# COLD WAR ASSEMBLAGES

DECOLONIZATION TO DIGITAL

Bhakti Shringarpure

Cold War Assemblages

Shringarpure goes beneath the skin of postcolonialism and finds the Cold War. Here is the brutality of colonial violence—the harsh use of the stick, surely, but also the enforcement of starvation. Her book slips through the minds of major thinkers of decolonization, finding so much about them that has been set aside by the narrower concerns of North Atlantic postcolonial studies. This is criticism with a foot deeply sunk into the mud of the South.

—Vijay Prashad, Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research

This is an important rethinking of postcolonial studies today. Shringarpure's provocative book underscores the urgency of bringing together studies of colonialism with studies of the Cold War, and offers a compelling methodology for doing this work. Clearly written and bold, *Cold War Assemblages* questions widely touted figures and approaches from Gandhi to close reading and "openness" in the digital realm, and offers in the place of depoliticized reading and teaching strategies a "red thread" that ties together the US-American university landscape and culture industry with the historical and ongoing impacts of colonialism and Cold War violence in the Global South.

—Kerry Bystrom, Associate Professor of English and Human Rights and Associate Dean of the College at Bard College Berlin, A Liberal Arts University

Bhakti Shringarpure's book is a necessary intervention in the intellectual history of the Cold War and the postcolony. In showing that these histories cannot be separated, Shringarpure also shows how both are "embedded in futures to come." Anyone interested in political violence, revolutionary time, radicalism and political theory must reckon with Shringarpure's analysis.

—Sean Jacobs, The New School and "Africa Is a Country"

This book bridges the gap between the simultaneously unfolding histories of postcoloniality and the 45-year ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the US and the USSR. Not only did the superpowers rely upon the decolonizing world to further imperial agendas, but the postcolony itself was shaped, epistemologically and materially, by Cold War discourses, policies, narratives, and paradigms. Ruptures and appropriated trajectories in the postcolonial world can be attributed to the ways in which the Cold War became the afterlife of European colonialism. Through a speculative assemblage, this book connects the dots, deftly taking the reader from Frantz Fanon to Aaron Swartz, and from assassinations in the Third World to American multiculturalism. Whether the Cold War subverted the dream of decolonization or created a compromised cultural sphere, this book makes those rich palimpsests visible.

Bhakti Shringarpure is Assistant Professor of English at the University of Connecticut and editor-in-chief of *Warscapes* magazine.

Routledge Studies in Cultures of the Global Cold War

Series Editors:
Monica Popescu
(McGill University)

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Routledge Studies in Cultures of the Global Cold War aims to invigorate research on the Cold War beyond the US-USSR bipolar framework, to focus on what is now called the Global South—Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. These sites have both been impacted by, and have transformed in turn, the global engagement of the Cold War and its cultural and political discourses. Moreover, the series focuses on cultural production in these regions to understand how ideological battles intertwined with direct violence in the Cold War's "hot zones." The series invites monographs and edited collections that historicize and trace genealogies of the conceptual tools and methodologies informing current debates stemming from the Cold War period.

Cold War Assemblages
Decolonization to Digital
Bhakti Shringarpure

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Cold War Assemblages
Decolonization to Digital

Bhakti Shringarpure

"History does not unfold in a straight line with predictable results."

Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, *Birth of a Dream Weaver*

Contents

Series Editors' Introduction

Routledge Studies in Cultures of the Global Cold War aims to invigorate research on the Cold War beyond the US-USSR bipolar framework, to focus on what is now called the Global South—Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. These sites have both been impacted by, and have transformed in turn, the global engagement of the Cold War and its cultural and political discourses. Moreover, the series focuses on cultural production in these regions to understand how ideological battles intertwined with direct violence in the Cold War's "hot zones." The monographs and edited collections in this series historicize and trace genealogies of the conceptual tools and methodologies informing current debates stemming from the Cold War period.

The first book in the series, Bhakti Shringarpure's *Cold War Assemblages: Decolonization to Digital* is a brilliant methodological intervention that cuts across disciplines to explore the entanglements of the global Cold War with processes of decolonization and their aftermath. Shringarpure identifies key Cold War moments and epistemes that have shaped our understanding of cultural production: the methodological bifurcation in the works of Gandhi and Fanon which set up different models for postcolonial theory; the assassination of revolutionary leaders and thinkers Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral, Thomas Sankara and the subsequent transformation of nation time in the postcolony; and the impact of the USA's covert patronage of cultural activities and the establishment of a Cold War paradigm in literary and publishing culture, a paradigm whose premises are still visible today in the digital realm. The book's "assemblages" approach and radical interdisciplinarity deliver a pathbreaking interrogation of postcolonial studies as a field.

Monica Popescu, Katherine Zien, and Sandeep Banerjee

Acknowledgments

Most of the ideas circulating through this book came out of my experience as a graduate student living in post-9/11 New York City. It was a turbulent moment in academia; various disciplinary factions went to war with one another and the surveillance-security complex became an everyday reality. But inside and outside of the classroom, so many brilliant conversations and discussions with professors and friends emphasized the historical haunting and learned amnesia that was passing as common sense. It was not that history was repeating itself but that this particular moment was no real surprise. The wheels had never stopped churning and we were bang in the middle of an epoch that had been spun, nourished, and manifested by the colonial histories and the Cold War. This book has tried to make sense of much of that seemingly hyperpolitical yet heavily obfuscated time, not just in the US but also in the "deep space" of postcoloniality that I grew up in.

Cold War Assemblages owes almost all its insights to Ammiel Alcalay; extraordinary poet, razor sharp thinker, and compassionate mentor. Yet another brilliant poet, teacher, and thinker, Ali Jimale Ahmed has been a tireless supporter and a wonderful interlocutor, especially when it came to thinking through questions of African literature and African politics. The book writing began in 2013 and this is when I welcomed the generous, rigorous, and incredibly clever Eleni Coundouriotis in my life. She has read and re-read all the chapters, encouraged me and guided me every step of the way. I cannot imagine how I could have completed this without our numerous conversations to which she sweetly obliged. There would be no book without Monica Popescu's faith in its structure, for her attentive reading and for making it sparkle with her incisive suggestions. Monica's work on the Cold War and African literature has been a game changer and much of the connections I make in this book take for granted her groundbreaking scholarship, and her insights have now started to pass as obvious understandings of what constitutes Cold War cultural production. It is also thanks to her many invitations to panels and roundtables that several of the ideas had a chance to be aired out, debated, and refined. And of course, I am

Introduction
Cold War Assemblages

> A coffin that wears the face of a child,
> a book
> written inside the guts of a crow,
> a beast trudging forward holding a flower,
> a stone
> breathing inside the lungs of a madman.
> This is it.
> This is the twentieth century.
>
> <div align="right">Adonis, "A Mirror for the Twentieth Century"</div>

> It is difficult at times to repress the thought that history is about as instructive as an abattoir; that Tacitus was right and that peace is merely the desolation left behind after the decisive operations of merciless power.
>
> <div align="right">Seamus Heaney, "Crediting Poetry" (The Nobel Lecture)</div>

> A blade of fire stands poised over this century; it is stained with the blood of men; that of the fighters and the victims. In the end, it will form a bloody line of retribution across a useless page.
>
> <div align="right">Mouloud Feraoun, *Journal 1955–1962; Reflections on the French-Algerian War*</div>

As the war in Syria, the annexation of Crimea, and the new frontier of pitched cyber warfare turn into vexed zones of confrontation between the United States and Russia, easy references to the Cold War reduce this history to nothing more than a simple marker of clear lines of allegiance between a powerful West comprising the US and Europe and Russian imperialist ambition. Yet, the somewhat recent, startling news that Belgian police commissioner Gerard Soete kept two teeth, one finger, and spent bullets from the body of Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba, which he helped dissolve in sulfuric acid in late January 1961, generated no more than a couple of obscure news items and bleeps on social media. The assassination of Lumumba is one of the more controversial and shocking of Cold War murders, one that led to furious protests in

North America (Gerard and Kuklik 2015, 2–3). In fact, the murder stains the résumés of a large ring of alleged collaborators: United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, American Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy, several CIA officers, Belgian colonialists and police officers, and Congolese collaborators Moïse Tshombe and Lumumba's friend and then-army general Joseph Mobutu. Indeed, repressed details of Lumumba's murder points to the way in which histories of the postcolonial Global South are cast aside in favor of easy and obvious geopolitical frameworks. The void between what counts as a general understanding of the Cold War and the corporeal cartography upon which the Cold War was actually waged becomes the central ontological question of this book. The Cold War etched itself most deeply and distinctly on the body of the postcolony and was, without doubt, its most active site.

Cold War Assemblages aims to produce a decisive understanding of the fact that the Cold War has had an extraordinary impact in shaping the postcolonial world by bridging the gap between what are seen as two distinct histories: one of the *longue durée* of European colonialism and the other of the 45-year period of intellectual, ideological, and geopolitical rivalry between the US and the USSR that came to be called the Cold War. By exploring the inherent connectedness between the emergence of the two superpowers and a decolonizing Third World, I am able to address trajectories, linkages, echoes, hauntings, and residues that show the Cold War as having continued the dynamic of European colonialism. Both the US and the Soviet Union furthered imperial agendas in a post-World War II universe relying precisely on relationships established by Europe in the previously colonized world. Thus, the Cold War is a key site to observe and delve into the afterlife of European colonialism. As colonial projects across two-thirds of the planet and over a period of several centuries engendered a binary system of thought and being—civilized/uncivilized, masculine/feminine, rational/irrational, queer/normative, parental/childlike, white/dark—the Cold War exacerbated these structures as two great powers, the US and the USSR, split the world literally and symbolically into further binaries of capitalism versus socialism and democracy versus communism. These confrontations, taking place as several regions were simultaneously throwing off the yoke of centuries of colonialism, managed to plunge the postcolonial world into an enduring quicksand of violence from the late forties right up until the early nineties.

Cold War Assemblages starts by identifying key moments within the long duration and wide scope of the Cold War to demonstrate several troubling and irreversible trajectories that it set into motion. I pay particular attention to epistemes of violence, nation, and culture as they were created, recast, and mobilized in the decolonized Third World during this period. New systems of power alignments, new implements of violence, and technological innovations were brought into being, and an

epistemological shift came about in the conception of politics, literature, art, and culture that continues to have a huge impact on most societies in the world today. I begin with postcolonial sites of violence as they were regulated and determined by Cold War politics and then move to examine specifically American interventions into a globalized literary culture as it came to be established in academia and in the mainstream, while also paying attention to the more recent and elusive frameworks of digital publishing. To establish a synergy between these disparate-seeming subjects, I look at the ways in which the Cold War has been historicized in the past and establish an alternative approach derived from theories of assemblages.

The Cold War came to be enacted upon a specifically postcolonial cartography. Eric Hobsbawm records that indeed during the mid-20th century after the end of World War II, the "imperial era was at an end" (1994, 222) and that "it had become clear to the surviving old empires that formal colonialism had to be liquidated" (221). But Hobsbawm also observed that the "twentieth century history of the non-Western or more exactly non-North-Western world is therefore essentially determined by its relations with the countries which had established themselves in the nineteenth century as the lords of human kind" (200). Here, it is important to note the massive rupture that occurred with the end of European colonialism. Furthermore, the ideological continuum in colonial and geopolitical frameworks that went on to be adopted by the US and the Soviet Union across a still decolonizing world was equally pertinent and Hobsbawm sees it as drawn across the long 20th century for the previously colonized regions. Yet another historian, Odd Arne Westad (2005), in his magisterial work, refers to the Cold War as "global" and writes a detailed history of ways in which the Cold War was defined by its interventions in various postcolonial places. It is neither plausible nor accurate anymore to separate the history of postcoloniality with that of the Cold War.

Over a span of three decades, the two superpowers turned the post-colony into a warscape. Errol Henderson and J. David Singer claim that,

> Since 1945, most wars have occurred *within* rather than *between* states, and most of these civil wars have taken place in the former colonies of the imperial powers. As we begin the 21st century, the violence in these post-colonial states is among the most pressing problems in world politics, even as we experience an unprecedented period of peace among the former colonizers.
>
> (2000, 275)

The authors include a rather diverse amalgam of violence ranging from protests, strikes, riots, plots, assassinations, coups d'état, and civil war (ibid.). Their study looks at civil wars between the years 1946 and 1992,

the precise period of the Cold War and the precise period in which almost two-thirds of the world was in the throes of decolonization. Additionally, the death toll from the Cold War era is staggering; about 180,000 a year from 1950 to 1989, adding up to several million dead over a period of almost 40 years (Goldstein 2011). Places that can be categorized as postcolonial like Vietnam, Angola, Afghanistan, Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, and Pakistan, among others, are still suffering the consequences of decolonizing from Europe and falling prey to the violent, imperial machinations of the Cold War actors.

Colonial violence was a toxic blend of many forms. The founding violence of occupation was sustained by military and judicial violence exercised by the colonial power. There was also the psychological dimension that postcolonial theory tends to focus on—the forceful imposition of imperial languages, the civilizing missions via culture and education, and the erasure of local histories are some examples (Mbembe 2001). Decolonization blew the lid on the centuries-old violence repressed within colonized persons, as Frantz Fanon observed in his final book *The Wretched of the Earth*. With the colonizers gone and the Cold War actors now weighing their roles in the Third World, the superpowers re-channeled and redressed this already existing violence as they competed for geopolitical superiority. Internecine rivalries that had reared their heads during the power vacuum that opened up during decolonization phase now transformed themselves into Cold War-sponsored proxy wars. Peaceful transition into postcolonial nationhood proved impossible as the two great powers armed, disarmed, infiltrated, and manipulated the newly independent countries across the globe. Thus, the violence that had been historically embedded due to colonialism was now furthered and sustained throughout the period of the Cold War. Similarly, the realm of culture in the colony that had been dictated by the ideology of a European civilizing mission was furthered and sustained by Cold War cultural interventions in the postcolony. However, European colonialism and the Cold War are often viewed as two distinct historical phases with regards to how they impacted the emerging Third World. Several Cold War histories published from the late eighties to the early 2000s assume such a historical disjunction (e.g. Gaddis 1997; Powaski 1997; Zubok and Pleshakov 1997).[1]

Recently published, rigorous studies of the Cold War are farsighted in their approach and more connective in their understanding of how the varied histories tend to culminate in the Cold War period and may continue right into the present. These include books by Odd Arne Westad (2005), Robert McMahon (2013), or Timothy Garton Ash (2001), which tend to emphasize a Foucauldian principle: that of writing a history of the present (Foucault 1995),[2] and thus "self-consciously writing in a field of power relations and political struggle" (Roth 1981, 43).[3] The notion of presentist history as methodology, and as "self-consciously writing in

a field of power relations and political struggle" (Foucault 1995, 31), has since become a seductive guiding principle for scholars of history and the humanities more generally. Partially because of the Cold War's proximity to our present time and partially because its influence shows no signs of ebbing, the writing of the Cold War has become an actively presentist task, one which uses the events and ideas of the Cold War as a way to explain contemporary geopolitical actions, failures, and cartographies. Westad's volume, for example, calls itself "an unabashedly presentist book" (2005, 1) written by a historian. Other works underline the consequentialist dimension of a Cold War history, and MacMahon (2013), for example, insists that the aftershocks of the superpowers' interventions continue to reverberate in the present. Along similar lines, Ash writes that "[t]he historian usually knows more about what happened afterwards, simply because he writes later" (2001, 21). The present, and sometimes the future, is omnipresent in these accounts and becomes an active site not just to re-investigate but also to rebuild the past to suit existing needs. Literary and cultural studies excavate the same history with an eye towards transformative transnational solidarities, failed as well as fruitful alliances, investigations of genres and theories of revolution.[4]

However, such approaches to history writing oversimplify what Foucault was actually articulating. In fact, Foucauldian understandings of presentist history distance themselves from easy, linear, and continuous ties between the past and present and, in fact, are better advanced through his reflections on genealogy. For Foucault, genealogy *fulfills* a theory of history by subsuming within it a counter-history, perhaps even an anti-history. No matter what the subject of scrutiny, genealogy allows for "the emergence of different interpretations, they must be made to appear as events on the stage of historical process" (1977, 152). Foucault finds that genealogy does not simply generate a historical narrative but includes within it the very process of making it, unmaking it, and interpreting those precise processes. Thus, genealogy alters our understanding of history's narrative as a "monotonous finality," and it also transforms the act of history-writing by seeking it "in the most unpromising of places, in what we tend to feel is without history" (139). History must then disavow typical and rational sources of origins and aim to become a "concrete body of a development" that is capacious enough to engage with accidents, deviations, errors, reversals, false calculations, and lapses. Origins are thus rendered without finality, and Foucault characterizes them as an "unstable assemblage of faults, fissures and heterogeneous layers" (146). Genealogy can offer interpretative versions, and in doing so, it can also expose the problems embedded within progressivist narrations of history. This is not to say that the recent presentist turn in Cold War histories is to be cast aside but only to emphasize that perhaps these historical narratives need to be destabilized even further and new historiographies will have to emerge. Such a history could then enable the actual and epistemic

ruptures that accompany the official end of European colonialism as well as the continuum that allows for new iterations of the same colonialism to come into view. It would also mean that there can be more room for contingencies, less obvious juxtapositions, and inadvertent connections. Thus, with the aim of destabilizing, decentering, and disrupting Cold War history, I propose the framework of assemblage theory.

Cold War Assemblages

Cold War histories have an active affiliation with the precise linear and continuous histories that Foucault critiques, and such approaches have failed in their exploration of the hydra-headed manifestations of power as they reverberate across the planet. Attributed to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, theories of assemblage can be productive for making sense of the Cold War because of their attempts to marry the linear with the non-contiguous, the emergent with the ruins, and the heterogenous with the singular. While Deleuze and Guattari evoke the assemblage in their work, it is philosopher Manuel DeLanda who expands upon these concepts. Through two books, DeLanda (2006, 2016) labors through the duo's references to assemblage in order to offer a framework (though only to a small extent, since an assemblage resists the notion of "framework"). "What is an assemblage?" Deleuze and Guattari ask. They describe it as

> a multiplicity which is made of many heterogenous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between them, across ages, sexes and reigns—different natures. Thus, the assemblage's only unity is that of a co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a "sympathy." It is never filiations which are important, but alliances, alloys; these are not successions, lines of descent, but contagions, epidemics, the wind.
>
> (Deleuze and Parnet 2007, 69)

In thus shattering existing ideals of unity and de-stabilizing organic and "natural" connections between entities, the assemblage can rescue Cold War studies from a tyrannically linear historicism. It can allow for the Cold War to be viewed as a set of potent vantage points that generated certain discourses and silenced others. More importantly, it allows for various seemingly disconnected aspects of the *longue durée* of the Cold War to come into an active symbiosis with each other: What, for example, is the connection between the prominence of postcolonial studies in academia and the cultural interventions spearheaded by the CIA during the Cold War? What are the links between Mohandas K. Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence and the Non-Aligned Movement led by Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamel Nasser, and Josip Broz Tito? What correlations can be found between how Wikipedia structures its popular platform and the Cold War? How have global technopolitical geographies arising from

the Cold War influenced the literary canon promoted in universities? It is possible to study each and every one of these questions if the existing understandings and historical sequences of Cold War studies can be shaken up and redressed.

In the original French, the terms *agencement* and *dispositif*, when used by Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1987), are both translated into assemblage. Here, the *agencement*, which means arrangement, converges with the *dispositif*, which can be translated as apparatus or deployment. This allows for an assemblage to gain a double resonance; not only is it a particular geometry but it is also a tool that can be utilized and applied. For DeLanda (2016), assemblages allow for four rather useful formulations. Firstly, assemblages have a "fully contingent historical identity," (20) and each has the same ontological status whether an individual community or organization or city. Secondly, assemblages are composed of heterogeneous units, and to use this concept correctly, one must include "in addition to persons, the material and symbolic artifacts that compose communities and organizations" (ibid.). Thirdly, assemblages can become part of larger assemblages, and lastly, while assemblages are created from an interaction between their parts, "once an assemblage is in place, it starts acting as a source of limitations and opportunities for its components" (ibid.).

How then, can the Cold War be actively theorized through the above articulations? While it has been assigned a definite starting and ending point, it eludes linear approaches due to an ongoing, contemporaneous temporality; plus, its vast spatial domain poses theoretical challenges. My discomfort with Cold War histories stems from the temporal sequences that have come to be seen as "obvious" approaches for any analysis. The national rivalries and emergent political systems that the two World Wars produced are seen as *a priori* explanations for the entangled trajectories that the Cold War put in place. Usually, the continuums that exist between colonial histories and civilizing missions are not placed alongside proxy wars and the cultural interventions that the Cold War generated. A singular temporal flow precludes us from seeing the ways in which disparate-seeming narratives are actually bound by various registers of imperial logic. For the scope of my work on the Cold War, I find Jasbir Puar's and Alexander Weheliye's understandings of assemblages much more useful because of their interest in connecting assemblages to marginalized histories. Weheliye's work—which combines race, the human, bare life, and black feminism—finds assemblages to be "inherently productive" due to their ability to "give expression to previously nonexistent realities, thoughts, bodies, spaces, actions, ideas and so on" (2014, 46). Weheliye also champions moving beyond the masculinist and European authority of Deleuze and Guattari in order to update their work to include postcolonial concerns and to detach from orthodox Deleuzianism.[5] In a similar gesture, Puar's (2007) work reconfigures race, sexuality, nation, and time

in unique and innovative ways by building an assemblage that brings together multiple temporalities, movements, and theoretical intersections.

In *Cold War Assemblages*, approaches that are a blend of history, literary studies, theories of violence, anthropology, political science, and digital media are essential for excavating heterogeneous, asymmetrical, and missed connections that have previously been abandoned. Yet, assemblage as methodology is different from an interdisciplinary approach that aims to fuse various disciplines in order to cross disciplinary boundaries. Assemblages involve a kind of unstacking and re-stacking of existing ideas in order to construct new ways of seeing. Here, contradictions, failures, accidents, and ruins can have a privileged place. For example, to view the Cold War as an assemblage allows for contradictory concepts— epistemic shifts and ideological continuums, or the ephemeral and spectral with the concrete and tangible—to co-exist. Perhaps the deeply embedded infrastructures of technology can be juxtaposed with the Cold War's more superficial propaganda in order to yield a whole new dimension on openness and cyber-utopia in contemporary times. Seemingly disparate modes, such as the bodies of revolutionary leaders, can intersect with the temporality of nation as they collude with Cold War policies. Maybe time and space can be stretched at will so as to see the Cold War as dead and locked away into the past but also alive and embedded in the futures to come. New possibilities and accidental connections abound, activating new historiographic possibilities.

Assemblages also allow us to ask what constitutes a Cold War imaginary. Arjun Appadurai, in his work on modernity, writes that "[t]he image, the imagined, the imaginary—these are all terms that direct us to something critical and new in global cultural processes: the imagination as a social practice." He adds that "[t]he imagination is now central to all forms of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of the new global order" (1996, 31). As I write this, ferocious debates about Russian President Vladimir Putin's role in the election of Donald Trump rage on, and herein, the Cold War as a shadowy, lurking image as well as figment of imagination reveals itself in equal capacities within the collective political space. The Cold War imaginary is thus a dynamic set of ideas, some truthful and some tendentious, that engages and preoccupies the current global collectivity in tangible ways. The assemblage allows for a re-construction and re-investigation of how this Cold War imaginary emerges and indeed offers new insights on the role it plays in the world today.

I explore the failures and bifurcations embedded in writings on decolonization through the works of influential thinkers such as Gandhi and Fanon, and I also theorize nation time, which was interrupted through the assassinations of young revolutionaries Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral and Thomas Sankara. I transition thereafter to the Anglo-American sphere and do not address cultural aspects of the Cold War in the USSR

for a host of reasons. It is only within the American cultural sphere that one can observe the emergence of a canon of postcolonial literature and the emergence of postcolonial studies as a field and theory. In fact, the origins of postcolonial studies can be traced to English departments during the sixties and seventies in the US, as I show in the third chapter. In service of my overarching argument about problematic genealogies of postcolonial studies, I am only able to investigate the American side of the cultural Cold War. This, in turn, allows for a deeper exploration of an advent of a particular type of liberal, ideological imperialism within American culture and offers insights on how it particularly unfolded in literary, publishing, and university culture. Covert patronage of cultural activities to win hearts and minds established what I am calling a "Cold War paradigm" within literary and publishing culture. This American paradigm put into place a manufactured consensus regarding an apolitical American narrative that pushed international and translated works to the margins. It also led to the silencing of dissenting discourses and constructed the notion of a literary world that is separate from politics. I explain how these views came to be constructed and argue that these frameworks are, actually, alive and well. This book adds significantly to the theorization of decolonization, existing debates on postcolonial studies, and the emerging field of digital humanities. The assemblage method allows for various parts of the book to stay intricately connected while remaining independently viable; Cold War violence in the postcolony was represented in art and literature, which was in turn either reframed or made invisible over time in cultural and academic institutions upon which the cultural Cold War actors held sway. The Cold War, I argue, is an assemblage of the colonial, postcolonial, racial, military, technological, and cultural imaginaries. This allows multiple vantage points to co-exist and illustrates that we remain in the grip of a tenacious Cold War imaginary. With regards to method, I would add that even though this book is deeply invested in an alternative and unusual account of the Cold War, it is certainly not a straightforward historical narration but one that insists on rupture and disjuncture as an organizing principle and as theoretical inquiry. Thus, in the body of the book, chapters do not follow a strict chronology and are, in fact, organized around instances of impact of the Cold War. These include moments of decolonization in various colonies, coups and assassinations, literary and academic publishing culture, and the arrival of digital technology.

The Cold War has been extensively explored in the humanities and social sciences. But there is a distinct dichotomy between the works that focus on geopolitical history and policy considerations (McMahon, Westad, Judt, Dobbs) and the more recent emergence of works about the Cold War's role in shaping culture (Saunders, Wilford, Rubin, Popescu, Scott-Smith, Kalliney). However, there is no study that makes connections between the Cold War and decolonization, literary culture, academia,

and the digital. The sustained theorization and re-historicization that I undertake in this project, with a particular intersectional eye towards global violence and global culture, advances our understanding of the impact of Cold War echoes and paradigms on the world today. *Cold War Assemblages* brings together a cross-disciplinary set of texts that draws from the fields of literature, history, anthropology, new media, and political science. In particular, it privileges life writing, an umbrella term that includes genres such as biography and autobiography but also short form categories such as speeches, letters, interviews, diaries, and testimonies. Life writing is invested in the excavation of collective and individual memory and, as such, becomes central for thinking through historical echoes and imaginative residues. In Cold War scholarship, there is a significant emphasis on biographies of great men who changed the face of foreign policy and these play into easy understandings of the Cold War as a particularly binaristic history entirely dictated by the great American and Soviet chess players on a fraught world political stage. *Cold War Assemblages* does the obverse. In the first two chapters, the book unearths and assembles writings by and about several anticolonial figures in order to significantly expand the field of the Cold War into the realm of the postcolonial, as well as to offer accounts of anticolonial and postcolonial events and ideas that defy simplistic historical narratives. Additionally, *Cold War Assemblages* places traditional literary and theoretical texts into a close engagement with archived digital collections and large digital platforms such as Wikipedia, Google, and Amazon.

The Beginnings: Specters of Bandung

The beginnings of the Cold War can be traced to the varied approaches to imperial expansion that the US and USSR had been experimenting with since the 19th century. Both states were on the outside of existing European colonial projects and were forced to carve out alternative strategies to grab a piece of the world, two-thirds of which had been divided up by Western Europe. The United States, while practicing gruesome settler colonialism and slavery at home, only ventured into foreign expansion in 1890 in order to colonize the Philippines. Russian expansion had its roots in the 16th century and later on, Communist parties ended up inheriting that same ambition and imperative.[6] The end of World War II led to an implosion within Europe and allowed anticolonial movements across Asia and Africa to intensify. Actual decolonization was staggered in terms of time and space but the consensus that the US and USSR had begun to fill the power vacuum left by a tattered, defeated, and war-weary Europe had become abundantly clear.

It did not take long for the term "Cold War" to spread from George Orwell's 1945 essay "You and the Atomic Bomb" to presidential advisor Bernard Baruch's usage in a speech in 1947 (see Glass 2010), and

into more general public usage worldwide. The decolonizing world's first head-on collective confrontation with the phenomenon that was the Cold War took place in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. Twenty-nine nations attended the now historic and iconic Bandung conference to discuss race, religion, colonialism, neocolonialism, and of course, the Cold War, and it was certainly impressive in terms of scale and agenda. Bandung was and continues to be a historically unprecedented convergence, and a truly robust assemblage of governments, ideas, races, theories, solidarities, plans, quarrels, tensions, sites, and chronologies. Though it only lasted six days, it has an extended, unceasing temporality. This is because Bandung projected into the future by being the first site where a map of postcolonial liberation was mapped out. Scholars of imperialism still contend with the long gaze of Bandung.

