, musical organisations tour Canada cum-music obtained Am Rus. Canadian orchestras, choruses, soloists regularly request ex Am Rus rental et published Sov Music."[29]

26 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 323, l. 37–53. History of Am-Rus.
27 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 165, l. 13.
28 Ibid., l. 20.
29 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 302, l. 19.

It becomes evident that Preslit would have been established in the mid-1940s – that is, at some point between 1942–44 – as the first contract Am-Rus held was with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, not with Preslit. In or by 1944, Preslit relieved Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga of matters relating to music works as the result of its agreement with the Union of Soviet Composers. A telegram sent on 28 July 1944 to Black from Preslit (signed on this occasion by Soboleva from VOKS) reveals that Preslit was by then publishing Soviet Music for distribution: "Preslit publishes in Soviet Union music in limited number of copies with English title pages for hire also for publishers, conductors, musicians et critics consideration. Will send you these publications pro-further distribution."[30] The aforementioned source indicates that Preslit's role was not only administrative (copyright and business management) and structural (mediator agency to VOKS Music Section), but also included production of music publications customised for international dissemination. Thus, Preslit's role in music score exchange was central and crucial.

However, Preslit's function lasted a very short period. In 1948, the contract between Preslit and Am-Rus lapsed and a new one was not signed. The death of Helen Black in 1951 resulted in the liquidation of her entire estate and the creation of a "new", third Am-Rus Agency. Notably, in 1952 the third Am-Rus signed a contract again with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga.[31]

The history of Am-Rus shows that Preslit was an organisation involved in publishing and operating in the music sphere between 1944–1948 – or possibly more broadly between 1943–51 – based on an agreement with the Union of Soviet Composers. Since Preslit worked in close collaboration with VOKS Music Section and published music for international dissemination, it is possible that Preslit also collaborated with Muzfond and its publications. Preslit's incorporation into Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga returned to the latter its initial musical copyright representation.

Nevertheless, the short period of Preslit's existence created new conditions for the dissemination and publication of the Soviet music in the US. In 1944, after Helen Black's Am-Rus acquired rights to Soviet music for the whole Western hemisphere, Black conducted negotiations with publishing companies G. Schirmer, Carl Fischer Music, Edward B. Marks Music Company and Leeds Music Corporation regarding the publication of Soviet Music. New York's Leeds Music Corporation was the only publishing company that agreed to create

30 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 165, l. 20

31 Am-Rus Literary Agency Records b. 29, f. 5 Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga 1951–1960'. Letter of 10 January 1952.

a special series for Russian music named "Am-Rus Edition" and to negotiate with the American Society for Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) copyright protection of Soviet music since Russian music did not enjoy international copyright.[32]

Yet, it might be plausible that Leeds Music Corporation initially had established business relations with Am-Rus Music Agency following VOKS's suggestion. The telegram dated 5 October 1944 from Ryessa D. Liberson, Chief of VOKS American Department, to Eugene Weintraub, Leeds Music Corporation employee, seems to suggest as much: "We regret to inform you that we are in no position to help you as all questions concerning Soviet Music are dealt with by the representative of Am-Rus Music Agency – Miss Helen Black, 11 West 42nd Street, New York, to whom we advise you to apply."[33]

Regardless of how the original contact between Am-Rus Music Agency and Leeds Music Corporation was established, on 24 November 1944 Helen Black signed a contract between Am-Rus and Leeds Music Corporation (henceforth abbreviated as Leeds), which enabled the latter to publish newly composed Soviet music works.[34] Eugene Weintraub was appointed Director of Am-Rus Division at Leeds Music Corporation. The newly formed collaboration was hailed in 1944 by the American press:

> The Leeds Music Corporation, which recently acquired the exclusive rights in the Western Hemisphere for the publications and distribution of works by Soviet composers, will release these Russian compositions in what is to be known as the Am-Rus Edition, bearing the stamp of approval of the Union of Soviet Composers. One of the first compositions to be issued will be Prokofieff's sonata in D major for violin and piano, Op. 94, edited by Joseph Szigeti, to whom the work was submitted after it had been flown from Russia to the Leeds corporation.[35]

This newspaper clipping underlines the significance (exclusive rights and scope) of Soviet-American collaboration, and demonstrates the wide public interest in Russian music abroad. The tone is enthusiastic, positive and enterprising, displaying the mutual interests that united American businesses and the Soviet state.

In 1945, the Leeds publishing plan included works by Glière, Khachaturian, Kabalevsky, Shostakovich and Prokofiev for solo piano, accompanied works for

32 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 323, l. 40 – 41; GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 165, l. 43 – 45.
33 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 205, l. 123.
34 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 165, l. 43 – 45; GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 302, l. 19.
35 Joseph Szigeti Archive (Howard Gotlieb Archival Research Centre, Boston University, USA) p. 3, loose newspaper clipping, (c. 1944), no newspaper title, no author.

violin, viola and flute, and orchestral excerpts for trombone and bassoon.[36] The first publications by Leeds's Am-Rus Edition came out on 1 April 1945 and included Kabalevsky's *Sonatina* for piano, Op. 13, Khachaturian's *Toccata* for piano and Prokofiev's *Gavotte* No 4, Op. 77. Three copies of the first Am-Rus Edition publications were sent to Moscow's Preslit as attachments to Black's letter dated 5 April 1945. In the same letter, Black informed Moscow that Leeds had created a special Am-Rus Division and employed eleven staff members and other external staff to prepare English translations of songs, copy and edit music for printers. Moreover, Leeds established a reference library – Am-Rus Rental Library – where musicians could refer to Soviet music scores and listen to recordings of new Soviet music, that were transcribed from broadcasts.[37] Leeds invested significant financial and infrastructural resources in Russian music, which indicates that this music enjoyed a wide appeal at the end of the war, making Am-Rus Edition a viable business.

According to agreements between Am-Rus and Preslit, Am-Rus was obliged to send to Moscow examples of Leeds publications. On 20 October 1945, Shneyerson, Head of VOKS Music Section, wrote a report addressed to Rosenzweig, director of Preslit, on Leeds' publications of Soviet music. The report mentioned seven works and one collection that had already been published, and another 23 works that were in the production line. The quality of publications was satisfactory with good print quality and design and displaying evidence of professional editorial work. However, in his report Shneyerson criticised the absence of symphonic works and the reissue of published works. Shneyerson concluded that considering publication figures and the scope of published works, Leeds "does not correspond to the scale of a solid firm that took over a monopoly supply of Soviet music on the American continent".[38] Indeed, archival correspondence indicates that Leeds was a small company, which nevertheless (according to Black) invested substantial resources based on its monopoly position and the promise of a niche market.

On 6 December 1945, Black sent more publications by Leeds to Rosenzweig in Preslit, among which were Glière's *Nocturne* for horn and piano, Khachaturian's Chant-poème for violin and piano and Glazounov's *Rêverie* for horn and piano. Due to World War II, Leeds experienced infrastructural challenges similar to the Soviet publishing organisations. Black's December 1945 letter proceeded to explain the reasons for publication delays:

36 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 323, l. 2–3, 22–23, 28, 32–35.
37 Ibid. l. 2–3.
38 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 323, l. 24. Author's translation.

> Publications of new music will now be coming much more quickly than they have in the past year. Leeds Music Company had a great deal of difficulty with printers and getting a supply of paper and many other technical details. At present the following compositions are at the printers and will be published very soon: Prokofieff – 3 pieces Op. 96, March Op. 99, Violin Sonata Op. 94, Cinderella Suite-piano, Concerto No 3.[39]

In Moscow, Leeds's publications were examined not only by Preslit and VOKS Music Section (Shneyerson) but were also sent to composers. The surviving GARF archival correspondence reveals that Prokofiev received the Leeds publications of his own works via VOKS. His letter dated 15 February 1946 gives a detailed account of it:

> In front of me are the American publications of my opuses 8, 65, 95. I think that they are produced very meticulously; the piano pedals and fingerings, which are added in these publications, are quite acceptable. Less acceptable is the situation with regard to the libretto's text, which appears a bit "light" and at times is [positioned] imprecisely. Alexander Nevsky is published very elegantly, albeit the score looks paler than the scores of smaller format [...] The Seventh [piano] sonata is published very well. S. Prokofiev'[40]

Eugene Weintraub, the Director of Am-Rus Division at Leeds, established direct contact with Shneyerson, who by 1946 was directly sending Leeds Music Corporation "music and microfilms for publication and for hire."[41] Besides direct business communication, post-war collaboration between Leeds and Moscow included exchange of technological knowledge to reduce the production cost, since producing editions from microfilms sent from Moscow was expensive for Am-Rus Edition. Therefore, in June 1946 Weintraub suggested that Shneyerson should acquire photo-stating and blue-printing machines, or should send pre-prepared copyist manuscripts: "Another idea is the following: we will send you about 10,000 sheets of the thin paper (ink and pens) which your copyist can use [...] [to] write one violin part which would then be sent here. Once we have it [...] we can blue-print it for 8 c per page – which is very cheap."[42] As was mentioned above, lack of publishing infrastructure and technological advancement in the Soviet Union led the Soviet publisher Muzgiz in November 1946 to use Leipzig's publishing facilities in order to satisfy domestic demand for classical music. Thus, sending microfilms abroad for the purposes of dissem-

39 Ibid. l. 32.
40 Ibid. l. 58. Author's translation.
41 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 368, l. 21.
42 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 401, l. 101.

ination of Soviet music was perhaps the most feasible strategy to achieve cultural music exchange during and after World War II.

During 1945, Am-Rus Music Agency worked as mediator between Leeds and the appropriate department in Moscow, passing all enquiries to either Preslit or VOKS. By 1946, Leeds established direct contact with Moscow and publications of Soviet music were produced more effectively. The year 1945 also marked the beginning of another important collaboration, the one between Preslit and London's Boosey & Hawkes.

Anglo-Soviet Musical Exchange: Boosey & Hawkes and Anglo-Soviet Music Press

In the 1940s Boosey & Hawkes's policy and vision for Russian music was very clear: contacts with Moscow's Preslit and Koussevitzky in the US would establish Boosey & Hawkes as the sole publisher in the UK of Russian music composed before and after the October 1917 Revolution. In 1923, Ralph Hawkes had secured the sole representation of Koussevitzky's Édition Russe de Musique, while in 1938, Hawkes appointed Hans Heinsheimer as Head of Serious Music at Boosey & Hawkes New York's branch and briefed him to "cement a relationship" with Koussevitzky. "Hawkes's ultimate aim was to acquire the ageing Koussevitzky's important catalogues, Édition Russe de Musique and Gutheil (which included works by Stravinsky, Rachmaninoff, Prokofieff)" and Heinsheimer was to play an important role in winning Koussevitzky's trust by helping the conductor to "sort out complicated legal matters."[43]

A preliminary contract between Preslit and Boosey & Hawkes was signed in early summer of 1945, set to expire by 30 September 1945, should the parties not sign a longer-term contract. Preslit granted Boosey & Hawkes sole representation rights of all Soviet music composed in the USSR – hire and publishing – for the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.[44] More importantly, this preliminary 1945 contract laid the foundations for the establishment of the Anglo-Soviet Music Press later in 1946. Additionally, in 1946 Boosey & Hawkes succeeded in buying Koussevitzky's Édition Russe de Musique for the phenomenal price of $300,000 and as a result acquired Koussevitzky's invaluable catalogue with major works

43 Helen Wallace. *Boosey & Hawkes: The Publishing Story.* London: Boosey & Hawkes, 2007, 17–18, 37, 65–66.

44 GARF f. 5283, op. 15, d. 176, l. 151–154. Preliminary contract between Preslit and Boosey & Hawkes, 1945.

by Rachmaninoff, Prokofiev and Stravinsky alongside the highly desirable copyright.[45] Moreover, in the case of Prokofiev, the two business agreements with Preslit and Koussevitzky practically gave Boosey & Hawkes "the publishing rights throughout the world for the most significant Prokofieff's works, written before his return to the USSR" and after his 1936 relocation to the Soviet Union.[46]

With these two business agreements, Boosey & Hawkes made a substantial investment in Russian music, just as Am-Rus Music Agency and Leeds Music Corporation had done in the USA. Towards the end of World War II, publishing Russian music was considered a viable business model on both sides of the Atlantic and publishing firms were actively seeking a monopoly on representation along with copyright. Indeed, the news about the preliminary contract rapidly reached New York's Am-Rus Music Agency. On 3 November 1945, Black telegrammed Preslit to enquire about the potential for a business collaboration between Boosey & Hawkes and Leeds Music Corporation: "Boosey Hawkes New York informs they signed contract pro-handling Sov music England. Advice if correct. They consulting Leeds re cooperation helpful both firms. Boosey Hawkes says their pro rights British Empire. Leeds contract Western hemisphere includes Canada."[47]

During World War II, cultural exchange between the Soviet Union, the UK and the US was encouraged alongside military ties. While musical and cultural exchanges were supported by Soviet governmental organisations – VOKS and Preslit – the Western businesses Am-Rus Music Agency and Boosey & Hawkes certainly used the opportunity to develop and launch financially viable schemes for publication of Soviet music in the USA and the UK. Yet, Western businesses had to overcome economic and institutional differences that existed between communism and capitalism, including securing Western copyright for Soviet music.