An after-world of Bandung exists and for my generation growing up in India, Bandung lives on through a decidedly nostalgic and nationalist imaginary: pictures of Jawaharlal Nehru's crisp collar and starched hat infusing a magnetic charm; his sari-clad daughter and later to be India's prime minister, Indira Gandhi, being ushered into the corridors of the power elite; the echoes of nostalgia for the patriarchal trio of Non-Alignment—Nehru, Nasser, and Tito; and the declarations of India's inherent peaceability, its nonviolent internationalism, and its valiant claims of standing up to the imperial powers and teaching the rest of the "Third World" how to be just like them. In my case, it also resides in a giant, engraved silver platter gifted by Egypt's Gamel Adbel Nasser to an elderly relative who was an Indian diplomat, the object as witness to the now somewhat defunct Non-Aligned Movement. Bandung is around as more than history. It has a spectral presence and haunts collective imaginations: It is also an imaginary. However, within scholarship about the Cold War and postcoloniality, Bandung tends to have what Jacques Derrida has called "the visor effect"—"[t]his spectral someone other looks at us, we feel ourselves being looked at by it" (2006, 8). I take this as an illustration of the fact that postcolonial attempts to construct a self-affirming, anti-imperial global politics with the Cold War in the foreground are not only haunted by Bandung but they reveal a desire to be evaluated by it, to ask where we are in Bandung's wake, and to ask where we are today in a post-Cold War realpolitik where there are barely any options left for imagining alternative, internationalist, anti-imperial futures.

Yet Bandung was not only a symbol of a collective and transnational consciousness of an anti-imperial ethic but it was a physical place of convergence for leaders united on the subject of postcolonial futures even though some countries had yet to gain independence and some had never been colonized in a traditional sense. It created a space for the Asian, Middle Eastern, and African postcolonial experience to come into a very real dialogical and tactical engagement. Bandung also exemplified a mode—a

way of being, thinking, and communicating as citizens of a postcolonial universe. Frantz Fanon declared it to be a "carnal and spiritual union" between colonized peoples, adding that it is "the historic commitment of the oppressed to help one another and to impose a definitive setback upon the forces of exploitation" (qtd. in Fanon and Chevalier 1964, 145). Lastly, it was paradigmatic; the issues, problems, and methods that were discussed or not discussed here remain emblematic of the successes and failings of postcolonialism as a whole. In fact, Bandung offers the most fitting use of the "post" in postcolonialism to signify what came after while remaining cognizant of the physical and psychological havoc wreaked by colonialism. But Bandung also contained and delimited the discourse of postcoloniality in ways that eventually proved detrimental to newly formed nations.

With the onset of the Cold War, the "colonial" embedded in the term "postcolonial" gave renewed vigor to existing dependent relations with the former colonies with the coming of a doggedly capitalist and imperial US, an iron-fisted, equally ambitious USSR, and Asia's biggest bully, China, coming into prominence and power. The postcolonial world was in the grip of a profound political conundrum perpetrated by the imperial void created by Europe that the superpowers were frantic to fill. According to African-American writer Richard Wright who attended the conference, the climate of fear was tangible; the fear of vast newly liberated populations, anxiety about neighbors, anxiety about the impending violence of the Cold War, and more generally, fear of the future. In fact, Wright's work is not just witness to the affect that was Bandung but the text's eruptive and subjective nature functions like an oracle. To this day, we remain entrapped within his prophecy, and the slew of questions he poses in his book remain ever more confounding. For example, he simultaneously asks and warns,

> Bandung was a decisive moment in the consciousness of 65 percent of the human race, and that moment meant: HOW SHALL THE HUMAN RACE BE ORGANIZED? The decisions or the lack of them flowing from Bandung will condition the totality of human life on this earth.
>
> (1956, 208, emphasis in original)

He was not blind to the fact that Bandung was crucial because it was here that an emergent Third World bloc attempted to create an inventive and strategic framework that could outdo the Cold War's imperial blueprint that was poised to swallow the decolonizing world before it even had a chance to form.

But there were hurdles, namely the epistemes of a parochial nationalism and an internecine violence that came to haunt the postcolonial world. While the formation of a Third Bloc and a strategy of Non-Alignment offered a temporary band-aid, the main contribution of colonialism and

its Cold War afterlife was to further these nationalisms and practices of violence within the postcolony. Wright was prescient in realizing that these frameworks would not work for organizing a human race that was not only racialized and psychologically colonized but also deeply divided on religious, ethnic, and sectarian lines. Studies of Bandung admit that it might have been a failed project, but those studies nevertheless acknowledge that Bandung has a spectral presence in the lives of generations growing up in its wake (Scott 2014, 6).[7] Christopher J. Lee (2010) uses the term "ephemeral" to describe the translocal communities, particularly the Afro-Asian alliances that were formed after Bandung, and he also emphasizes their influence on how tensions and contradictions within postcolonial identity and politics were framed. In line with Fanon, a recent work on Bandung emphasizes it as a "spiritual" moment (Pham and Shilliam 2016).

The conference is thus often spoken of in terms of "spirit"—the spirit of solidarity, the revolutionary spirit, the spirit of non-alignment, the spirit of anti-racism, the communal spirit (Prashad 2008; Lee 2010). But it is rarely viewed as specter, as a haunting, as having a spiritual presence in a non-corporeal, non-material sense of the word. The specter foregrounds historiography. María del Pilar Blanco and Esther Pereen (2013) insist that the Derridean understanding of the specter comprises the *revenant* (invoking what was) and *arrivant* (announcing what will come) and this signals several temporalities. Here, the future is made to interact with the past and the present. The Derridean specter imposes the past upon the present and imbues the future with possibility. Thus, for Derrida, hauntology liberates events from historical overdetermination and offers a welcome disruption from chronology. Haunting can be historical but it cannot be given a date. Bandung as specter works similarly. It is a ghost from the past that presses hard on the question of futures. Bandung is therefore a starting point but it is also a spectral through line, and postcolonial Cold War studies must submit to its haunting, and to the inherent possibility that this haunting invokes. It is a failure and a success, it is concrete as well as symbolic, it is real as well as ghostly, it lives but it has also died.

Cold War Assemblages offers new vantage points for elucidating the specters that repeatedly enter and re-enter the Cold War landscape. The book is composed of two parts; the first emphasizes the centrality of violence by teasing out theories of violence through beloved leader-thinker figures of revolution who, I argue, invariably failed to frame viable solutions to colonial violence as it bled into the Cold War. Nation also figures prominently in this section, especially as it is undercut by violence and is left unrealized as a concept and as a reality within the postcolony. The second half of the book moves beyond seemingly urgent political concerns to illustrate that a literary and academic publishing culture is established precisely to obfuscate the extraordinary violence of the Cold

War. These assemblages offer perspectives on how cultural production in the Global North and South derives from Cold War histories and dynamics. Though the theories and practices of violence and nation undergo perceptible epistemic shifts, I establish that that there is also a continuum within the realm of culture, that is pivotal to understanding how this paradigm actually works.

Chapter 1, "Epistemic Bifurcations: Fanon, Gandhi and the Failure of Theory," tackles the large questions of violence and nation. I examine the speeches, writings, and biographies of Mohandas K. Gandhi and Frantz Fanon, two leaders of massive anticolonial movements in India/Pakistan and Algeria respectively. Both represent two unique and complex paradigms of anticolonial and postcolonial theory due to their focus on the question of violence and the question of nationalism. In tracing the shortcomings of Gandhi's understanding of violence and his staunch belief in nonviolence, it becomes, paradoxically, imperative to rescue Fanon from his longstanding association with the theory that violence leads to the creation of new men, and that violence as mobilizing and cleansing. Re-reading Fanon in juxtaposition with Gandhi sheds light on Fanon's deep engagement with violence as *a priori*, as the cause and not merely the effect of anticolonial revolution.

The push-pull dynamic brought about by their dual roles of leader and thinker, as well as the strong-arming by Cold War actors, reveal ruptures in their theories of nation too. Cumulatively, these ideas had a direct effect on the way in which the paths of new countries were charted and envisioned. By re-investigating Gandhi and Fanon, I am able to identify a problem that I am calling an "epistemic bifurcation." Understanding the formation of both figures and the specific nature of their theories reveals the challenging nature of performing the parallel roles of leader and thinker. Both of them simultaneously attempt to ponder, historicize, and structure a problem while also trying to resolve that problem on a practical plane. This leads to an epistemic crisis and potentially embeds failure in their theories. As colonies across the vast Third World found themselves in various states of extrication from their colonial powers (anticolonial wars, decolonization, postcolonial independence), Cold War politics cut across and through these stages due to the brand new alignments dictated by the US and the USSR. Calling the Cold War an era of "perpetual backlash," Fanon extends his understanding of violence to this period, viewing it as a further totalizing praxis and claiming that the political ideology of neutrality was a hypocrisy and a sham, thus inadvertently predicting the disintegration of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In light of these developments, this chapter will also reflect on Fanon's deeply intuitive and prescient understanding of the precise nature of the confrontation between the Cold War and decolonization on a global scale.

Chapter 2, "Dying Before Their Time: Lumumba, Cabral, and Sankara," considers the ways in which trajectories of postcolonial nation

building were further ruptured by the systematic assassinations of certain leaders and several coups d'état perpetrated by the superpowers. I draw from the rich archive of decolonization materials that includes histories, biographies, documentaries, and print and video versions of speeches and writings of the leaders themselves. The specific dynamics that led to the carefully planned murders of Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral, and Thomas Sankara are not only tragic events that bring the individual trajectories of these young revolutionaries to an abrupt end but they cut across what can be called "nation time," the deeply layered, complicated chronopolitics that newly formed nation-states struggle with. Firstly, temporal mechanisms are fundamental for the control, surveillance, and disciplining of non-normative bodies. With this in mind, I argue that decolonizing regions that aspire to transition into peaceful postcolonial nation-states must struggle with the triple bind of time. The first bind of time is established during the colonial era, and it subjugates the colonized population by relegating them to a primitive anterior time that forecloses their entry into modernity and into history. The second bind of time is imposed by revolutionary, anticolonial leaders themselves when they ask the newly radicalized masses to wait and to put on hold their immediate identitarian or particularly political concerns for the collective good of the nation. Thus, nation time when articulated here yet again places the colonized populations into the waiting room of history. And finally, as the postcolonial nation seems close to becoming a reality, the Cold War swoops in by staging brutal murders of able-bodied, male revolutionaries who have come to stand in for the nation symbolically and physically. Here, Lumumba's, Cabral's, and Sankara's assassinations are potent examples of ways in which national trajectories are appropriated. More importantly, this chapter does the work of displacing theories that argue for the grand failures of a utopian Marxist left and illustrate that the Cold War played a crucial role in slashing through these anticolonial revolutions by corporeal and temporal interventions.

Chapter 3, "Cold War Disciplinarity: Postcolonial Studies and Its Discontents," shifts its attention to the Anglo-American realm of culture during the Cold War and its impact upon shaping the postcolonial and multicultural canon today. Through campus infiltrations, the re-arranging of academic disciplines and departments, and the proliferation of magazines and journals—all of which worked as "soft power" to deliberately obfuscate the ideological aims of the American government—these interventions succeeded in altering academic disciplines and fields as well as several aspects of American publishing, especially with regards to multicultural and postcolonial literature. I start by offering a survey of the deeply entangled relationship between American universities and American imperial interests during the Cold War. Though it seemed that English departments existed in a pastoral idyll and were cut off from Cold War machinations, the influence of New Criticism and the development of

academic constellations such as area studies allowed English to separate literary studies from politics. In fact, the Cold War exercised a strong role in re-structuring English and this has impacted postcolonial studies, a field that tends to reside in English. More importantly, if the Cold War significantly impacted postcolonial places, why does postcolonial studies overlook Cold War histories that seem foundational to the field? As previously colonized places in Asia and Africa experience continued breakdowns in communication and education systems, terrifying levels of poverty, and acute hunger as well as wars and genocides that threaten the very possibility of human existence—so much of which is the product of Cold War geopolitics—it is shocking that the field of postcolonial studies has moved away from an engagement with that exact history. There has been a jump from the field's founding moments—where anti-imperialism, tricontinentalism, Third World nationalism, and aesthetics of realism and resistance thrived—to the current trends that show a slant toward postmodernist fragmentation, metropolitan narratives, and a theorization of the field itself. There are many reasons for this: the specific dynamics of the post-Cold War culture in the Global North within which these works were received, the symbiotic relationship between academic and commercial publishing culture, and the sway of postmodernism over academia as a whole. This chapter offers a sustained critique of postcolonial studies as a field by intervening in its genealogy and by locating it within the very specific disciplinarity that emerged in the American academy during and after the Cold War.

Chapter 4, "The Cold War Paradigm: A Trajectory of Literary Canons," zooms in on the cultural Cold War as it officially came to be called. The US government staged subversive interventions into the fields of literature, media, and publishing from the 1950s onwards with the direct help of several different governmental agencies. One example involved the CIA penetrating the workings of about 30 small prestige magazines at home and abroad for two decades through an organization known as the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). I use this particular intervention as my main case study to argue that, through these magazine operations, the CCF put into place a "Cold War paradigm": a structure and logic of doing things in publishing that soon came to be perceived as "obvious" or as "commonsensical." The Cold War paradigm worked on many different registers. Firstly, it involved creating a politics of visibility where some writers were privileged, funded, published, and cross-published over others who were sometimes ignored but sometimes also willfully discredited. Secondly, the figure of the dissident writer was re-framed to accommodate an American agenda. Here, American violence, domestic blacklisting practices, squashing resistant figures, and weapons flooding in postcolonial spaces were pushed to the background and instead, the US was framed as a shining beacon of openness and democracy that could save the writers and artists who were being repressed and censored

by the USSR. Lastly, these politically mitigated literary magazines promoted a diluted version of modernism that was transformed into a mere set of formal techniques emphasizing abstraction, autonomy, fragmentation, indirectness, and the undermining of emotions and politics.

Though the Cold War officially ended in 1991, this paradigm had embedded itself quite deeply into American publishing practices by then. The practices inherited from cultural Cold War interventions were furthered by an agent-editor-reviewer nexus that had received a renewed impetus with the corporatization of publishing in the US, and this in turn has had profound effects on how non-Western literature, in particular, is chosen for publication and also how it is disseminated. As we enter the post-Cold War digital age, we are bombarded with messages of "openness" and how this has put previously marginalized voices and writers from the Global South onto a more mainstream map. However, I find that these shifts in the digital publishing sphere tend to mimic the structures put in place by the same Cold War paradigm. Theories of technopolitics allow for a reflection on the "strategic practice of designing or using technology to enact political goals" (Hecht and Edwards 2007, 4), to investigate the digital journey of non-Western, Third World, and translated literatures as they arrive in the Global North, the literatures' collusion with large entities such as *Wikipedia*, *Google*, and *Amazon*. Through a historicization and interrogation of these cultural Cold War interventions, a blueprint of how academic, mainstream, and digital publishing work to generate and sustain literary canons begins to emerge.

My book centralizes the *longue durée* of European colonialism and the later decolonization period as chronotopes within which the Cold War discourses can be sought and parsed through. Perhaps not enough attention has been paid to ruins, echoes, residues, and afterlives, and those are the directions I end up with in my Epilogue. As the Cold War extended the work of empire, it has left a trail of destruction in its wake and those trajectories can be identified within an assemblage of temporalities, sites, cultures, disciplines, and technologies. How does one theorize the ontology of a nation from whom time itself was stolen and which now finds itself falling deeper and deeper into the hole of debt, violence, and poverty? In the heart of Anglo-American empire, why are our youth forced to consume the same canonical texts that emphasize the same values of liberalism, Eurocentrism, and forceful multiculturalist assimilations? How did universities turn into the frontlines of recruitment for the work of espionage and propaganda? What set of strategies facilitates our euphoric acceptance of discourses of freedom, openness, and neutrality on the Internet? As the US violently intervenes in almost 14 different regions across the world right this minute, what work has it taken to ensure that the general public remains severely deprived of any information? Why does the postcolony enter and re-enter the vicious vortex of civil war and internecine violence? How did the dream of

decolonization go awry? Why do we continue to exist in the Cold War's perpetual backlash? These are some of the questions this book tries to grapple with.

Part of the challenge of this book is to acknowledge the sheer scale of how the Cold War enveloped the world. The violence it engendered was of extraordinary proportions, and the cultural paradigms it established to cope with and obfuscate that violence were equally all encompassing. Today, there is a rush to coin terms such as Cold War II or New Cold War in the wake of Russia's militarization tactics in neighboring regions, but there is a also a grand befuddlement in the air as American President Donald Trump flirts with a bizarre bond with Russia's Vladimir Putin. It is perturbing to see the language and terminologies of the Cold War having such a seductive and simplistic sway on the media and on policy experts today. Though on the one hand, it proves my claim that we remain entrenched in a Cold War paradigm, it also shows that the framework through which this filters is terribly flawed. Mostly, it reveals a nostalgia for a world easily divided between superpowers—one whose massive violence touched people elsewhere, in the postcolonial world and not here, at home in the United States. It also shows hesitation to move towards fresh perspectives on the world order today, to remain attached to simplistic binaries even though they fail us again and again. Perhaps this book can shed light on the Cold War as a heuristic, one that urges us to subvert and then re-design sympathetic and analytically useful paradigms to understand the existing global imaginary.

Notes

1. Accounts by John Lewis Gaddis (1997 1987), for example, are some of the most widely accepted versions of the Cold War, and here American foreign policy as a deterring force to the Soviet Union is of central concern, as is the necessity to explore in great detail the key architects of Cold War policies. But there is no interest in colonial or postcolonial politics. Yet another historian, Ronald Powaski (1997), goes deeper into American-Soviet relations by starting his account from the early 20th century, but his concerns, yet again, do not extend to the postcolonial spheres. A history by Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov (1997) takes a close look inside the Kremlin, and while it does examine the USSR's relationship to Asia, particularly China, it does not focus on any of the postcolonial countries that were directly affected by Cold War policies. These examples are not meant to be comprehensive in any way, but only include some of the more prominent historians of the Cold War.
2. In *Discipline and Punish*, Michel Foucault (1995, 31) describes the task for the historian as follows:

    I would like to write the history of this prison, with all the political investments of the body that it gathers together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means writing a history of the present.

3. The full passage reads thus:

> Writing a history of the present means writing a history in the present; self-consciously writing in a field of power relations and political struggle. The genealogy of the present form of the prison is a criticism of this form because it undermines the claims of the ideology of the prison to being concerned with eternal problems, and because it uncovers the prison's links with practices it seemed to have left behind. By exposing the relationships of the prison to the mechanisms of normalization, Foucault has placed the sciences of criminality into the domain of power, and thus cut them off from any field which would have had some pristine access to Truth. He achieves this placement as his own discourse is seen to fall in this domain of power.
>
> (Roth 1981, 42)

4. Here, works include Saunders (2001); Wilford (2009); Rubin (2012); Popescu (2010); Kalliney (2015); Whitney (2017); and Finn and Couvée (2015).
5. For the full discussion, read the chapter "Assemblages: Articulation" in Weheliye (2014).
6. See the first two chapters of Westad (2005).
7. Here, the demise of Bandung's attempts to point to a third way due to the emergence of a political order views liberal democracy as the only acceptable direction.

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1 Epistemic Bifurcations
Fanon, Gandhi, and the Failure of Theory

I ask: Is there a new prophet for this new time?
> Mahmoud Darwish, "I See My Ghost Coming from a Distance"

I know that people are tired of hearing of these hot, muddy faraway places filled with people yelling for freedom. But this is the human race speaking.
> Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain*

Whiteness of a dawn that was soiled.
> Assia Djebar, *Algerian White*

The lives and writings of Frantz Fanon and Mohandas K. Gandhi shaped multiple anticolonial revolutions theoretically and literally. As leaders of massive and influential revolutionary movements in India/Pakistan and Algeria, respectively, Gandhi and Fanon represent two unique and complex paradigms of anticolonial theory. Both were committed to the struggle for independence while attempting to articulate a vision for the future that would also critique the very ideologies of nationalism, violence, and capitalism upon which these countries would be founded. While both of their vast bodies of writing straddle myriad subjects, their theories on violence resonate most, in fields from political science to philosophy to literature. These same theories also tend to be seen as directly connected to the fates of the places where these thinkers physically situated themselves as leaders of mass movements. A re-engagement with these theories significantly extends the temporality and spatiality of Cold War studies because even though Gandhi and Fanon's thinking is never seen as directly influencing Cold War dynamics, it is in their focus on an anticolonial and postcolonial vision that certain embedded patterns, arrangements, and templates of Cold War futures can be retrieved.

The centrality of violence in colonialism has been emphasized by several scholars: political violence in Mahmood Mamdani, epistemological in V.Y. Mudimbe, and linguistic in Albert Memmi, for example. Achille Mbembe consolidates multiple violence(s) in his theorizing of the postcolony, claiming

that "*commandement*, in a colony, rested on a very specific imaginary of state sovereignty. . . . Colonial sovereignty rested on three sorts of violence" (2001, 25). The first kind was the founding violence, which presupposed its own existence, thus allowing the right of conquest and the prerogatives attached to that right. The second kind was a legitimizing violence, which helped produce "an imaginary capacity converting the founding violence into authorizing authority" (25). And the final form of violence existed to maintain and spread this authority and make it permanent. Mbembe concludes,

> Falling well short of what is properly called "war," it then recurred again and again in the most banal and ordinary situation. It then crystallized, through a gradual accumulation of numerous acts and rituals—in short, played so important a role in everyday life that it ended up constituting the central cultural Imaginary that the state shared with society, and thus had an authenticating and reiterating function. (25)

Given that violence was profoundly entrenched in colonial society and had become its main cultural imaginary, it was one of the first issues that intellectuals and leaders of anticolonial movements had to contend with: What role should violence play in the resistance? How should colonial violence be resisted? What does this violence mean and where does it stem from? Should it be channeled and harnessed or should it be discouraged?

No two leaders had more different views on the subject of violence than Frantz Fanon and Mahatma Gandhi. One is remembered as a prophet of violence, while the other is celebrated as the saint of nonviolence. But the brutally violent Algerian civil war and the bloody partition between Hindus and Muslims demand that we look at their highly influential revolutionary ideas differently. Places touched and impacted by these ideas have experienced very particular kinds of violent futures and have been shaped by very particular orbits of ideas in terms of how they responded to the Cold War. It is, in fact, possible to trace the linguistic, spectral, and conceptual afterlives of Gandhi's and Fanon's theories within the Cold War-inflected postcolonial internecine violence that came later, whether the emphasis is on Gandhi's notions of "mob violence" in India or on Fanon's formulations of "cleansing violence" in Algeria.

In this chapter, I reengage with selections from their disparate bodies of writing to develop a coherent understanding of violence because it has resounding impacts on the how the postcolonial Cold War universe came to be structured. Here, it becomes important to dismantle Gandhi's status as a leader who is celebrated for successfully deploying the practice of nonviolence to oust the British from the Indian subcontinent. Investigating Gandhi's coming-into-being as a unique world leader, and also one of the most beloved and respected, forces us to reckon with the many experimental stages of his nonviolent philosophy.

I find that while successful only sporadically, its sway as a theory is discursive and ideological rather than physical and actual. The horrific and decidedly bloody Partition of India and Pakistan shocked Gandhi and left him feeling helpless and undervalued (Desai 2001, 109; Chakrabarty 2006). But it also revealed that he underestimated the influence of violent modalities in colonized and decolonized societies. This paradox of violent realities and nonviolent ideologies also played right into Nehru's framing of the Non-Aligned Movement, which maintained a politicized neutrality against superpowers and advocated mutual non-aggression and peaceful co-existence. Simultaneously, however, India itself was embroiled in violent conflicts with its neighbors, thus maintaining a fundamentally contradictory approach to violence throughout and after the Cold War.

In tracing the shortcomings of Gandhi's understanding of violence, it becomes, paradoxically, imperative to rescue Fanon from a longstanding association with ideas of violence as leading to the creation of new men, violence as mobilizing and cleansing, and violence as inevitable. Re-reading Fanon in juxtaposition with Gandhi sheds light on Fanon's deep engagement with violence as *a priori*, as the cause and not merely the effect of anticolonial revolution. Fanon's essays in *The Wretched of the Earth* and *A Dying Colonialism* demand a close and sympathetic reading in light of the extraordinarily violent postcoloniality that he seems to have seen with such prescience. While extricating and reinstating Fanon is important when it comes to the discourse of violence, this is certainly not a hagiographic mission. I also look at ways in which Fanon misgauged the Franco-Algerian war and at the consequences of those miscalculations. A comparison of his view of the ongoing war with Mouloud Feraoun's reflections from the ground certainly highlight some of Fanon's more serious blind spots.

In approaching Gandhi and Fanon from these standpoints, I have identified a peculiar problem that I am calling an "epistemic bifurcation." Understanding the formation of both figures and the specific natures of their theories reveals the challenging nature of simultaneously performing the roles of leader and thinker. In their writing, both Gandhi and Fanon attempt to theorize, historicize, and structure a problem while at the same time trying to resolve that problem pragmatically. The primary intent in generating the knowledge itself remains fraught and reveals a kind of epistemic difference and anxiety. Some of this can be located in both of their writing styles, which alternate between frenzied and reflective, nearsighted and farsighted, and philosophical and strategic. Thus, Gandhi's and Fanon's works walk a fine line between theory and practice—on the one hand, there is an attempt to objectively theorize anticolonial revolutions everywhere, while on the other hand, both thinkers formulate ideas with a sense of utilitarian urgency. There are clear attempts to incite anticolonial sentiment and potential action, and

to offer immediate solutions to those participating in the uprisings. A re-evaluation of selections from their large bodies of work, with an eye toward theories that did not successfully translate into action, highlights important ways in which civil and internecine violence came to be the mainstay of several postcolonial countries in the aftermath of colonialism.

The fraught nature of performing the dual roles of leader and thinker is foregrounded and seen as the primary epistemic tension once the revolutionary phase is over and the nation-building phase intersects with the ominous and supremely powerful machinations of the Cold War. The resulting push-pull dynamic, as well as the strong-arming by Cold War actors, yielded ruptures in their theories that had a direct effect on the way in which the paths of the new countries were charted and envisioned. Thus it is important to consider Gandhi's and Fanon's conceptions and critiques of "nation." As newly independent countries adopted the framework of nation as their main operating structure after colonialism was over, the precise nature of a postcolonial nation as envisioned by these two thinkers came to occupy an almost disproportionate influence as future trajectories were charted. While the longevity of Gandhi's life and career and the brevity of Fanon's makes this comparison seem imbalanced and perhaps unfair, similar factors in their formation and coming-of-age as revolutionaries had a significant impact on how their thinking was shaped. Both were loyal subjects of empire until they were inadvertently drawn into confrontations based on skin color, and this led to a radical re-structuring of their views of colonialism and its production of racialized identities. Both men, after sincerely exploring pragmatic vocational paths (barrister and psychiatrist, respectively), found that their professional work led them directly into anticolonial work, and this happened while they were both living far away from their places of birth—Gandhi in South Africa and Fanon in Algeria. While several biographies enable a comprehensive understanding of the multiplicity of roles that Fanon and Gandhi straddled during their lives, my intervention is staged with an eye toward failures and blind spots. The writings of Fanon and Gandhi during the anticolonial struggles reveal several shortcomings in the theorizing of violence and nationalism, two paradigmatic approaches that shaped Cold War relationalities as they played out globally and, to a large degree, neocolonial futures as well. As they developed wide-ranging and expansive theories on the subject of liberation from imperialism, they also displayed specific blind spots: Hinduism in the case of Gandhi, and Algeria for Fanon. It is, however, important to keep in mind that while Fanon's work was often written in urgent haste and was meant for immediate impact, Gandhi's reflections on his own life and ideas took place over a decade after he had established himself as an activist. However, Gandhi's speeches and letters could certainly be seen as having more immediacy, and here, they have some synergy with Fanon's writing.

Gandhi and the Disciplining of Bodies

Though the types of resistances to colonialism were varied—large and small, local and national, sporadic and organized—it cannot be denied that violence, while its scale varied, played a potent and pervasive role in all aspects of these mass movements. The national liberation struggle envisioned and executed by Gandhi in British India is often regarded as a unique and somewhat legendary example of an anticolonial struggle that practiced a largely nonviolent form of resistance. Now, almost 70 years later, the irony inherent in India and Pakistan's cloven histories reveals itself clearly. While the era of decolonization brought with it the shocking violence of partition, postcolonial India continues to be afflicted with a virulent form of civil violence, leading to ethnic cleansings and ongoing communal strife primarily rooted in religion. Always blamed on a tendency toward "mob rule" (Srivastava, Verma, and Ugra 2007), and often discounted as a spontaneous eruption of riots perpetrated by mobs, it is in reality a highly deliberate, politically motivated, and usually state-sanctioned form of violence. Next door, postcolonial Pakistan suffers under military regimes and the constant civil strife that such oppressive leadership generates, which shows no sign of receding given additional recent factors such as the War on Terror. Meanwhile Homi Bhabha considers Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* more pertinent than ever and has claimed that Fanon's reflections on emerging national histories "quickens the long shadows cast by the ethnonationalist 'switchbacks' of our own times, the charnel houses of ethnic cleansing: Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Gujarat, Sudan" (Bhabha 2004, xvi). Bhabha's focus here is on Fanon's ability to predict the kind of fate that the postcolony would come to endure, and indeed, reading Fanon retroactively reveals his extraordinary foresight.

While the literature by and about Gandhi is certainly vast, there seems to be little debate on how he came to create and advocate the philosophy of nonviolent resistance, arguably making it the core strength of the Indian struggle for independence. While in South Africa in 1907, Gandhi was exposed to the writings of Henry David Thoreau—in particular his essay "On the Duty of Civil Disobedience"—which influenced Gandhi's thinking considerably and which he even translated into Gujarati (Gandhi, *Collected Works* [CWMG] 1999, 7: 187, 201). The principles of civil disobedience and passive resistance implemented by Gandhi yielded swift results at the time, and he sought to translate the terms into Gujarati for his newspaper *Indian Opinion*, arriving eventually at the term satyagraha, which meant truth-force or soul-force (Gandhi, CWMG 1999, 8: 80). In the years that followed, calling it satyagraha also allowed Gandhi to substantially broaden the term and incorporate into it his longstanding preoccupations such as dietetics, celibacy, simplicity of life, vegetarianism, self-discipline, religiosity, and self-suffering. The concept of satyagraha also grew richer through the use of sources from the *Bhagavad Gita*, the

Bible, and the writings of Leo Tolstoy and John Ruskin. Eventually Gandhi distanced the practice of satyagraha from passive resistance, and even made exaggerated declarations such as, "Satyagraha differs from Passive Resistance as the North pole from the South" (Gandhi 2000, 6).

Gandhi wanted satyagraha to be seen as a science, selecting terminology to give it the appropriate objectivity and empiricism, and thus using the term experiments (Tidrick 2007, 84). Not only did truth here become a relative and elastic idea but the experimental aspect of turning satyagraha into a science gave Gandhi the freedom to try out various iterations of conscience training, rigorous discipline, natural cures, and religious learning at Phoenix, his settlement in the Transvaal region of South Africa. It is here that Gandhi also began honing a strong sense of "atonement." At Phoenix, "Gandhi began sniffing out 'impurity' in his little group of followers. He would then 'atone' by fasting with the belief that lapses of others were due to imperfections in himself" (70). These were the early beginnings of Gandhi's political strategies, during which the hunger strike became an important constituent of satyagraha. By this stage in Gandhi's career as activist and spiritualist, the concept of satyagraha had almost been perfected, and its final element, the vow of *bramhacharya* (celibacy), was also eventually included. By the time Gandhi left South Africa for India in 1914, he was ready to deploy his revolutionary technique for the purpose of gaining India's independence from the British.

However, in *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, Partha Chatterjee looks at Gandhi's understanding of satyagraha as an articulation of "negative consciousness," and until the failure of the satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act in 1919,[1] Gandhi did not see the need to concern himself with anything other than the "spontaneous strength of popular resistance to injustice." In fact, Gandhi was not thinking through the "precise degree of maturity before the masses could be asked to join a satyagraha, or about the organizational and normative safeguards against the inherent unpredictability of a negative consciousness playing itself out in the political battleground" (Chatterjee 1986, 104). With regards to Gandhi's notions of maturity, two issues came to light: first, the question of whether peasant resistance could indeed be confined to nonviolent forms and, second, whether there needed to be trained leaders of satyagraha. For Chatterjee, the Rowlatt satyagraha also showed that *ahimsa* (nonviolence) was indeed the most necessary aspect of satyagraha—it supplied Gandhi with the moral framework that successfully addressed the "disjuncture between morality and politics" (107). Here, *ahimsa* as a method of political action did not depend on the masses fully comprehending Gandhi's theories of satyagraha, but it did require those select leaders to make decisions. Gandhi went on to declare that "before restarting civil disobedience on a mass scale, it would be necessary to create a band of well-tried, pure-hearted volunteers who thoroughly understood the strict conditions of satyagraha" (105). Thus,

there is a troubling top-down hierarchy that immediately reveals itself in this arrangement: the selected leaders lead the discontent masses, who are seen as nothing more than bodies to be disciplined for an anticolonial revolution.

Also connected to the above ideas is Gandhi's approach to the issue of "mob violence." Gandhi depicted the masses that appeared in the political arena as a mob and characterized them as "half-educated raw youths" possessed of "false ideas" and easy to train since "they have no mind, no premeditation. They act in frenzy. They repent quickly" (107). The patronizing tendency inherent in this dismissal of the masses as uneducated and unintellectual, the idea that morally implemented nonviolence is the only solution, and the inability to engage them as anything other than bodies for revolution reveal a fundamental failure on Gandhi's part. For him, the mob was a flaw in the otherwise well-honed theory and strategy that was satyagraha—an attitude revealed in this small sampling of Gandhi's quotations on the mob. I searched digitally through the *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, a massive archive of over 55,000 pages in 98 volumes, comprising everything Gandhi wrote during his lifetime (letters, telegrams, speeches, essays, and more). Here are some examples:

> The actions of the mobs during the disturbances also have been unworthy and of a highly condemnable character.
>
> (CWMG 1999, 18: 125)

> We, who are living in this Presidency, cannot but contrast the Punjab proceedings with those at present going on in Ahmedabad. Nothing that was done in Hafizabad could surpass the wicked and wanton cruelty of the mad mob at Viramgam.
>
> (CWMG 1999, 18: 432)

> I would venture to present this thing in connection with these riots. I consider that the action of this mob, whether in Ahmedabad or in Viramgam, was totally unjustified, and I have thought that it was a very sad thing that they lost self-control. I do not wish to offer the slightest defence for the acts of the mob, but at the same time I would like to say that the people among whom, rightly or wrongly, I was popular were put to such severe stress by Government who should have known better. I think that Government committed an unpardonable error of judgement and the mob committed a similar unpardonable error, but more unpardonable on the part of the mob than on the part of the Government. I wish to say that also as a satyagrahi, I cannot find a single thing done by the mob which I can defend or justify. No amount of provocation, however great, could justify people from doing as they have done.
>
> (CWMG 1999, 19: 227–8)

The Rev. Mr. Bailey's house stands on an isolated piece of ground, about two miles from Wazirabad and a mile from Nizamabad. So much for the mob action, for which there is no justification. The destruction of an innocent and popular missionary's house makes the action all the more regrettable and reprehensible. We have not been able to find out any particular motive for this action, save that the mob had yielded to an anti-European fury.

(CWMG 1999, 20: 127)

We must therefore scrupulously avoid all occasions which would excite the passions of the mob and lead them into undesirable or criminal conduct.

(CWMG 1999, 23: 139)

When a mob becomes unruly, it knows no better; when the police become unruly, their action is deliberate and unpardonable. The mob frenzy can be controlled, the police frenzy spells disaster for an unprepared people.

(CWMG 1999, 25: 422)

Mobocracy is autocracy multiplied million times.

(CWMG 1999, 30: 35)

Democracy is an impossible thing until the power is shared by all, but let not democracy degenerate into mobocracy.

(CWMG 1999, 40: 422)

In this archive, the use of the word "mob" occurs with great frequency during three historical moments of the Indian independence struggle: right after the failure of the Rowlatt satyagraha; during and after the Jallianwala Bagh massacre of April 1919, in which British troops fired on nonviolent protesters; and in the aftermath of the Chauri Chaura incident, when clashes between protesters and police led to the killing of 23 policemen. The quotations above reflect Gandhi's frustration around the time of these three episodes and reveal a few common themes: mob behavior is a product of unrestrained passion, it is unpardonable and indefensible, it has no justification whatsoever, mob violence and mob behavior stem from a character flaw that can be controlled or fixed, and, finally, mob rule is a type of autocracy that is the opposite of democracy. In his short essay "Democracy 'versus' Mobocracy," Gandhi writes that, "India is passing through the mob-law stage." He goes on to offer solutions for overcoming this phase. Gandhi insists that mob violence is not the same as war, which he believes is "disciplined destruction"—if violence must be part of the freedom struggle, it would have to be disciplined and honorable. Desai and Vahed, insisting that Gandhi's Anglophilia

might have something to do with how satyagraha theory evolved, claim that "a *satyagrahi* invested a certain amount of trust in his opponent and throughout Gandhi's political life, that opponent was ostensibly a European one (English most often) from whom he seemed to expect a certain level of 'fair-play'" (2015, 23, italics in original). This preoccupation with fair play explains Gandhi's predilection to see war through the glorified lens of discipline and objective balance.

In addition to offering a 20-point manual on how mobs can discipline themselves with the help of accomplished volunteers, Gandhi also believed that playing music, as in some European countries, might control "the mischievous tendencies" of the mob. Gandhi's thinking stems from very pragmatic concerns regarding activism and organizing for the cause of the freedom struggle. How can there be a successful and effective protest, Gandhi seems to be pondering. But even though incident after incident of violence goes against the principles of *ahimsa* and the rules of the satyagraha, Gandhi does not seem to realize that the shortcomings might be embedded in the strict theoretical code that he has developed. Theory and practice here reveal an early epistemic difference, and the failure became obvious when the independence struggle, during the Partition of India into India and Pakistan, culminated in some of the bloodiest violence the region had ever experienced, much to Gandhi's shock, horror, and surprise (Leifer 2001, 109).

Gandhi was long dead when the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) developed its mission in which then Indian Prime Minister Nehru played a decisive role. But his spirit haunted the Bandung conference of 1955. Siba N. Grovogui's essay on Malek Bennabi, a prominent Arab intellectual, claims that Bennabi not only viewed Bandung as a "bearer of salvation for humanity" but insisted that it was founded on Gandhian and Tagorian ideas at its very core (qtd. in Phạm and Shilliam 2016, 64–5). Elsewhere, Grovogui illustrates that Nehru's longstanding political party, the Indian National Congress (INC) was founded with the support of the Theosophical Society in Britain and thus emphasized the creation of an "ethos of spirituality, tolerance and togetherness," and this type of spiritual instinct was emphasized in the Bandung communiqué (123). It is not necessarily easy to prove in an objective manner, but it does seem that Gandhi's emphasis on spirituality infected Bandung and, in turn, affected Nehru's conception of NAM. As I argue later in the chapter, it devolved into a bundle of contradictions since Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence, while alluring, was tone deaf to the reality of the violence of colonialism, and this was mirrored in Nehru's inability to maintain a peaceful non-aggression during the peak of Cold War interventions in the postcolonial world.

Fanon and Violence: Misreadings and Misappropriations

At this juncture, it is crucial to reflect on the ways in which Frantz Fanon understood and theorized violence as an almost elemental offshoot of

colonialism. Fanon's posthumously published *The Wretched of the Earth* has often been viewed as a call to violent action against the colonizer, as a radical militant anthem for all oppressed peoples, and as a deeply controversial ideology of resistance. However, embedded within the anxious haste of the rigorous ten weeks (Gordon, Sharpley-Whiting, and White 1996, 4) within which Fanon composed *The Wretched of the Earth* and dictated it to his wife, Josie (Philcox 2004, 245), there lay some disconcerting and timely predictions about what the postcolony would go on to become. Simone de Beauvoir described him as having a dark, hesitant air that lent his works "an enigmatic quality as though they contained obscure, disturbing prophecies" (qtd. in Bhabha 2004, xli). Written at the cusp of Algerian independence and at the end of the author's life, Fanon's last work pulses with intuitive urgency: he was deathly ill with cancer and fully aware that this was to be his legacy. *The Wretched of the Earth* seems to have been his attempt to make a larger contribution to the study of colonialism and decolonization in Africa.

Colonial violence begins with the colonizer, who, according to Fanon, "does not alleviate oppression or mask domination. He displays and demonstrates them with the clear conscience of the law enforcer, and brings violence into the homes and minds of the colonized subject" (Fanon 2004, 2). During decolonization, it is this exact unchecked, destructive, and tireless violence that is "appropriated" by the colonized. Further reinforcing that the origins of violence lie with colonial power, Fanon defines decolonization as "an encounter between two congenitally antagonistic forces that in fact owe their singularity to the kind of reification secreted and nurtured by the colonial situation." He explains that "in its bare reality, decolonization reeks of red-hot cannonballs and bloody knives. . . . This determination to have the last move up to the front . . . can only succeed by resorting to every means, including, of course, violence" (3).

Using a generalized psychological analysis of the colonized people (a population he frequently treated as a psychiatrist and knew intimately), Fanon explains the process that leads a person to employ violence by mapping it onto a single individual. Somewhat reminiscent of Albert Memmi's treatment of the same subject, he creates an emblematic portrait of the colonized man living in an atmosphere where a reservoir of repressed fury is beginning to manifest itself consciously and where the desire to be a "man" instead of the "thing colonized" is omnipresent. He writes,

> The muscles of the colonized are always tensed. It is not that he is anxious or terrorized, but he is always ready to change his role as game for that of hunter. The colonized subject is a persecuted man who is always dreaming of becoming the persecutor.
>
> (16)

In fact, even the dreams of the colonized man are infused with a physicality, action, and "aggressive vitality," and through these, he subconsciously

frees himself. The problem implicit in the unleashing of this aggression is obvious to Fanon, and it is herein that one can locate a point of entry into later internecine violence as well. In what appears to be a projected anger,

> the colonized subject will first train this aggressiveness sedimented in his muscles against his own people. This is the period when black turns on black, and police officers and magistrates don't know which way to turn when faced with the surprising surge of North African criminality.
>
> (15–16)

In fact, Fanon states that this violent rage erases all common sense and that while the colonized might be beaten and humiliated by the colonizer

> it is not uncommon to see the colonized subject draw his knife at the slightest hostile or aggressive look from another colonized subject.... Internecine feuds merely perpetuate age-old grudges entrenched in memory. . . . Here we grasp the full significance of the all too familiar "head-in-the-sand" behavior at a collective level, as if this collective immersion in a fratricidal bloodbath suffices to mask the obstacle and postpones the inevitable alternative, the inevitable emergence of the armed struggle against colonialism. So one of the ways in which the colonized releases his muscular tension is through the very real collective self-destruction of these internecine feuds. . . . The colonized subject loses sight of the colonist through religion. Fatalism relieves the oppressor of all responsibility since the cause of wrongdoing, poverty and the inevitable can be attributed to god.
>
> (18)

The above passage is a description of the behavior and mindset of the subject, but further explanation of this phenomenon can be found in Fanon's chapter titled "Colonial War and Mental Disorders." Here he elaborates on this surge of violence amidst the Algerians, claiming that "in a colonial situation the colonized are confronted with themselves. They tend to use each other as a screen" (230–1). The reason for this is often material—poverty, debt, starvation, unemployment, and fatigue. Fanon writes of this evocatively:

> Exposed to daily incitement to murder resulting from famine, eviction from his room for unpaid rent, a mother's withered breast, children who are nothing but skin and bone, the closure of the worksite and the jobless who hang around the foreman like crows, the colonized subject comes to see his fellow man as a relentless enemy.
>
> (231)

He likens this situation to a concentration camp where the imprisoned fight among each other for breadcrumbs.

One of Fanon's aims here is to disprove previously published psychological studies on North Africans, predictably infused with racism and condescension—the notion that this criminality is a "natural" trait given underdeveloped minds and psyches, childlike manners, and lack of reason. Fanon claims that this internalized and repressed violence changes course dramatically as soon as the anticolonial war begins; the protagonists and antagonists in this war are identified, which allows for directing the aggression at the occupier. By framing the question of this malaise through the lens of colonialism and its apartheid policies, he is able to show that, with the onset of the war, criminality diminishes drastically since "the screen" is no longer required. During the war of national liberation, there occurs an absolute reversal; the internecine fighting comes to a halt as families can offer soldiers their only donkey or share their meal. The anticolonial war creates a moment of unity in spite of the material conditions even though this "violent praxis is totalizing" (50). Fanon's ideas about the war and the communal sharing and generosity that it facilitates are certainly romantic, and indeed almost utopian.

Though Fanon was a spokesperson for the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), an ardently radical writer for *El Moujahid*, a psychiatrist for fighters and tortured combatants, and a staunch critic of the French Left, his posthumous fame became focused on his singular observation about violence during decolonization. He wrote that decolonization "fundamentally alters" the colonized man's sense of self: "It infuses a new rhythm, specific to a new generation of men, with a new language and new humanity. Decolonization is truly the creation of new men" (2). This observation about the new men formed through the use of violence has been consistently viewed as a detrimental and dangerous idea. James Le Sueur, in his comprehensively researched intellectual history of the French Left during the Franco-Algerian war, and also in his introduction to Mouloud Feraoun's translated journals, remains a staunch critic of Fanon's ideas. Like many of Fanon's critics, Le Sueur's understanding of Fanon reveals a strong ambivalence. He criticizes Fanon's faith in violence as a cleansing, revolutionary force that would liberate the oppressed subject by "erasing colonial identity through anticolonial violence" (2000b, 272). He also opens up a debate about Fanon by filtering it through the opinions of some of the prominent intellectuals of the time. For example, Jean Daniel, of the journal *La Blessure*, was disgusted by how much Fanon's ideas smacked of revenge and claimed they were futile in terms of any real negotiations or reconciliation. Le Sueur seems to favor Pierre Bourdieu's objective, analytical, and ethnographically framed understanding of Algerian violence, which was very unlike Fanon's, whose understanding was more dangerous due to its ability to turn into direct practice. Bourdieu firmly believed that Fanon's lack of concern with the traditional Algerians'

inclinations toward Islam, coupled with the eagerness of Algerian leaders to apply Fanon's "celebratory" attitude toward violence and his belief in the "avant-garde revolutionary peasantry" (285), was detrimental to the understanding of the Algerian struggle and eventually led to the creation of a highly volatile postcolonial, post-independence Algeria: "The end result was that Sartre and Fanon's visions of revolutionary identity and Algeria epistemologically recolonized Algeria's political leadership after the war" (Le Sueur 2010, 2). In his book on Algerian civil war since 1989, Le Sueur pointedly blames Fanon:

> The Front de Liberation Nationale's (FLN) revolutionary heritage, embodied in the violent theories of authenticity articulated most clearly by the adopted revolutionary Frantz Fanon, culminated in the state's vision of the nation that pitted unity against individuality, authoritarianism against liberalism, national identity against ethnic and regional differences, and Arabic against other indigenous languages and French.
>
> (2)

While it makes sense that anticolonial adoption of violent ideologies becomes a factor in embedding the violence epistemologically and onto-logically within society, it does seem that Bourdieu's (and by extension Le Sueur's) reading of Fanon tends to be more simplistic than *The Wretched of the Earth* gives evidence of. It is also somewhat reductive when seen in the light of the precarious and complex position that Fanon found himself in during the war. Le Sueur simultaneously overestimates and understates Fanon's role in the war and in postcolonial Algeria. He emphasizes that Fanon was "neither Algerian nor Muslim but a Black psychiatrist from Martinique in the French West Indies" (Le Sueur 2000a, xxvii). By reminding readers of the fact that Fanon was not native to Algeria, Le Sueur inserts a primary doubt about the ways in which Fanon would comprehend and interpret the struggle. By juxtaposing his life trajectory with that of the "elder" (and thus more experienced) Feraoun, he further establishes that Feraoun "lived" through the violence and that Fanon was merely a "revolutionary outsider" (Le Sueur 2000a, xxvii). In the same breath, however, Le Sueur insists that Fanon's influence on the Algerian war as well as on postcolonial Algeria was significant and unparalleled, and that it continues to have far-reaching consequences to this day. These contradictions and ambivalences remain at the heart of Le Sueur's interpretation of Fanonian afterlives.

It was not that Fanon called for violence and it occurred—it was that violence was everywhere in Algeria and he wrote of it as an inevitable result of a revolution in which he had a profound faith. Biographer David Macey's detailed reading of Fanon's "terrible" book and the context surrounding its publication gives the controversy that placed Fanon in the

role of an instigator of violence some breathing room, and provides a more generous space for Fanon's writings by elaborating the chain of events that led to the dissemination of Fanonian ideas about violence (2000, 461). Macey writes about the way in which Jean-Paul Sartre's preface to *The Wretched of the Earth* created a grave risk for the book: "Sartre wholeheartedly endorses the thesis that violence can be cleansing or even therapeutic, and that the colonized man cures himself of his colonial neurosis by driving out the colon by force of arms" (459). However, it was Sartre's comment that "leaving aside the fascist rantings of George Sorel, Fanon is the first person since Engels to have discussed the role of the midwife of history" (459) that created an even more troubling interpretation of Fanon's ideas. According to Macey, this comment "obscures Sartre's own contribution to Fanon's stance on violence," and the reference to Sorel becomes a "red herring" (460).

Placing Fanon and Sorel in relation to one another created a false consensus around Fanon's theories of violence. Hannah Arendt, for example, takes Fanon's debt to Sorel for granted when she claims,

> Much can be learned from Sorel about the motives that prompt men to glorify violence in the abstract. . . . Fanon, who had an infinitely greater intimacy with the practice of violence than either [Sorel or Vilfredo Pareto], was greatly influenced by Sorel and used his categories even when his own experiences spoke clearly against them.
> (Arendt 1970, 71)

Macey tries to dispel this connection when he argues that Sorel writes of violence as a "mobilizing myth which will eventually bring about an apocalyptic transformation of society rather than a contemporary reality" (2000, 461). For Fanon, however, there is nothing mythical about violence in Algeria; it is simply a daily reality. There was no evidence that Fanon had been influenced by Sorel, and Sartre's conjoining of the two thinkers entirely distracted from Fanon's much more nuanced understanding of how violence functions in a colonized society and, eventually, during decolonization.

Thus it comes to be that Sartre's powerful but misleading preface overshadows Fanon's book—Jean Daniel and many other thinkers from the French Left gave it far more attention than Fanon's actual work. In Macey's opinion, Daniel misreads the Sartre text in a "spectacular fashion," viewing it as a book about blacks and whites rather than colonizer and colonized or Europeans and natives. He also believes that Daniel's anger was reserved mostly for Sartre (2000, 463–7). There might be some truth to this claim: Daniel was well aware of Fanon's speech in Accra about the necessity of violent struggle against the colonized three years before it was published, and had been told that it was a moving and profound moment (371). Thus Fanon's ideas in his last work could not have come

as a big surprise to him. The preface had acquired a difficult afterlife and when Sartre officially declared his support for the Zionist cause, Josie Fanon asked for the preface to be omitted from all future editions of *The Wretched of the Earth*.

   Macey does not falsify Fanon's thesis on violence and admits that it did form the crux of his work. Fanon's limited political experience and the blunders it led to jointly with the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA) are also well documented in Macey's biography. But he does criticize Jean Daniel, Jean-Marie Domenach, and Hannah Arendt, who have turned Fanon into a figure who glorifies violence for its own sake:

> Fanon does not "glorify" violence and in fact rarely describes it in any detail: there are no descriptions of what happens when a bomb explodes in a crowded café and when shards of glass slice human flesh. The violence Fanon evokes is instrumental and he never dwells or gloats on its effects. In a sense, it is almost absurd to criticize Fanon for his advocacy of violence. He did not need to advocate it. The ALN [Armée de Libération Nationale] was fighting a war and armies are not normally called upon to justify their violence. By 1961, the violence was everywhere. It had even seeped into the unconscious. A schoolteacher "somewhere in Algeria" set his pupils, aged between ten and fourteen, the essay topic "What would you do it you were invisible?" . . . They all said that they would steal arms and kill the French soldiers. The children of Algeria dreamed of violence, and two of Fanon's young patients in Blida acted out those dreams. "Our prosperous societies" do not have nightmarish dreams of massacres in Sétif or Philippeville or torture in their schools. Algeria had been having those nightmares for over a century.
>
> (475)[2]

Here, Macey is revealing the obverse manner in which Fanon's work had been received. Fanon's preoccupation with the impact of colonial violence on the Algerian subject, particularly children, can be found in his essay compilation *L'An V de la révolution algérienne* (1959), translated into English as *A Dying Colonialism*. In its preface, Fanon quotes from a Swedish report on Algerian refugees drawn up by Mrs. Christian Lilliestierna:

> The next in the line was a boy of seven marked by deep wounds made by a steel wire with which he had been bound while French soldiers mistreated and killed his parents and his sisters. A lieutenant had forcefully kept the boy's eyes open, so that he would see and remember this for a long time.

> This child was carried by his grandfather for five days and five nights before reaching the camp.
>
> The child said: "There is only one thing I want: to be able to cut a French soldier up into small pieces, tiny pieces!"
>
> Does anyone think it is easy to make this child of seven forget both the murder of his family and his enormous vengeance? Is this orphaned child growing up in an apocalyptic atmosphere the sole message that French democracy will leave?
>
> (Fanon 2007, 26)

In the above passage, Fanon explains the psychological processes that lead to violent acts against the agent of oppression and the ways in which this might generate political agency. Relatedly, Macey states, "In a sense, it is the term 'violence' itself that is so scandalous; had Fanon spoken of 'armed struggle' the book would have been much less contentious" (2000, 475). Fanon's theories were certainly misread, but in the coming years they were also misappropriated. Whether it is Le Sueur's insistence on blaming Fanon for the civil violence that gripped Algeria or Hannah Arendt's characterization of him as a lip-smacking promoter of violence, there is no doubt that Fanonian theories traveled far and wide, and that they remain more relevant than ever to re-configuring our understanding of divisive decolonization in post-independence countries and the deliberate violence set in motion by the Cold War.

Gandhi's and Fanon's ways of understanding violence differ over the question of the disciplining of colonial subjects and over the role that violence can play in revolution. Gandhi believes that the colonized can be mentally and physically disciplined to revolt through nonviolent means, and Fanon instead sees that counterrevolutionary violence can actually free and energize the already overdisciplined and brutally repressed body of the colonized subject. Regarding the role of violence itself, both Gandhi and Fanon seem to acknowledge that there is an agency inherent in deploying violence, and both thinkers seek to map out strategies to cope with the totalizing phenomenon that is colonial violence. Fanon accepts its existence and, to a degree, finds it insurmountable. His pragmatic solution is to prepare members of the FLN to endure the tortures that they will undergo through exercises that can strengthen their minds.

Offering victims of torture protection and counsel is yet another strategic intervention in the ongoing revolution. Case No. 4, included in the chapter "Colonial War and Mental Disorders," narrates the story of a European police officer who actively tortured Algerians and sought Fanon's psychiatric help. However, the same torturer's Algerian victim, who was also recovering at the same hospital, went missing after spotting his torturer and attempted to commit suicide in the bathroom. Fanon's staff worked long and hard to "convince him he had been deluding

himself, that policemen were not allowed inside the hospital, that he was tired, and he was here to be cared for, etc." (Fanon 2004, 196). This is just one example that illustrates how Fanon's constantly evolving techniques for healing and re-strengthening the victims' psyches were pivotal during the French-Algerian war.

Gandhi's satyagraha techniques and the lifestyle changes that he advocated along with them were also developed as a response to colonial violence. Gandhi's ashram and Fanon's hospital were physical spaces that could be seen as interstices through which one learned to cope with colonial violence. In a way, both Gandhi and Fanon willingly submitted revolutionary bodies into the vortex of war, but the kind of clearheaded theorization of violence that Fanon engaged in would have been incomprehensible, and possibly repugnant, to Gandhi. While Gandhi felt that moral purity could overcome any violent situation, Fanon was more concerned with imbuing the already violently radicalized colonial subject's violence with a moral and political high ground.

Both thinkers, however, set into motion an understanding of revolutionary violence that remains rooted in an epistemic duality. Gandhi's and Fanon's works walk a fine line between theory and practice—on the one hand, both thinkers attempt an objective theorizing of anticolonial revolutions everywhere, while, on the other hand, they both formulate ideas with a sense of pragmatic urgency. There are clear attempts to incite anticolonial sentiment and potential action and to offer immediate solutions to those participating in the uprisings. Though very different at the outset, the writings of both leaders reveal a constant back and forth between two styles, two objectives, and two personalities, which make the works alluring, urgent, and complex; but at the same time they remain difficult to characterize on the level of form, or even genre. The actual timeliness of the unfolding revolutions leaves less actual time for pushing theoretical formulations to their most radical ends, and in the case of Fanon, his final and most potent work exhibits a fragmented, sometimes unfinished, quality. Gandhi, on the other hand, remained mired in deliberations with the British and had to patiently negotiate all sorts of paperwork for committees and hearings. While some stretches in prison did allow him time for reflection, he remained a man of action, and his goal of being the perfect *satyagrahi* was always his first priority. Thus his most influential and important theories are often embedded in letters and speeches. With regards to the Cold War, my goal is to illustrate that Gandhi's ideas were very influential in Nehru's conception of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Nehru's version of NAM displayed some iterations of Gandhi's epistemic dualities: moral, nonviolent and spiritual in intention but not quite able to convert that into pragmatic policy. Nehru presided over several small wars with neighboring nations and the non-alignment model predicated on no violent engagement seemed to mirror Gandhi's own nonviolent philosophies which seemed flaccid given the materiality of

violence in the subcontinent at the time. Fanon, meanwhile, experienced the early period of the Cold War firsthand and managed to predict not just the inherent colonial bias inherent in international diplomacy but the ways in which violence in the Third World was continually justified by the superpowers and practiced without any conscience.