It was only in 1946 that the agreement was reached between Preslit and Boosey & Hawkes, which resulted in the establishment of the Anglo-Soviet Music Press (ASMP). Alfred Kalmus was appointed its director. The agreement allowed Boosey & Hawkes to publish newly composed Soviet works in the UK on the same day they appeared in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the negotiations of the agreement were time-consuming and difficult. GARF's correspondence reveals that the communication between Boosey & Hawkes and Preslit was con-

45 Wallace. *Boosey & Hawkes. The Publishing Story*, 66; Harlow Robinson (ed.). *Selected Letters of Sergei Prokofiev.* Boston, [Mass.]: Northeastern University Press, 1998, 173, f. 2; Viktor Aranovich Yuzefovich. *Sergei Prokofyev – Sergei Kusevitsky. Perepiska 1910–1953.* Moscow: Deka-VS, 2011, 448.

46 Anthony Pool. Prokofieff's Publishers. *Three Oranges* 1 (2001): 27.

47 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 331, l. 83–84.

ducted via the bureau *Soviet War News*, located at London's Trafalgar Square in 819 – 812 Grand Building. Rostovsky[48] appears to have been either its owner or director, according to the surviving titles in GARF telegrams: ELT Rostovsky Sovietwarnews. Rostovsky's bureau played a key mediator role since both Preslit and Boosey & Hawkes cabled their requests. Kalmus's letter dated 13 February 1946 to the *Soviet War News* reveals the negotiation process: "The draft of the agreement which we sent to you in September [1945] (the first copy of which has been lost) has been in Moscow now for more than 6 weeks and we would be grateful if a response of some kind is sent before long." In the same letter, Kalmus complained that Moscow underestimated the significance of copyright by releasing for purchase Shostakovich's Ninth Symphony in the Soviet Union before informing London, which prevented London securing Western copyright. Moreover, the material that Moscow had sent to London was of unsuitable "microfilm" format, which imposed unnecessary expenses:

> Although it is now one year since we started our negotiations and we made it clear right from the beginning how very important the question of copyright is, we regret to see that all our information which we have forwarded to Moscow on many occasions has not had the slightest effect. It would have been very simple to send us two or three copies of this mimographed edition [Shostakovich's 9th Symphony], with the copyright imprinted, by airmail before they were distributed in Moscow, and in this way secure the copyright.
>
> We do not understand why a copy of the microfilm has been sent to us, causing the very unnecessary expense [...] for photographic enlargement, and for this amount I am sending you a debit note enclosed. [...] We intended to print all the parts and to properly publicise Shostakovich's new work [9th Symphony], but in the given circumstances we shall prefer not to do so and cancel the negotiations for several performances that we have initiated [...]. Preslit and the composers and the various publishers do not seem to care whether a work can be copyrighted, but it is impossible for us to do without copyrights as we have explained to you many times. If Preslit cannot be convinced about the importance of copyright to us [..] we shall not be able to undertake printing of any quantities as we have provided in Clause 8 of our draft agreement. You have to make it clear to Preslit that with a few exceptions, we are not able to get back the expenses if we only print non-copyright works.[49]

The copyright "law" which Boosey & Hawkes adhered to was the Berne Convention. Under the Berne Convention, "in order for the work to be protected by copyright at all, it must be published first or simultaneously in a country that had signed up to the convention. Russia was not a signatory"[50] and hence, Boosey & Hawkes had to request a copy of the score from Russia and to work on the pro-

48 Examined GARF correspondence has not revealed Rostovsky's full name.
49 GARF f. 5283, op. 15, d. 313, l. 25 – 25 verso.
50 Wallace. *Boosey & Hawkes: The Publishing Story*, 89.

duction line in time, so that it would be published simultaneously in the Soviet Union and the UK. Otherwise, Boosey & Hawkes would not be able to secure the copyright. Boosey & Hawkes informed Preslit that the only procedure to ensure copyright protection was a registration of the newly composed work at the British Museum before its publication in the USSR. As soon as the registration would be secured, Boosey & Hawkes would telegraph Preslit to inform that the music can be published in the USSR. The telegraph of 13 August 1945 sent from Rosenzweig to Rostovsky shows the reluctance of Preslit to cooperate: "Cannot undertake detain appearance publication Sov music before their registration Britishwise Museum."[51] However, after consideration Preslit agreed to the registration of works at the British Museum on the terms that for every work there would be a special agreement regarding the title of the composition.[52] Copyright considerations were significant for Boosey & Hawkes to secure a financially viable publication of Soviet music in the UK. In contrast, copyright was less significant in the Soviet Union, where music works belonged to Preslit, meaning the state. While the GARF correspondence reveals tensions between Boosey & Hawkes and Preslit, Moscow's agreement to negotiate copyright on a case by case basis demonstrate their flexibility and willingness to collaborate with a capitalist institution.

Despite the fact the Soviets understood the system, obtaining scores from Moscow was a "regular nightmare".[53] The main reasons for this were Moscow's unhurried business correspondence that required approval by Soviet bureaucratic organisations (e.g. VOKS) and agencies (e.g. Preslit), copyright and cost considerations, a lack of publishing infrastructure or its incompatibility with Western publishing facilities, the high cost of producing and sending microfilms, and the shortage of Soviet copyists and manuscript paper. If it was not for Boosey & Hawkes's persistence, it is likely that the Anglo-Soviet Music Press would have not been successfully established. A telegram dated 10 October 1945 from Rostovsky to Preslit is indicative of Moscow's slow response: "Please cable number of pages full score War et Peace, number of pages orchestral parts, Boosey Hawkes ad-estimate cost of publishing. Can you send microfilm of score in advance pro-publication of miniature score. Is an English translation available? Please answer queries in cables August 25, 17 September."[54] Nevertheless, telegrams from Moscow through 1945 mention delays with contract and lack of

51 GARF f. 5283, op. 15, d. 176, l. 135.
52 Ibid., l. 139.
53 Wallace. *Boosey & Hawkes: The Publishing Story*, 89.
54 GARF f. 5283, op. 15, ed. khr. 176, l. 32.

music supply. A telegram dated 29 October 1945 sent from Rosenzweig to Rostovsky reads: “Final draft agreement non-received. [...] Please explain Boosey impossible ad-fulfil orders [...] pro-reason lack many published music materials. Doing our best ad-satisfy their demands. Please send plan publication Soviet music.”[55] In response, Boosey & Hawkes contacted Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, but was unable to place an order with them, since Preslit obtained rights for Soviet music.[56] Among other difficulties that Boosey & Hawkes experienced was the lack of paper supply. In 1945, Rostovsky cabled Moscow with the news that Boosey & Hawkes had guaranteed to publish 300 pages yearly, when restrictions in paper supply remained stringent, 600 pages when the restrictions would be less stringent and 1000 pages yearly when restrictions would be lifted.[57] In 1945, Moscow was sending parcels with music scores and music on microfilms to London, but the delivery of music scores required further control and clarification. On 6 December 1945, Rostovsky complained to Rosenzweig that Russian-British journalist Alexander Werth had passed on Prokofiev’s new piano suite (brougth from Moscow) to the British-based pianist Franz Osborn. “Such methods of importing new music works in England invalidates the agreement with Boosey” Rostovsky concluded.[58]

In the end, it took another year for Kalmus to settle all the details of the agreement with Preslit, including procedures for a stable music supply, sending of alternative formats excluding microfilms, and information necessary for securing Western copyright. Rosenzweig’s (Preslit Director) letter dated 31 January 1947 to Kalmus (Director of the Anglo-Soviet Music Press) reads:

> Mr Rostovsky [Soviet War News] already has all material necessary for the final (as we hope) settlement of all questions connected with the general agreement. [...] We readily concede to all your arguments regarding the necessity of adopting a stable system of supplying you with music works so as to enable you to ensure the copyright for these works in time. When sending you new compositions, we intend to inform you in future about: 1) the expected date of their publications – if MS and 2) the date of publication if the work has been published in the USSR. Microfilms will be sent rarely and only in exceptional cases after first settling the matter with you. Six copies of each new publication (whether VOKS publications or Muzgiz) will be sent to you.[59]

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55 Ibid., l. 62.
56 Ibid., l. 38.
57 Ibid., l. 188.
58 Ibid., l. 29. Author’s translation.
59 GARF f. 5283, op. 15, d. 384, l. 56–56 verso.

Rosenzweig's letter listed 28 music works by 17 Soviet composers, which were posted from Moscow in parcels in January 1947. Among the composers were: Glière, Gnesin, Kabalevsky, Khachaturian, Knipper, Prokofiev, Myaskovsky, Muradeli, Sviridov, Prokofiev, Rakov, Shaporin, Shostakovich, and Vasilenko. Each listed work included details of whether the work was sent as a manuscript or as VOKS publication and whether it had been already published by Muzgiz (State Music Publishers). Rosenzweig's letter ended with a request for Kalmus to inform Moscow how the materials would be used by the Anglo-Soviet Music Press and to "kindly send us five sample copies of all ASMP publications."[60]
Due to the prolonged negotiations, the first Anglo-Soviet Music Press publications finally appeared in 1946. Additionally, the establishment of the Anglo-Soviet Music Press was a little optimistic, since the approaching 1946 "political frost of the Cold War" would soon make such a business collaboration "impossible to set up".[61] In this respect, it was fortunate that the extensive 1945–47 period of business negotiations between Preslit and Boosey & Hawkes just avoided the new political tone of the approaching Cold War.

1946: Political Change and Music Publications by Am-Rus Edition and Anglo-Soviet Music Press

Towards the end of the war, ideological differences between Soviet Union and the Anglo-American axis became more apparent. Stalin viewed security "in terms of space", defending the borders of his vast country. In contrast, Americans viewed security "in institutional terms [...] [establishing] a collective security organisation capable of resolving differences".[62] Moreover, while during the war Stalin "downplayed the Soviet commitment to communism", after the war he actively pursued influence in Eastern Europe and embarked on "a renewed crusade for world revolution" in the interests of international communism.[63] In particular, Stalin sought to gain influence in communist-dominated Romania and Bulgaria that would lead to establishing communist ideology in the Balkans extending to the Mediterranean countries. "The 'Sovietisation' of Eastern Europe [...] meant imposing a Soviet model of socialism [...]: state-owned and controlled

60 Ibid., l. 56 verso.
61 Wallace. *Boosey & Hawkes: The Publishing Story*, 56–57.
62 John Lewis Gaddis. *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History*, 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990, 176–177.
63 Ibid., 177

economies, centralised state planning, collectivised agriculture and communist totalitarian intrusion into civil society".[64] This "Sovietisation" was ideologically opposite to the Anglo-American axis. Another reason behind ideological differences were the technological advances and the superiority of the US in developing the atomic bomb. In February 1946, news about Soviet atomic espionage was disseminated in the West, which led to the arrest of Russian agents.[65] In the same month, on 9 February 1946 in the Bolshoi Theatre, Stalin gave a speech highlighting the "incompatibility between communism and capitalism" and stating that "the Soviet Union had returned to an era like the one that had preceded the war and stood alone in the hostile world where outside threats are real, and an even more destructive war is possible."[66] This hostility was perceived in the West as an attempt to justify oppressive and centralised power. The Cold War began to set in slowly after the war. Churchill's speech on 5 March 1946 at the Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, USA, was one of the first signs of a new rhetoric being introduced. In his speech, Churchill used the term "Iron Curtain" and signalled the division between the West and the Soviet Union. The year 1946 signalled the beginning of an anti-formalist campaign in the Soviet Union. Led by Andrei Zhdanov, the campaign focused on opposing capitalism and Western "bourgeois" institutions. Yet, in a series of interviews between March 1946 and April 1947, which Stalin gave to Western media, Stalin declined the possibility of a new war and supported a peaceful coexistence with the West. In an April 1947 interview with Republican Senator Harold Stassen, while acknowledging the differences in communist and capitalist economic systems, Stalin "pointed out [...] [that] the Soviet Union and the United States had co-operated during the war and there was no reason why they could not continue to do so during peacetime".[67]

Examples of the wartime cooperation certainly include negotiations and agreements between Preslit and Am-Rus Music Agency, which started in 1944, and Preslit's preliminary 1945 contract with Boosey & Hawkes. These two agreements made it possible for Western music publishers Leeds Music Corporation and Anglo-Soviet Music Press to publish Soviet music works from 1945. The year 1946 saw the first publications by the Anglo-Soviet Music Press among

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64 Geoffrey Roberts. *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953*. New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press, 2006, 319.

65 Gaddis. *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States*, 178, 183.

66 Herrala. *The Struggle for Control of Soviet Music from 1932 to 1948*, 147; Gaddis. *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States*, 183; John Lewis Gaddis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941–1947*. New York; London: Columbia University Press, 1972, 299.

67 Roberts. *Stalin's Wars*, 311–312.

which were Prokofiev's Eighth Piano Sonata with plate number A.S.M.P. 4, Shostakovich's *Six Children's Pieces* with plate number A.S.M.P. 6, and Khachaturian's *Toccata* for piano with plate number A.S.M.P. 10. Among Leeds's 1946 publications can be mentioned Shostakovich's Third Symphony and Prokofiev's Suite No. 1 from *Romeo and Juliet*. In 1947, the Cold War rhetoric was becoming more commonplace in the media. The pianist Harry Cumpson was editing Prokofiev's Eighth Piano Sonata for Leeds when he encountered difficulties with the musical text. Cumpson's letter of 14 May 1947 to Prokofiev is revealing of the Cold War atmosphere of that time, and contains a personal opinion on the value of cultural exchange at times of contrasting governmental policy:

> We have cabled VOKS (or Preslit) [...] and their reply for us was to follow the VOKS edition [...] [which] does not contain the desired information [...] Dear Mr Prokofieff, the money power which controls the press and radio here shout loudly and hatefully about Russia but please believe me there are many good folks in the U.S.A. who are full of friendliness and admiration of the Soviet Union.[68]

In fact, the political change brought a new challenge for Western publications of Russian music. By 1947, the problems with business and copyright agreements and practical incompatibilities between Soviet and Western publishing infrastructures had been largely overcome. Instead, the new challenge for Soviet music score exchange and publications emerged from the wider political change and the reluctance of governmental Anglo-American policies to continue supporting cultural exchange including Western publications of Russian music.