The Question of Nation: Gandhi's Blind Spots

These interplays of action and reflection create within Fanon and Gandhi an epistemic bifurcation. This can be located in their theoretical interventions that are attempting to generate and unsettle knowledge about concepts that are key for revolution, such as violence and nationalism. Here, a core contradiction reveals itself: Violence, for example, is seen as disruptive, and its role is certainly criticized, but it is also viewed as an idealized marker of agency and power. These epistemic bifurcations are also manifested in Fanon's and Gandhi's explorations of nationalism, and fairly dire blind spots reveal themselves: these include the importance of Hinduism within Indian nationalism for Gandhi—with an almost overly idealized understanding of *Ram Rajya*—and Algerian nationalism for Fanon. Gandhi's ideals of nation are plagued by various ambiguities and paradoxes. While on the one hand he opposes representative democracy on the grounds that it breeds individual self-interest, on the other he promotes a Hindu ideal grounded in the figure of a moral and patriarchal leader. While Gandhi's views on nationalism are dense and theoretically complex, on the practical level of post-independence governance, what exactly is he proposing? To form a nation free of violence, greed, immorality, and industrialization, Gandhi is in essence proposing a state that would relinquish all control over the national economy, would not have a national army, and would be based on a moral duty to its people. Chatterjee writes that while Gandhism remained firm in its ideals, it was not able to "specify concretely the modalities of implementing this as a viable political practice" (1986, 117). In addition, the concept of nation becomes more muddled and contradictory when the issue of Hindu-Muslim unity is considered.

Tracing the origins of Gandhi's overall intellectual formation by placing it "entirely outside the thematic of post-Enlightenment thought" (100), Chatterjee writes,

> Gandhi claimed that it was a moral failure on the part of Indians that led to the conquest of India. . . . It is not the backwardness or lack of modernity of India's culture that keeps it in continued subjection. And the task of achieving freedom would not be accomplished by creating a new modern culture for the nation. For Gandhi, it was precisely because Indians were seduced by the glitter of modern civilization that they became subject people. And what keeps them in

subjection is the acceptance that by leading sections of Indians of the supposed benefits of civilization. . . . Even if they succeed physically in driving out the English, they would still have "English rule without the Englishman," because it is not the physical presence of the English which makes India a subject nation: it is the civilization which subjects.

(86)

Thus, at the outset, in attacking the Indian attraction to civilization, Gandhi formulates a fundamental moral critique of the national elite who are the primary adherents of such an ideology and participants in the double-layered suppression of the peasant masses—the suppression by English rule and the more localized suppression at the hands of the Indian bourgeoisie who are engaged in a mimicry of the colonizers and are seduced by industrial technology and Western economics. Gandhi wants to abolish industrialization itself, and, repulsed by the urge for excess and competition, he invents an anticolonial philosophy that progresses through moral, economic, psychological, social, and eventually political stages. By first cleansing oneself of the greedy and immoral allure of Western goods and technology, the individual begins weaving his own *khadi* (cloth), thus achieving liberation at an economic level and, consequently, at a psychological level. If self-sufficient communities of *khadi*-making people were established, then the social and communal bonds would be strengthened, leading eventually to the formation of a revolutionary polity.

It is also via the *khadi* program that he attacks the foundations of the discourse on civil society. Chatterjee discusses this at length, stating that Gandhi objects to the entire notion of representative democracy wherein parties and alliances based on individual interests interact and manipulate each other in the guise of serving the society's needs. Gandhi claims that such a party-driven form of representation alienates the leaders from the population they claim to represent. Furthermore, it leads to a detachment from political values due to an overemphasis on self-interest, "in which the wealthy and the powerful enjoy disproportionate opportunities to manipulate the machinery of the government to their own sectional interests" (91).

Gandhi's ideal for politics and society was also based on the concept of a moral utopia (which he referred to as *Ram Rajya*), wherein every member of the society and the patriarchal ruler are moral and truthful, thus liberating them from practices that are self-serving and self-fulfilling. Here the ideology shaping the Gandhian political movement comes into play, as he attempts to reconcile

at one and the same time, its integral parts: a nationalism which stood upon a critique of the very idea of civil society, a movement supported by the bourgeoisie which rejected the idea of progress,

the ideology of a political organization fighting for the creation of a modern national state which accepted at the same time the ideal of an "enlightened anarchy." Clearly there are many ambiguities in Gandhism.

(101)

While ambiguous, it was certainly a startling example of theorizing outside the box of post-Enlightenment thinking and also of shaping a very original discourse of anti-nationalist ideas within an anticolonial movement.

The question of viable political practice crops up in any discussion of Gandhi's philosophies. His subversive politics cut through the core of every colonial import, from economy to lifestyle to social organization and even gender constructions. Ashis Nandy writes sensitively on this subject and explains Gandhi's countering of the homology of the "adult" colonial versus the childlike colonized, and also his reinvention of gender frameworks. He directly defies the ideology of adulthood, as evidenced by the many references to his childlike smile and the descriptions of his manner as childlike and childish. Nandy observes, "His infantile obstinacy and tendency to tease, his immature attacks on the modern world and its props, his juvenile food fads and symbols like the spinning wheel—all were viewed as planks of a political platform which defied conventional ideas of adulthood" (1983, 56). While Nandy connects this to Gandhi's ideas of history and of self, I prefer to view it as part of a general Gandhian approach to spiritual purity that often embodies the quality of a childlike innocence, the clean slate of morality, and the purging of greed and dishonesty. It was also a way to hold the attention of the masses that he commanded and to convince them of his inner innocence and goodwill. Gandhi's simple writing style, often in the form of parables, is also evidence of the deliberate stance of childlike purity, an unattainable ideal to be striven for and thus superior to the moral and spiritual corruption represented by adulthood. On the subject of gender, Nandy finds that Gandhi stressed the concept of *Naritva*—the essence of femininity— discussed in Sanskrit scriptures, wherein one finds "a closer conjunction between power, activism and femininity than between power, activism and masculinity" (53). Gandhi propagated this idea in order to subvert the hyper-masculinity of colonialism as well as the hyper-masculinity it induced in the anticolonial ideology.

Armed with his formula of satyagraha and with many volunteers for its practice, Gandhi not only ushered the Indian freedom struggle into a decisive new phase of anticolonial revolt but in fact introduced a strengthened version of nationalism. To some degree, the local leaders and intellectuals had laid the groundwork starting in the early 20th century by inciting rage against the injustices of colonialism. Gandhi came on to the scene armed with a unique ideology and, more importantly, offered an actual method

to counter the existing amorphous flux of the anti-British sentiment. How, then, did India's adoption of the principles of nonviolence give way so quickly to a bloody partition into India and Pakistan? The multiple historical factors and the multiple powerful actors that influenced this decision have been explored quite extensively in books and films—the Muslim League's aversion to being dominated by the Indian National Congress, the historic space reserved for Hindu nationalism within the Congress, and the mobilization of the Muslim provinces by A.L. Jinnah and others for a two-state solution, as well as the popular theory that blamed the British "Divide and Rule" policy, which drove a furious wedge between the two religious groups.

In a way, Gandhi was perceived as an outsider to the unfolding of these events because of his strict adherence to nonviolence. However, he remained a powerful and important leader right up until his death and continued to be able to influence the masses. On the surface level, Gandhi's methods for uniting India and resisting the British had an opaque simplicity emphasizing truthfulness, honesty, moderation, and tolerance. Focusing on the question of the class of Untouchables created by the oppressive Hindu caste system, Gandhi strove to change the deep-seated prejudices by changing the terms with which this group was addressed and treated. He was also considered to have championed the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity from the early phases of the struggle, and toward the end of his life, he desperately pleaded with both communities to stop slaughtering each other in the name of religion. He was shot to death by a fundamentalist Hindu, Nathuram Godse, who acted in order to end his call for equality and tolerance of Muslims. While everything reached a pitch of chaos and violence in the last years of Independence and Partition, a retrospective consideration of Gandhi's views and writings on the Hindu-Muslim issue reveals some disturbing inconsistencies.

Gandhi sincerely propagated the idea of one tolerant, united nation, but his leanings toward Hindu scriptures and Christian writings in all of his political and philosophical ideas have been documented. The sources from Gandhi's derivation of satyagraha and *ahimsa* are not just located in ancient Hindu texts but also borrowed from the Bible's Sermon on the Mount. The influence of close friend and English cleric C.F. Andrews on Gandhi was significant. Evidence of Gandhi's close reading of the Biblical texts can be found in his writing style and also his speeches, which were often in the form of parables and generously sprinkled with tenets such as "turn the other cheek" or "love thy neighbor." Nandy states that, due to Gandhi's reliance upon Biblical ideas,

> he knew well that he would have to fight hard in India to establish his version of non-violence as "true" Hinduism or as the central core of Hinduism. . . . In the 150 years of British rule prior to Gandhi, no

significant social reformer or political leader had tried to give cen-
trality to non-violence as a major Hindu or Indian virtue.

(51)

Thus Gandhi's obvious use of Hindu and Christian ideas, as well as the use
of Hindu terminology and linguistic bases, overshadows to some degree the
many gestures he made to the Muslim community in India. These would
include his symbolic refraining from becoming an enlisted member of the
Indian National Congress, and his constant references to the assimilated
Hindu-Muslim populations. There is a sense that Gandhi took Hinduism
and its influence upon him for granted and, in so doing, managed to appeal
to the Hindu population on a very natural linguistic and cultural level.
There is no evidence to indicate that this alienated the Muslims, and there
were several devoted leaders of the Muslim faith who were avid followers
of Gandhi's movement. Yet, while he fused Hinduism and Christianity as a
mode of reconciling India and England, Gandhi left out Muslim religious
sources entirely.

Gandhi took a strong position on Hindu-Muslim unity as soon as he
arrived in India from South Africa in 1915, and he did not waver from
this position, preaching nonviolence, tolerance, and joint Hindu-Muslim
efforts to oust the British. He referred to the relationship as "a daily-
growing plant, as yet in delicate infancy, requiring special care and atten-
tion" (Gandhi 1921), but he failed to create a viable discursive space
in which Hindus and Muslims could co-exist. In 1921, he complained
that "the Mussalman masses do not still recognize the same necessity
for Swaraj (self-rule) as the Hindus do. The Mussalmans do not flock
to public meetings in the same numbers as the Hindus" (Gandhi and
Hingorani 1965, 15). He thus urged Hindus to make a special effort to
"draw out" their Mussalman neighbors. When asked about the tricky
question of interdining and intermarriage between the two communities,
Gandhi reacted with surprise and asserted that these two ideas were bor-
rowed from the West. He determined that both were "not necessary fac-
tors in friendship and unity, though they are often emblems thereof" (16).
Finally, he concluded, "I hold it to be utterly impossible for Hindus and
Muslims to intermarry and yet retain intact in each other's religion" (17).
Coming from the very Hindu perspective, which believed that food was
a private and sacred matter, he found the whole line of questioning to be
manipulative, Western, and artificial. Gandhi had a hard time reconciling
his deeply embedded Hindu beliefs and practices with notions of interre-
ligious socialization and engagement. He seems to have been advocating
a separate togetherness or mutual tolerance, and he remained a staunch
proponent of those ideas.

In many areas, a hegemonic Hindu discourse would overtake the usu-
ally fair and nonjudgmental leader. In a particularly disconcerting obser-
vation, Gandhi begins by stating that religious environments have made

Hindus and Muslims different, though they are essentially of the same stock, and that these environments transform their characters. He goes on to identify the ways in which Hindus and Muslims are quite different in character from one another:

> The Mussalman, being generally in a minority, has as a class developed into a bully. Moreover, being heir to fresh traditions, he exhibits the virility of a comparatively fresh system of life. Though, in my opinion, non-violence has a predominant place in the Quran, the thirteen hundred years of imperialistic expansion had made the Mussalmans fighters as a body. They are, therefore, aggressive. Bullying is the natural excrescence of an aggressive spirit.
>
> The Hindu has an age-old civilization. He is essentially non-violent. His civilization has passed through the experiences that the two recent ones are still passing through. If Hinduism was ever imperialistic in the modern sense of the term, it has outlived its imperialism and has either deliberately or, as a matter of course, given it up. Predominance of the non-violent spirit has restricted the use of arms to a small minority, which must always be subordinate to a civil power highly spiritual, learned and selfless. The Hindus, as a body, are, therefore, not equipped for fighting. But not having retained their spiritual training, they have forgotten the use of an effective substitute for arms, and not knowing their use nor having an aptitude for them, they have become docile to the point of timidity or cowardice. This vice, is, therefore, a natural excrescence of gentleness.
>
> (47–8)

This passage displays a particularly biased and superficial attitude, expressed in the basest of anthropological terms. Gandhi constructs a dangerous binary: the Muslim as an aggressive bully—thus violent by nature, and the Hindu as docile and physically weak—thus nonviolent by nature. Speaking of Hindus as belonging to an age-old civilization and claiming that they are done with usurping power generates extremely false, prejudiced notions of the self, of history, and of religious culture. Gandhi's insistence that Hindus are "naturally" nonviolent and inclined to the spiritual reveals his worst blind spot. It also reinforces the idea that it was indeed only Hindus who potentially were "naturally" prepared for satyagraha and its principles of nonviolence, thus yet again excluding other religious populations from an anticolonial struggle that was now starting to seem like it was only designed for Hindus.

Anthropological and theoretical studies have established the dialectical relation between the notions of violence and nonviolence in the context of Hindu thought and tradition. In the provocative anthology *Violence/Non-Violence: Some Hindu Perspectives*, scholars aim

to illustrate that "how the concepts of violence and non-violence are defined cannot be understood if they are disassociated from each other. . . . Violence very frequently legitimates itself in the name of non-violence as well" (Tarabout, Vidal, and Meyer 2003, 12). The collection sheds light on various processes through which violence becomes institutionalized. Christopher Jaffrelot traces the rise of Hindu militarism from the early stages of the freedom movement (2003). In fact, popular anticolonial leaders such as Lokmanya Tilak and Veer Savarkar, who were key figures in the freedom struggles, had made a case for a specifically Hindu form of violent resistance. This was based on a *realpolitik*-influenced reading of the *Bhagavad Gita* and was radically opposed to Gandhi's forms of nonviolence. Jaffrelot includes some striking quotations from the trials of Nathuram Godse, Gandhi's assassin, who justified and glorified the killing using these arguments, even fancying himself a modern-day Arjuna, who was forced to kill loved ones for the sake of a cause. It is hard to imagine why Gandhi took such an unquestioning and partisan stance toward Hinduism. The problems inherent in his call for a united India certainly reveal themselves to be riddled with contradictions, and they show no real attempt on Gandhi's part to overcome his own blind spots.

Later in the struggle, when the two-state idea finally took root and started to look like a real possibility, Gandhi opposed it with his usual deliberate simplicity. At a session in Lahore, he declared India a joint family, and further proclaimed,

> The vast majority of Muslims of India are converts to Islam or are descendants of converts. They did not become a separate nation as soon as they became converts. A Bengali Muslim speaks the same tongue that a Bengali Hindu does, eats the same food, has the same amusements as his Hindu neighbor. They dress alike. I have often found it difficult to distinguish by outward sign between a Bengali Hindu and a Bengali Muslim. The same phenomenon is observable more or less in the South among the poor who constitute the masses of India. When I first met the late Sir Ali Imam I did not know he was a Muslim. His speech, his dress, his manners, his food were the same as of the majority of Hindus in whose midst I found him. . . . Hindus and Muslims of India are not two nations. Those whom God has made one, man will never be able to divide.
>
> (Hasan 1993, 70)

This passage shows a complete reversal in Gandhi's original conceptions of Hindu and Muslim identities. The Muslim League's needs had been articulated for almost two decades by the time Gandhi wrote this—the fear of the Indian National Congress as the main party, the resistance to being viewed as a minority group, the need for a cultural

and religious space that was not subsumed into Hindu culture and politics, and the need for equal power in governance. From a separate togetherness and mutual tolerance, Gandhi makes a desperate and sincere case for both groups' being deeply assimilated and impossible to tell apart, and thus indivisible.

Here, Gandhi reveals yet again an underestimation of the Muslim group's sense of self and identity. Jinnah passionately argued that the difference between the two groups was immense—food, dress, social habits, religious philosophies, historical sources, and literatures—and stressed that the two rarely intermarried or dined together. Gandhi's position by this point has taken on the manner of a patriarch trying to resolve a quarrel between two siblings, and his tone to some degree reveals a disturbing paternalism, a lack of complex analysis, and an unpragmatic solution to the situation at hand. Perhaps unconsciously, he stresses that the Muslims were merely converts and thus were potentially Hindu in an earlier epoch. His claim regarding the cultural and linguistic assimilation between the two religious groups was probably only applicable to Bengal and some regions in the south. The rest of India presented a different picture, as he himself had admitted over a decade before. The true social ethnography of difference between the people of the two religions is not entirely relevant here, but what becomes evident is that Gandhi now (and perhaps too late) profoundly undermines unity by coercing the two to exist under the hitherto nonexistent rubric of the "Indian." And his use of analogies of plants and families only serves as evidence of his infantilization of the deep dilemma of worsening Hindu-Muslim tensions.

Thus, even though he had an immense and spellbinding power over the masses, Gandhi left many gaps for Pakistan propagandists to view his message as somewhat lopsided and communal. Gandhi's idealization of the *Rama Rajya* cannot be directly blamed for the growth of Hindu fundamentalist movements today but it does appear that a conceptual space has been carved out in Indian politics, and civil violence has become its most distressing aftermath. In my view the language becomes evidence of an inherent ideological strain of religious communalism that Gandhi refused to confront head on. Gandhi's protégé and ardent disciple, Nehru, who went to become independent India's first prime minister, himself admitted some discomfort:

> I used to be troubled sometimes at the growth of this religious element in our politics. . . . Even some of Gandhi's phrases sometimes jarred upon me—thus his frequent reference to Rama Raj as a golden age which was to return. But I was powerless to intervene, and I consoled myself with the thought that Gandhiji used the words because they were well known and understood by the masses. He had an amazing knack of reaching the heart of the people.
>
> (qtd. in Chatterjee 1986, 151)

Nehru was reluctant to criticize Gandhi's Hindu-influenced language and ideas at the time, partially because several aspects of Gandhi's language were foundational for Nehru himself as a leader and thinker. It is crucial to examine what Nehru inherited from Gandhi as he went on to shape the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) during the Cold War and implement a foreign policy that attempted to reconcile Gandhian paradoxes such as violence and nonviolence, modernity and tradition, and an imperialist nationalism over a humbler, progressive sort of nation-building. Thus India entered the Cold War mired in the contradictions of Gandhian theories and though these specters of Gandhi are rarely admitted into official discourses of foreign policy and Cold War histories, they are embedded epistemologically in ways that are not immediately perceptible but can only be characterized as fragmentary traces.

Fanon's Algeria as Idealized Nation

Fanon's interventions into nationalism certainly had echoes of Gandhian ideas. He was just as concerned as Gandhi was with the relationship between the masses (primarily peasants) and the nationalist bourgeoisie (intellectuals, business elite, and party leaders), as well as with the fundamental spatial, economic, and ideological dichotomies of the rural and the urban. According to Fanon, the peasants in the rural areas were clear that they wanted to usurp the colonizer's place and take back the land through violent means. The urban/rural binary was a large hurdle since the supporters of these nationalist parties were primarily urban voters and were attempting to profit from the colonial situation to some degree. The intellectuals also remained far too individualistic and assimilated for Fanon's taste. The sad result of this was that "the peasantry [was] systematically left out of most of the nationalist parties' propaganda" (Fanon 2004, 23). While they pillaged, burned, and killed, the nationalist parties distanced themselves from the people's struggle in order to reach a nonviolent compromise with the colonizers.

In Fanon's eyes, this compromise was a form of profit-mongering and a betrayal of the struggle. Yet in hindsight it reveals the early chasms between the different sections of society that are bound to come to the fore, perhaps even more violently, when independence has been won. Questions of modernity, technology, and progress only widened the gap between the two groups,

> so it is understandable that the clientele of the nationalist parties is above all urban: technicians, manual workers, intellectuals, and tradespeople living mainly in the towns. Their way of thinking in many ways already bears the mark of the technically advanced and relatively comfortable environment in which they live. Here "modernism" is king. These are the very same circles which will oppose obscurantist

traditions and propose innovations, thereby entering into an open conflict with the old granite foundation that is the national heritage.

(2004, 65)

As the peasants migrated to the towns, the distrust between the two groups worsened. Dividing the social classes further was the extremely complicated strategy for creating a national consciousness, culture, and ideology. The colonialists manipulated the antagonism between the rural and urban and further revived tribal identities. The existing gap had already broadened into an acrimonious rivalry, and it came to plague nation formation during decolonization. Herein, we can also locate the origins of what later turned into a bitter civil war.

Fanon writes that national consciousness is nothing but a

> crude, empty, fragile shell. The cracks in it explain how easy it is for young, independent countries to switch back and forth from nation to ethnic group and from state to tribe—a regression which is so terribly detrimental and prejudicial to the development of the nation and national unity.

(97)

He singularly blames the apathetic nationalist bourgeoisie for not sufficiently inspiring this somewhat unnatural process of nationalist awakening. Furthermore, he claims that the bourgeoisie play a double game of hoarding resources and profiting from Western capitalism while pretending to appeal to anticolonial sentiment and attempting to create a nation. It is to them that Fanon attributes the creation of a "narrow-minded nationalism," which relies too heavily on foreign trade and systematic oppression through the army, thus leading to corruption, decay, and often dictatorships that loom on the horizon.

The answers are obvious to Fanon—to transition into a peaceful and prosperous postcolonial phase, the nationalist bourgeoisie should display an impeccable and selfless commitment (much like in Gandhi's ideal universe), the leadership should be genuine and humane, the youth should be employed, the rural should be prioritized, and socialism should be privileged over capitalism. Fanon even goes so far as to say that perhaps the bourgeois phase can be effectively skipped and resolved through revolutionary action since it cannot pave the way for national culture. Macey has rightly observed that

> for Fanon, the nation was a product of will, and a form of consciousness which is not to be defined in ethnic terms; in his view, being Algerian was a matter of willing oneself to be Algerian rather than of being born in a country called Algeria.

(2000, 378)

Fanon thus acknowledges that the concept of nationalist consciousness is rudimentary, abstract, and to some degree something that is imposed from elsewhere onto a people instead of organically arising from "within." But while he admits that nationalism might be an inappropriate and fundamentally weak idea, he does not take this inquiry further by offering any other methods to unify the multiplicity of identities existing in a colony. For Fanon, the process of attaining national consciousness is hierarchic and linear—that is, from territorial, tribal, or ethnic identities, a group eventually progresses into a national identity. For example, he writes,

> The Africans and the underdeveloped peoples, contrary to what is commonly believed, are quick to build a social and political consciousness. The danger is that very often they reach a stage of social consciousness before reaching the national phase. In this case the underdeveloped countries' violent calls for social justice are combined, paradoxically enough, with an often primitive tribalism.
>
> (2004, 143)

As with his theories on violence, we can detect a split here: he criticizes nationalism by calling it crude and empty but at the same time he idealizes it as a higher, important stage within a revolution, a paradox that seems hard to reconcile.

Thus, while being cognizant of the fact that violence and nationalism are fundamentally problematic ideas, he persists in elaborating an engagement with them, despite the likelihood of serious repercussions. There is an odd paradox in Fanon's ability to be farsighted and nearsighted at the same time. Fanon mediates the split position on violence and nationalism by holding the nationalist group and new leadership responsible for not having a generous and expansive vision of the world. Though he relies primarily on his understanding of Senegal's post-independence history and the hatred of Islam and Arabs that rose to the surface there, he is generalizing when he writes,

> Since the only slogan of the bourgeoisie is "Replace the foreigners," and they rush into every sector to take the law into their own hands and fill the vacancies, the petty traders such as taxi drivers, cake-sellers and shoe shiners follow suit and call for the expulsion of the Dahomeans or, taking tribalism to a new level, demand that the Fulani go back to their bush or back up on the mountain. . . . This ruthless struggle waged by ethnic groups and tribes and this virulent obsession with filling the vacancies left by foreigners also engenders religious rivalries.
>
> (2004, 105–6)

It is the bourgeoisie he blames for the postcolonial problems caused by their "ultranationalism, racism and chauvinism" (104). It is also them he

rebukes and chastises, and it is to them that he attributes all postcolonial conflicts. It slowly becomes evident that this might be the targeted object of *The Wretched of the Earth*. Fanon is quick to blame the nationalist bourgeoisie as a group, but he does not suggest an alternative form of leadership. While he praises Bandung or Accra, he does not seem to acknowledge that the leaders he is praising (Sekou Touré or Kwame Nkrumah) belong precisely to the group of pragmatist, nonviolent, urban, reformist bourgeoisie who he criticizes elsewhere.

In terms of a theory, Fanon's ideas are solid, but as practice, they lack any guidelines on how to decenter the leadership by shifting it from the urban metropole or on how to avoid the pitfalls of adopting a colonial mode of government, law, and economics for the new nations. Part of this stems from the fact that he does not attribute to Algeria the problems he diagnoses in other postcolonial societies, demonstrating again that Algeria was indeed his blind spot. When he wrote his book in 1961, a great euphoric intensity inhabited the moment of Algerian unity and seeming national consciousness. While he criticizes other African countries and also Brazil, he intersperses references to "we Algerians" throughout the text—for instance, "We Algerians during the course of this war have had the opportunity, the good fortune, of fully grasping the reality of a number of things" (131). He meant that the FLN created clear communication systems, kept the masses informed and engaged, and cultivated dependent relationships between the various echelons of society.[3] Fanon assumed that the Algerians were on the right path and would not end up meeting the same fate as other postcolonial states.

Fanon's ideas about Algerian nationalism, communal sharing, and generous intermingling between groups are romantic and overly idealistic. He observes that the internecine divisions between various Algerian groups disappear as soon as the war of national liberation begins. The anticolonial war creates a moment of unity in spite of the material conditions, even though this "violent praxis is totalizing" (50). Meanwhile Mouloud Feraoun's reflections on living in close proximity to the same war make a completely different, contradictory claim. As the daily brutality takes its toll, Feraoun speaks of the fatigue experienced by the people. He writes,

> Money is demanded of them, they do not know where to get it, they have to provide shelter for the maquis members and feed them good meals,[4] they have to cease all contact with the French and still manage not to lack anything. All of them have to become outlaws and obey—albeit blindly—only the outlaws. Those in charge of the village arouse both fear and admiration. They are well dressed, large, fat and arrogant. They have already taken power. They are already independent. Yet there are all the others who are dying of hunger,

terror, and suppressed anger. One of these days, it's going to get tough for the independents.

<div style="text-align: right">(Feraoun 2000, 188–9)</div>

Feraoun experienced the war firsthand and depicted the bullying, aggressive conditions under which rebels demanded hospitality. Though Fanon's writings on nationalism predict and outline every possible postcolonial pitfall, it is his solidarity with the Algerian cause and his aversion to critiquing it that explains why he glosses over the problems that were occurring during the war. Feraoun's version of the war is a poignant and indispensable contribution to the writings on the subject, as it charts the hideous civil war being waged against his own Kabyle people by the predominantly Arab FLN. It is clear to him that it will indeed "get tough for the independents" once independence arrives and the cycle of violence begins yet again, but this time, the violence is internal to Algeria. Feraoun is very clear about his distress regarding the FLN. As early as 1956, when the FLN rebels carry out a massacre in the western Kabyle town of Palestro, he writes,

> They were machine-gunned. Their farms were burned down because they were the enemy, and nothing more. Has the time for unbridled furor arrived? Can people who kill innocents in cold blood be called liberators? If so, have they considered for a moment that their "violence" will engender more "violence," will legitimize it, and will hasten its terrible manifestation? They know that people are unarmed, bunched together in their villages, immensely vulnerable. Are they knowingly preparing for the massacre of "their brothers"? Even by admitting that they are bloodthirsty brutes—which in any case does not excuse them but, on the contrary, goes against them, against us, against the ideal that they claim to defend—they have to consider sparing us so as not to provoke repression. Unless liberation means something different for them than it does for us.

<div style="text-align: right">(84–5)</div>

While Feraoun articulates his questions and concerns in a straightforward manner, Fanon hesitates to make his questions specific to Algeria. He is likely to have known about these problems and certainly was aware of the murder of Abane Ramdane and also the scandal of the Melouza massacre,[5] but when he makes observations similar to Feraoun's, he poses them for a generalized African postcoloniality. He points out that

> obviously the violence channeled into the liberation struggle does not vanish as if by magic after hoisting the national colors. It has even less reason to disappear since nation-building continues to operate

within the framework of critical competition between capitalism and socialism.

<div align="right">(Fanon 2004, 35)</div>

Fanon also understands that a dystopian future awaits the African post-colony when he writes,

> Between colonial violence and the insidious violence in which the modern world is steeped, there is a kind of complicit correlation, a homogeneity. The colonized have adapted to the atmosphere. Independence brought dignity and moral reparation but there has not yet been time to elaborate a society and build and ascertain values.

<div align="right">(40)</div>

In my opinion, it is perhaps possible to soften the positions taken by Fanon and Feraoun on the war by acknowledging that each played a different yet necessary role. Feraoun wrote frankly about the daily brutalities of Algeria and Fanon wanted to create a text for the African continent and was thus always hesitant to criticize Algeria due to his position as being a public defender of the war.