Despite this, however, London's Boosey & Hawkes started reprinting Russian music works from Koussevitzky's catalogues from the 1946 deal: in 1947 Boosey & Hawkes reprinted Prokofiev's Third Piano Sonata with copyright acknowledgment 1917, Gutheil and Prokofiev's *Classical Symphony* with copyrighted acknowledgment 1926, Édition Russe de Musique. The year 1947 saw more Anglo-Soviet Music Press publications, among which were Kabalevsky's Second Piano Sonata (A.S.M.P. 34), Platonov's Thirty Studies for flute (A.S.M.P. 36), and Prokofiev's First Violin Sonata (A.S.M.P. 56).

In the Soviet Union, the 1946 anti-formalist campaign aimed at eliminating Western influences and culminated in 1948 with a direct attack on Soviet composers. An intense governmental inspection was conducted in VOKS to challenge dissemination processes and publication of Soviet music works that were customised for Western audiences. The inspection resulted in the dismissal of Shneyerson from his post and the closure of VOKS publications. On 5 August

68 GARF f. 5283, op. 14, d. 411, l. 118.

1948, Shneyerson wrote to Prokofiev that his work at VOKS put him in a lot of trouble, especially “excessive” explanations about the conditions that were “allowed by Muzfond for the distribution of music scores [abroad] and for our VOKS publications which were published not quite under [correct] rules.”[69] However, both Leeds Music Corporation and Anglo-Soviet Music Press continued publishing Soviet music throughout the late 1940s.

Impact and Legacy of Wartime Policies on Cultural Exchange

The year 1945 created fertile ground for the dissemination of new compositions of Soviet music in both the UK and the US. The two key agreements between Moscow’s Preslit and New York’s Am-Rus Music Agency and London’s Boosey & Hawkes opened a new chapter for the exchange of music scores amongst the three countries. The war allies – the US, the UK and the Soviet Union – formed military and cultural partnerships that, however, lasted effectively only until the year 1946. While the political shift that gradually began in 1946 resulted in hostility between the Soviet Union and the West, the historical and political circumstances enabled the cultivation and dissemination of Soviet music in the West in the mid-1940s and the establishment of new publishing possibilities for Soviet music beyond the 1940s into the Cold War. Preslit’s agreements with Am-Rus Music Agency and Boosey & Hawkes showed that despite obstacles such as paper shortages caused by the war and extensive copyright negotiations, the two economic systems of communism and capitalism could achieve a business partnership. Beyond the ideological governmental objectives to unite war allies and bring about greater understanding between the nations, Western dissemination of Soviet music allowed the Soviet Union to obtain good quality Western scores with English titles and to further distribute Soviet music compositions during times when there were domestic shortages of manuscript paper, copyists, publishing facilities and published scores. From the Western perspective, the monopoly representation and exclusive copyright of Soviet music granted by Preslit to the Am-Rus Music Agency and Boosey & Hawkes gave these businesses a clear advantage when operating in competitive markets.

Moreover, the chapter demonstrates that besides government policy, the examination of cultural exchange and dissemination also requires examining independent business strategies shaped by market trends, profits and sustainability.

69 RGALI f. 1929, op. 1, ed. khr. 750, l. 21. Author’s translation.

While Russian music was clearly favoured during World War II, both Am-Rus Edition and Anglo-Soviet Music Press publications survived the political upheaval of 1946–48, mainly due to the goodwill and sustained efforts of independent businesses and individuals involved in exchange of music scores. The two antagonistic systems and cultures of Western capitalism and Eastern communism found a business consensus in the dissemination and publication of Soviet music despite the approaching Cold War.

Bruce Johnson, Mila Oiva, Hannu Salmi

Yves Montand in the USSR: Mixed Messages of Post-Stalinist/Western Cultural Encounters

"I feel as if I were in a newsreel."
– Simone Signoret to Yves Montand, December 1956

A newsreel was screened throughout the Soviet Union during week 51 of 1956. It began in the Kremlin, with a talk from Khrushchev to farm workers, and ended with a motorcycle competition in Italy. The highlight of the newsreel was the arrival of the famous French/Italian singer and actor Yves Montand with his wife, the actress Simone Signoret at the Vnukovo airport in Moscow on 16 December 1956.[1] Amazed by the enthusiastic reception, Montand said: "I am deeply moved. I am not a politician; I am only an artist. I have come here at a time when cultural exchanges are more important than ever, because they serve the cause of peace among peoples."[2]

In the newsreel, Montand's peace message is presented along with a report from Hungary, recovering from the struggles of October and November 1956. The Soviet troops had entered the country, with devastating results. The newsreel shows the reconstruction of destroyed homes and the reopening of public transport in Budapest.[3] Everything seems to be on track again. Obviously, Yves Montand's visit took place amidst very turbulent events, not only from the perspective of the Eastern bloc, but at the same time in the US, where McCarthyisim had divided Hollywood into patriots and traitors, and France was involved both in Algiers and (with Britain) in the Suez crisis.

The arrival of Montand in the Soviet Union at this critical moment was partly a coincidence. Montand's visit had, according to his own testimony, been planned as early as March 1956.[4] In fact, it seems that the idea for the visit arose immediately following the first news of Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twenti-

1 Newsreel, Week 51, 1956, Net-Film Digital Database, https://www.net-film.ru/en/film-10342/
2 Yves Montand, Hervé Hamon, and Patrick Rotman, transl. Jeremy Leggatt. *You See, I Haven't Forgotten*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1992, 269.
3 Newsreel, Week 51, 1956, https://www.net-film.ru/en/film-10342/. Unless otherwise stated, all the translations from Russian are by Oiva.
4 Montand. *You See, I Haven't Forgotten*, 263. Montand stated in an interview in *Le Figaro* (12 November 1956) that "I made this commitment eight months ago". Unless otherwise stated, all the translations from French are by Salmi.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110573169-011

eth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956. After the Hungarian incident, Montand had hesitated over whether or not to proceed with the tour to the Soviet Union, but finally he decided to go. He arrived in late 1956, where his Soviet concerts – including some in factories – were packed with audiences of up to 20,000 each performance. Montand's imminent tour became a matter of vitriolic debate in France, resulting in serious career damage.

Montand's visit is related to the Soviet Union outreach towards the international community, a development that had begun after the death of Stalin in 1953 and became more active after Khrushchev's secret speech. *The Washington Post* noted on 30 December 1956 that the Soviet Union seeks "wider cultural ties with other countries" and had just hosted the concert of "the French crooner".[5] The tour was of great propaganda value for the Soviet Union, exemplifying the deepening cultural ties. Accompanied by his wife Simone Signoret, the couple were fêted at receptions, and invited to a private dinner with the senior Soviet party leaders. The visit was a significant cultural, diplomatic and media event in the Soviet Union. In addition to the newsreel, and press coverage, the *Central Documentary Film Studios* (CDFS)[6] very quickly produced the documentary film *Yves Montand Sings* (*Poyot Iv Montan* 1957).[7]

Cold War era cultural diplomacy[8] has recently been widely studied through the exchange of artists and tours "on the other side", as well as through exhibitions and trade fairs.[9] It is well established that the significance of informal in-

5 Washington Post, 30 December 1956; Montand. *You See, I Haven't Forgotten*, 258.

6 The Central Documentary Films Studios (Tsentral'naya Studiya Dokumental'nïkh Filmov TsSDF) was established in 1936. It was the major all-Union producer of documentary films in the Soviet Union. In addition to that, there were Mosfilm (artistic films), the Central Studios of Educational Films, Soyuzeksportfilm (organisation of export cinema), the Gorkii Film Studio (producing films for children and youth) and the Cartoon Film Studios. In addition to the all-Union film studios, there were also regional and republican studios.

7 The film is available online at the Net-Film Digital Database at https://www.net-film.ru/en/film-4886/

8 Cultural diplomacy can be understood as a cultural activity that supports "objectives which have been defined through normal policy channels", although it is less focused on immediate outcomes as it aims to broadly influence the elite or mass public opinion of another nation. Its aim is to align the policies or views to the advantage of the influencing nation. For further details, see Graham Carr. "No Political Significance of Any Kind": Glenn Gould's Tour of the Soviet Union and the Culture of the Cold War. *The Canadian Historical Review* 95, no. 1 (2014): 3–4.

9 Sarah Davies. The Soft Power of Anglia: British Cold War Cultural Diplomacy in the USSR. *Contemporary British History* 27, no. 3 (2013): 297–323. György Péteri. Sites of Convergence: The USSR and Communist Eastern Europe at International Fairs Abroad and at Home. *Journal of Contemporary History* 47, no. 1 (2012): 3–12. Graham Carr. "No Political Significance of Any Kind".

ternational relations and non-state actors increased in mid-twentieth century diplomacy.[10] Michael David-Fox has seen cultural diplomacy – "defined as the systematic inclusion of a cultural dimension to foreign relations, or the formal allocation of attention and resources to culture within foreign policy" – largely as a twentieth-century phenomenon.[11] European states and diplomatic actors had already begun to manipulate public opinion and deploy modern propaganda methods in foreign countries in the nineteenth century. However, the extension of voting rights, advancement of compulsory education, and the emergence of the mass circulation press changed the situation dramatically and emphasised a need to influence public opinion abroad.[12] The research question driving this paper asks what is the relationship between the perceptions of Montand's tour in media and its representation in the 'official' film of the event. It analyses the Soviet media representations of Montand's tour in the Soviet Union, as a major cultural diplomacy event, exploring the ambiguities of the tour from several perspectives, including its musical content and its cinematic representation. Placing the media representations in the contexts of the increased international tensions and the Soviet policy of opening up the country to international encounters in 1956 – 1957 allows us to study various meanings attached to the visit.

This chapter uses a variety of research methods for analysing the audio-visual video and textual newspaper sources, varying from analytical close-reading, -watching, and -listening to computer assisted text analysis. We deploy computer assisted research tools including topic modelling and collocation analysis.[13] Computer assisted text analysis tools are often associated with analysis of very big data sets, but this chapter demonstrates that they can also be helpful in supplementing the analysis of smaller textual units. The computer assisted text analysis reveals patterns that a human reader would not necessarily see, providing as it were "another set of glasses" for the analysis. The human reader pays attention to the culturally significant features of the text, and seeks to understand it in the context known to him or her. Simultaneously the computer programmes read the

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10 Carr. "No Political Significance of Any Kind": 12.

11 Michael David-Fox. *Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921 – 1941.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, 14.

12 David-Fox. *Showcasing the Great Experiment*, 14 – 15.

13 This paper uses the Python based Text Processing web tool (http://text-processing.com/demo/stem/) for stemming the newspaper article texts, Voyant tools (https://voyant-tools.org/) and Mallet (http://mallet.cs.umass.edu/) for text analysis, and Plot.ly (https://plot.ly/) for visualising the results of topic modelling. Stemming is a process which removes the word suffixes and leaves the common root forms of the words there. This process is needed in particular in a highly inflected language like Russian. The programs used are free and easy to use and can be used also by scholars with no coding experience.

text in a "cold" manner: not understanding the text, but perceiving patterns in the texts that the human reader is less likely to attend to. Combining and cross-reading the results of computer assisted and human analysis can generate new findings in the overall meaning of the text within its context.

The Significance of Montand

Why was Montand's visit so important that CSDF decided to produce a full-length documentary instead of a newsreel? *Yves Montand Sings* is seventy-three minutes long, which means that it was intended to be either the main feature of a movie programme or a special product that could be screened at festivals and other occasions. Certainly it had particular cultural and political gravitas since Yves Montand was such a well-known figure. Nonetheless the decision to produce a full-length film was by no means inevitable, considering how few documentaries on concert tours were produced at the time.

The Montand tour – and the documentary film of the visit – was associated with the Soviet Union's opening up to the West. In 1955 foreign trade relations expanded, leading to an increase in the number of foreign exhibitions, which would include the American exhibition in 1959, and lobbying for bilateral cultural exchanges with many countries.[14] In February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev gave his Secret Speech, condemning the Stalinist crimes, and introducing the policy of *peaceful coexistence*. The following summer in 1957, after Montand's visit, Moscow was about to host the International Youth festival, expecting 30 000 visitors from 140 countries.[15] Simultaneously the number of foreign tourists visiting the Soviet Union began to revive and increase in the late 1950s.[16]

14 Carr. "No Political Significance of Any Kind" 7–8; Eleonory Gilburd. The Revival of Soviet Internationalism in the Mid to Late 1950s. In *The Thaw: Soviet Society and Culture during the 1950s and 1960s*, Eleonory Gilburd, Denis Kozlov, (eds.), 362–401. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013; Mila Oiva. Creation of a Market Space. The Polish Clothing Industry, Soviet Union, and the Rise of Marketing, 1949–1961. Unpublished PhD, Cultural History, University of Turku, 2017.

15 Pia Koivunen. Friends, "Potential Friends", and Enemies: Reimagining Soviet Relations to the First, Second, and Third Worlds at the Moscow 1957 Youth Festival. In *Socialist Internationalism in the Cold War: Exploring the Second World*, Patryk Babiracki, Austin Jersild (eds.), 219–247. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; M. Lebedeva and V. Chertikhin (eds.). *Korotko o stranakh. Navstrechu VI Festivaliyu*. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoye izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literaturï, 1957, 283.

16 Shawn Salmon. Marketing Socialism. Inturist in the Late 1950s and Early 1960s. In *Turizm. The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism*, Anne E. Gorsuch, Diane P. Koenker (eds.), 186–204, 190. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006; Hanna Kuusi. Accidental

At the time of his tour, Yves Montand was already a major star for the Soviet public. His films were shown in Moscow cinemas and Russians already knew his songs from recordings. He had met the Russian puppeteer Sergey Obraztsov (1901–1992), the director of the Moscow Marionette Theater, during his performances in Paris in 1954. Obraztsov had attended Montand's concert at Étoile, bought all available recordings and taken them with him to Moscow. These records ended up on the Soviet radio and, according to Montand's autobiography, the songs *A Paris* and *Les feuilles mortes* became familiar to millions of Soviet citizens.[17] Wherever the couple went in the USSR they were received like royalty. All his shows were booked out, and after five performances the concert venue was moved to the newly built Luzhniki Stadium because it could accommodate 18,000 seated audiences.[18] Significantly, his programme was exactly as it had been for his carefully rehearsed Paris concerts – that is, there was no adaptation to the Soviet audiences. Presenting a repertoire of dramatic narratives, chansons, and sentimental ballads, he sang and spoke in French, but the songs were translated into Russian in the programme and in newspapers. The ecstatic reviews focussed on three themes:

1. Montand's embodiment of and appeal to "simple", ordinary people.
2. He also evoked Paris, which for Russians was the "city of fashion".
3. And there was press appreciation of his pro-peace message.

Admiration for him reached cult-like proportions during his tour: the streets around the concert halls in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev were crowded with girls waiting to catch a glimpse of the star, and outside the major cities enthusiasts organized Montand concerts, with lectures on French culture and playing recordings of Montand's songs. Soviet singers also helped in making Montand popular: Gleb Romanov sang his songs in French and Leonid Utyosov in Russian, and Mark Bernes dedicated a song to Montand.[19] This pre-publicity helps to explain the huge success of Montand's concerts. Tens of thousands of tickets were sold in advance.[20] In Paris, *France-Soir* reported that

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Traders – Finnish Tourists in the Soviet Union in the 1950s–1970s. In *Finnish Consumption. An Emerging Consumer Society between East and West*, Visa Heinonen, Matti Peltonen (eds.), 206–227. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2013, 208.

17 Montand. *You See, I Haven't Forgotten*, 259. See also Simone Signoret. *Nostalgia Isn't What It Used to Be*. New York: Harper & Row, 1978, 155.

18 On Montand's success see, for example, Vladislav Zubok. *Zhivago's Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia*. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 2009, 99.

19 Gilburd. The Revival of Soviet Internationalism in the Mid to Late 1950s, 366.

20 Montand. *You See, I Haven't Forgotten*, 263.

> a large crowd stood in line for tickets. There were ladies complete with chauffeur and limousine and astrakhan furs, the sons and daughters of the elite taking temporary leave of their institutes of higher learning, flocks of young female fans, old ladies, suffragettes of a century ago, squads of soldiers, young men and women from the factories. People kept all-night vigils.[21]

At the same time, Yves Montand was famous for his socialist or communist connections. He was never a member of the French Communist Party, but his family members were activists. Montand was an Italian immigrant whose father had been the founder of a Communist cell in his hometown Monsummano, and had fled Italy because of the Fascist regime. Montand's brother Julien Livi was an active party member in France. When the Soviet leaders met Montand, they were well aware of his working class reputation and his artistic profile, blending entertainment with social consciousness. After the Hungarian Revolution in October and November 1956,[22] he struggled with the decision whether or not to visit Moscow, but finally decided to go, ostensibly because of his commitment to the international peace movement. Together with actor Gérard Philipe, he had been one of the first signatories of the Stockholm Appeal in 1950, to support the ban on nuclear weapons.[23] This peace message was important also for the Soviet leadership and undoubtedly strengthened their desire to capitalise as much as possible on Montand's tour.

Turning the Tour into a Documentary Film

To document Montand's visit, the film *Yves Montand Sings* (*Poyot Iv Montan* 1957) was produced with great speed. Planning for the film took place mostly in December 1956, when Montand had finally decided to come to the Soviet Union, and the official film production agreement was signed in February 1957, shortly after Montand and Signoret had left the USSR.[24] It was produced by the Central Studio for Documentary Film (CSDF), that had been one of the main producers of documentaries since 1927. In the 1950s, the CSDF produced weekly newsreels for movie theatres, to showcase the country's achievements,

21 Montand. *You See, I Haven't Forgotten*, 269 – 270.

22 On the French discussion on the Hungarian crisis, see Michael Scott Christofferson. French Intellectuals and the Repression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956: The Politics of a Protest Reconsidered. *In After the Deluge: New perspectives on the Intellectual and Cultural History of Postwar France*, Julian Bourg (ed.), 253 – 271. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004.

23 Joëlle Monserrat. *Yves Montand*. Paris: Éditions Pac, 1983, 61.

24 See documents in RGALI f. 2487, op. 1, d. 560 "Poyot Iv Montan", December 1956–March 1957.

Table 1. The Structure of the Film *Yves Montand Sings* (1957)

Section	Content
1. Title Sequence and Prologue (0.00–4:58, c. 5 minutes)	
	0:00–0:52 Les Grands Boulevards
	Images of Paris, sounds of Carmagnole, scene from René Clair's *Sous les tois de Paris*, (1930), Montand's arrival to Moscow
2. Moscow (4:58–47:30, c. 43 minutes)	
	6:15–6:34 Les feuilles mortes (background music)
	Reference to Signoret's career: a clip from Henri Calef's film *Ombre et lumière* (1951) where Signoret plays a role of a pianist
	8:35–11:15 Les Grands Boulevards
	11:25–12:58 Quand un soldat
	13:26–15:38 Les saltimbanques
	18:05–20:20 Les feuilles mortes
	20:30–24:00 Il fait des… (Le fanatique du jazz)
	24:45–26:52 La Marie Vison
	30:48–32:40 Un gamin de Paris
	34:28–36:52 Les routiers (images of *Wages of Fear*)
	40:37–43:13 A Paris
3. Leningrad (47:30–1:01:39, c. 14 minutes)	
	51:37–53:30 Car je t'aime
	55:50–59:10 Les Cireurs de souliers de Broadway
	59:20–1:01:30 C'est si bon
4. Kiev and the Ukrainian kolkhoz (1:01:39–1:05:30, c. 4 minutes)	
5. Epilogue (1:05:30–1:13:10, c. 8 minutes)	
	1:06:09–1:09:15 Une Demoiselle sur une balancoire
	1:09:40–1:13:00 C'est à l'aube

Tab. 1: Breakdown of the film "Yves Montand Sings" (1957).

to comment on international affairs and to strengthen the unity of the Soviet republics.

The film employs voice-over narration to contextualise Montand's tour, and in the prologue the narrator even refers to the Cold War and the enemies who tried to ruin the planned visit. The film falls geographically into three sections: Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. The songs of each sequence have also been listed (see Table 1).

This table indicates that sixty-eight percent of the film focused on Montand's and Signoret's time in Moscow. Only nineteen percent of the total film was situated in Leningrad. The Ukrainian section is brief, but the director Mikhail Slutsky

gives it particular emphasis by adding ethnographic details to it. These proportions reflect fairly accurately the stages of the visit itself, since Montand and Signoret stayed mostly in Moscow. Furthermore, it is interesting to note how much the documentary foregrounds Montand's music. Of the total length of seventy-three minutes, there are thirty-six minutes of music, almost half of the film.

In the planning of the film, the authors reported that "1200 – 1300 meters of the footage have been reserved for Montand's songs, which we need to record carefully. Each song will be accompanied by other film material that illustrates the idea and content of the song."[25]

The high production values of the film are unsurprising given that the best production team was behind the camera. The director of the film was three-time winner of the Stalin Prize, Mikhail Slutsky, (1907 – 1959) who was also the Honoured Artist of the Ukrainian SSR. After the Yves Montand film and before his untimely death in 1959, he made only one more film, a long documentary on the youth festival in Moscow 1957. Slutsky wrote the Montand film script together with Sergei Yutkevich (1904 – 1985) who, in spring 1956 had won the best director award for his *Othello* at the Cannes Film Festival. The camera operators were experienced professionals, Igor Bessarabov, Abram Krichevskiy and Ruvim Khalushakov. Stylistically, the film *Yves Montand Sings* was built on the tradition of Soviet documentary filmmaking. It also includes many features typical of Mikhail Slutsky himself. It draws on earlier footage, previous documentaries and newsreels, fiction film clips, including many works by Montand and Signoret, and with strong ethnographic elements.

The film *Yves Montand Sings* is chronologically structured so that it follows the itinerary of Montand and Signoret. The film opens with his signature song, "Les grand boulevards". After the title sequence, the film begins with a prologue that positions Montand's visit within a longer history of French-Soviet relations.[26] It also emphasises personal connections, especially between Montand and Obraztsov (see above), and the emphasis on the personal level might even have been a suggestion from the Soviet Embassy for obscuring the obvious political agenda of the visit. This same strategy is clear in the beginning of the film, which underlines relations on a personal level. More generally, French culture was actively disseminated in the Soviet Union in 1955 – 1956. The Pushkin Museum in Moscow organised two exhibitions of French art within a short peri-

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25 Film plan "Signer of Paris" dated 21 December 1956, II version. RGALI f. 2487, op. 1, d. 560, "Poyot Iv Montan", December 1956–March 1957.

26 *Yves Montand Sings* time stamps 0:04:06, 0:07:20. On the history of French-Soviet relations, see Sophie Coeuré and Rachel Mazuy. *Cousu de fil rouge: Voyages des intellectuels francais en Union soviétique*. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2012, 173, 336, 340.

od, and Picasso's art was exhibited in Moscow and Leningrad in autumn 1956.[27] In July 1955, the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers passed a resolution "On the Expansion of Cultural Relations between the Soviet Union and France". The French Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited the Soviet Union in May 1956. The result of the visit was the Declaration on Cultural Exchange, which was announced in May 19th, 1956.[28] Odessa and Marseille became sister cities in 1955, the first French film festival was organised in the Soviet Union and the first French-Soviet football match attracted an audience of 80,000.[29] The *Comédie-Française* visited the Soviet Union in April 1954 and French actor Gérard Philipe and filmmaker René Clair visited the Soviet Union together with other French filmmakers in 1955, and later Soviet artists visited France.[30]

Yves Montand Sings was one of the first Soviet documentary films depicting Soviet people meeting foreigners and the peaceful coexistence of Soviets with the rest of the world, but at a time when production of such "friendship films" was increasing.[31] The reasons behind the decision to produce a high quality documentary may well also be connected to the attempt to develop the quality of the Soviet media in the late 1950s.[32] An attractive documentary film that was distributed throughout the country to the numerous cinemas, could be the best medium for spreading the official view of the visit. In their proposal to the CDFS to make the documentary film, Slutsky and Yutkevich state that "it is particularly important now [to make such a film on French Soviet friend-

27 Susan E. Reid. Toward a New (Socialist) Realism. The Re-Engagement with Western Modernism in the Khrushchev Thaw. In *Russian Art and the West: A Century of Dialogue in Painting, Architecture, and the Decorative Arts*, Rosalind Polly Blakesley, Susan E. Reid, (eds.), 217–239. United States of America: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007; Simo Mikkonen. Soviet-American Art Exchanges during the Thaw: from Bold Openings to Hasty Retreats. In *Art and Political Reality*, M. Kurisoo (ed.), 57–76. Proceedings of the Art Museum of Estonia (8). Tallinn: Art Museum of Estonia – Kumu Art Museum, 2013.
28 Gilburd. The Revival of Soviet Internationalism in the Mid to Late 1950s, 365.
29 Gilburd. The Revival of Soviet Internationalism in the Mid to Late 1950s, 366.
30 Nakanune ot"yezda (On the Eve of Departure). *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 15 December 1956, 4.
31 The Soviet documentaries dealt also the themes of Soviet leaders and the heroism of World War II, the Communist Party, agriculture, industries, scientific and technological development, Soviet and foreign culture, cinema, journalism, and sport. Tsentral'naya studiya dokumental'nïkh filmov (TsSDF), description of fond 3, RGAFD, http://ргафд.рф/nauchno-spravochnyi-apparat/obzor-fondov/fond-studiya-dok-filmov/fond-3-tsentralnaya-studiya-dokumentalnykh-filmov.shtml accessed 30 January 2017.
32 Simo Mikkonen. Stealing the Monopoly of Knowledge?: Soviet Reactions to U.S. Cold War Broadcasting. *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, 11, no. 4 (2010) (New Series): 771–805, 772–775, 792–794.

ship and cultural contacts], when certain reactionary circles abroad use all their forces to break this friendship and these contacts, and we think that making this kind of a film will be a good response to detractors and spreaders of disinformation."[33] The discourse of friendship was thus a useful argument within the Soviet artistic circles to obtain funding and permission to make a film. Simultaneously, the rupture caused by the Hungarian events to the Soviet cultural outreach[34] motivated the Soviet leaders to emphasise their story with the help of attractive and good quality documentary film such *Yves Montand Sings*.