Feraoun's journal also exposes the gaps in Fanon's knowledge of the FLN's daily practices dictated by religious fanaticism and ethnic rivalries. Even in the early stages of the war, Feraoun expresses his disdain for the FLN rebels' expectations:

> They include prohibitions of all kinds, nothing but prohibitions, dictated by the most obtuse fanaticism, the most intransigent racism, and the most authoritarian fist. In a way, this is true terrorism. There is nothing left to do for the women of T.A. except to shrill with enthusiasm in honor of the new era of freedom that they seem to perceive beyond the foggy horizon that our dark mountains inexorably obstruct. It is forbidden to call for a doctor (?), for a midwife, especially for a midwife (?), or a pharmacist (?). And on top of this, one must welcome, according to our most hospitable tradition, our brave visitors who put on the airs of heroes and apostles, just as we would welcome the great saints of Islam one knows so well.

<div align="right">(Feraoun and Le Sueur 2000, 53)</div>

Part of the problem was that Fanon's Marxist and atheist sensibilities led to a dismissive attitude toward religious or ethnic consciousness among people, and he did not concern himself with assimilating varied identities into a nationalist one or even with the national project of developing secular thought, even though he brought up the potential identity wars quite often. Despite its shortcomings on many counts, Fanon's examination of different classes of this society during decolonization illustrates

his pessimism about the new nations. This, in turn, becomes crucial for understanding the impending internecine wars that essentially display a failure of nationalism and the corrupt, faulty leadership of the nationalist bourgeoisie, topics explored by Fanon in some depth.

Once again, the idea that Fanon was not just a thinker but also an active participant in the revolution becomes central to understanding his theoretical shortcomings. He was an honorary Algerian who had been granted a Tunisian passport with the name Omar Ibrahim Fanon. He was closely associated with the key FLN members and traveled to many places advocating the anticolonial cause, notwithstanding two serious assassination attempts and a CIA-monitored hospital stay in the United States. More importantly, though he did not experience the war as a victim or as a soldier, he certainly saw it up close as its primary psychiatrist, confronting a huge influx of torture victims, fatigued soldiers, and patients suffering from general trauma as they fled to Tunisia. As a writer and spokesperson for the FLN, Fanon had been put in a position of defending the struggle at any cost, especially to what he saw as a paternalistic and impotent French Left. His writings on psychiatry are scholarly and researched, but his writings on politics, society, and culture stand at the nexus between theory and practice. The sweeping generalizations, the prophetic tone, the dialogic style, the frequent references to "we Algerians," and the psychological interpretation of politics are the product not just of a haste precipitated by impending death but also of a final coming together of a Fanonian legacy that was meant to be both a theoretical manifesto and a call for practical shifts toward understanding, living with, and eradicating colonialism.

Gandhi, Fanon, and Reverberations in the Cold War Era

Gandhi and Fanon explored and propagated varied understandings of violence and nationalism, and after their deaths, these ideas were subsumed within the postcolonial Cold War era. While Gandhi died before the Cold War machinations became the tangible reality of decolonizing and independent countries, the influence of his ideas reverberated in Nehru's founding of the powerful NAM.[6] Nehru has said that independence-era India was an "authentic Gandhian era and the policies and philosophy which we seek to implement are the policies and philosophies taught to us by Gandhiji" (Datta-Ray 2015, 212). But a vision of a Gandhian foreign policy and international relations strategy, particularly during the Cold War, meant that Nehru struggled to reconcile Gandhi's anti-modernity and anti-technology philosophies with the pressures of modernization and science-based forward thinking that nation-building engendered. NAM took inspiration from the Gandhian legacy by becoming "the moral force of a political subjectivity grounded in non-violent struggle," and it traced "a direct line from the anticolonial struggle to

independent India's foreign policy worldview" (Abraham 2008). Deep K. Datta-Ray argues that NAM was indeed a product of Nehru's adaptation of Gandhian thought, and this was because "to be non-aligned is not to succumb to the sticks and carrots meted out by the soliciting superpowers, but to actively engage that violence with resistance" (2015, 213). NAM was inspired by Gandhi's insistence on nonviolence, and nuclear disarmament was a key concern. Satyagraha and *ahimsa* were thus mobilized in ways that allowed Nehru to experiment with new, creative registers of international diplomacy. NAM thus offered a third option for the developing and decolonizing Third World countries so they would not have to be aligned with either of the superpowers.

There was no doubt that the non-aligned philosophy was a rich and capaciously drawn policy for a newly independent Third World that did not want to bow down to the binaristic and deeply imperial ethos dictated by the Cold War powers. But it also was riddled with a Gandhian epistemic bifurcation; the praxis stage seemed unattainable. I would certainly blame some of this confused scramble of Gandhian and Nehruvian articulations for the somewhat bewildering and contradictory ways in which the NAM progressed during the Cold War. Sadly, violence was embedded and unshakeable at its foundations whether it was colonialism, neocolonialism, or that Cold War that was to blame. Despite the vow to embrace mutual non-aggression and peaceful co-existence, countries like Egypt and India continued to arm themselves quite heavily. India fought two wars with Pakistan and one with China during this time. Nonviolence seemed like a distant fantasy and India's modernity-driven imperial desires could never entirely prevent it from becoming the region's bully power. The Gandhian legacy offered moral imperatives but eventually failed to offer a truly resounding understanding of violence as it had imbricated itself into postcolonial society. Gandhi's death in 1948 meant that while his ideas and legacy continued to reverberate through the post-independence sphere, even he was not an actual player in the Cold War's collusion with postcoloniality.

Fanon, however, came of age as a thinker and leader within the actual climate of the Cold War, and he had the opportunity to observe firsthand some of the machinations and interventions put into place at the time. He had a lot to say about the precise nature of the confrontation that the Cold War and decolonization were engaged in on a global scale. As all the colonies across the vast Third World found themselves in various states of extrication from their colonial powers (anticolonial wars, decolonization, postcolonial independence), Cold War politics cut across and through these various stages since the colonial powers were now part of a brand new alignment dictated by the United States and the USSR, which Fanon also refers to as the "competition between capitalism and socialism" (Fanon 2004, 35). The Soviet-American rivalry put in place a dangerous paradigm where winning over newly decolonized countries

on one side or the other meant a disastrous arms race supplemented by a culture war in order to sway hearts and minds at the level of values and ideology. Violence as an episteme, as a strategy, and as a resource remained central to the politics of the Iron Curtain. Fanon offers a careful understanding of the fluctuations around the implementation of violence and spends a significant portion of his essay "On Violence" exploring the ways in which there comes to be a disconnect between the colonized masses' desire for the unmitigated annihilation of the colonial world and the colonized intellectuals' dialogue with the colonial bourgeoisie.

Fanon is aware that the Cold War brings about a paradigm shift for ongoing liberation struggles as well as for the nation-building phase. He writes that the current struggle waged by colonized countries is determined by a new capitalist economics that has evolved from slavery and that has turned the colony into a market with the colonial population as its consumer base: "What the metropolitan financiers and the industrialists expect is not the devastation of the colonial population but the protection of their 'legitimate interests' using economic agreements" (27). This effectively alters the role of violence, and the question of "whether the economic zones are safeguarded" becomes paramount (27). Fanon writes of what I believe is the coming of a new Cold War paradigm:

> Artillery shelling and scorched earth policy have been replaced by an economic independency. The crackdown against a rebel sultan is a thing of the past. Matters have become more subtle, less bloody; plans are quietly made to eliminate the Castro regime. Guinea is held in a stranglehold, Mossadegh is liquidated.
>
> (27)

Here, Fanon invokes Cuba and the American attempts to remove Castro from power, which sparked the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. He also alludes to the difficult position that Guinea's socialist leader Sekou Touré found himself in when he was held in an economic stranglehold by France after independence. And finally, he writes about Mohammed Mossadegh of Iran, who was indeed overthrown in a coup orchestrated by Britain and the United States in an attempt to stop the leader from nationalizing the oil industry and auditing the accounts of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) (Kinzer 2003). All three references show the struggle of leaders and countries wishing to adopt a socialist paradigm but being forced into brutish confrontations with the capitalist powers. He believes that this competition between socialism and capitalism chokes the Third World materially and militarily as it tries to build a nation, but it also simultaneously puts all Third World struggles onto the global stage: "This competition gives a quasi-universal dimension to the most local of disputes. Every meeting, every act of repression reverberates around the international arena" (Fanon 2004, 35). Fanon is certain that the Third World is aware

of being forced into a frenetic game as it hears news that "the sixth or seventh U.S. Fleet is heading toward some coast or other, when Khrushchev threatens to come to Castro's aid with the help of missiles, when Kennedy envisages drastic solutions for Laos" (36). Here, Fanon claims that the colonized have now become habituated to an atmosphere of "perpetual backlash."[7] The question he raises is whether the decolonized population can elaborate and work toward the creation of a new nation given the international constraints and the Cold War paradigm that now has most of the world in its grip. The answers he provides are certainly prescient, and they offer an understanding of why violence becomes a further totalizing praxis in the event of the Cold War.

Fanon suggests that rockets from both sides do not scare away the colonized people, since their recent history of decolonization has made them accustomed to continual and universal violence. They have a clear sense of why Cold War machinations push away Patrice Lumumba or Phoumi and Phouma of Laos. Trapped and aware that their fate is being decided elsewhere, the colonized masses are not surprised when all politeness and courtesy leaves the annals of diplomacy. They are not surprised when their national spokespersons refuse to obey any etiquette and rage against the assemblies. No one is shocked when Khrushchev brandishes his shoes at a United Nations conference or when Fidel Castro arrives in a military uniform. As the world of international diplomacy avoids all confrontation and keeps up the façade of objectivity, the Third World is caught between two blocs that feed and maintain violence.

However, this Cold War confrontation is certainly not opposed to neutrality. Fanon explains that this neutrality is a hypocritical sham:

> There is much to be said on the subject of neutrality. Some liken it to a kind of loathsome mercantilism which consists of taking handouts left and right. But although neutrality, a creation of the cold war, allows underdeveloped countries to receive economic aid from both sides, it does not permit either of these two sides to come to the aid of underdeveloped regions the way they should. Those literally astronomical sums invested in arms research, these engineers transformed into the technicians of nuclear war could raise the living standards of the underdeveloped countries by 60 percent in fifteen years. It is therefore obvious that the underdeveloped countries have no real interest in either prolonging or intensifying this cold war. But they are never asked for their opinion. So whenever they can, they disengage. But can they really do so? For example, here is France testing its atomic bombs in Africa. Even allowing for the resolutions, the meetings and slammings of the door on diplomatic relations, it cannot be said that the African peoples had much impact on France's attitude in this particular sector.
>
> (40–1)

This strongly worded passage on neutrality, diplomacy, and survival in the Cold War era immediately offers a counterpoint to the NAM's many shortcomings. Once again, it is Gandhi's lofty moralistic legacy and Fanon's pragmatic analysis of the facts at hand that seem to be at odds with one another. While the leaders of various independent countries attempted to design a foreign policy that would neither align with superpower blocs nor create an even more fragile environment with a third bloc, Fanon understood these endeavors as an impossibility.

Adekeye Adebajo explains that to understand Africa's current international relations, it is not just the colonial era or the Cold War between the United States and the USSR that must be better understood, but also France's role as an unofficial "big power" (2010, 4). Adebajo evokes France's arrogant declaration of Africa as a *chasse gardée*, a private hunting ground, and it is precisely this ownership and its pernicious effects that Fanon understood very clearly. While Fanon did believe that neutrality imbues the Third World citizen with a brazenness and defiance, along with a "staunch refusal to compromise" and a "sheer determination to go it alone" that disconcerts the Western observer, it was clear to him that underdeveloped countries have no actual interest in the Cold War and certainly were not being asked for their opinion.

Fanon grasped the symbolic force of resisting the Cold War blocs, but he knew full well that in the realm of the real, violence remained the be-all and end-all in the Cold War arena. In light of Fanon's observations, it does appear that the NAM in reality was just as inconsistent as other Gandhian legacies—nonviolence and satyagraha, for example. Potent as an idea but almost impossible to execute, NAM countries compromised their own principles again and again. India developed an appetite for nuclear weapons, and the country continues to suffer from a virulent and violent nationalist strain. Egypt plunged into a cult-of-personality regime with Hosni Mubarak, and Yugoslavia succumbed to full-fledged civil war. In hindsight, the NAM did not effectively shield its members from the sort of violence that Fanon seemed to understand as cyclical and unavoidable.

The complicated legacies of Gandhi and Fanon offer a retrospective understanding of the staggering violence that gripped the postcolonial Cold War universe. Both leaders and thinkers experienced an "epistemic bifurcation" that created a dichotomy in the way they understood and disseminated knowledge about the revolutions at hand. The urgency with which philosophical and theoretical knowledge had to be turned into strategic praxis often led to blind spots and misgauged situations. This had deep repercussions on the ways in which theories of violence and nation were articulated and practiced, and in a way, these leaders can be seen as playing an instrumental role in how Cold War machinations impacted the postcolony. Clearly, I see Gandhi and Fanon as very vital in their contributions; but the investigation intensifies with more

prolific and beloved leaders such as Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral, and Thomas Sankara, whose work and lives are explored in some depth in the next chapter. Taking us out of Asian and North African contexts, these leaders from sub-Saharan Africa illustrate epistemic dualities, but more importantly, since they were all murdered at a young age: considered together, they illustrate the importance of theorizing time—empire time, revolutionary time, nation time—and ways in which these collapsing, colluding temporalities come together to offer insights into the ways that the emerging postcolonial nations were in some sense stillborn and thus forced into fragile, sometimes failed, trajectories.

Notes

1. Passed by the British government in India in February 1919, the legislature allowed cases to tried without juries and imprison suspects without trial. It resulted in public uproar and the organization of several protests under Gandhi's leadership.
2. Here, Macey refers to "A quoi rêvent les enfants d'Algérie?" *Les Temps Modernes* 164 (October 1959): 720–724.
3. Fanon's exact formulation is,

   > The flow of ideas from the upper echelons to the rank and file and vice versa must be an unwavering principle, not for merely formal reasons but quite simply because adherence to this principle is the guarantee of salvation. . . . Once again we Algerians quickly understood this, for no member of the upper echelons has been able to take precedence in any mission of salvation. It is the rank and file which fights in Algeria and they are fully aware that without their difficult and daily heroic struggle the upper echelons would collapse—just as they are aware that without the upper echelons and leadership the rank and file would disintegrate into chaos and anarchy.
   >
   > (2004, 138)

4. The term *maquis* in Feraoun's work refers to "members of the resistance; here, Algerians who fought against the French during the French-Algerian war" (Feraoun 2000, 335).
5. Abane Ramdane was a young member of the FLN of Kabyle origin who was assassinated. Details can be found in Ait Benali (2007). In June 1957, the FLN massacred up to 374 males in the village of Melouza for their support of the rival faction MNA (Mouvement National Algérien). The FLN insisted that it was the French who perpetrated this massacre.
6. NAM was first founded in Belgrade in 1961 by India's Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, Indonesia's Sukarno, and the former Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito.
7. My translation of the original "*secousse universelle*." Previously, it has been translated as "universal convulsion" by Richard Philcox (2004) and as "international stress" by Constance Farrington (1963).

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2 Dying Before Their Time
Lumumba, Cabral, and Sankara

The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the "state of emergency" in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight.

> Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History"

How best to convey the lived experience of the multiple durées of unfreedom?

> Saidiya Hartman, "Dead Book Revisited"

Modern politics is often justified as a story of human sovereignty acted out in the context of a ceaseless unfolding of unitary historical time.

> Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*

Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically elected leader of Congo, was assassinated on January 17, 1961. He was only 36 years old. In what was eventually deemed as the quintessential Cold War plot, Belgians, Americans, and the Congolese came together to kidnap, torture, and execute Lumumba using three firing squads. In macabre attempts to leave no trace of this murder, his body was hacked to pieces, dissolved in sulfuric acid, and the bones were ground and dispersed. The body of Lumumba, first leader of the independent, postcolonial nation of Congo, was turned into vapor, bone dust and scattered ash.[1] That the body is the battlefield upon which histories of violence are inscribed has been well understood. However the body, particularly the young body, can also be a marker of time—in this case, the time of nation. Lumumba, an ardent believer in the cause of Congo as new nation, represented the nation's birth and held the promise of its freedom and maturity. Annihilating Lumumba's young body was a way of rupturing this teleological nation time.

Amilcar Cabral—leader, political theorist and guerrilla fighter for the independence movements of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde—was assassinated on January 20, 1973 in the stealthy darkness of 10:30 PM. He was 49 years old. Ambushed while he was with his wife in Conakry, Cabral

resisted wildly as he was tied up and was eventually subdued by a bullet to his lower stomach. His requests to the assassins that they talk were drowned out by the sound of rapid machine gun fire to his head.[2] He died on the spot on a night when the independence he had worked tirelessly for during the last 25 years was only eight months away. Inocêncio Kani, the assassin, was a member of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde; PAIGC) founded by Cabral himself. The murder was depicted as an internal PAIGC struggle for power and sometimes even as a tribal conflict (Nteta 1973);[3] however, declassified CIA documents reveal a Machiavellian plot that allegedly involved the Portuguese colonial government and also showed then US Secretary of State Kissinger's impatience and frustration with not being able to have the outcomes they desired in Portugal's African colonies.[4] After Cabral's assassination, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde attained independence in 1973. In 1975, a coup in Portugal effectively neutralized Portuguese colonial power within their African colonies. Only five years later, there was a coup within the PAIGC that split the party. These three moments mark the ruptures in Guinea-Bissau's nation time, with Cabral's body as its first signifier. The Cold War interventions ensure that time is always kept out of joint, that time is always manipulated.

Thomas Sankara was the charismatic and staunchly anti-French president of Burkina Faso for almost four years until he was shot to death in his office on October 15, 1987. He was 38 years old. "It's me they want," were his famous last words as he rose to face the gunmen that late afternoon in Ouagadougou. His body was cut to pieces and buried that same night (Shuffield et al. 2006). All clues pointed to Sankara's friend and second in command Blaise Compaoré, who soon took over as president as a coup unfolded with support from France. Though 1987 was much later in the Cold War, the usual feuds were still in place. Sankara was openly Marxist and had condemned United States interventions in Nicaragua and Grenada; he had also criticized their support of Israel. His flagrant rejection of a neocolonial relationship dictated by France made him unpopular and difficult to manage at the level of French foreign policy. Sankara was possibly the last of the irritants of the type that Cold War actors had worked for almost three decades to diminish, at all costs, in Africa. His elimination also effectively ended any social or economic progress that the nation of Burkina Faso had shown signs of making. With the strongman Compaoré anointed by the West now in place, Burkina Faso only plunged further into poverty and disorder. These days the country is an important hub for American surveillance missions,[5] but it is, of course, haunted by specters of Sankara. Echoes resurface now and again of those that want the French role in Sankara's assassination investigated ("French MP" 2013). Burkina Faso's trajectory as a failed nation-state is surely tied to the physical and metaphorical erasure of

Sankara's body. These deaths not only mark the stoppage of time for the individuals but they in fact mark the suspension of time for an emerging postcolonial nation-state.

Time binds, time is a bind, time is binding, Elizabeth Freeman suggests, as she reminds us that temporal mechanisms are pivotal to controlling, disciplining, and annihilating non-normative bodies (Freeman 2010). The time of decolonization is fraught and is fundamentally tied to the paradigm of revolution and emancipation. "These were years when revolutionary futures were not merely possible but *imminent*; not only imminent but *possible*" writes David Scott (2014, 3) in his work on revolutionary temporality titled *Omens of Adversity: Tragedy, Time, Memory, Justice*. Yet here we are, pontificating the failure of these large-scale anticolonial revolts which have yielded at best a bittersweet postcolonial nation and at worst, violence on a massive scale. Nowadays, these revolutions can only be viewed through the lens of failure because the imminent and possible futures did not materialize. In fact, the emergence of a viable postcolonial nation-state has been made impossible, again and again. Scott is right to observe that these have provoked "a more acute *awareness* of time, a more arresting *attunement* to the uneven *topos* of temporality" (emphasis in original, 1). This awareness aligns with Freeman's temporal mechanisms, which allows me to think about the ways in which these mechanisms rupture, subvert, and shatter. Colonized populations have always been subjugated by temporality—in fact, by several temporalities. Scott defines temporality as "the lived experience of time passing and the social relation" among the past, the present, and the future (1). For the colonized, all three temporalities are encumbered, and the weight of the past can be just as tyrannical as the sweet promises of the future. One of the reasons for this is that the binding time of revolution colludes with the even more binding time of the nation being imagined, or as I will henceforth call it: nation time. As postcolonial futures hang in the balance during this period, the arrival of heavy-handed Cold War interventions throw the emerging Third World into further disarray.

In this chapter, I argue that there exists a triple bind of time for colonized populations who are struggling to gain independence and to transition into peaceful postcolonial nation-states. This tripling is comprised of the ways in which the colonized have been controlled *temporally* over three distinct phases. First, there is the period of colonial rule which relegates the colonized to a primitive, pre-historic, anterior time ensuring that they are left out of modernity and thus out of history itself. Next comes the period of decolonization and revolution led by cerebral and dynamic leaders across the rapidly radicalizing Third World. During this phase, the time of nation becomes urgent, emergent. Leaders attempt to resist existing perceptions of time by creating awareness about how colonial discourses left them out of modernity, but in an ironic twist, they ask the masses to wait and to put aside their demands and internal

differences. Thus, there might be liberation from an oppressive past but impending postcolonial futures place the masses in a difficult bind. This is not the time for any internal disparities or for being critical of revolutionary visions, leaders say. This is the time of action and urgency, to remain steadfastly bound to the present and stay focused on the future. Thus, during this phase, while resisting colonial temporal mechanisms, a whole other array of bindings are put into place. Lastly, as the colonized make a push towards independence and the dream of the postcolonial nation-state starts to appear in the line of sight, the Cold War enters this already charged chronotope and thwarts this much anticipated postcolonial nation time and, with it, the urgency of the "now" as well as the dream of the peaceful *longue durée* of nation is appropriated. The murders of young male bodies are direct temporal interventions, what I have been calling temporal ruptures, meant to stymie the birth of independent nations. Time and more specifically nation time, it appears, is never on the side of the Third World.

Nation time, or the way in which the nation conceives its relationship to temporality, can vary drastically depending on cultural and historical factors. Benedict Anderson offers one of the earliest working definitions of nation time. According to him, an understanding of time is one of the key criteria required for populations to "imagine" nation, and he borrows from Walter Benjamin to claim that a homogenous and empty time allows for a new kind of transversal simultaneity. Here, it is no longer the simultaneity of divine intervention where the past and present were merely in service of a prophesied future fulfillment, but instead time is empty until it is filled up by various events happening simultaneously across various places and people, and it operates according to what Anderson calls the conception of the "meanwhile" (1991, 24). Nation could be imagined only through the prism of this temporal awareness whereby a connectedness could be perceived despite lack of actual contact. In Anderson's view, it was print media, particularly the novel and the newspaper, that allowed for this transversal, "meanwhile" simultaneity to be mapped onto the collective consciousness. For the colonial project, this particular consciousness allowed for patriotic and national fervor to be deeply ingrained in all imperial activity while being physically distant from the locus of national power.

More importantly, temporal mechanisms were decisive in subordinating populations at a cultural, commercial, and epistemological level. For entire people and places to be deemed pre-historic, outside of history, and outside of modernity allowed for the establishment of the progressive, teleological, developmental, and linear model of European nation time that in turn gave unlimited stimulus to the colonial civilizing mission ideologies. For colonized populations, it meant being subjugated by what Dipesh Chakrabarty refers to as a "particular strand of developmentalist thought" brought about by political modernity that he called

"historicism" (2007, xiv). He defines it as a "mode of thinking about history in which one assumed that any object under investigation retained a unity of conception throughout its existence and attained full expression through a process of development in secular, historical time" (xiv). This secular, historical time of civilization and development was framed as the fundamental divide between the colonizer and the colonized. The colonized were relegated to "an imaginary waiting room of history" (8) where it was understood that since the Africans and Asians were not *yet* ready to rule themselves, they would have to wait. And this is likely why when anticolonial movements erupted across the Third World, it became urgent to resist this brutish, imperial management of time with a resounding call for the "now."

This chapter also engages the connections between the bodies of revolutionary leaders and postcolonial time. Whether nations or individuals, they are often "defined within a narrow chronopolitics of development," a concept of temporality that Freeman employs to disrupt existing paradigms in queer politics and theory but that could easily be extended to reflect on nation and postcolonial futurity (2005, 57). Chronopolitics here can be defined simply as the politics of time, and Anne McClintock's foundational work on nation, time, and gender provides a good starting point for a specifically postcolonial chronopolitics. She writes:

> What is less often noticed, however, is that the temporal anomaly within nationalism—veering between nostalgia for the past and the impatient, progressive sloughing off of the past—is typically resolved by figuring the contradiction in the representation of *time* as a natural division of *gender*. Women are represented as the atavistic and authentic body of national tradition (inert, backward-looking and natural), embodying nationalism's conservative principle of continuity. Men, by contrast represent the progressive agent of national modernity (forward-thrusting, potent and historic), embodying nationalism's progressive, or revolutionary principle of discontinuity. Nationalism's anomalous relation to time is thus managed as a natural relation to gender.
>
> (1995, 369)

McClintock frames nationalism as being inherently temporal, and within that, postcolonial chronopolitics is marked by certain fundamental characteristics. Firstly, it is always gendered such that this relationship specifically (and most directly) exists between the *male* body and nation time. While women represent an idealized past, men are the agents of a progressive, forward movement. The time of nation is not realized unless it is being mapped upon gender. Ironically, in the case of postcolonial nations, colonial ideologies of backwardness and lack of modernity are indeed resisted but ironically by relying on explicit and less explicit figurations of gender.

Secondly, postcolonial chronopolitics is often embodied. It is through the lens of time-work that we can uncover the Cold War's disciplining of postcolonial nations because here, it places the body (the gendered body) and time in an inextricable bind. It is useful to split these linkages into two nodes; one can be nation time as it applies to the postcolony, and the second would be by exploring how this nation time is simultaneously gendered and embodied. Not only does nation time reveal an explicit preoccupation with the figure of a male leader, it also engages in a disciplining, policing, and even annihilation of the body. The body becomes the site upon which nation time enacts its interventions and here, the male body's inherent relation to the future makes it particularly susceptible to these interventions. These two nodes of gendering and embodiment are placed across a more horizontal chronology as I examine the second bind of time that emerges during short periods of revolutionary activity and the third bind of time which is essentially the *longue durée* of the Cold War.

Using an archive of materials composed of speeches, videos, biographies, and images, the triple bind I described above will emerge through a focus on writings by and representations of Lumumba, Cabral, and Sankara. The latter two binds of time are more crucial here since the first bind of time which connects the relationship between time, modernity, and history as framed by colonialism has already been explored by several thinkers.[6] My goal is to examine the three leaders' understandings of nation time, their predilection towards developmentalist narratives of progress, and their underlying assertions of masculinity. Their much publicized assassinations at a young age may have stunned the world, but very little has been written that offers a coherent and analytical understanding of the impact of these assassinations not just on their respective countries but for postcolonial and Third World discourses as a whole. Additionally, a lot of postcolonial theory engages with questions of nation and questions of temporality but fails to consider the role of Cold War machinations in fundamentally influencing trajectories and outcomes. By following the chronology of the three binds of time, this chapter illustrates that the Cold War extends colonial ideologies by intervening not only by intensifying violence (as discussed in the previous chapter) but also by first enforcing and then appropriating the trajectory towards nationhood.

The Second Bind: Lumumba, Cabral, and Sankara on Nation Time

Nation time as it came to be framed and formed during decolonization, and later on in the postcolony, was often a contradictory and perplexing mixture of ideas. Nation time wrestled with articulating postcolonial nationhood while resisting nationalism itself. To gain entry into the annals of modernity and history, anticolonial and decolonization thought

had to embrace an imperial script that mapped nationhood onto a secular and linear time of development and progress. Achille Mbembe has asserted that the postcolony is one among several temporalities of a previously colonized place: "As an age the postcolony encloses multiple *durées* made up of discontinuities, reversals, inertias, and swings that overlay one another, interpenetrate one another, and envelope one another: an *entanglement*" (2001, 8). While these multiple *durées* are useful in trying to understand a longer postcolonial time, the moment of decolonization is much shorter, and one of the challenges within that singular moment is to take this already entangled time and mold it into a revolutionary and urgent time of the now. This decolonization time is animated with urgency and is repeatedly reinforced as leaders of national independence attempt to mobilize the masses into a revolutionary fervor when colonialism shows signs of ending and the formation of an independent nation-state seems imminent.

In this particular moment (and it was often a very short moment), several leaders tended to grapple with the task of enforcing a strong nationalist mindset among the colonized while trying to stave off the fear that the nationalist bourgeoisie with neocolonial aspirations would immediately fill in the shoes of the colonizers. Nationalism also had to be promoted in light of the knowledge that ethnic, clan, or religious divisions threatened to tear apart the anticolonial uprisings internally. Here, nation time was often expressed as the moment for progress, for shaking off the yoke of colonialism, for technological development, and for embracing modernity in whichever hybrid form it might make itself available. Time was of the essence. This urgency managed to unite disparate groups even if for a short moment, and it eventually allowed for a collective consciousness to imagine, think, narrate, envisage, fantasize, and project the postcolonial nation onto a canvas of the future. By briefly examining a combination of their biographies and their speeches, I want to investigate Lumumba's, Cabral's, and Sankara's precise relationships to this nation time and to look at the ways in which their temporal ideologies played out during the frenetic periods of their respective leaderships, especially since these temporal ideologies stopped being simply theory but were turned into practice, policy, and strategy.