Encounters Between Politics and the Arts, Intellect and Emotion

When discussing Yves Montand's visit to the Soviet Union, the Soviet media depicted an image of a hugely popular French "artist-ambassador", Yves Montand visiting a friendly, cultured and peace-loving Soviet Union. International friendship – in terms of Khrushchevist policy of peaceful coexistence – was demonstrated in encounters of Yves Montand and Simone Signoret with the Soviet people where they exchanged artistic gifts by singing songs, or reciprocal dedications of poetry.[35] To further emphasise the artistic bond of friendship between France and the Soviet Union, the film shows several visits of French artists, performances and art exhibitions in the Soviet Union, Soviet artists visiting France, and mutual translations of fine literature. Press coverage of the visit also emphasised the idea of art as the appropriate medium for international communication among peoples.

The newspaper articles published on the visit varied from reporting briefly about the concerts and descriptions of Montand's position as an artist in France, to flattering critiques of the concerts and interviews with the Soviet people enthusiastic about the concerts. Between December 12–31, 1956 *Pravda*, *Izvestiya* and *Literaturnaya Gazeta* published twelve articles, varying from short notices to lengthy analyses of the concerts. A topic model[36] analysis of the newspaper

33 Offer of M. Slutsky and S. Yutkevich to make a documentary film of visit of Yves Montand to the Soviet Union, no date. RGALI f. 2487, op. 1, d. 560 "Poyot Iv Montan", December 1956–March 1957.

34 Mikkonen Soviet-American Art Exchanges during the Thaw.

35 Yves Montand Sings time stamps 0:01:51, 0:02:32, 0:05:02, 0:08:08, 0:08:40, 0:29:50, 0:31:39, 0:38:02, 0:39:33, 0:44:14, 0:54:36, and 1:05:19.

36 Topic modelling is a statistical text analysis method, which analyses which words were used most frequently in connection to each other, and thus form a topic discussed in the text. The

articles shows that although the articles discussed the visit from various points of view, the theme of art mediating international friendship across the borders was the ubiquitous underlying motif.[37] It is not surprising that this theme occurs both in the film and the newspaper texts since the high literacy rate and theatre and concert attendances were subjects of pride among the Soviets. Furthermore, following the policy of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet leadership assigned to art an important role in the foreign exchanges.[38] The sphere of fine art was regarded as a measurement of the quality of civilization and the political system, and therefore it was also an appropriate site for international and cross-bloc encounter.

The film depicted the international encounter through art as an emotional-rather than knowledge-based, endeavour. The emotional character of the encounters was clearly visualised in the documentary film through the great number of smiling faces in the audience. Almost all the faces in the audience shown in closeup are smiling.

The faces in the audience remained serious only when the theme of the song is serious, such as war or capitalist-racist exploitation,[39] as for example when Yves Montand sang *Quand un soldat*,[40] and *Les Cireurs de souliers de Broadway*, a song about Afro American shoeshiners on Broadway.[41]

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granularity of the results depends on the amount of topics that the researcher chooses to focus on: a greater number of topics provides more fine-grained results, while a small number of topics provides a more rough understanding what the texts talk about. Since this chapter uses a small and pre-selected sample of texts that all discuss the tour of Montand in the Soviet Union over a short time period, breaking down the texts into ten topics provides information that is varied enough, but at the same time generalises the texts. The results of the analysis with ten topics were verified by analysis with five and twenty topics, which both provided results pointing in the same direction. The analysis program deployed, Mallet, gave as the result of topic modelling analysis ten groups of words representing the topics, and percentages of each topic in each analysed article. After receiving the results of the program, we analysed the groups of words, and gave each of them an appropriate title (see the visualisation of the topics below), based on the words emerging in the group.

37 Although “art mediating international friendship” is an overarching topic, we would not have necessarily identified it in the articles only based on close reading, although one can easily recognise it after receiving the topic modeling analysis results. The topic modeling result also gave words for describing the phenomenon identified earlier in the documentary film.

38 Mikkonen Soviet-American Art Exchanges during the Thaw.

39 See, for example smiles in 0:14:06, 0:28:41, 0:29:46, 0:32:22, 0:32:29, 0:36:06, 0:50:37, 0:51:37, 0:53:00, 0:54:01, 1:00:43 and 1:08:31 and serious faces in 0:12:15, 0:13:32, 0:59:39, and 0:52:58.

40 See 0:13:32.

41 See 0:59:39.



Fig. 1: Topics of Soviet newspapers discussing Yves Montand's visit to the USSR, December 1956.

Fig. 2: Smiling audiences listening Yves Montand singing. Source: Shots from a documentary film by Mikhail Slutsky and Sergei Yutkevich "Poyot Iv Montan" (1957).

The smiling faces are strategically located throughout the film, and many appear to be posed in purpose. The smile, of course, has been a frequent feature in the Soviet propaganda posters, depicting happy Soviet life. Similarly, in the Khrushchev period, the Soviet media used smiles in depicting the international encounters in the spirit of Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence.[42] In the film plan, the film-makers indicated to the CSDF directors that they did not simply want to produce an advertisement for Montand, but also to present the Soviet people as "genuine lovers of everything progressive and talented".[43] In doing so, the newspaper articles also emphasised emotional rather than intellectual modes of communication between simple people (*prostykh lyudey*).[44] The positive emotions awakened by Montand's performances included joy, friendship, respect, love, pride, hospitality.[45] In an article in *Literaturnaya gazeta* a Soviet man declared that he would like to "shake hands with Montand", and a young Soviet woman said that Montand sang "from one heart to another heart".[46]

The positive emotions were connected in the Soviet newspapers with the realm of international politics. A collocation analysis of the usage of the words *friend*, *love* and *feeling* in the newspaper texts shows that they were used in close connection to words usually associated with world politics.[47] Revealing that the word *friend* appears most frequently in connection the words such as *peace*, *people* and *nation* – and not for example *love* and *relationship* – required the computer programme's "cold reading". The analysis discloses a significant aspect of the way the friendship was understood in the Soviet newspaper discourse regarding Yves Montand and his tour. The emotional communication among people acquired international dimensions and meanings, when the people involved represent different nations across the Iron Curtain.

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42 Koivunen. Friends, "Potential Friends", and Enemies, 229.

43 Film plan "Signer of Paris" dated 21 December 1956, II version. RGALI f. 2487, op. 1, d. 560 "Poyot Iv Montan", December 1956–March 1957.

44 Nik. Smirnov-Sokol'skii. Golos serdtsa. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 22 December 1956, 3.

45 These were the adjectives used most frequently in close connection to the word *chuvstvo* – feeling in English.

46 Ochered no 10207 (Queue position number 10207). *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 18 December 1956, 1.

47 Originally a corpus linguistics method, collocation analysis has also been used in social sciences and humanities to understand the ways of discussing and understanding connections between the words in a text. See, for example Scott Blinder and William L. Allen. Constructing Immigrants: Portrayals of Migrant Groups in British National Newspapers, 2010 – 2012. *International Migration Review* 50, no 1 (2016): 3 – 40 and Tuuli Lähdesmäki and Albin Wagener. Discourses on governing diversity in Europe: Critical analysis of the White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 44 (2015): 13 – 28.

Fig. 3: "Collocation analysis of the word *friend* connected to words like *peace*, *people*, and *nation.*"

The emotions are connected not only to world politics in general, but also to the political compartmentalisation of the world. One of the *Literaturnaya gazeta* articles portrays Montand as a defender of peace and socialism when describing the situation in France and discusses the criticism, which Montand received because of his decision to perform in the Soviet Union despite the Suez and Hungarian crises. The article describes the "progressive emotions" – instead of opinions – that Montand cannot conceal that have made him a target of "reactionary and Fascist-like" forces.[48] Thus the emotions, rather than intellectual ideologies, drive Montand, and his "Fascist" opponents, and the world was divided into people with peace-loving positive feelings, and people with hostile and negative emotions.

Depictions of warm encounters were common in the Soviet media around the time when the documentary film was shown in the Soviet cinemas.[49] The Soviet media showed that it was possible to sustain friendly relations with people from bourgeois countries, if they held "correct" political views. In the Soviet media, the right kind of art and positive emotions were connected to the "peace loving socialist forces", and decadent art and negative emotions were connected to "Fascist-like forces". However, the division of the world was no lon-

48 Nakanune ot"yezda (On the Eve of Departure). *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 15 December 1956, 4.
49 Koivunen. Friends, "Potential Friends", and Enemies, 2016, 221–222, 226–230.

ger simply based on geography, since approved friends could come also from France.

Musical Messages in the Cultural Encounter

The state-run newspapers published very positive reviews of Montand's performances. But was the diplomatic harmony between the star and the regime as complete as the carefully staged film and the press coverage of the tour suggest? One of his songs was the anti-militarist *Quand un soldat*, which Montand had introduced into his repertoire in France during the French Indo-Chinese war of 1946 to 1954. Given the importance of presenting Montand to the Russian public as an advocate for peace, *Pravda* reported that the song "evoked warm sympathies of the audience", and *Izvestiya*, approvingly, that he "reminds us of the horrors of the past war" and *Literaturnaya gazeta* that "he hates the same things we hate: war and its consequences". In Signoret's account however, the reception of this song was "chilly". In short, there were clearly cross-currents under the harmonious surface portrayed by the Russian media, including the movie.

We can explore these tensions in relation to one particular song and the genre it refers to. The song is *Il fait des*, also known as *Le fanatique du jazz*. This song was a staple of Montand's repertoire well before the USSR tour. It ridicules the jazz fanatic whose eyes glaze over at the sound of classical music, "but who explodes to the sound of boogie-woogie".[50] A review of one of Montand's concerts refers to this song as representing Montand's humour in its presentation of what the writer calls "a stilyaga". Likewise, the voice-over commentator in the movie refers to the jazz fanatic, or "in our vocabulary, simply a stilyaga. Montand laughs at them, these people exist, unfortunately, also in our own country". A moment later we see a close up of a young male audience member wearing a tie that is conspicuously patterned and colourful, and a shot of his foot tapping in its thick-soled shoe. When the *Moonlight Sonata* is played, the Russian commentary says: "When this 'expert' is asked how he liked classical music, he will reply to you, 'Oh yes, of course it is very … wonderful!' … and he will fall asleep".

The word "stilyaga" provides a focal point for a discussion of this song. Originally coined in 1949, the word came to describe young people who adopted Western lifestyles. The stilyaga was most frequently from the privileged levels of society, his parents likely to be professionals – doctors, lawyers, academics,

50 Montand. *You See, I Haven't Forgotten*, 113.

diplomats – "the new Soviet elite".[51] Like so many other hedonistically-oriented youth subcultures emerging internationally in the postwar decade, the stilyagi proclaimed their identity through dress, demeanour and argot. For the male, tight trousers, "zoot suit" style colourful jackets and ties, an exaggerated quiff hairstyle, striped socks and shoes with thick soles. Again, as with so many subcultures, music was a decisive marker of group identity, and in the case of the stilyagi, it was jazz. The hostility towards stilyagi softened with the Thaw, particularly regarding their music of choice, though jazz still remained ideologically suspect until the mid-1960s. Yet at the same time, there were increasingly open debates about music throughout the 1950s, and over 1954 and 1955, "several hundred jazz bands were founded in schools, universities and Houses of Culture".[52] In 1961, even the Komsomol opened its own jazz café.[53] In the transition described as the Thaw, jazz was a musical focal point. On the face of it, Montand's parody of the "jazz fanatic" aligns well with the official attitude to the stilyagi. It is interesting that the propaganda film presented the complete performance of this particular song, with elaborate editing, intercutting footage of stereotypical, US-referenced high-energy jiving, at times sped up to increase the sense of derangement on the part of the young dancers. Whether he knew it beforehand or not, Montand's performance played directly to the official Russian hostility toward this subculture and its music.

So is there really a convergence of values here, as manifested in the attitude to jazz? This takes us to Montand's own attitudes to the music. We can begin by noting that while the lyrics of the song clearly portray the jazz fanatic as a simpleton, *the actual music* contains no hint of parody. When the pianist breaks into a boogie-woogie, the effect is compelling, and in fact we hear some audience members begin to clap or tap loudly along with the jazz. The intensity of the jazz feel should not be surprising. The entire band consisted of famous French jazz musicians. Bassist Emmanuel Soudieu had played with Django Reinhardt and with another long-time member of the Reinhardt groups, reed player Hubert Rostaing, who later "became responsible for [Montand's] orchestrations". Montand's Musical Director since 1947 was pianist Bob Castella, who recalled audi-

51 Martin Lücke. The postwar campaign against jazz in the USSR (1945 – 1953). In *Jazz Behind the Iron Curtain*, Gertrud Pickhan, Rüdiger Ritter (eds.), 99 – 116. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010, 97.

52 Michel Abeßer. Between Cultural Opening, Nostalgia and Isolation – Soviet Debates on Jazz between 1953 and 1964. In *Jazz Behind the Iron Curtain*, Gertrud Pickhan, Rüdiger Ritter (eds.), 99 – 116. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010, 108.

53 Abeßer. Between Cultural Opening, Nostalgia and Isolation, 113.

tioning for the position simply by playing “some jazz”, and that was enough.[54] Castella was eminent in jazz circles and was close with guitarist Henri Crolla, musically “the equal of his friend Django Reinhardt” according to Montand.[55] The three shared Montand’s Paris apartment, as well as musical kinship. With these two as musical collaborators, Montand recalls that he “began to create an authentic jazz band”.

Reviews of his early career suggest that Montand was himself a “jazz fanatique”, a major figure in the jazz-based “Americanitis” that invaded France in the 1940s. Reviewing this trend, the magazine *Les Cahiers du film* referred to

> a real “swing” professional, Yves Montand, whose eccentric gifts are on display in many a major theatre. Having no partner, he grimaces, writhes, yells, slides, and dislocates himself with enough energy for two. He is “swing” from head to toe, and since he’s well over six feet tall his swing-style shimmying and shaking seem to go on forever.[56]

After 1951, Montand stopped performing in larger revues and was thus able to exercise full control over his shows, and as such, in his own words he “put together a group of musicians who played jazz the way he liked it”.[57] When he presented his one man show, *An Evening with Yves Montand*, on Broadway in the US in 1961, produced by jazz impresario Norman Granz, his US band included leading US jazz musicians. Significantly, he performed “Le fanatique du jazz”, confirming again that however the Russian audiences might have interpreted his performance, it was by no means inconsistent with a commitment to jazz.

The significant point to emerge from all this is that the message Montand was sending is not the message being received by the Soviet authorities. One very important difference is that the jazz fanatique does not have the same political meaning as the stilyaga, even though they appear to be the same social phenomenon. There is a crucial difference between what the “jazz fanatique” means in France and what the stilyaga means in the USSR.[58] The stilyaga was interpreted as a threat to the State ideology. The USSR had laws against parasitism. The stilyagi were primarily from the privileged backgrounds that economically enabled them to be “parasitic” – that is, not in paid work. Montand’s “jazz fanatique” is merely a harmless idiot. The stilyaga is a potential criminal,

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54 Montand. *You See, I Haven’t Forgotten*, 159.
55 Montand. *You See, I Haven’t Forgotten*, 164.
56 Montand. *You See, I Haven’t Forgotten*, 74.
57 Montand. *You See, I Haven’t Forgotten*, 205.
58 Abeßer. Between Cultural Opening, Nostalgia and Isolation, 108.

subverting the state ideology. This was a major semiotic discrepancy that eluded the film.

So exactly what is the meaning of Montand's stardom in relation to this music? When we think of Montand's vast Soviet audiences, we must remember the heterogeneity of that category. They included conservatives who took unbridled pleasure in the parody of the "jazz fanatique", but on the evidence of the film, the audiences also include stilyagi for whom the parodic representation of themselves is also an opportunity to tap their feet to some full-on jazz. Like similar "double coding" movements in relation to later rock in the USSR, the mocking of jazz culture was also an opportunity to provide the experience of jazz under the guise of ridicule, in keeping with the official line.

Thus, the superficially anti-jazz message is full of paradoxes. It is useful to conclude by enquiring into Montand's own attitude to his tour and its propaganda function. The experience of the Soviet Union completely reversed his political sympathies. By the time the Russians were watching the propaganda film, Montand declared, "The events of 1956 and 1957 meant the loss of faith for me".[59] As reported in *Le Figaro* February 27 1958: "I feel all too clearly that I've been exploited, just like a shampoo or a drink".[60] Given the USSR's objectives for the tour, it is ironic that its effect on Montand was, by his own account, to turn him completely away from communism.[61]

This narrative thus brings together many critical moments in the history of twentieth-century culture and politics, including the first great crisis in totalitarianism, a crisis of global significance. Montand's tour lies at the central moment of these shifts and exposes all the contradictions they entail. When he sings about the jazz fanatic to the Soviet audiences, they are all hearing the same song, but the complex, multi-layered meanings of the jazz fanatic mean they are all receiving very different messages. In this exercise in cultural diplomacy, the semiotic dissonance could not be more complete.

On 19 December, the couple were invited to a private official supper with Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, Malenkov and Mikoyan. To the dismay of their hosts, Montand and Signoret made it clear that the invasion of Hungary was, in their words, "unspeakable".[62] All was not so harmonious as the press and the film implied. Montand had been a life-long sympathiser with the left, and was represented in the film as a political "trophy" of the USSR, a celebrity endorsement of the new Soviet order. Yet ironically he concluded the tour

59 Montand. *You See, I Haven't Forgotten*, 282.
60 Montand. *You See, I Haven't Forgotten*, 283.
61 Montand. *You See, I Haven't Forgotten*, 275 – 276.
62 Signoret. *Nostalgia Isn't What It Used to Be*, 164 – 166.

irrevocably disillusioned with the regime. What was intended as a form of cultural diplomacy and *rapprochement* was in fact intersected by confused and confusing political messages.

During their tour, Yves Montand and Simone Signoret were conscious of the fact that they were filmed. Signoret whispered to Montand at the backstage of the Tchaikovsky Concert Center on 24 December 1956: "I feel as if I were in a newsreel."[63] But, strangely, both Montand and Signoret are silent about the long documentary. The tour took place in such a turbulent situation that "the Soviet tour" was not something to particularly advertise. One aspect of the film *Yves Montand Sings*, and what reveals its political strategy, is the fact that it isolates Montand's tour in the Soviet Union from his wider itinerary in the Eastern bloc. The film gives an impression that Montand's tour was confined to the USSR and does not give any clues of the bigger picture. This sounds strange from the perspective of solidarity within the Eastern bloc, but perhaps it suggests that the film was tailored for the Soviet market and was therefore emphasising the warm relationships between Montand and his Soviet audience. Table 2 shows the route of Montand's whole tour of the Eastern bloc:

Table 2. Yves Montand's Tour of the Eastern Bloc

- 16 December 1956 Air France flight to Prague, from there Aeroflot flight to Moscow (via Vilnius)
- Concerts in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev in late December and January
- In late January 1957 flight to Warsaw, Poland
- From Warsaw to Berlin, East Germany
- From Berlin by train to Prague, Czechoslovakia (according to Signoret, "a week in February"), a train to Bratislava
- From Bratislava by train to Bucharest, Romania (arrival on 22 February)
- By train to Sofia, Bulgaria
- By train to Beograd, Yugoslavia on 4 March 1957
- Arrival at Budapest on the second week of March 1957
- Return to Paris

Tab. 2: Montand's complete route in his tour of Eastern Europe 1956 – 57.

63 Quoted in Patricia A. DeMaio. *Garden of Dreams: The Life of Simone Signoret*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2014, 138.

In France, the collections of Gaumont Pathé Archives include a newsreel clip (01:53) from Montand's concert in Prague, dated on 24 February 1957.[64] The local audiences became familiar with the visit through newsreels. Interestingly, the Gaumont Pathé Archives show that this clip was never used in the French newsreels. Instead, Gaumont Pathé acquired Mikhail Slutsky's film which is archived under the French title *Yves Montand chante en URSS*.[65]

Whose Cultural Diplomacy?

It is clear from the beginning that there were profound discrepancies between what the tour represented for Montand and Signoret, what it represented for the Soviet authorities and what it represented for the Soviet public: this exercise in "cultural diplomacy" was an asymmetrical conversation. If we understand cultural diplomacy as a form of soft power that emphasises the exchange of ideas and information, it is obvious that there were different layers of that diplomacy, or processes of cultural exchange, happening at the same time. The film *Yves Montand Sings* can be interpreted as a cultural diplomatic tool that drew on the tradition of Soviet newsreel and documentary film. It had elements of socialist realism in its representation of harmonious joy, of the emotions of mutual friendship and in its clear, although sparse, deployment of ethnographic elements. On the other hand, there were also features that refer to the changes in political climate. The idea of strongly foregrounding an international star was something new. Ultimately, the audience could choose to listen to the voice of Montand more than to the narrative voice-over that commented on the peaceful encounter of French and Soviet cultures.

Finally, then, one can ask whose cultural diplomacy is at stake. The film wanted to highlight Montand's visit in the USSR, instead of the longer tour in the Eastern bloc. Montand himself had been under huge pressure before leaving France. Jean-Paul Sartre stated to Montand: "If you go, you stand surely for the Russians; if you stay, you stand surely for the reactionaries".[66] Both options were uncomfortable, and the French press discussed Montand's actions very critically. It is understandable that in the middle of this controversy Montand referred to his interest in defending peace, and this was his first message in the USSR.

64 Gaumont Pathé Archives, Yves Montand, 1957 9 21 NU, http://gaumontpathearchives.com/index.php?urlaction=doc&id_doc=37506&rang=47

65 Gaumont Pathé Archives, Yves Montand chante en URSS, 5700AKDOC02496, http://gaumontpathearchives.com/index.php?urlaction=doc&id_doc=271972

66 Quoted in Montand. *You See, I Haven't Forgotten*, 267.

From this perspective, it is reasonable to conclude that the larger tour in the Eastern bloc was also in his own interest. He wanted to show that it was not a question of the Soviet Union only: he wanted to speak for peace everywhere. It is tempting to speculate that perhaps the film's conscious focus on the Montand's visit to the USSR and exclusion of his larger tour also undermined his more general peace message through emphasising his devotion to the Soviet audience.

From the point of view of cultural diplomacy, the film and the tour were two different events, but it is essential also to see the difference between the interests of Montand's hosts and his own position as a public figure whose activities were carefully followed not only by the French audience but by the international community.

Giles Scott-Smith

Looking for Lagonia: On "Imaginary Bridges" and Cold War Boundaries

At 12.21 on the afternoon of 28 May 1987, a pilot took off in his Cessna Skyhawk 172 single-engined aircraft from Malmi airport in Helsinki, with its destination being Stockholm. After about twenty-five minutes, he steered the aircraft first south, then east, turned off the aircraft's transponder that communicated with radar signals, and failed to respond to requests for clarification from air traffic control. At around 1pm, the aircraft disappeared from Finnish radar screens. Traces of an oil slick in the Gulf of Finland were observed by a passing helicopter, but no wreckage was seen. The Finns let the matter go – after all, it was only a single-engined Cessna, what could that possibly do?

This is of course the flight of the nineteen year old German, Mathias Rust, on his 550-mile trip to Moscow and Red Square. Rust was a child of the Cold War – born in 1968, he grew up in Hamburg during Ostpolitik and became politically aware during the Euromissiles crisis of the early 1980s. The threat of nuclear war was a formative element of his political imagination. Rust was a loner – peace marches were not his thing. Instead he absorbed himself in aeroplanes and science fiction. He was fortunate enough to have parents who supported his flying ambitions, giving access to lessons and the ability, at such a young age, to hire a plane from the local flying club for three weeks without anyone asking questions. On the surface he was working as a data processor, having quit as a bank trainee in order to devote more time to flying training.[1] Underneath this everyday existence, a plan was being hatched.

Rust in Cold War Culture

Rust's epic flight has so far not generated a serious academic study in English, with no scholarly article having been published on the wider cultural meaning or implications of what he did. There is one German monograph on him, published in 2012 by Ed Kuhler, but this was written in cooperation with a film production

I would like to thank Evgeniya Kondrashina, Simo Mikkonen and Jari Parkkinen for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

1 John Tagliabue. In Law-Abiding West Germany, Delight. *New York Times*, 31 May 1987.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110573169-012

company and is largely based on newspaper reports from the time, further embellishing Rust's escapade as no more than a bizarre episode of popular culture.[2] Rust has therefore occupied a prominent place in the public sphere, but there have been only brief references to him outside of the media. Anniversaries of his flight – 2017 was the most recent, marking 30 years – always bring a new round of press and tv media coverage and questions such as "where is he now?" but rarely bring anything new to light.[3] Rust has regularly been branded a misfit, an oddball (even in his own words), someone difficult to categorise, who didn't belong to any particular movement but was driven only by idealism. As he said in a 2007 interview with the *Washington Post* (to mark the 20th anniversary), "I was full of dreams then, I believed everything was possible".[4] His rather wild-eyed appearances in TV interviews only seem to confirm this impression.

A critical analysis could easily (and often does) dismiss him as a bourgeois teenager born into privilege with too much time and money fuelling delusions of grandeur. His parents had rescued him from failure at school at age 14 by encouraging his wish to become a pilot and flying instructor, setting aside DM10,000 for the lessons.[5] Gender-based analyses would not produce a better result. Rumours that he undertook the flight purely to raise his status among females have circulated. After becoming a celebrity for a while following his return to West Germany from Soviet imprisonment, Rust's image was quickly tarnished when he stabbed a female co-worker at the hospital where he was working in November 1989. The most detailed account of his post-1987 life is to be found in Oliver Jungen and Wiebke Prombka's cynical *Deutsche Nullen: Sie komen, sahen und versagten* (German Zeroes: they came, saw and failed) from 2016, where these two journalists cover Rust along with sixteen other would-be heroes such as von Treitschke, von Ribbentrop, Egon Krenz, and Rudolf Scharping, all of whom had big plans with little (or disastrous) outcome. As one report on Rust

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2 Ed Stuhler. *Der Kreml-Flieger. Mathias Rust und die Folgen eines Abenteuers*. Berlin: Links, 2012, written to accompany the documentary of the same name made by the film production company Gebrüder Beetz.