Patrice Lumumba's rise to power was rapid and impressive, but in some ways it was unsurprising. An archetype of the charismatic politician, Lumumba was also an *évolué*, the term used to describe the up and coming, urban, educated, and Europeanized folk of African descent. Fluent in French, dashing and attractive with a flirtatious edge when it came to women, he was very comfortable within the heterosexist contexts of colonial patriarchy. Because of all this, he had been able to escape the waiting room of history. He synthesized his image and authority to become a key figure in a mere 18 months leading up to Congolese independence (Gerard and Kuklick 2015, 14–15). The extraordinarily

compressed timeframe within which he simultaneously became a beloved and despised figure within a volatile and violently decolonizing world speaks to the way in which his body evokes urgency, emergency, and the immediacy of the now. In 1963, Jean-Paul Sartre wrote a breathless introductory essay for a collection of Lumumba's speeches, writings, and telegrams (1972, 3–4). It seems that his interest in Lumumba was motivated by his friendship with Fanon, who spoke of Lumumba in proud and loving terms (3–4). I believe that Sartre's desire to compare the two towering figures of anticolonialism arises less from the commonalities between their thinking, but rather in the coincidental timing of their deaths. Fanon and Lumumba died one month apart from each other, and both were 36 years old. Sartre appears to be mourning Fanon through this overview essay of Lumumba's life and work, but he also wants to argue that the two men's understandings of resistance were very different. Sartre tugs at the comparisons:

> Everything still remains to be said about Fanon. Lumumba was better known; nonetheless he has kept many a secret to himself. No one has really tried to discover the causes of his failure. . . . This is the purpose that reading these speeches will serve: they will enable us to understand why, even though his economic program was a moderate one, the leader of the Congolese National Movement was regarded as a brother-in-arms by Fanon the revolutionary and a mortal enemy by the Société Générale.
>
> (5)

Sartre tends to frame Lumumba's life and work through the lens of failure and seems puzzled that Fanon saw him as a comrade and revolutionary compatriot. Throughout his essay, he is not quite able to mirror the admiration that Fanon felt for Lumumba.

Sartre's criticism of Lumumba is grounded in the idea that Lumumba was a "victim of Belgian paternalism" (3), and thus had the inability to understand and to address the fact that neocolonial African bourgeoisie posed a fundamental threat to independence. He passionately opposed colonialism, but he also often emphasized its positive features. This is attributed to his Catholic upbringing in a rural area with a missionary education, which was then sharply contrasted to his life as a file clerk in the city. As Lumumba thrived in his new cosmopolitan environment, and as his standard of living suddenly rose through the fruits of his hard work, Sartre observes that, "This son of a peasant is now an *évolué*" (9). Lumumba's embrace of his own identity as an *évolué* became his blind spot, and for Sartre, this is why he ended up becoming fixated on catch-all concepts such as humanism and universalism. This universalist mode became manifested in the way Lumumba shaped his political party, *Mouvement Nationale Congolais* (MNC). Additionally, a natural

extension of Lumumba's reliance on universalist ideologies was his ral-
lying cry for a nationalist unity in the massive and divided region that
was Congo. Naively, he also hoped that once all the African nations were
independent, there could emerge a free and united Pan-African continent
that could be bound by solidarity in the face of oppression and shared
colonial pasts. Within the short span in which Lumumba emerged as a
popular resistance leader, he repeatedly appealed to the disparate and
divided population to awaken from their slumber, to unite despite them-
selves, and to put their differences on hold: "It is only when we have won
independence of our countries and when our democratic institutions are
stabilized that the existence of a pluralist political system will be justi-
fied" (71). Sartre found this problematic:

> In politics, what is *necessary* is not always what is *possible*. Unity,
> the powerful idea behind the Congolese National Movement, a mod-
> ern party and one conceived in the image and likeness of European
> movements, was *necessary* to the Congo: without it, independence
> was a dead letter. But at this moment in its history, the European for-
> mula did not really seem to the Congolese to fit their needs; simpler
> and more solid ties bound them to their native soil, to their ethnic
> group. *Centralization* represented only the class consciousness of the
> *centralized*, that is to say the *évolués*.
>
> (29)

Sartre viewed Lumumba's most fundamental ideas as short-sighted and
cast Lumumba in the role of a leader who was cut off from how the
masses felt with no real understanding of the Congolese people's iden-
titarian affiliations. That necessity and possibility were at odds with
each other certainly proved itself to be true as Congolese decoloniza-
tion, sadly, moved towards certain disaster and internecine violence.

However, even Sartre admits that it was this particular "moment in
history," this current *time*, that seemed to generate certain realities. For
Lumumba, time loomed even bigger since he existed in the throes of a
rapidly unfolding decolonization. He was, of course, always thinking
chronopolitically: the present moment, the current reality, the urgent now
were all crucial pieces of a political pandemonium that seemed imminent
in Congo. Lumumba was preoccupied with and bound by time. Unso-
phisticated and short-sighted as they seemed to Sartre, unity and indepen-
dence were Lumumba's most pressing concerns. But in order to promote
those ideals, Lumumba embraced and advanced an antithetical practice
of temporality. An example of Lumumba's appeal to the people goes thus:

> We invite all our compatriots, whatever their station, and *what-
> ever their present or past tendencies or divergences of opinion* to
> pool their energies and their courage with ours in order to carry out

the necessary and indispensable formation of a united front, with-out which we will not be able to assert ourselves or make our voice heard, the voice of the Congolese people. It is *high time* that the Congolese people prove to the world that they are conscious of the realities of the sort of independence being offered us—a token gift that the government is preparing for them and promising them. We do not want this sort of independence.

(qtd. in Lierde and Lane 1972, 62, my italics)

The above declaration made at the Accra conference in 1958 is only one of many in which Lumumba attempts to appeal not just to the Congolese people but to the decolonizing African continent by evoking time. It is not time yet, he believes, for setting up pluralist governments and inter-nally oppositional frameworks.

The fundamental contradiction within postcolonial nation time is apparent here: it is certainly time to bring down colonialism and build a new nation, but it not yet time to figure out how to accommodate the diversity of identities and opinions around the question of nation itself. Chakrabarty has called this the "double bind" through which postcolo-nial history articulates itself. Referring to India, he explains this double bind by claiming that history as a subject is split into the "modernizing elite and the yet-to-be modernized peasantry" (2007, 39). The ideas and plans articulated by Lumumba, the elite *evolué* who is also the voice of resistance, fall precisely within this mode. Chakrabarty claims that,

[a]s a split subject, however, it speaks from within the metanarrative that celebrates the nation-state; and of this metanarrative the theo-retical subject can be a hyperreal "Europe," a Europe constructed by the tales that both imperialism and nationalism have told the colonized.

(39)

Thus, postcolonial nationhood cannot escape the tentacles of a hege-monic European ideology and the developmentalist narrative of tempo-rality. In yet another example from 1959, Lumumba said at the Ibadan Congress that,

The existence of an intelligent, dynamic, and constructive opposition is indispensable in order to counterbalance the political and adminis-trative action of the government in power. But this moment does not appear to have arrived yet, and dividing our efforts today would be to render our country a disservice.

(qtd. in Lierde and Lane 1972, 71)

Lumumba is unable to find alternatives to the metanarrative that places these fundamentally European frameworks on a pedestal, and he modifies

them only marginally when it comes to applying these narratives to the colonized populace that he is addressing. Postcolonial nation time as it came to be configured for the Congolese banished the colonized masses, for the second time, to the waiting room of history.

Amilcar Cabral was more predisposed towards complex theoretical reflections on colonialism, oppression, and independence than the pragmatic-minded Lumumba. Cabral's repeated emphasis on praxis over theory, however, does place him outside of the framework of epistemic bifurcations that I laid out in the previous chapter, though it is worth digressing to delve into his biography to parse through some of the strands of the thinker-leader figure that do recur. Cabral's revolutionary phase begins towards the end of Fanon's life even though they were both born in 1925 and their formative years have resounding similarities. Brought up in a middle-class environment with a focus on education, both studied in Europe after the Second World War where their experiences fed their commitment towards an anticolonial struggle and both found radically anticolonial, European women to be their life partners. Yet, it is the differences between the two that are more prominent according to Jock McCulloch, a scholar of Cabral's life and work. While Fanon approached the colonial problem through the study of psychiatry, Cabral's anticolonialism stemmed from his profession as an agronomist. At the level of style, Fanon had a "marked attachment to a kind of intellectualizing that is so conspicuously absent from the writings of Cabral" (1983, 8). In his famous speech at the Tricontinental conference at Havana, Cabral laid out his primary ideas with a warning:

> To those who see in it a theoretical character, we would recall that every practice produces a theory, and that if it is true that a revolution can fail even though it be based on perfectly conceived theories, nobody has yet made a successful revolution without a revolutionary theory.
>
> (Cabral 1969, 93)

Cabral, more than Fanon, deliberately tried not to slip into the role of an intellectual or philosopher of colonialism and claimed a more pragmatic relationship between revolutionary theory and practice—a revolution requires a theory but theory itself cannot lead to a successful revolution.

Most of Cabral's writings were in the form of speeches for conferences at venues as wide-ranging as the United Nations and the Tricontinental Conference in Havana. Influenced by *Présence Africaine* while studying in Lisbon and having made minor attempts to write poetry influenced by Senghor's ideas of negritude, Cabral's scholarly and creative side found its most pragmatic use in his role as a teacher to new PAIGC recruits. He taught his young students about the mechanisms of colonialism and the importance of a nationalist war (Chabal 1983, 43, 62). Irrespective of the

form it originated in, Cabral's opinions on violence, nationalism, guerilla wars, and the impending issues of national leadership are pertinent given that he became a father figure in the revolutionary struggles of Lusophone Africa. He worked hand in hand with Agostino Neto of Angola, who led the MPLA (Popular Movement for Liberation of Angola), and he was also aligned with Mozambique's FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front). He had managed to live in Cape Verde, Guinea, Angola, and Sao Tome and also visited Ghana (for the All African People's Conference in Accra) and went to Guinea to gain support from Sekou Touré. Cabral's first studies of the Portuguese colonies began with research on agriculture and the peasantry. As a trained agronomist, he spent years studying the main crops being produced, the technology being used, and most importantly, the ways in which agriculture stratified social groups and vice versa.

It can be argued that a Cabralian theory of time exists though it has to be extrapolated from his many reflections on the subject of history. He displays a fairly linear imaginary when it comes to the question of time, and his lens was certainly teleological when it came to history, development, and revolution. However this was not a simplified linearity without nuance or complexity. "Let us be precise," he said, "for us, African revolution means the transformation of our present life in the direction of progress" (1969, 16). Yet progress was a challenge and involved being able to confront the "problem of the future of our people" (16) as people tried to advance economically, socially, and politically. The present moment, for Cabral, was deeply burdened by ways in which colonial history had appropriated time from those they subjugated, but also because future time (in this case, impending postcolonial nation time) was just as fraught for him. He was also conscious of colonial temporal mechanisms and articulated a theory resisting this bind. He believed that colonialism had appropriated and arrested history in the colony, and with this idea as his grounding principle, he was able to resist colonial discourses which relegate these African places and people to historical anteriority. Below is a long example from Cabral's talk titled "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea," given at a seminar held in the Frantz Fanon Center in Milan in 1964:

> A rigorous historical approach is similarly needed when examining another problem related to this—how can the underdeveloped countries evolve towards revolution, towards socialism? There is a preconception held by many people, even on the left, that imperialism made us enter history at the moment when it began its adventure in our countries. This preconception must be denounced: for somebody on the left, and for the Marxists in particular, history obviously means the class struggle. Our opinion is exactly the contrary. We consider that when imperialism arrived in Guinea it made us leave

history—our history. We agree that history in our country is a result of class struggle, but we have our own class struggles in our own country; the moment imperialism arrived and colonialism arrived, it made us leave our history and enter another history.

(68)

Cabral's twist on Marx ensured that the beginning of history in the colony was not attributed to colonial conquests. Class struggle was taking place in the microcosm that was Guinea-Bissau, and in fact, colonialism not only ruptured this historical continuity but it also seemed to stop time for the colonized. And that arrested time now had to be made to move forward again. It seems that, for Cabral, history mimics the structure of what is known in many genres of music as "stop-time" wherein the continual forward flow of the music suddenly stops, giving the impression that the tempo has changed. But the song actually continues, despite the illusion of suspension. Colonialism, similarly, only suspends historical continuity in the colony, and this history was rich and complex before the arrival of imperial projects. It is also waiting to return to its previous form.

The period of colonialism signifies an entry into an alternative history, someone else's history. The historical, cultural, and societal paradigms of the colonial European power come to determine the colonized population's movement into time. During this period, the time of the native is suspended, which brings about an arrested development. This is the reason why the colonized find themselves in extreme poverty, rampant illiteracy, and without proper ownership of their own lands. Cabral is well aware that to emerge out of the vortex of underdevelopment, a history must be forced to re-emerge and only this can lead to progress and revolution. Perhaps because he was an agronomist by training, Cabral had a tendency to use biological metaphors, often describing history through terms such as evolution, decay, or mutation. One of his tenets for revolution made use of a local proverb, which states that no matter how hot the water from your well, it will not cook the rice. For him, this expressed the simple principle that "the development of the phenomenon in movement, whatever its external appearance, depends mainly on its internal characteristics" (92). Applying this to the socio-economic sphere of humanity, it appears that while the external realm might wield some influence on this socio-economic whole, the internal processes are rhythmic, constant, and progressive in comparison. Cabral was very taken with the paradigm of progress whether technological, cultural, political, or historical. He believed that for the colonized to re-enter the realm of their own history, this internal rhythm and pattern of progress had to somehow be re-engaged, possibly through "violent alterations—mutations—in the level of the productive forces or in the pattern of ownership" (94). Being a firm believer in the party as an agent of change, he faithfully applied the

idea of revolution achieved by "sudden progress" through violent altera-
tions or mutations to all aspects of his anticolonial strategies. The way to
enact these violent transformations would be through the development
of classes, thus reinstating the Marxian class struggle, not colonialism, as
the conduit of history.

Several aspects of this broad strategy are particularly interesting when
it comes to thinking about postcolonial nation time. Firstly, Cabral
believes that the peasantry is not a revolutionary force in Guinea-Bissau
and that it is in fact the petit bourgeoisie that must be viewed as agents of
history. His strategy was to train them to always be on the side of the toil-
ing masses. Cabral wanted them to commit to a "class suicide" and Rob-
ert J.C. Young states that Cabral "had already committed suicide in class
terms" (2001, 28), which meant that he had rejected the material interests
of his social class and chosen to embrace revolutionary consciousness as
dictated by the culture of revolution as it emerges. He recognized the key
to such an action involved what he called "cultural reconversion." This
entailed a re-Africanization of the mind, which he considered an indis-
pensable criterion for "the integration of colonized peoples into the liber-
ation movement" (28). And this was how Cabral mapped the revolution.
In search of this ideal revolutionary class and diverging even further from
Fanon when it came to the question of revolutionary peasantry, he gave
a central role to the urban experience of the déclassé young people who
become the "key stimulant required for the awakening of consciousness"
(Cabral 1969, 63). Cabral proceeded to cultivate this déclassé group that
consisted of unemployed youth having migrated to their petit bourgeois
relatives, who had some knowledge of Portuguese and had awakened
to the stark colonial inequalities in the urban areas. This section of the
déclassé group ended up with a heightened anticolonial consciousness
and a will to fight for the cause. He felt it was imperative to inculcate a
working class mentality among a certain set of people. The PAIGC suc-
cessfully trained almost a thousand such people in Conakry for two years
who, in turn, attempted to spread this mentality to the peasants. McCull-
och observes that, "The task of the national liberation movement was to
instill a working class consciousness in a society in which there was no
working class" (1983, 67). And this new consciousness would form the
underpinnings of a socialist revolution in Guinea-Bissau.

But there are blind spots in Cabral's apparently pragmatic, practical
theorization of the various classes and the way in which each of them
can be used and manipulated for the revolution. To some degree, for
the déclassé—a group of seemingly idle but angry youth cultivated for a
war of national liberation and who were essentially without vocation—
the war becomes a self-affirming phenomenon. But the future was fairly
unclear. Lack of economic promise—with its danger of impending unem-
ployment as well as the possibility that this déclassé group, once turned
into soldiers might not assimilate back into society—would be a real

challenge once independence was achieved. Cabral's revolution reveals an absurd irony. While he believed that only practice yielded theory, his attempts to superimpose Marxist-socialist ideals upon a region illustrated the exact opposite. Part of the violent transformations he tried to facilitate included the creation of a proletariat class in an entirely forced manner. McCulloch exposes a tension in the work of Cabral, wherein he hoped that the anticolonial war would have created and sustained a deep change in the men and women who fought, and that this would find its way in the development of new institutions of the new state. But at the same time, Cabral, "feared that this would not be enough." This tension widened as a contrast emerged between

> Cabral's enthusiasm for the changes which had taken place during the period of armed struggle in the spheres of education and health and his prescription on the development of the state and rise of the pseudo-bourgeoisie once independence had been achieved.

> (132)

Thus, it can be argued that though Cabral was a primary instigator of nationalist unity, class-free society, and strong intellectual foundations for the anticolonial revolution, his overly linear understanding of how the present would flow progressively and smoothly into a postcolonial future was optimistic and not necessarily entirely realistic. But then again, it was not as if he lived to finesse and deploy his theories and strategies as his own future was abruptly appropriated.

Thomas Sankara's life and work have to be mapped onto a timeline that is very different from Lumumba and Cabral's. Upper Volta, the country in which Sankara was born and brought up had already gained its independence from France in 1960. But post-independence leadership in Upper Volta was incredibly fraught and fundamentally unstable. The French had handed over the country to Maurice Yaméogo, who had come to power through an euphoric, democratic process only to immediately abuse this popularity by turning Upper Volta into a one-party state. After six years of discontent among its people, a military coup brought Lt. Col. Aboubakar Sangoulé Lamizana into power. He lasted well over a decade, in what was a period of great volatility, exercising an uncertain leadership that was primarily militaristic in form. Yet another coup followed and put Colonel Saye Zerbo in power for a short two years. It was now 1982, and it was Maj. Dr. Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo who usurped the power with promises of a civilian government. But the two decades of strongman leadership seemed to continue unabated. It was at this point that Sankara—who was then a young officer and had become part of a secret communist group called *Regroupement des officiers communistes* (ROC or the Communist Officers' Group)—entered the scene. He rose from the ranks of captain to become a Secretary of State for Information

but resigned after vocalizing his opposition to the regime. Yet another coup led to Sankara being ushered in as prime minister, but he was soon placed under house arrest, a decision that seemed to come on the heels of a visit by the French president's son, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand. This event resulted in a popular uprising followed by a coup instigated and led by Blaise Compaoré (later Sankara's alleged murderer) that put Sankara in power in August 1984. Sankara soon renamed the country Burkina Faso, the land of upright people.[7]

Thus, Sankara's trajectory as a leader does not fit directly into the movement from decolonization to postcoloniality as Lumumba's and Cabral's do. In this case, the postcolonial nation had already been created, and Sankara's intervention was an attempt to remedy the erroneous paths that the nation had taken since its independence. Yet, it was still a revolution in earnest, except it was not driven by the goal of ousting a colonial power but about "reorienting the state back toward the initial promise of the independence era: to overcome the inequalities bequeathed by colonialism, to see to the welfare of the common citizen, and to build a sovereign Africa, free of foreign tutelage" (Harsch 2014, 18). Sankara had the opportunity to observe postcolonial failure at close range and also to grasp the extent to which the Cold War machinations were an extension of colonial rule.

The postcolonial nation then known as Upper Volta was a fairly standard example of what had been termed as "Françafrique," the network of relationships that managed to sustain a distinctly neocolonial economic, cultural, and political relationship between France and its former African colonies (Verschave 1999). The term Françafrique has come to encompass a scandalous, postcolonial history of French interference in Africa that has involved support for certain regimes and dictatorships, the fueling of rampant corruption, several military interventions in the region, the sustenance of an import-export infrastructure and lucrative business deals benefitting France, and votes for France from its African friends in international institutions. Francois Xavier Verschave has argued that this is indeed a "network of mechanisms put in place to keep Africans in bondage," and that "Françafrique is sustained by the French and Africans. Thus, Africans are certainly playing a crucial role in promoting the domination and pillaging of their continent" (2005). When Sankara was in high school, Upper Volta's first president Yaméogo was plunging the country into chaos and corruption. Not only had he "acceded to independence rather reluctantly," he also "maintained a strong connection to France, with numerous French 'advisors' working in both the army and the civil administration" (Harsch 2014, 23–4). It is this a framework that Sankara inherited and against which he waged a stubborn and bellicose revolution.

The time he spent in Madagascar getting advanced officer training radicalized him. Not only did he thrive in the vibrant urban atmosphere—improving his French and reading more—but his final year there

"coincided with an unprecedented period of political upheaval marked by peasant revolts, general strikes, huge public demonstrations against a conservative pro-French regime, and finally a military takeover that steadily brought ever more radical officers into high positions of power" (Harsch 2014, 28). Colonialism was indeed public enemy number one for Sankara, and the cause of all rupture in the country he was from. But what he had to contend with was, in truth, a complicit, neocolonial African bulwark wherein distinctions between colonizer and colonized, and black and white had collapsed over a period of two decades. "In essence, neocolonial society and colonial society do not differ in the least," he had declared (Prairie 2007, 81). Elsewhere, he had asked, "Who are the enemies of the people? The enemies of the people are both inside and outside the country" (52). It was the cancer of imperialism that Sankara had decided to resist. "When the people stand up, imperialism trembles," he announced (51). Imperialism seems like a catch-all term now, but in the eighties it signified a specific opposition to the Euro-American Cold War monolith that had created and sustained relentless violence across Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East.

Of the three leaders I focus on in this chapter, Sankara is the most future-centric. Lumumba and Cabral were progress-oriented and extremely conscious of strategies and patterns of development, but Sankara gives the impression of being in a feverish haste when it came to dismantling the ossified and corrupt governance structures and to immediately erecting a new future. Part of the reason for this was that time, for Sankara, had been learned within a military setting where he had spent many years training as a soldier, and it was compounded by his belief in the idea that the military can be instrumental in bringing democracy[8] and civic progress. The trope of emergency and urgency ran vividly through his understanding of the world. Only two weeks after he came to power through a military overthrow of the government, he was asked about when the army might be returning to its barracks. Sankara replied,

> But you should understand that for us, it's not that there are revolutionaries in the barracks and outside the barracks. The revolutionaries are everywhere. . . . It is not a question of the military taking power one day and giving it up the next. It is about the military living with the Voltaic people, suffering with them, and fighting by their side at all times.
>
> (Prairie 2007, 74–5)

An integrated and civic-minded military was a fundamental component of Sankara's plans for future betterment of his people. This was probably Sankara's most unique insight, while also being his most troubled. Meanwhile, it is also the locus of where his ideas about time, futures, and history can be configured.

In 1985, halfway through his short, four-year career, Sankara was interviewed by Mongo Beti, prolific writer and vocal critic of Françafrique for the magazine *Peuples noirs, peuples Africains*, edited by Beti himself. In a conversation that borders on argumentative, Sankara and Beti debate a wide range of topics, and questions about modernity and progress are tackled early on. When asked about the tension between modernization and tradition as a hurdle to revolution, Sankara answers:

> In general, African traditions are the product of a backward ideology. Nevertheless in every thing and every phenomenon there is a progressive and regressive aspect that we must learn to single out in order to allow society to evolve much more rapidly towards progress, toward the modernism you speak of. Revolutions are not made to regress in time. The aim is to constantly move forward. The revolution will inevitably suppress the negative aspects of our traditions. Such is our fight against all the backward forces, all the forms of obscurantism, a legitimate fight that is essential to freeing society of all old and decaying influences and prejudices, including those that marginalize women or turn them into objects.
>
> (242)

In a way, these declarations go against the grain of anticolonial revolutionary theories, most of which attempt to make sense of the past and configure ways to resurrect pre-colonial chronotopes to develop a strong historical and cultural consciousness within the colonized. The quick dismissal of tradition by seeing it as backward, obscurantist, and decaying was problematic because—as Beti demands to know right away—"Isn't the logical outcome of the revolutionary process a cultural revolution?" (243). Sankara retorts by saying that a radical transformation of society will take care of the cultural aspect. For Sankara, it seems that tradition and the past, more generally, was a surmountable and pragmatic burden to be cast off as quickly as possible.

In Sankara's mind, revolution moves forward breathlessly in time, and its forceful momentum represses the unwanted elements along the way. In fact, it seemed odd that Sankara, who was such a keen observer of and participant in Third World solidarity, was unaware of the many revolutions which had already turned reactionary. Plagued by civil war and an unwavering tide of Islamic fundamentalism, Algeria in the eighties was certainly an easy enough case study to ponder. Revolutions can, in fact, regress, and Sankara's inability to work through revolution's complicated temporality placed his country's population in a peculiar time bind. This was not the temporal mechanism where the masses had been told to wait, to suspend their immediate concerns; it was the exact opposite.

Sankara's Burkina Faso was being asked to hurry up, speed along, and play a game of catch-up with the world. He wanted the progressive strains

of modernity and development to radically change Burkinabé society in a matter of weeks. His government's chief task would be "total conversion of the entire state machinery" (Prairie 2007, 93), which included legal, judicial, administrative, and military aspects. Sankara created Committees for the Defense of Revolution (CDRs), which were "representatives of revolutionary power" in rural and urban areas. He sometimes referred to them as "revolutionary militants" who had to take charge of education, commerce, and governance and these CDRs were imbued with "revolutionary morality" and "revolutionary discipline" (97–8). The idea was not unlike what Gandhi had envisioned when he attempted to find a group of pure-hearted and morally disciplined volunteers to successfully implement principles of satyagraha (Chatterjee 1986, 105). However, it differed vastly from Gandhi in its strategy of fast application rather than adopting a gradual movement towards popular awakening, self-development, and learned leadership.

In fact, Sankara goes as far as referring to the CDRs as "shock troops" (Prairie 2007, 95). It is hard not to be reminded of Naomi Klein's comprehensive work on the shock doctrine as one the most disastrous ideologies for development (2007). Elsewhere, he uses similar language when he speaks of "a cruel and brutal flash." This "flash" is a reference to the events of a May 1983 coup preceding the one that made him president a few months later, in August. Sankara believes that these few days of the May coup were a sudden eye-opener for the populace and "imperialism was revealed to them as a system of oppression and exploitation" (Prairie 2007, 95). One is hard-pressed to imagine that this was the case given that Upper Volta was at the mercy of a corrupt one-party system that exacerbated poverty and unemployment. But Sankara has a penchant for shocks and flashes, and time for him is a play between urgency, emergency, and change. I would argue that many of the contours of his revolution are marked by a commitment to his identity as a military captain. He often speaks of the revolution as if it were just like charging into a battlefield, and there is a constant feeling that this is an emergency that requires rapid decision-making abilities, precision and immediacy around time, and a dedication to military-style austerity. In his inaugural speech, he speaks passionately about the enemies within and outside the country's borders, promising the people that, "They must be combated, and we will combat them" (53). The rhetoric of combatting the enemy on the battlefield that is Sankara's revolution continues with an enthusiastic back and forth with the crowd that has gathered:

Let me ask you a question: Do you like these enemies of the people, yes or no?
[Shouts of "No"]
Do you like them?
[Shouts of "No"]

So we must combat them.
Will you combat them inside the country?
[Shouts of "Yes!"]
On with the fight! (53)

Sankara riles up the crowd with his battle cry and tells the crowd that they are all soldiers in this struggle: "We tell the people to be ready to fight, to be ready to take up arms, to resist whenever it's necessary" (63). Sankara also urges the masses to pay no attention to any criticism of his ambitious haste:

> when we're told that two years is too short a time for returning to normal constitutional life, we say it's quite sufficient. Because when you let the people speak in complete freedom and complete democracy, the people will tell you in thirty minutes what they want. We don't need two years.
>
> (63)

When analyzing Sankara's words, it is important to remember that this is, after all, a speech, and that comes with its own genre principles which may include immediacy, rhetorical declarations, compressed policy declarations, and the performance of incredible enthusiasm and passion. Sankara certainly manages to stick to all of those principles in his speeches, but his haste can be discerned even in interviews and, more importantly, in the way he chooses to make his policies a daily reality. The urgent manifesto deployed to the CDRs and the impatient dismantling of bureaucracy were evidence of this. Sankara's advisor Alfred Sawadogo speaks of having to adjust the pace and style of his work to suit his boss's desire to have everything be expedient. "[H]e sometimes took initiatives in an ad hoc fashion, with little evident forethought about how they could be implemented." "Sankara was the antithesis of a bureaucrat," Sawadogo commented. Sankara hated formalism and cumbersome slow procedures. Functioning alongside the president, Sawadogo learned to "work fast, think fast, act fast, make decisions and be fully responsible for them" (Harsch 2014, 60). Sawadogo's commentary shows that Sankara's preoccupation with speed was not limited to speeches but could be discerned in his actions too. Even more than Lumumba or Cabral, postcolonial nation time for Sankara was characterized by an immense sense of urgency. In a way, he was trying to rectify the previous two decades, which had been deprived of the dream of independence. But the acceleration of time and the slowing down of time are two sides of the same coin.