3 Finnish and international media did give the event some renewed attention for the thirtieth anniversary. See Hannu Pesonen. Mathiaksen Lento. *Suomen Kuvalehti* 21 (May 2017), 40–45; Stephen Dowling. The audacious pilot who landed in Red Square. BBC website, 26 May 2017, http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20170526-the-audacious-pilot-who-landed-in-red-square

4 Peter Finn. A Dubious Diplomat. *Washington Post*, 27 May 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/26/AR2007052601262.html

5 Viola Roggenkamp. Ein ganz besonderes kind. *Die Zeit*, 12 April 1991.

put it, "Die Welt lachte über den Witz des Jahrhunderts ("The world laughed at the joke of the century")."[6]

With the thirtieth anniversary of the flight in May 2017, it is a perfect moment to try and situate Rust within the field of Cold War culture. The cultural turn and more recently the transnational turn in Cold War studies has broadened the study of the period to include non-state actors and the everyday life of citizens, aiming to understand what they experienced and what effect this had on their beliefs and behaviour. The framing of the Cold War as simply a binary superpower military stand-off has given way to an appreciation of the role of smaller nations, and in turn to an understanding of how all societies – including East and West – were 'entangled'. Subjectivities were shaped by cultural, political, and economic influences that transcended national borders and render negotiable the assumption that social life should be analysed primarily according to national units. As the recent volume *Beyond the Divide* by Simo Mikkonen and Pia Koivunen argues, "the barrier dividing the Socialist and Capitalist worlds was not fully impervious. Beneath the seemingly bipolar structure, there were corporations, organisations, unofficial networks, and individuals interacting, connecting, and communicating."[7]

Cultural transfer took place in both directions – in fact in all directions, not simply West-East. The assumption that the West functioned as the sender and the East the receiver still permeates much of the literature. In fact, it is even harder to let go of the moral hierarchy, since pointing to a "society" or a "public sphere" in socialist states is somehow in danger of condoning the one-party systems and the forms of ideological and literal repression that went with them. As Annette Vowinkel, Marcus Payk and Thomas Lindenberger rightly point out, it remains awkward to identify a single European Cold War culture that could identify and locate a distinct set of transnational entanglements within a single continental space. Studies on divided Germany have delved into the symbiosis of East and West, but that is a special case. Nevertheless, the shift in Cold War history "from political and diplomatic to social, cultural, and media history, the history of ideas, utopias, and mentalities," does lead to "ironing out" the Iron Curtain and treating all societies as part of the same cultural arena.[8] For a while, both communism and capitalism were dreamworlds in their own ways, mirroring each other as much as competing against each other. Even then, "individuals,

6 Ibid.

7 Simo Mikkonen and Pia Koivunen (eds.). *Beyond the Divide: Entangled Histories of Cold War Europe*. New York: Berghahn, 2015, 3.

8 Annette Vowinkel, Marcus Payk and Thomas Lindenberger (eds.). *Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western European Societies*. New York: Berghahn, 2012, 5.

minorities or at times majorities might not feel at home within these dreamworlds, creating instead their own alternatives."[9] Rust was one such individual.

Rust, "Airworld", and Lagonia

Rust was very much a product of this European Cold War cultural space as dreamworld. The threat of nuclear armageddon, which saturated West German culture in the early 1980s and which manifested itself in transnational social movements such as END (European Nuclear Disarmament), was a major influence on his thinking. But the key to interpreting Rust is not through political activism, but through the imagination. Firstly, there was his passion for flying. Writing on the importance of civil aviation in the post-WW II era, Annette Vowinkel has used the concept of "airworld" to describe the unique environments and atmospheres of airports and aircraft. In her words, it is "a utopian space, a dreamworld shaped by the longing for freedom and success translating as mobility," where access to this utopia was for long only for the privileged few.[10] Some have claimed that aviation also had a special place in the German imagination, merging the efficiency of technological advances with the cultural superiority of a burgeoning nationalism in the early twentieth century.[11] Vowinckel goes further by stating that during the Cold War "mobility became a synonym for (political as well as individual) freedom," a linkage easily confirmed by the presence of the Berlin Wall and the restrictions on mobility in and from the East being a central indicator of an unfree society.[12]

Freedom of movement was one of the central issues in the CSCE negotiations during the early 1970s and was encapsulated in the Helsinki Accords and its "third basket" on humanitarian issues. The remarkable escape from the GDR by the Strelzyk and Wetzel families on 16 September 1979 by home-made hot-air balloon is a perfectly symbolic linkage of "airworld" and the strive for mobility to ensure personal freedom.[13] But the case of Mathias Rust points to another

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9 Peter Romijn, Giles Scott-Smith and Joes Segal (eds.). *Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012, 2.

10 Anette Vowinckel. Flying Away: Civil Aviation and the Dream of Freedom in East and West. In *Divided Dreamworlds*, Romijn, Scott-Smith, Segal (eds), 182.

11 Peter Fritzsche. *A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.

12 Vowinckel, 182

13 See https://www.ballonflucht.de/html/englisch.html . On "Airworld" and the German (Cold War) imagination one should also mention Wim Wenders' *Der Himmel Über Berlin* (1987). Ukrai-

form of mobility – that of the imagination, and in his case (and that of many others) the ability to imagine a way out of the Cold War confrontation and its hanging threat of unstoppable destruction. He very personally fits Vowinckel's conclusion that "the airplane became an icon of freedom, representing the modern dream of mobility and success both symbolically and materially."[14] From the socialist viewpoint, unlimited travel was of course a sign of a decadent society, and Rust's evident privilege fits neatly into this interpretation. From that perspective, class determines how imagination is used as a motive for action.

Extending this argument, the ultimate form of flying as escape, as an expression of freedom, is the possibility of space travel. From this perspective, the 1970s were a key decade. Having seen the race to the moon as the epitome of 1960s technological ambition and competition between the superpowers, the onset of détente and the development of combined missions set very much the tone for the decade after. The Apollo-Soyuz mission of 1975 was a high point of this new era. As Andrew Jenks wrote in 2011,

> New ideas about collaboration and cooperation – which often clashed with Cold War imperatives and heroic national narratives of space conquest from the previous era – envisioned spaceflight as a way to forge a global consciousness and community.[15]

The astronaut as global citizen rested on the alleged "overview effect" – the claim that space travel brought about a sense of "universal connectedness" due to seeing and experiencing planet earth from an all-encompassing perspective. Jenks rightly links this to the famous Earth Rise photo taken from Apollo 8 on 24 December 1968, and its ecological manifestation in James Lovelock's book *Gaia* from 1979.[16] Flying – and particularly space flight – therefore had the potential to provide the ultimate birds-eye view for a transnational, normative, rev-

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nian film-maker Roman Balayan's *Birds of Paradise* (2008), set in the early 1980s, also depicts imaginary flight as a means for its protagonists to escape the oppressive confines of a single-party surveillance state.

14 Vowinckel, 191. It is interesting to speculate here about how the aeroplane can also be interpreted in the sense of Bakhtin's "chronotope", in that air travel "creates" its own time-space configuration as experienced by the pilot and/or passenger. Writing about Rust's flight now, we can only follow his course on the map. It is impossible to recreate what Rust was thinking during that flight, outside of his own memory. See Mikhail Bakhtin. Form of Time and Chronotope in the Novel. In *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981.

15 Andrew Jenks. Transnational History and Space Flight. *Russian History Blog*, 5 October 2011, http://russianhistoryblog.org/2011/10/transnational-history-and-space-flight/.

16 James Lovelock. *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

elatory interpretation of life on earth, transcending national competitiveness and destructive antagonisms.

Rust was not only an avid aviator, he was also a reader of science fiction, linking his personal ambitions in the stratosphere of civil aviation with his imaginary heroes into outer space. On the tail of his Cessna, Rust had placed a cartoon image of a space rocket, which further emphasises the connection between his flight, "airworld", and science fiction-generated utopias. Science fiction was of course a popular genre within both the capitalist and communist worlds. Soviet sci-fi was regarded as a lower-level genre that for this reason only felt the light touch of the censor, and for a while its faith in rational technological progress towards a socialist future generally diverged strongly from the more paranoid fears of its Western counterpart.[17]

The most popular sci-fi publication in West Germany, which Rust also knew, is the long-running Perry Rhodan series, begun in early 1961 – the year of the Berlin Wall's construction – by two authors, Karl-Herbert Scheer and Walter Ernsting, and their mutual urge to transcend both Germany's past and the Cold War's artificial barriers and irrational violence is clear from the start. Scheer was just too young to fight in WW II, and he ended the war a sixteen-year-old volunteer machinist in the German naval base in Kiel, working on submarine propulsion systems. Illness and age enabling him to avoid imprisonment, Scheer switched to writing full-time in 1948. His first sci-fi novel *Stern A funkt Hilfe* appeared in 1952 and in the mid-1950s he founded the German sci-fi club Stellaris. Ernsting, eight years older, served in the war with a Wehrmacht intelligence unit in Poland, France, Norway, and Latvia before capture and imprisonment by the Russians in Kazakhstan until his release in 1952. He then worked as an interpreter with the British military forces, and it was in that position that he first encountered American science fiction. In 1955, he published his first sci-fi novel, *UFO am Nachthimmel*, using the British pseudonym Clark Darlton to overcome the problem that his publisher, Pabel, only published sci-fi in its Utopia-series in English. Scheer and Ernsting won the Hugo Award back to back in 1957 and 1958. The Hugo Award was the creation of sci-fi pioneer Hugo Gernsback, a German emigrant to the United States who founded the popular magazine *Amazing Stories* in 1926. Ernsting would achieve fame himself as the pioneer of post-WW II German sci-fi, even having an asteroid named after him in June 2003. Perry Rho-

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17 Patrick Major. Future Perfect? Communist Science Fiction in the Cold War. In Rana Mitter and Patrick Major (eds.). *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History*. London: Frank Cass, 2004, 71–96.

dan would become by far his most successful work, also becoming a childrens' TV series in 1967, the year before Rust's birth.[18]

The influence of the Cold War is very evident in the first Rhodan series, titled The Third Power, which was the theme for the first 49 weekly editions through 1961–62. Perry Rhodan is an American astronaut who travels with a small team to undertake the first moon landing in 1971. The world is at the time divided between the Western Block, the Eastern Block, and the Asiatic Federation, the latter two operating in a loose alliance against the former. Taken off course by a strange jamming signal, Rhodan's team encounter an alien spaceship from the planet Arkonide on the moon surface. The Arkonides have long dominated the Milky Way but are now a civilisation in decline and are searching for other inhabited planets further away to revive their race. Rhodan strikes a deal with the Arkonide commander and returns to earth, landing in the Gobi desert in order to prevent the Arkonides' technological superiority from falling into the hands of any of the existing blocks. From there, protected by an anti-neutron shield, Rhodan attempts to establish a neutral Third Power. He succeeds, avoiding nuclear Armageddon and founding a single nation for all mankind, named Terra, but the multi-block struggle nevertheless continued in perpetuity across other planets and solar systems. That two Germans would write of an American protagonist in this way is very much an emblem of the Americanisation of West German society after 1945. Only an American, in their eyes, could possess the belief in a better future and overcome the grim realities of a divided world. Rhodan therefore represented rugged individualism, male heroics, decisive leadership – and the power of imagination to overcome all obstacles.

In 1986, the year before Rust's flight, a jubilee edition of the first twenty-five years of Perry Rhodan was produced by the Moewig publishing house. It was also the year of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik in October, which promised much for a new era of détente, but ultimately seemed to bring few results. Rust was apparently so dismayed by this outcome that he aimed to carry out his own Perry-Rhodan daredevil escapade, bypassing governments, transgressing borders, and disrupting the established order, just like the American astronaut-hero had done. By flying to Moscow he would create an "imaginary bridge" between West and East, setting himself up as an emissary of peace. At his Moscow trial he responded to the charge that he had offended the Soviet peo-

18 Heiko Langhans. *Clark Darlton. Der Mann, der die Zukunft brachte*. Rastatt: Pabel-Moewig Verlag, 2000; Heiko Langhans. *K. H. Scheer. Konstrukteur der Zukunft*. Rastatt: Pabel-Moewig Verlag, 2001; Claus Hallmann. *Perry Rhodan. Analyse einer Science-Fiction-Romanheftserie*. Frankfurt am Main: Rita G. Fischer Verlag, 1979.

ple by apologising but also declaring "I believe that the promotion of world peace and understanding between our peoples justifies this flight."[19] For this purpose he had written a twenty-page text with the title "Lagonia", describing a plan for a democratic world order, which he hoped to deliver to Gorbachev. It has not been possible to locate a copy of this notorious text, and we don't know if it ever found its way to Gorbachev, but it has cemented Rust's image as a teenager with an outsized ambition. Published accounts claim that the text called for a basic right to housing for all, full employment through state-run enterprises, and an end to material greed and desire. As one observer put it, such a manifesto against the market economy "could easily be used as a party programme for the Left."[20]

Rust's "Lagonia" was therefore a mix of fantasy utopianism and growing up for his first fifteen years under the social democratic governments of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. Where did he get Lagonia from? In October 2010, the theatre company Studio Braun, based in Rust's home town of Hamburg, produced the musical "Rust: Ein deutscher Messias" that saw the actor Fabian Hinfrichs portray him as a dreamer wandering through his utopian Lagonia, encountered by three soothsayers who decide to enter "the valley of the Bermuda triangle to decode the Rust phenomenon."[21] Lagonia is a term sometimes used for utopian locations, but it does not appear in the Perry Rhodan series, and it is not clear where Rust took it from. The earliest known reference is to be found in John Leland's *Itinerary* from 1540, which describes the Irish nun Breage, founder of the Cornish parish of the same name, as coming from the region of Lagonia in Ireland, perhaps referring to Leinster since this is known as Laighin in Gaelic.[22] With this association of a distant, unspoilt, pastoral paradise, the term must have been used in fantasy literature, but the only publication that appears with it in the title was published in 2016.[23] It is therefore unclear what the source of Rust's Lagonia actually was.

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19 Roggenkamp. Ein ganz besonderes kind.