Thinking through this second temporal bind imposed by the revolutionary figures upon the population they are striving to liberate is a rich and revealing exercise. Even though Lumumba, Cabral, and Sankara have

really varied approaches to temporality, their revolutions are plagued by complicated and sometimes reactionary ways in which strategies of nation time are articulated and deployed. Scott beautifully diagnoses revolutionary temporality with its inherent linkages to development, progress, change, and questions of success and failure. It is worth quoting him at length here:

> For moderns, temporality preeminently has been an experience of the unfolding of historical time. As is well enough known, modern historical time—the collective time of nations and classes and subjects and populations—has been organized around a notion of discrete but continuous, modular change, in particular, modular change as a linear, diachronically stretched-out succession of cumulative instants, an endless chain of displacement of before and after. Such succession, moreover, is progressive: change is improvement. Change, therefore, not only has a formal, built-in rhythm of movement and alteration but also a built-in *vector* of moral direction. Secular Enlightenment change is pictured as a temporal movement in which, with regular periodicity, the future overcomes the past, and in which the present is a state of exception and waiting for the fulfillment of the promise of social and political improvement.
>
> (2014, 5)

Certainly, for the three figures I have chosen to explore in this chapter, the notion of continuous, modular change is an overarching belief and a fundamental principle. The moral direction that it is supposed to elicit is also evident in how Lumumba, Cabral, and Sankara speak to their people and the actions they expect from them. The already subjugated populations are further subjugated by the promise of the revolutionary future in enabling the overcoming of the past. They are asked to wait, they are put on hold, or they are forced into the shock of over-acceleration. Despite all this, these concepts about historical change do not "line up quite so neatly, so efficiently, so seamlessly, so instrumentally—in a word, so *teleologically*—as they once seemed to do," Scott reminds us (6). What awaits us is failure and rupture; the failure of revolution, the rupture of historical continuity, and the lack of progress. I diverge from Scott when it comes to honing in on why this failure comes about. For Scott and for several other scholars from Hannah Arendt to Edward Said to, more recently, Vivek Chibber, the problem is the utopian nature of Marxist-socialist thought and the ways in which these ideologies mutate and transform during the periods of decolonization and postcoloniality. In examining the third bind of time in the following section, I hope to displace some of the critique of failed Marxisms to focus on the material and corporeal reality of how these revolutions were toppled and subverted by Cold War regimes.

The Third Bind: Cold War Assassinations

The final component of this chapter examines the third bind of time, the bind which is enacted directly upon the male body that has come to stand in for national trajectories. "Colonialism was, to a large extent, a way of disciplining bodies," writes Mbembe (2001, 113). The regulation of bodies was paradigmatic for modernity[9] and it is thus no surprise that the body had to be made complicit in order to enter the modern time of nation. Revolutionary leaders were certainly aware of this, whether consciously or subconsciously. Lumumba, Cabral, and Sankara did not use their own bodies as a visceral site of intervention in the way that Gandhi did with his hunger strikes and by choosing to only be clad in the loincloth that he had himself woven. But they certainly tried to subvert existing stereotypes of the non-European body as weak, feminized, diseased, or dirty. At the outset, the leaders' sartorial choices were quite indicative of how they projected their bodies. Lumumba's formal, Western attire is a declaration that he and his Congolese people have indeed entered modernity and are ready to take over the reins from the Europeans. Cabral is often photographed in a loose, unbuttoned camouflage-patterned military jacket and a West African knitted beanie known as the *sumbia*.[10] The traditional pattern on his *sumbia* mirrored his views on returning to the pre-colonial source while the camouflage jacket simultaneously embodied his commitment to military discipline and revolutionary war. Sankara had a much more intensive commitment to bodily discipline. His two outfits of choice were either crisp military fatigues or a tracksuit. Photos and videos also exist of Sankara's third outfit of choice, shorts and a jersey for the days that he played soccer with his advisers and staff. All three choices of clothing exude fitness, discipline, and youth. In a newspaper profile of Sankara, an essayist claimed that he "incarnates African youth." Additionally, he was described as "'[e]levated, poised, incisive. It's the style of the black man of the modern age'" (Brooke 1987b). Sankara also made sports such as soccer, biking, and track mandatory, further reinforcing ideologies of able-bodied youthfulness as part of his revolutionary practice (Shuffield et al. 2006).

Writing about the significance of wrestling and yoga in the formation of nationalist identity in India, Joseph S. Alter argues that "body discipline is regarded as both the means and the ends of nationalism" (2003, 17). Additionally, Alter suggests that, "[b]ecause the body is a tangible, material thing that reveals, and is implicated in, the artifactuality of ideas, it is useful to theorize nationalism in terms of the body" (18). The body though corporeal is also an object, an artifact and a site of nationalism. The assertion of a strong able-bodiedness through the projection of army uniforms allows for nationalism to be embodied as "both individual and collective biomoral strength" (21). Through an imagery that encodes modernity and discipline, the body of the revolutionary leader becomes the locus

of physical strength and moral integrity. Additionally, the projection of youth by the leaders becomes synonymous with a teleological nationalist imaginary. In the genealogy of nation, the journey from childhood to adulthood becomes a corollary for national development. In this story, the time of youth is filled with hope for the future. For the leaders to imbibe and project this youthful energy signified the coming of advancement, progress, and liberation from age-old paradigms (whether pre-colonial tradition or colonialism) that had collectively shackled the people. The image of a smiling, youthful, and charismatic revolutionary leader that promised adventure and accelerated futures was the precise antithesis of the paternalism and tradition that an older father-of-the-nation figure tended to project.

The embodiment of nation is deeply enfolded with the gendering of nation and thus nation time is not only written across the body but also imbricated in gender difference. To ask why these three *male* bodies become a site of intervention during the Cold War, it becomes important to foreground the connections between nation and gender. "All nations depend on powerful constructions of gender," writes McClintock. "Despite many nationalists' ideological investment in the idea of popular unity, nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned institutionalization of gender difference" (1995, 352). Women's roles in the mobilization for independent nationhood and for nation building have several iterations. Not only are women crucial as participants in anticolonial war, they are valorized as the "revolutionary female figure" waving a flag or carrying a bomb for her national struggle. However, as soon as the postcolonial nation is established, the same woman is relegated to the realm of domesticity, family, and maternity. She becomes the agent of reproduction and inadvertently becomes subsumed within the symbolic process that turns nations into domestic genealogies (357). Elleke Boehmer has observed that the figure of the male within nationalism is "metonymic" whereas women figure in symbolic, metaphorical, or allegorical ways (qtd. in McClintock 1995, 355). When it comes to the question of nation time, it is imperative to return to McClintock's observation that nation time is interwoven with gender. Women are "not seen as inhabiting history proper but existing, like colonized peoples, in a permanently anterior time within the modern nation" (359). Meanwhile, men become agents of national progress, forward movement, and modernity.

As the colonized gradually began to confront European colonialism, revolutionary leaders certainly pondered the role that women ought to play in revolution, but unfortunately neither Lumumba nor Cabral arrived at any nuanced or progressive ways for women to either fully participate in revolution or to be fully integrated into the postcolonial nation. Lumumba addressed women's emancipation and wanted this mission to be explicit in his agenda, but his identity as an *évolué*

limited his status. Having lost touch with Congolese practices of communal family life, Lumumba pursued a vision of family and domesticity that was akin to colonial lifestyles. A more direct connection between husbands and wives would free women from the undue influences of other relatives. He also emphasized husbandly responsibilities and criticized men's callousness towards their wives' education and skills.[11] He wholeheartedly supported women's education but his main focus was on the "educators, parents, and husbands" (Bouwer 2010, 21) who would be in charge of implementing these goals. Karen Bouwer is right to point out that in Lumumba's world, "Women themselves were not given a voice but are seen as perpetual minors, always under the tutelage of others" (21). Cabral also saw women's emancipation as crucial for the liberation struggle, but like Lumumba, he had a hard time enforcing these beliefs in ways that did not reinforce gender differences. For example, the PAIGC divided the tasks of soldiers along gender lines. Women recruits were only occasionally allowed to participate in combat but were usually tasked with duties such as "cooking, laundry, weapons transport, spying, and nursing care" (Aliou 2014, 31). Reasons for this vary; the most obvious reason given was that women were physically not strong enough for combat and the most insidious reason was that the "leaders felt that the female population must be preserved for population reproduction and growth for the post-war period" (18). At the end of the day, Cabral's revolution only furthered the gender divide and re-relegated women to their traditional domestic duties instead of allowing the army to become a conduit of liberation and inclusion.

Sankara, however, deployed a much more aggressive and innovative approach when it came to women's development in Burkina Faso. Despite resistance from members of his cabinet and army, Sankara relentlessly pursued women's reforms. These included pushing for women candidates to run for CDR positions, creation of several women-led assemblies, setting a minimum marriage age, allowing for consensual divorce, correcting inheritance laws, and the launching of various campaigns against female genital mutilation (Harsch 2014, 79–84). As with all aspects of Sankara's short period of governance, the speed with which he imagined utopias was always incompatible with the speed with which revolutionary awakening could be elicited among the Burkinabé people. Women themselves found some of these policies incomprehensible, but Sankara stayed firm on pushing this top-down structure of reform to advance gender equality and women's emancipation. Sankara's rigorous approach towards women's inclusion, and Lumumba and Cabral's lukewarm attempts to engage women in revolution and resistance, proves that anticolonial ideologies of nation could not be accused of possessing a singularly patriarchal bent. Nonetheless, nation as it eventually came to be conceived during this time and in these spaces unfortunately remained largely ingrained as a gendered imaginary.

   If the Cold War is the afterlife of colonialism, as this book illustrates, then this disciplining of bodies continued unabated and found even more unique and grotesque iterations during and after the period of decolonization. Books connecting the Cold War and the proliferation of torture emphasize the US's and USSR's desires to control minds and wield psychological influence on so-called enemies. This goal could only be achieved through extraordinary experiments of cruelty on the human body (McCoy 2006; Klein 2007).[12] If conquest, slavery, and occupation had created access to a vast laboratory of human bodies in the colonies, then the Cold War allowed for an exacerbation of these efforts, and this time it was imbued with a manic spirit of competition. The two superpowers competed to gain totalitarian control over newly forming countries. Arresting their nation time and appropriating their national trajectories were ways of ensuring a *tabula rasa* for foreign policy and neocolonial economic agendas. The typologies of these interventions were certainly numerous and diverse: one such type was performed upon the revolutionary body of leaders that had come to signify the nation they led. Cold War actors, whether American or Soviet, were able to identify male, Third World, revolutionary leaders as standing in for their respective nations. Just as it was Che's Cuba, Mandela's South Africa, or Gandhi's India, the figures of Lumumba, Cabral, and Sankara were inextricable from their Congo, Guinea-Bissau, or Burkina Faso.

   Lumumba's murder was an international event with Belgium, the United States, and the United Nations being implicated in several recent histories that revisit this particular assassination in Congo. Lumumba was unanimously disliked by the international community. Having made himself an unwilling player in Belgium's desire to further their economic interests in Congo post-independence, Lumumba's open calls for aid from the Soviets incensed them further. In their dramatically narrated history, Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick (2015) write about the brewing of a malicious storm of rumors and character attacks that snowballed into the events of the 1961 murder. After Lumumba's somewhat successful visit to North America, an irritated Belgian government threatened lack of support to the US via their membership in NATO. They also insinuated that the UN, which was then trying to maintain a fragile peace in the volatile country, would be forced out of Congo by Lumumba (60–72). A frustrated President Eisenhower is on record as saying that, "we were talking about one man forcing us out of the Congo; of Lumumba supported by the Soviets" (72). Gerard and Kuklick speculate that this statement was perhaps uttered with enough force to merit an immediate chain of events. "To cast off Lumumba, the State Department noted, Americans would explicitly construct policies 'outside the UN framework'" (79–90). The UN was not an innocent either, so "Americans could more or less rely on the UN as an instrument of their foreign policy" (74). At the time of Lumumba's murder, Swedish official Dag Hammarskjöld was Secretary General of

the United Nations, and he was keen to see Congo as the place for the successful implementation of the UN's first rather expansive peacekeeping plans. The UN's blue-helmet peacekeeping troops were deployed in mine-rich Katanga, which was the Belgian-backed seceded region with Moïse Tshombe in charge. Hammarskjöld visited Katanga and avoided Lumumba, furthering their isolation of Lumumba and showing allegiance towards the Belgian stronghold of Katanga. Comparing him to Hitler, Hammarskjöld solidified his hatred of Lumumba and his support for Euro-American interests in the region (83–6).

Lumumba's ties to the USSR were grossly exaggerated. Nikita Khruschev of the USSR did see in Congo a great opportunity to garner support and to expand ties in Africa more generally. Yet, their lack of understanding about the region and Lumumba's insistence that he was staunchly non-aligned meant that the Soviets were essentially "posturing" in Congo (89). But even the faint posturing allowed the UN and the Euro-American parties to construct a virulent and exaggerated reality about Lumumba's perceived communist ideals (85–7). Chaos reigned, and Gerard and Kuklick report that there exist several accounts of the meeting in which Eisenhower gave explicit orders to have Lumumba assassinated. The CIA's Project Wizard—meant to eliminate Lumumba—found traction within this chaos. Allen Dulles, director of the CIA, himself wired Devlin about the "removal" of Lumumba as "an urgent and prime objective." In about a month or so, agent Sydney Gottlieb (known as Dr. Death) arrived in Congo with poisons for CIA station chief in Congo, Larry Devlin (147). Furor against Castro at the time also allowed for Lumumba to be the test body for a CIA assassination at the time (150). The poisons did not work but the die had been cast. The assassination began to unfold in gradual stages as Lumumba and two other politicians, Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito, were imprisoned. Several photos (202)[13] show a disheveled Lumumba being handled roughly by Mobutu's soldiers and Belgian police officers, alternatively. Most accounts claim that he was horribly beaten in prison and deprived of water (De Witte 2001, 108). After being shot, an aggressive assault was enacted even on his dead body. Without doubt, this was done in an effort to cover up, but it was also an attempt to squash even the potential afterlife of Lumumba's legacy.

Historian Ludo de Witte makes a provocative claim about the impact of this assassination:

> This murder has affected the history of Africa. . . . Lumumba and the Congolese government appeared just when the anticolonial revolution was at its peak worldwide. Lumumba was the product of these favorable power relationships, but at the same time his downfall was a sign that a neo-colonial counter-offensive was already gaining ground. The neo-colonial victory in the Congo indicated that the tide had turned for the anticolonial movement in Africa.

The change of direction became clear with Portugal's success in delaying decolonisation in its overseas territories; with the temporary halt of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa; with temporary reprieve for Ian Smith's "settler" regime in Rhodesia, and finally with the overthrow of Ben Bella in Algeria in 1965. If Africa was a revolver and the Congo its trigger, to borrow Frantz Fanon's analogy, the assassination of Lumumba and tens of thousands of other Congolese nationalists, from 1960 to 1965, was the West's ultimate attempt to destroy the continent's authentic independent development.

(xxiii)

The appropriation of the trajectory of independent, nationalist development was wiped out with one fell swoop when Lumumba was eliminated. De Witte goes as far as to say that Lumumba's murder threw the continent into disarray. As coups and counter-coups unfolded in Congo, the uncertain progress forward that Lumumba had made was yet again stunted with the coming of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Mobutu enjoyed the patronage of Belgium, France, and the United States, thanks in part because he fostered adversarial relations with both USSR and China. The Cold War's first grand intervention succeeded in encircling the newly independent people of the Congo region in a third bind of time where the linear push forward completely stopped, development stalled, and the future remained a vague and distant dream.

Cabral's assassination came on the heels of the assassination of yet another anti-Portuguese leader Eduardo Mondlane, who was the leader of the Mozambique Liberation Front (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* or FRELIMO). Mondlane was killed by a bomb planted in a book that arrived by mail to the FRELIMO headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 1969 (Shore 1992). Cabral had spoken of having known that his life was in constant danger and Mondlane's death only made that fear a certainty. He was fairly clear it was the Portuguese who would try to kill him and said that it was because "they believe that if they kill me it is finished for our fight" (Fraser and Johnson 1973). Much more than Lumumba, Cabral clearly understood the importance of what his persona and body symbolized for his colonial enemies. Unlike Lumumba, Cabral was killed before independence was won, and perhaps due to this, his murder is often analyzed as a violent event that took place within the larger event of an ongoing war with the Portuguese and less as a Cold War plot. José Pedro Castanheira's *Qui a fait tuer Amílcar Cabral?* (Who Got Amilcar Cabral Killed?) is a fairly comprehensive history of the murder and its aftermaths, and inevitably points fingers at the Portuguese secret service (*Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* or PIDE) which had infiltrated Cabral's PAIGC party as part of an espionage mission called "Mer Verte" (Green Sea) (2003, 163).

However, these linkages are not enough, and it is imperative to see Cabral's assassination within the wider framework of cumulative US and Soviet interests in Portuguese colonies. About a month after Cabral's murder, South African activist Christopher Nteta was interviewed on an African-American television show called *Say Brother* and articulated the reasons for US attempts to control Portugal and, by extension, its African colonies.

> Well, I think you have to see it in a broader context. It isn't just Guinea-Bissau, it is Angola—a very very wealthy country, one of the wealthiest countries in Africa, there is oil, gold, diamonds, and so forth—and then there's Mozambique, a big country with vast resources. So it's a package and the United States' support stems out of that factor—that there is natural resources to be exploited there.
>
> (Nteta 1973)

Several recently declassified documents reveal that the US was watching Portugal closely and were aware of their goings-on in Guinea-Bissau and other African colonies. Resources were likely an important goal, but there was also the desire for totalitarian control over any territory and the desire to eliminate elements that had Communist affiliations. Portugal was never formally implicated in the murder of Cabral and, in an ominous section titled "Les archives sont disparu" (The archives have disappeared), Castanheira reports that a detailed dossier that had indeed been created by the Portuguese Commission de Démantèlement de la PIDE/EGS (Commission to Dismantle PIDE/EGS) was never found. Cabral's widow Ana Maria Cabral and other researchers including Castanheira himself have looked for the documents but in vain (171–2). Despite the hundreds of people who were interrogated, implicated, and eventually released by the international committee that investigated the murder (65–6),[14] the full circuit of understanding around the events remains obscured.

Cabral's death had a dual effect. On the one hand, it solidified his heroic reputation as one of the most powerful anticolonial revolutionaries from Africa but on the other hand it led to deep fissures within the PAIGC itself, provoking a crisis of leadership that plagues Guinea-Bissau to this day. Cabral's funeral was a grand event that took place in Conakry. It was presided over by Guinean President Sekou Touré and attended by 25,000 people. Speeches did not just include Touré but also a young visitor from the US, poet Amiri Baraka. *The New York Times* article about the funeral spins it as a flagrant celebration of communist and socialist sensibilities, and speaks of the numerous Soviet and Chinese advisers that live in Conakry. But in the final line of the article, it also mentions that despite Touré's policy of "African scientific socialism," there also exists "substantial American investment in

bauxite-mining operations" (Johnson 1973). The Cold War comes full circle in the colonies and illustrates quite obviously that Cabral's assassination took place at the nexus of several intersecting and warring Cold War interests. Nteta insisted that the death of Cabral certainly did not mean that the revolution was dead. In fact, the revolution was not just in Cabral's head but it was hydra-headed, and would simply carry on despite this setback (Nteta 1973). Certainly, independence for Guinea-Bissau was achieved soon after, but the leadership required for advancing the postcolonial nation had suffered a profound rupture. Guinea-Bissau has continued to be embroiled in coups, counter-coups, dictatorships, and civil wars. Guinea-Bissau, which had implemented some of the most progressive agronomic reforms under Cabral is now one of the poorest countries in the world and ranks almost at the bottom in the UN-tabulated and crudely named Human Development Index (United Nations 2016).

Yet another decade of the Cold War had gone by when Sankara came on the scene. More war, more splintered nationalisms, more revolutions and counter-revolutions, and a rising body count marked these years. The enemy was no longer colonialism but it's much wilier avatar—neocolonialism—which was bolstered and sustained by Cold War desire to control economies, implement foreign policy, and create cultural initiatives. Much more than Cabral or Lumumba, the enemies that Sankara had chosen to go against were numerous, adroit, and multi-faceted due to the changing geopolitical landscape of the eighties. Ex-colonial power France was, of course, deeply invested in keeping Burkina Faso under its thumb. Among the several anecdotes that exist of Sankara bashing France, the one most often narrated is where Sankara lectured then French President Francois Mitterrand on the subject of "neocolonialism" during the official French visit to Burkina Faso. Mitterrand responded to most of the points that Sankara had brought up and added that with Sankara, "it is not easy to sleep peacefully" or to maintain a calm conscience. Half-jokingly, he added, "This is a somewhat troublesome man, President Sankara" (Harsch 2014, 17). France was quite tired of Sankara's aggressive attempts to kill his country's dependence on foreign aid and to divest it from French economic and military interests in the region.

Sankara was also a thorn on the side of the Americans. Flagrantly Marxist, he openly sided with Fidel Castro, supported the Nicaraguan revolutionaries resisting the United States and accepted an interest-loan of 20 million dollars from China to build a sports complex in the capital (115). Additionally, Sankara was inclined to prove that aid from Western countries always came with strings attached. For example, he had told the US that he preferred a direct budgetary support over the Peace Corps program. The US denied this request and Sankara suspended the Peace Corps program. Harsch observes that Sankara's government, unsurprisingly,

aroused the enmity of France, the US, and other powerful nations. Their African client states, especially in neighboring Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Togo, attempted to destabilize the Sankara government. They helped dissident military officers carry out bombings, and in 1986 Mali even waged a brief war against Burkina Faso.

(2015)

By the time of Sankara's murder, several aspects of his revolution had come unhinged. There was dissension within his cabinet, and his friend and political comrade of several years, Blaise Compaoré had started to campaign on his own. Sankara was alarmingly isolated.

By 1987, a year before Sankara's death, relations with France changed for the worse with incoming President Jacques Chirac aligning himself with Jacques Foccart, who was the man behind the amalgam of policies called Françafrique. In the documentary, *Thomas Sankara: An Upright Man*, the filmmakers allege that the time was ripe to change the course of Burkina Faso's trajectory. The narrator declares that, "Félix Houphouët-Boigny, president of the Ivory Coast and a worthy representative of this cooperation between France and Africa, with the help of the Foccart network, sees the opportunity of getting rid of the revolution in Burkina Faso" (Shuffield et al. 2006). Soon after the murder, Michael Wilkins had also offered a summary of the rumors and conspiracies swirling around the region. He wrote: "Ivorian President and 'wise man' Houphouet-Boigny was accused of setting up the coup and financing it, while Blaise Compaoré was labeled a liar, a murderer and a puppet of Houphouet" (1989, 381). The documentary film also shows a clip from a journalist, Marie Roger Biloa, who claims that Houphouët-Boigny's main contact was Blaise Compaoré who had grown visibly tired of Sankara and found him "out of control" and "unpredictable" (Shuffield et al. 2006). It did not help matters that Compaoré was also married to Houphouët-Boigny's niece, Chantal, who was rumored to have clashed with Sankara on occasion (Ouattara 2014, 25–6). It seems impossible to prove anything further, but it is alleged that Compaoré's men murdered Sankara in broad daylight. Just as with Lumumba, his body along with 12 others was dismembered and hastily buried in a grave outside of the capital. "The burial was so hasty that mourners were able to dip their handkerchiefs in pools of blood that drained from the grave. On Oct. 17, the remains were reburied in separate graves," the *New York Times* reported (Brooke 1987a). Compaoré declared himself president the next morning and claimed that Sankara had died from "morte naturelle" (natural causes). Sankara's death bore all the marks of a Cold War plot, and it was possibly one of the last of these kinds of assassinations until the Iron Curtain fell only a few years later in 1991.

Burkina Faso's relationship with France rapidly improved and soon resembled other Francophone nations. "The French authorities not only

regularly welcomed Compaoré to Paris but even awarded their National Order of the Legion of Honor to Colonel (later General) Gilbert Dien-déré," writes Harsch (148). As recently as 2011, former President Chirac and former Prime Minister Dominique Villepin were accused of accepting up to 20 million dollars in handouts from five African leaders, one of whom was Compaoré, to finance election campaigns. Corruption, poverty, unemployment, and repressive governance plagued Burkina Faso (Randall 2011). Compaoré ruled for 27 years until the coup that finally forced him to flee to neighboring Ivory Coast in 2014. For the United States under Obama, Burkina Faso became a significant air base and the hub of the US spying network in the region. "Under a classified surveillance program code-named Creek Sand, dozens of U.S. personnel and contractors have come to Ouagadougou in recent years to establish a small air base on the military side of the international airport," reports Craig Whitlock while also reminding us that this is taking place in one of most impoverished nations in Africa (2012). It is clear from these outcomes that Burkina Faso became extremely malleable to imperial powers. There are no real traces left of the resistant and belligerent stance that had characterized the country during the time of Sankara.

But with Compaoré gone, there has come about a great revival of the memory of Sankara. Not only have there been attempts to bring Compaoré to trial (Haque 2017) but Sankara's widow called for the exhuming of her husband's body ("Burkina Faso" 2015). The long, bureaucratic process of opening up graves and identifying the corpses, almost 30 years later, began in 2015. A real desire to gain clarity on the obscure, hectic, and chaotic events that shook the small nation several years ago is evidence of what the assassination managed to abort. This third bind of time, one instigated by Cold War machinations, certainly managed to re-shackle and seize a linear-moving, future-centric nation time. Unlike Cabral's Guinea-Bissau and Lumumba's Congo, the new wave of Sankara's memory and the impending trial for Compaoré more overtly show a collective consciousness re-emerging after three decades of frozen trajectories. It is evidence that time had been seized and that a time bind was indeed in effect. Perhaps it can be said that time has now started up again though there is no way to predict where this may lead.

To conclude, we can rightfully say that specific dynamics that led to the carefully planned murders of Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral, and Thomas Sankara are not only tragic events that bring the individual trajectories of these young revolutionaries to an abrupt end but they cut across nation time, that deeply layered, complicated chronopolitics that newly formed nation-states struggle with. Here, to borrow from Jasbir Puar, who borrows from Derrida who borrows from Shakespeare, time is indeed out of joint, and the untimely murders of young leaders who are symbols of emerging nations (that have emerging times) leads to an appropriated trajectory of nationhood by the Cold War that is as literal as it is metaphoric (Puar 2007; Derrida 2006).

These assassinations have led to the collapse of those particular nation-states and these places continue to struggle to recover from these events and to regain lost time. These murders have created "a 'deviant chronopolitics,' one that envisions 'relations across time and between times' that upturn developmentalist narratives of history" (Puar 2007, xxi). Time, and thus the historical trajectory of these emerging nations, was deliberately shrunk by Cold War geopolitics, furthering the hierarchies and divisions between the imperial powers and subject nations.

Notes

1. Two recent books have revisited the details of this murder: De Witte (2001); and Gerard and Kuklick (2015).
2. Cabral's death is described in the archives of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) that emerged from the Conferences organized within the framework of the lusophone Initiative's International Symposium on Amílcar Cabral.
3. Christopher Nteta (1973) of South Africa's Pan African Liberation Committee spoke about Western obfuscation of the truth in an interview that referred to Cabral's murder. His exact words were, "But it can be truly reported here that the *Newsweek* magazine is trying to confuse people into believing that rather than that the Portuguese are behind the assassination. The assassination is the result of some power struggle, tribal or otherwise. There is a fondness among Western people and the Western media to say anything that happens in Africa that is bad is because of tribalism."
4. Two documents reveal the Cold War dynamics at play. The first document titled "Portuguese Guinea: The PAIGC After Amilcar Cabral" (dated February 1, 1973) was declassified by the US Department of State on May 4, 2006 (See United States 1973b). This document reveals that the US was following the assassination closely and had reason to believe that the Portuguese were involved and that the murderer named here as Innocente Camil had his escape attempt thwarted by a Soviet ship. The second document is the Memorandum of Conversation no. 68 (New York, October 3, 1973. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976). This document reveals the US and Portugal's conversation on undermining PAIGC authority. PAIGC would have not been as open if their high-profile leader, Amilcar Cabral had not been eliminated some months ago (United States 1973a).
5. Several news articles speak of US military and air bases in Burkina Faso as a direct legacy of Sankara's assassination, among them Plaut (2014) and Taylor (2014).
6. David Scott, Homi Bhabha, Arjun Appadurai, and Dipesh Chakrabarty among several others have written about modernity and colonialism.
7. Timeline and biographical details from Prairie (2007).
8. Harsch warns that Sankara's understanding of democracy was not the Western-style electoral model but a more basic participatory democracy (55).
9. One of the key arguments made by Michel Foucault in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.*
10. Pomar, Rosa. 2011. "A Sumbia." *A Ervilha Cor de Rosa* blog. http://aervilhacorderosa.com/2011/04/a-sumbia/ Accessed January 23, 2019.
11. See comprehensive discussion about Lumumba, gender, and women in Bouwer (2010, 17–27).