20 Oliver Jungen and Wiebke Prombka. *Deutsche Nullen: Sie komen, sahen und versagten*. C.H. Beck, 2016.

21 Katrin Ullmann. Flug auf deb Flokati-Teppich, 21 October 1987, http://www.nachtkritik.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4808:rust-ein-deutscher-messias-studio-brauns-neue-fantasie&catid=56

22 John O'Hanlon. *Lives of the Irish Saints: With Special Festivals*. J. Duffy & Sons, 1873, 137.

23 Silviu Aiftincai. *Lagonia: The Sacred Earth*. Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016.

The Flight and its Aftermath

Testing his endurance for the flight to Moscow, Rust first flew to Rekjavik via the Shetland and Faroe islands, and visited the location of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit of the previous year, Hofdi House. A later account had quoted him saying “I was so disappointed with the failure of the summit and my failure to get there the previous autumn.” Had he planned on interfering with the superpower meeting itself? Or was this an imaginary flight he wished he had taken? It is not clear.[24]

On his trip from Helsinki to Moscow, Rust faced two encounters with scrambled MiGs from Soviet air defence, but both times his apparently harmless appearance and steady course and altitude prevented hostile interpretations. The West German flag on his aircraft’s tail was either not reported or disbelieved by the MiG pilots’ superiors on the ground, and one wonders what they made of the cartoon-like rocket symbol as well. But Rust’s flight actually benefitted from previous tragedies. Soviet air defence had shot down two civilian airliners in the previous decade, both of them belonging to Korean Airlines. On 20 April 1978, KAL 902 from Paris to Seoul was shot at when entering Soviet air space near Finland, making a crash landing with two fatalities. On 1 September 1983, KAL 007 was attacked as it crossed Kamchatka and the Sakhalin peninsular, with the loss of all 269 passengers and crew. President Reagan condemned the attack as “a crime against humanity” and every effort was made to use it to undermine the Soviet Union’s credibility and legitimacy in international affairs. These much larger incidents set the context for the more restrained response to the single-engined Cessna as it crossed the Finnish Gulf into Estonia and on to Russia in May 1987, as the Soviet air force could now only open fire based on orders from the very top. The confusion over a small civil aircraft prevented the request going that far up the chain of command. Five years later, after the break-up of the USSR, the transcripts of the discussions within the air defence units were released, revealing the following exchange:

> Maj. Gen. Aleksandr Gukov: There’s just one thing that fazes me. Birds fly north in the spring. But this is coming from the north.
>
> Lt. Gen. Y. Brazhnikov: I still think we will come to the conclusion that it was geese. So Aleksandr Ivanovich, it will be birds.

24 Tom LeCompte. The Notorious Flight of Mathias Rust. *Air and Space Magazine*, July 2005, http://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/the-notorious-flight-of-mathias-rust-7101888/?noist=&story=fullstory&page=2

> Maj. Gen. Aleksandr Gukov: Yes, sir, let it be that. Yes sir.[25]

In short, the Russians wanted the irritating little plane to disappear. But there was more. 28 May, the day of his flight, happened to be Border Guards Day, an annual holiday that meant security was slightly lax. Coincidence? Rust had to convince the disbelieving interrogators after his landing that there was no connection. Then there was the bridge next to Red Square that he landed on. Usually strung with six sets of telephone and electricity wires, on the day of his arrival several sets had been removed for maintenance, allowing him just enough space to manoeuvre the aircraft. Again, the response from his Soviet captors was disbelief – how was this possible?

Rust was able to interact with Russian civilians on Red Square for a short while before security forces arrested him. This short period of interaction, the content of which must be lost forever, represents a remarkable moment of unexpected East-West interchange. 1987–88 was already a period of surprise and shock for Russian citizens as they began to appreciate the greater meaning of *perestroika*.[26] But for the state authorities, Rust still had to be treated as an intruder. Charged with illegal entry, violation of international flight rules and hooliganism, Rust was put on trial and given a four-year sentence, but eventually released after 14 months following an appeal by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Gorbachev won another favour through this minimal humanitarian gesture – after all, he took full advantage of the chance arrival of Rust in Moscow. Refusing to meet with the German, Gorbachev instead took the opportunity to fire the Defence Minister Sergei Sokolov, the head of Soviet Air Defence Alexander Koldunov, and many other lower ranks, in order to establish his control of the air force command, having announced only three months previously that he was prepared to negotiate an Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty with the Americans. Sokolov had long been a thorn in the side of Gorbachev's turn towards rapprochement with the West. Rust had inadvertently triggered a purge that bolstered Gorbachev's grip on the military, a not insignificant

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25 Look! In the sky! It's a bird! No, a cloud! *Newsweek*, 120/1, 6 July 1992, 48. See also the longer account in Michael Dobbs. *Down with Big Brother: The Fall of the Soviet Empire*. London: Bloomsbury, 1997.

26 See Alexei Yurchak. *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Fig. 1: Mathias Rust among Muscovites right after landing, before authorities have arrived. Source: Lehtikuva. Photograph by Hannu Podduikin.

development as the Soviet leader moved to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the Cold War.[27]

Fig. 2: Mathias Rust flying over the Red Square in Moscow on May 28th, 1987. Source: Lehtikuva. Photograph by Hannu Podduikin.

This link between Rust and Gorbachev's perestroika has fuelled ongoing Russian suspicions of a bigger plot, since for many the coincidences were so great that Rust must have been part of a coordinated effort to undermine Soviet prestige.[28] An example of Rust's continuing status in Russian self-perception and popular culture was provided in dramatic fashion on the popular Russian talk-show *Pryamoi Efir* in 2013. Invited on to the show to talk about the episode 26 years after the fact, Rust instead walked into a set-up designed to discredit not only him but also the entire Gorbachev era. The show was titled "Mathias Rust: A Dove of Peace?" and when asked to explain his act Rust repeated his wish to create "an imaginary bridge" between East and West. But the questioning turned to the string of coincidences that occurred: not being shot down, the

27 See William Odom. *The Collapse of the Soviet Military.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998; Ilya Zemtsov and John Hynes Farrar. *Gorbachev: The Man and the System*. New Brunswick: Transaction, 1989, 325.
28 See Stuhler. *Der Kreml-Flieger*, 117–130.

lack of wires on the bridge, the border guards’ holiday, the presence of cameras on Red Square, the extra time it took to fly to Moscow indicating he must have landed on the way to change clothes, all of which led to the assertion that Gorbachev, together with allies in the Western and Soviet governments, had engineered the flight in order to remove opponents of arms control such as national war hero Sergei Sokolov. The accusations culminated in an emotional tirade:

> Retired Air Defence Officer: “How would you look in the faces of the people who, as a result of your actions, died from a heart attack, were demoted in rank, went to prison, lost their pensions? […] If you could look in their eyes, the eyes of their wives and children, and all of the people who you harmed with your dove’s flight.”[29]

The mood on the show was laden with ugly nationalist overtones. Rust’s imaginary bridge of peace was now no more than further confirmation of the West’s determination to collapse Soviet power, with Gorbachev the traitorous willing accomplice. Regular attention for Rust in the Russian media continues to follow this interpretation.[30]

Conclusion

The subtitle of this chapter is “On ‘Imaginary Bridges’ and Cold War Boundaries.” Rust crossed the Soviet boundary and directly involved himself in the gradual process of East-West reconciliation going on at the time. But Cold War boundaries here also refer to his absence from Cold War historiography. This can be further expanded. In their book *Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe* from 2012, the editors Bozo, Rey, Ludlow and Rother gathered together an excellent overview of projections and formulations as to how the leaders of the time saw an end to the Cold War emerging. The book overall has a statist orientation, with non-state actors represented in various chapters, but only in one, covering

29 Anya Loukianova. A Cessna-Sized Hole in the Iron Curtain, Revisited. *Arms Control Wonk*, 7 May 2014, available online < http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/604381/a-cessna-sized-hole-in-the-iron-curtain-revisited/

30 See for instance The Journalist failed to repeat the Flight of Mathias Rust. *Russian Gazette*, 17 May 2017, https://rg.ru/2015/05/17/polet-site.html which comments that “Many experts are still convinced that Rust’s flight was planned and executed as a very serious operation which involved the special intelligence services from many leading countries.” A more balanced view is given in ‘How Mathias Rust helped Gorbachev,’ *Argumenty i Fakty*, 28 May 2015 http://www.aif.ru/society/history/zaletnyy_gastroler_kak_nemec_matias_rust_mihailu_gorbachevu_pomogal

Charter 77, are they deemed an actual subject of singular interest. The editors remark that

> Within civil societies, groups of individuals may also have entertained visions of ending the Cold War: consider, for example, the role of experts … or scientists on both sides of the Iron Curtain, … or the role of dissidents in Eastern Europe … But such visions may also have been associated with *processes rather than actors:* for example … the importance of the Helsinki process or that of European integration …[31]

This approach sums up the reason why Rust has so far not occupied any place in Cold War Studies. Not part of an identifiable "process" and not fitting easily into an interpretive paradigm, it is easier to sideline him as not worthy of scholarly attention. That way, history – as the narrative of "important and influential events in the past" – does not need to "deal" with his idiosyncracy. Yet it is certainly possible to situate him within an expanded understanding of what Cold War studies encompass. In the 1970s there was already a recognition of how private individuals could function as diplomatic actors, and how this needed to be taken into account in the study of international relations. The seminal collection *Unofficial Diplomats* of Maureen Berman and Joseph Johnson from 1977 covered "private international relations" and the role of non-governmental individuals and groups in influencing the passage of events through their own direct contacts.[32]

Since then, other moves have been made to insert individuals into the mix of inter-state contacts, emphasising their particular influence both inside and outside diplomatic spaces.[33] Rust himself intended to act as a kind of diplomatic envoy, although as a self-chosen representative of the West (or, more appropriate, of humankind). However, he could not be easily fitted within the study of the "Cold War everyday", since his story was so exceptional, except from the perspective of how nuclear danger permeated his worldview beyond science fiction and led him into taking such a unique and dramatic step in response.[34] The his-

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31 Frederic Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow and Bernd Rother (eds.). *Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945–1990.* New York: Berghahn, 2012, 3 (emphasis added).

32 Maureen Berman and Joseph Johnson (eds.). *Unofficial Diplomats.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. See also John Richardson (ed.). *The Human Dimension of Foreign Policy, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 442 (1979).

33 Giles Scott-Smith (ed.). Who is a Diplomat? Diplomatic Entrepreneurs in the Global Age. Special Issue of *New Global Studies*, Vol. 8 No. 1, 2014.

34 See Alf Lüdtke. *The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Everyday Experience and Ways of Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995; Thomas Lindenberger. Everyday History: New Approaches to the New History of the Post-War Germanies. In Christoph Klessmann (ed.), *The Divided Past: Rewriting Post-War German History.* New York: Berg, 2001.

tory of everyday life makes the ordinary unordinary (as a topic of research), whereas with Rust, the unordinary has in some way to be made ordinary in order to encapsulate its meaning. In this sense, Rust's flight was his way of dealing with Cold War reality as he perceived it. While others marched or protested, he flew to Red Square.

> The collective dreamworlds of the Cold War were not all-encompassing. Both in the East and the West, individual dreams did not necessarily coincide with the official collective ones .... Alternative dreams could also be developed into counter-forces.[35]

For the West German popular press he was initially the "young messiah" daring to challenge "the system", and *Stern* paid DM100,000 for exclusive rights to his story. But *Stern*'s published account only set him up as "a dangerously unhinged daydreamer", and his image as the kranky kid was set: "Man hatte vom Modus Messias in den Modus Ikarus gewechselt." ("He had switched from a Messiah figure to an Icarus figure")[36] This media hype undoubtedly contributed to his wayward life thereafter, including his legal offences and curious career.

However, to leave it there would miss the point. Rust was himself fully a product of Cold War culture, a child of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, a reader of Cold War-influenced, Americanised West German science fiction, and someone who understood the symbolic significance of flight – Airworld – to transgress the borders of East and West. He became politically aware when he was 15 – in 1983, the year of East-West tension, SDI, and KAL 007. He was also (and continues to be) a source of and inspiration for European "Cold War culture". He inspired the West German pop group Modern Trouble to write "Flight to Moscow" (1987) with the line "Now Uncle Sam and Pentagon, They couldn't do what he has done, Gorbachev he had no laughs, When Mr Rust signed autographs."[37] He has inspired contemporary opera and has been the model for film characters such as the fictitious "Mathias Rust Band" in the Norwegian movie *Mannen som elsket Yngve* (The Man who loved Yngve) from 2008.[38] While Rust was still languishing in a Soviet prison, his Cessna Skyhawk 172 was taken on a "celebrity tour" by French entrepreneur Paul-Loup Sulitzer, who referred to it as "a symbol of a feat of

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35 Romijn, Scott-Smith and Segal. *Divided Dreamworlds*, 2.

36 See Jungen and Prombka. *Deutsche Nullen.*

37 Modern Trouble. Fly to Moscow. Chic Label, 1987. The single made it to no. 57 in the West German charts. The band only released one other song.

38 *Mannen som elsket Yngve*, directed by Stian Kristiansen, Motlys produtions, 2008.

peace and freedom".[39] It was subsequently reproduced as a miniature model airplane kit by the Italeri toy company.[40]

Rust was driven by his imagination to reject the false borders of Cold War Europe, but in Putin's Russia he continues to represent the corruption of the Gorbachev era and the scheming duplicity of the West. Rust therefore represents many dimensions of European Cold War culture: one actor, many processes, in the meeting of East and West. His singular act continues to fascinate precisely because of his rejection of the orthodox binaries of the Cold War narrative, and the challenges in placing this within a historical narrative of the times.

39 Mathias Rust's Plane to Tour. *New York Times*, 12 November 1987. The aircraft was thereafter sold and exhibited in Japan before returning to Germany as a permanent exhibit at the Museum of Technology in Berlin.
40 See http://shop.italeri.com/Products/21807–2764-cessna-172-skyhawk.aspx accessed 29 June 2018.

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