12. Though it is not the main emphasis of either of their books, both McCoy and Klein write about the American scramble to establish a competitive torture program during the Cold War.
13. In addition covers of De Witte (2001), and Gerard and Kuklick's book use the photo of Lumumba and his aides in the back of a truck in Léopoldville on the day after their arrest. Authors credit Associated Press/Topham and Bettman/Corbis respectively.
14. The report created by the International Investigation Committee claims that 465 persons were interrogated, 43 were accused of participation, and nine of those were considered suspects.

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3 Cold War Disciplinarity
Postcolonial Studies and Its Discontents

Colonization of the mind by self-censorship is the most efficient effect of repression or censorious relationships.

Laura Nader, "The Phantom Factor," *The Cold War and the University*

It seems to me that the special responsibility of literary intellectuals and scholars has to do with precisely the center of their vocation: literature itself. Academic humanists often speak of themselves, a little grandly, as the preservers and transmitters of literary culture, and I have no quarrel with that design. What should be questioned is the means of preservations and transmissions.

Richard Ohmann, *English in America: A Radical View of the Profession*, 48

One of the inherited traditions of Western education in the last four hundred years is that of putting things in compartments, resulting in an incapacity to see the links that bind various categories. We are trained not to see the connections between phenomena, we become locked in Aristotelian categories. So the East becomes East, and the West becomes West, and never the twain shall meet! But is this really true in a world that ultimately is round?

Ngũgĩ'wa Thiong'o, "Borders and Bridges," 120

The Cold War not only stimulated an exhaustive and boundless trail of violence across the world, but it also engendered penetrating echoes, troubling residues, and deviant lineages in the realm of culture in the broad sense of the word. As covert actions and proxy wars set in motion by the United States and the Soviet Union destabilized decolonization movements in several regions, culture was profoundly and deliberately altered. Frantz Fanon has observed that, as decolonization unfolds, the colonial powers, in their desperation to hold onto the countries, "decide to wage a rearguard action with regard to culture, values, techniques and so on" (Fanon 2004, 9). As decolonization movements and the proxy conflicts stemming from the Cold War locked the world in a lengthy, tumultuous

competition, culture was turned into an active site and a potent agent for constructing narratives during a precarious, significant, and decisive historical period. Experts estimate that a staggering 53 conflicts took place between the years 1945 and 1992 (see Henderson and Singer 2000), and a majority of these were direct outcomes of the Cold War. What is disturbing is that these do not seem to even register, let alone figure prominently, within the American sphere of academic or mainstream culture.

Having focused my attention on postcolonial regions in the previous two chapters, I now transition to a specifically American realm from this point forward to examine and understand the extent to which the emergence of a doctored intellectual and cultural sphere cast a veil over the realities of violence in the postcolony and strictly controlled the ways in which the public grasped its extents and significances. This was not a one-way street: the USSR indeed masterminded a variety of such cultural interventions as well. But the goal of the next two chapters is to investigate the ways in which the US attempted to fill the power vacuum that had been created with the coming of the end of European colonialism. Scholars such as Rossen Djagalov (2017, Djagalov and Salazkina 2016) and Hala Halim (2012) explore the Soviet arm of the cultural Cold War in some depth. In addition, my lack of expertise in Russian language and culture, and the fact that postcolonial studies as an academic field and of a postcolonial literary culture very much emerged in the US, confines me to the American realm. *Cold War Assemblages* is also about trajectories, and to that end, I expose the *fil rouge* that runs through Cold War violence, the postcolonial representation of that violence in the cultural and literary spheres and the frameworks which either obfuscate this representation or change the prisms through which the Cold War culture is viewed. The field of postcolonial studies and the ways in which Cold War mechanisms deliberately manipulated its genealogy is a charged site to understand not just how the postcolonial canon came about but also how the Cold War has decisively shaped American literary and publishing culture.

I use the term "culture" loosely here to mainly include academic, artistic, and literary production but also to connote an anthropological milieu within which sites and events such as universities, classrooms, exhibits, conferences, prize ceremonies, literary salons and clubs, magazines, and journals are contained. Interventions in culture allowed the superpowers to solidify foreign as well as national policies and promote them to the general public both in their own countries and in their former colonies, over which they hoped to hold firm ideological sway. The cultural Cold War, as it came to be called, can be defined as a set of subversive interventions in the general field of culture, and it took place at the same time that the many hot conflicts of the Cold War were unfolding. Both the US and the USSR founded and funded organizations and institutions that took the work of cultural propaganda seriously. This

second half of the book addresses the American cultural Cold War in order to uncover the emergence of a distinctly American political and cultural imperialism and explore its role in our received understandings, not just of postcoloniality but related concepts such as the literary canon, non-Western literature more widely, academic and mainstream publishing, postcolonial studies, and digital publishing. As these myriad projects unfolded in mainstream cultural spaces, universities, and institutions, the dissemination of any knowledge, no matter what field it belonged to, suffered tremendous setbacks. Deliberately muddled questions of genealogy, withheld or omitted information, false theoretical trajectories, and heavily manipulated disseminations of cultural artifacts managed to alter the course and nature of culture itself as it manifested in mainstream, academic, and even radically political spaces. In the next two chapters, I first look at the Cold War interventions on American university campuses and follow it up with an exploration of Anglo-American literary cultures.

The Cold War University

In the forties and fifties, the scholar-to-spy pipeline tended to start at prestigious American Ivy League universities. In fact, Yale poetry major turned Chief of CIA Counterintelligence, James Jesus Angleton, was the inspiration for Matt Damon's character (though loosely based) in the Hollywood thriller *The Good Shepherd*. Angleton's professor and mentor, Norman Holmes Pearson, was also a scholar of poetry, specialist on the work of Nathaniel Hawthorne, and founder of the American Studies program at Yale (Holzman 1999). In the case of prolific writer and founder of *The Paris Review*, Peter Matthiessen, it was his paper on William Faulkner that caught Pearson's eye and led to Matthiessen's stint in the CIA. The outing of Matthiessen's work in the CIA was a central episode in linking the funding from the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) to the shape and mission of *The Paris Review*. Matthiessen has admitted that, "Pearson recruited a great great many Yale seniors for the CIA" (qtd. in Whitney 2017, 11–12). Yet the role of English departments and literature scholars is seen as marginal at best when it comes to the Cold War's hydra-headed reach into American campuses. This is certainly far from the truth.

The Cold War indeed shaped and determined the ways in which English departments began to define themselves from the sixties and seventies onward. Cold War assemblages played a role in shaping English curricula and in attempts to negotiate the canon wars that marked American humanities departments in the aftermath of the protests against the war in Vietnam and the counter-cultures following the 1968 movements. Having emphasized that the Cold War is indeed postcolonial by nature throughout this book, the emergence and genealogy of postcolonial studies

within English departments becomes the central query of this chapter. It is an irony and travesty that postcolonial studies does not imagine or investigate the Cold War with any real rigor, and this chapter hones in on that absence as a crucial epistemological riddle. Large-scale interventions by the government in American universities and the intensive implementation of area studies departments determine the way we operate today within humanities departments, and it impacts the scholarship that gets produced.

Cold War-induced ruptures in English departments and the ways in which those ruptures functioned had direct repercussions on how postcolonial studies was (and to a degree, still is) imagined and managed within the academy. Starting with an overview of Cold War machinations within universities, I examine the changes that English departments experience during the decades of the Cold War. A sustained critique of the discipline of postcolonial studies emerges through an intervention in its genealogy; firstly, by an analysis of the field's fraught relationship with realism and then, more specifically, through an exploration of the development of the postcolonial canon through the body of work produced on and about Frantz Fanon. My goal is to offer ways of reading disciplinary formations that go past the obfuscation created by an existing duality within the humanities: On the one hand, we are moving towards hyper-specialization of different fields, and in a completely contrary mode, we are being told that this is a fertile moment for interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary scholarship. How can we reconcile this contradiction? My investigation of English and postcolonial studies as a Cold War formation offers one detailed case, and it could perhaps be extrapolated to think about other humanities disciplines as well.

At Harvard, it was not the poetry scholars but the political scientists who were busy recruiting graduates for the CIA and its various sibling organizations. William Y. Elliot taught at Harvard's school of government and was a trusted political advisor for six American presidents. At Vanderbilt, he had been part of the group of Southern Fugitive poets, but he had gone on to research European political relations. He steered many promising Harvard graduates to government service, not the least of them being Henry A. Kissinger, a graduate student at the time (Wilford 2009, 125–6). Kissinger collaborated with Elliot to invite 50 European scholars to participate in a ten-week course during the university's Summer School. Many future leaders passed through this program, and in the *New York Times* exposé in 1967, it was revealed that Harvard had received $456,000 from the CIA, out of which one-fourth had gone towards the Summer School (127). Over at Princeton, five humanities professors served as consultants. This secret panel of academics met a few times a year to assist with intelligence assessments for the CIA's covert operations by providing assessments of enemies' intentions. In addition, a former Dean of Students worked with the CIA to help recruit Princetonians (Cavanagh 1980).

These examples show only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the deeply entangled, symbiotic relationship between American universities and American imperial interests during the Cold War. In the US, nationalist fervor against the communist threat reached a high point during the McCarthy era of the late forties and early fifties until the Senator was ousted in 1954. But even with Senator McCarthy gone, the damage was already done, and it seemed like the anti-communist crusade was only just taking off. Universities were at the forefront of this agenda, and the heads of over 30 institutions that included Harvard, Columbia, MIT, Caltech, and University of Chicago declared through their organization— the Association of American Universities (AAU)—that membership in a Communist Party will terminate the right to a university position (Zinn 1997, 42). Whether wittingly or unwittingly, departments of sciences, social sciences, and the humanities were enlisted in the service of a plethora of military, intelligence, and propaganda operations. Though it is still a marginalized area of study, scholarly accounts have trickled out that give evidence of the massive extent to which the universities were funded and then deployed for research that was attempting to aid Cold War interventions through areas as diverse as nuclear technology, culture-specific data, history writing, intelligence gathering systems, and literary criticism.[1] Several fields were implicated, and it can even be said that fields such as communications, development studies, and the ubiquitous international studies even came into being because of Cold War funding and particular Cold War needs (Simpson 1998, xi–xxxiv).

Unlike the cases of literature and the humanities, the role of sciences and social sciences in fighting the Cold War was tangible and easy to quantify. Noam Chomsky speaks anecdotally of his early years at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which he calls a "virtually Pentagon university." Here, the Research Lab of Electronics was funded by three armed services, and about 90 percent of the budget for its two military labs came from the Pentagon (Chomsky 1997). The logic was simple: the atomic bomb had transformed the world in extraordinary ways and science was now a key player in the international arena. Naomi Oreskes draws attention to the scale of the intersection between the sciences and the Cold War:

> The arms race, most obviously, would not have occurred without the East-West political conflict that is often taken to define the Cold War, but it also *could* not have occurred without the work of scientists and engineers. Much has already been written about the role of scientists in building the nuclear weaponry that defined the Cold War, but the space race, the exploration of the deep oceans and the deep interior of the Earth, the rise of telecommunications and civilian nuclear power, and many other scientific and technological developments were also directly tied to the global conflict that the Cold War entailed.
>
> (2014, 1)

Thus scientists and social scientists were imbued with a very concrete mission with regards to aiding and potentially even winning the war.

Scientists were involved in augmenting technology, but social scientists were involved in something different. The ambiguity and secrecy that surrounded covert Cold War operations enabled a very sophisticated psychological warfare program. The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) was the first independent office of the US government's psychological warfare division and was in charge of what could euphemistically be called persuasion. In only three years, it was dissolved into the CIA, which was the larger intelligence outfit. But the OPC's charter still defined a large part of the mission of the organization. Simpson writes:

> propaganda, economic warfare; preventative direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.
>
> (Simpson 2015, 40)

Even with the OPC now part of the CIA, such activities and the term "psychological warfare" tended to be stretched at will (Cull 2008),[2] often to accommodate more than just the above agendas. These missions boosted departments of anthropology, communications, psychology, sociology, and geography, among others, by funding large and small research projects across the world that engendered the creation of new systems, theories of warfare, and massive data collections, often giving a sense of real patriotic mission to academics at various American universities.

So what precisely were some of these projects? Robert Witanek offers an illuminating list and below is a small sample:

> From 1955–59, Michigan State University had a $25 million contract with the CIA to provide academic cover to five CIA agents stationed in South Vietnam who performed such jobs as drafting the government's constitution, and providing police training and weapons to the repressive Diem regime. The constitution included a provision requiring the South Vietnamese to carry voter identification cards. Citizens without such cards were assumed to be supporters of the Vietcong, and faced arrest or worse by the regime's police.
>
> In the mid-1950s, professors at MIT and Cornell launched field projects in Indonesia to train an elite of Indonesian military and economic leaders who later became the impetus behind the coup that brought Suharto to power and left over one million people dead. The elites were trained at the Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies at the University of California at Berkeley by Guy Pauker who had moved there from the MIT Center for International Studies.

In 1968, the CIA used the Eagleton Institute for Research at Rutgers University in a plan to influence the outcome of the presidential election in Guyana. Through the Eagleton Institute, the CIA helped amend the Guyanese constitution to allow Guyanese and relatives of Guyanese living abroad to vote by absentee ballot. Then 16,000 votes were manufactured in New York City, giving the CIA's candidate, Forbes Burnham, a narrow margin over socialist Cheddi Jagan.
(1989, 25–8)

In addition, recruitment of spies on campuses had reached a fever pitch in the seventies and the numbers were quite shocking, up to 5000 academics in total. Some of these academics belonged to screening committees to recruit 200 to 300 foreign students out of the 250,000 who came annually to the US for higher education at the time (25–8).

Thus, while the role of sciences and social sciences is less ambiguous, the part played by the humanities seems to lie beneath the radar and is possibly harder to discern. The questions I want to tackle in this chapter are manifold yet intricately connected to one another: What is the role of the Cold War in re-configuring various disciplines in the humanities and carving them up as area studies departments? If the Cold War is indeed a postcolonial event, how can its absence in postcolonial studies (usually located in English departments) be understood? For example, why is the Cold War such an ominous absence in the genealogy and material that constitutes postcolonial studies? How can this absence be theorized, accounted for, and more importantly, what does it say about how postcolonial futures were imagined? This chapter will draw from a mix of theoretical reflections from fields ranging from English to postcolonial studies to critical university studies in order to redraw the map of literary studies, as a whole, and postcolonial studies, more specifically, as it developed and has endured in Anglo-American academic spaces in the last half of the 20th century. I also expand on ways in which the Cold War's role in literary canon formation impacted English departments in the US, an issue that will be explored in further detail in the Chapter 4.

The English Department

On the surface, the role played by English studies appears pretty meager given the lack of military and government funding for a type of department that was seen as espousing apolitical interests. Though the CIA did eventually recruit their share of English majors during the Cold War, it did seem like "[l]iterary history went along on history's margin, with little cold war money and excluded from policy circles" (Ohmann 1997, 76). Ohmann claims that literary practitioners were not invited to walk down the corridors of power and were not really asked to participate in

commissions or in foreign policy conversations. "English was not producing action intellectuals; as a body of knowledge it had nothing to offer . . . to the managers of global affairs" (76). However, this happened to be the era of the post-war economic boom, which meant that students could indulge their interest in the humanities even if it was perceived as being impractical. It seemed that

> [a]cademic humanists in the fifties had special reasons for wanting politics not to exist. McCarthy had made activism improvident for college teachers at the start of the decade, and, in any case, the cold war had reduced ideology to seeming inevitabilities of free world and iron curtain, while drastically narrowing the range of domestic political positions available.
>
> (Ohmann 1976, 80)

Thus, it was not as if the Cold War could be ignored by English professors given that the specters of McCarthy and propaganda about the nuclear race loomed large. They might not have been at the forefront of all the action, but they were certainly impacted by the anti-communist witch hunts that were part and parcel of the era and in which scholars and writers were often targeted. While some professors did sign on to protest against nuclear programs, the overly political atmosphere mostly had the inadvertent effect of pushing English and literary studies intellectuals into an apolitical enclave where activism was risky, and it was seen as common sense to remain confined within particular and specialized areas of expertise.

   With these goings-on as the backdrop, it is also important to note the influence of New Criticism upon departments of English. During this time, modernist works—with their extensive interest in aesthetic experimentation, detachment, autonomy, and fragmentation—motivated and provided an impetus to new theories of reading that soon became the highly influential literary-critical movement called New Criticism (see Litz, Menand, and Rainey 2008).[3] Scholarly studies of literature and methods for literary criticism became institutionalized in American colleges and universities sometime in the 1930s due to a confluence of factors, one of them being the growing need for a method for reading, studying, and producing scholarship on contemporary literary texts that reflected modern life. The desire for a focused method for literary study had already made its presence felt in the 1890s and had cleared the ground for the advent of New Criticism in the academy (see Graff 2007).[4] The influential and foundational texts of New Criticism began to trickle in from the 1920s onwards with works such as "Tradition and the Individual Talent" by T.S. Eliot (1920), *The Principles of Literary Criticism* (1924) and *Practical Criticism* (1929) by I.A. Richards, *Understanding Poetry* by Cleanth Brooks (1938), *Seven Types of*

Ambiguity (1930) by William Empson, and *The Double Agent: Essays in Craft and Elucidation* (1935) by R.P. Blackmur. These works were groundbreaking not only because they completely revitalized the study of poetry but because they also offered students and critics a systematic, scientific, discriminatory, and objective method of "close reading." Primarily a formalist movement, New Criticism advanced literary criticism that was focused on seeing a work as a completely self-contained aesthetic object. By arguing that previous approaches to criticism were far too focused on external factors such as biography, history, or comparative references, New Critics insisted on analyzing the text by connecting its ideas to its form.

However, it took a couple of decades before New Criticism became established within institutions, particularly in the US,[5] and gained currency for the claim that the object of English studies must be the "text" itself and not, in fact, literary history or political-social contexts. With the US slowly positioning itself as the light of democracy against the dark and brutal horrors of Stalinism and Soviet policy, New Criticism offered a soothing, seemingly secular and objective approach to literature. There do exist scholarly claims that the development of New Criticism and the solidification of anti-Communist Cold War ideology was no coincidence but that it was in fact a phenomenon that was bound together when it came to the role of English studies and English departments in the Cold War in the wider sense (see Franklin 2001; Cain 2003; Walhout 1987; Kimsey 2017). In his book *Cold War Criticism and the Politics of Skepticism*, Tobin Siebers makes a provocative argument about the connections between what he calls the "cold war mentality" and New Criticism (1993, 29). "Modern criticism," claims Siebers, "is a product of the cold war, and the repeated emphasis by the New Critics on objectivity, ambiguity, paradox, the impossibility of paraphrase, and the double meaning are part of the cold war climate" (30). For Siebers, the cold war climate is a mood marked by constant skepticism, paranoia, anxiety about uncertain futures, and a desperate quest for harmony and order in a chaotic postwar world. "We are attracted to formalism because we see the mirror image of our own distraught and disordered conditions in the perfections of pure form" (35).

Elsewhere, in his semi-autobiographical yet scholarly book about the profession, Ohmann tends to take a radical view of New Criticism's influence on English departments during the Cold War. He writes that as a graduate student in the fifties, New Criticism "was the central intellectual force in our subculture during those years," and that there was a connection between this method and the enormous growth of American universities. It tended to provide insularity from the existing political climate and this was a luxury that became available within this field. New Criticism legitimized an intellectual and literary practice that disavowed political or historical connections within the academy. In his

history of English studies, William E. Cain observes that while it is not easy to prove the connection between New Criticism and the Cold War, "one can readily see the advantages of an apolitical method during a painful, intimidating political era" (1984, 4). Ohmann argues that New Criticism reinforced an individualistic bourgeois liberal order within the English profession by emphasizing the newfound economic prosperity and the entry of professors of English into a more professional-managerial class.

For Ohmann and, to a degree, Cain, this ideology permeated many aspects of the profession from pedagogy to writing centers to scholarly publications. In retrospect, Cain viewed these trends less as effects of New Criticism but more as part of large-scale attempts to make American culture central to departments and to institutionalize them more firmly within university agendas. He writes:

> Still, one can understand how the intensities of the Cold War period might make the close reading of texts—a method that did not require commerce with politics and history—seem to be a desirable mission to pursue. Academics were pressured to stick to their work, and they were criticized when they appeared to trespass on political territory. Focusing on the text gave teachers a well-defined area of expertise, trained students in useful skills, and thus made English seem important yet marginal, necessary for the attainment of certain social goals—a literate public, for instance—but not likely to interfere with the workings of the social order.
>
> (Cain 1984, 4)

Eventually, New Criticism as pedagogy and scholarship existed less and less in its pure, formalist method but became more synonymous with the practice of "close reading." As close reading proliferated literary studies in the US, withdrawing from social action and the embrace of wholesome personal well-being were just some of the effects. The impact of these developments was direct and resounding, and thus

> [l]iterary studies played a small part in the Cold War, not by selling out unwanted expertise, not by perfecting the ideology of free world and evil empire, but by doing our best to take politics out of culture and by naturalizing the routines of social sorting.
>
> (Ohmann 1983, 85)

Right until the explosive moment of 1968 protests and the collective resistances to the war in Vietnam, departments of English were proactive in separating literary studies from politics, and experience from action.

The pastoral idyll ruptured upon the arrival of the protest culture of the sixties and debates on representation in the literary canon took center

stage in English departments. Cornel West writes that this was a moment of "decolonized sensibilities" and describes it thus:

> During the late 1950s, '60s, and early '70s in the United States, these decolonized sensibilities fanned and fueled the Civil Rights and Black Power movements, as well as the student antiwar, feminist, gray, brown, gay, and lesbian movements. In this period we witnessed the shattering of male WASP cultural homogeneity and the collapse of the short-lived liberal consensus. The inclusion of African Americans, Latino/a Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and American women in the culture of critical discourse yielded intense intellectual polemics and inescapable ideological polarization that focused principally on the exclusions, silences, and blindnesses of male WASP cultural homogeneity and its concomitant Arnoldian notions of the canon.
>
> (1990, 101)

In West's intellectual genealogy of how we arrived at this moment, the Cold War is never explicitly named though he is indeed investigating the period from the fifties to the eighties; in fact, the exact duration of the Cold War. However, he writes of the ways in which the decline of Europe after World War II, the ascendancy of American domination, the rapid decolonization of two-thirds of the world, and the massive influx of Jewish intellectuals fleeing the Holocaust in the American academic and cultural scene led to the unseating of the WASP male intellectuals from the echelons of academic hierarchies. The aggressive push for feminist literary studies, African-American and Black studies, multicultural and postcolonial studies found a home in English as demands for curricular reformation became the urgent agenda of the day. English "took 1960s challenges into its own internal discourse, putting in question such givens as the autonomy of literary works, the universality of the values attributed to them, and the permanent value of canonical works outside the historical process" (Ohmann 1997, 92). The opposition to the Vietnam war also transpired to allow for a consensus from white, liberal male academics in the efforts to revise and radicalize curricula, especially as exposés such as the My Lai massacre, the use of napalm, carpet bombing, and CIA-orchestrated assassinations and domestic surveillance technologies penetrated public consciousness.

   While all of this sounds like the coming of an era of deeper awareness and liberal-progressive new order, paradoxically much of the Cold War circuitry had already been set into motion. The next chapter shows how simultaneous book publishing interventions by American governmental agencies amplified Cold War rhetoric and paradigms, and these were not necessarily shaken off by the shifts in consciousness that were starting to take place. In fact, Cold War interventions often had inadvertent effects.

For example, the CIA interventions in publishing led to intensive shifts in the existing transatlantic and globalized alliance of literary exchange and dissemination. But these dynamics were fundamentally lopsided, and promoted sanitized and easily digestible frameworks that often filtered out radical, oppositional, and sometimes formally baffling works and figures. Similarly, English departments became a place where curricular revision, progressive canon debates, and a new literary culture began to thrive, but the Cold War interventions had managed to alter the genealogy of fields as they established themselves within academic departments. The massive use of academics in various universities by the American government already made it difficult to ignore that the Cold War had indeed infiltrated academic spaces and academic minds, exaggerated though that may sound. Thus, most departments were impacted by such echoes and linkages even though it seemed like a progressive transformation was underway due to the protest movements and the coming of an aggressive counter-culture.

Techniques of close reading brought about by New Criticism might have created a dichotomy between literature and politics, but there were also other institutional shifts that transformed the way in which the counter-cultural, non-traditional, and politically challenging, new literary works entered English departments. One such shift was brought about by the creation of area studies programs. Area studies programs were introduced into American universities in light of the perceived need for gathering data about places of geopolitical interest to the Cold War. The idea of starting area studies programs is credited to William Donovan, one of the founders of the CIA who "had a plan to transform academia and bring enormous amounts of government and foundation funding into American universities" (Cumings 2014, 72). Immanuel Wallerstein defined area studies as

> the notable postwar innovation that sought to bridge these three great divides. It grouped together people from all the axes of cleavage, to study one geographical area that presumptively united a culture, a history, a language and a people. The result was massive secular growth in the numbers and competence of scholars who worked on the non-Western world.
>
> (qtd. in Cumings 2014, 81–2)

Departments that sprung up would sometimes include large continental territories such as American Studies, Slavic Studies, Asian Studies, African Studies, Middle Eastern Studies or smaller nation, religion, ethnicity, or language-based fields such as Islamic Studies, Tibetology, African-American studies, or Persian studies, among several others. Area studies programs were hosted by universities, institutes, and centers across the US with funding from places such as the Ford Foundation, Carnegie

Endowment, MacArthur Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation, an estimated $30 million of which was reportedly coming out of government pockets (80). Statistics also reveal the extent of resources poured into area studies programs—between 1951 and 1972, there were an estimated 3000 area studies dissertation fellowships and another 2800 area studies research grants. Ford Foundation alone invested $270 million in area studies programs between 1951 and 1966 (Szanton 2004, 11).

Though criticized in the early years for its complicity with government agendas and partisan role on the Cold War, area studies has since shaken off this reputation, and it would not be far-fetched to say that area studies departments are often the epicenter of some of the most original, interdisciplinary, and theoretically innovative work in the academy. It also rid itself of the criticism that it had "no hard core" and "no clear epistemological position" (Wallerstein 1997, 202, 210). However, when it came to English departments, a peculiar contradiction had started to make an appearance. The pressure to open up English and make it inclusive of hitherto marginalized and ignored narratives had certainly made an impact. The debates over canons and cultural values coming out of the launch of African-American studies, Asian-American studies, women's studies, American studies, and the ubiquitous role of theory managed to somehow take root in English departments and turned into what became known as the "culture wars" in the nineties. Since then, the liberal-oriented American university has cultivated an almost contradictory mission—on the one hand, it wants to address its growing multicultural population and accommodate them within the academic mission, but on the other hand, it continues to privilege Western culture, narratives, and epistemes. English departments are perfectly emblematic of this contradiction.

In my experience, the English departments that I have taught in (City University of New York and the University of Connecticut) have always insisted on a very traditional blueprint for undergraduate and graduate majors. This includes a primary focus on British literature, a secondary focus on American literature, and finally, a skimpy but mandatory focus on postcolonial, women's, or multi-ethnic literatures. Usually, literature is periodized: British literary history is organized in great depth and American literature in larger, less nuanced chunks. Students are usually required to take no more than one class that fulfills the criteria for diversity such as postcolonial literature or American multicultural literature. Women authors, African-American literature, courses on non-print media, and literary theory are often relegated to the realm of electives. While there is no definitive way to prove this, and certainly, I do not have statistics from universities nation-wide that would make the case for me, I believe that this is often the standard approach regarding the English major in a majority of universities across the US. Thus, English manages to sustain its Western epistemological bias and an imperious English language

paradigm while making a token gesture towards accommodating non-Western and non-normative ideas, and deeming itself as being on the progressive side of the political spectrum.

Cold War assemblages are crucial for understanding how this somewhat deficient system emerges and sustains itself. Over the years, English has been absolved of its responsibility to amend its epistemological and regional-linguistic bias because area studies programs offer a welcome respite. If an English major has a deep interest in Asian-American studies, gender studies, or American studies, for example, they could take courses there and perhaps even minor in that field. English then could remain focused on British and American literature. Thus, the Cold War—with its creation of area studies programs—managed to drive a wedge between what could be a more wholesome and organically interlinked study of certain humanities subjects. While the interdisciplinary methodology creates the impression of uniting various fields and methods, the Cold War-generated area studies framework tends to actually keep the various fields apart from each other, leading to a regurgitation of existing ways of functioning in English departments. The coming of protests and counterculture brings about a small shift and, in fact, does allow for an inclusion of certain diversity-focused courses; but the curriculum as a whole remains undisputed and it does not undergo much radical re-structuring.

Thus, the Cold War's interventions into the university managed to strengthen area studies programs which in turn weakened what could have been a strong push towards a complete overhaul of existing humanities fields. Within English, debates about what counts as "important" literature, who are "major" authors, and which literary periods must not be skipped still abound. Instead of working towards an approach that can harness various disciplines and methods, further categorizations and relentless divisions are the order of the day. On the surface, sub-fields such as gender studies, indigenous studies, postcolonial studies, critical race theory, or Asian-American studies may seem like the right way to build and sustain a progressive department, but the truth is that they only emphasize difference rather than a shared sense of mission towards education, inquiry, and scholarship. Current practices of interdisciplinarity could even be characterized as epitomizing over-disciplinarity. Ideally, a progressive English department would, by virtue of its very ontology, allow research and curricula which tackle large historical, linguistic, artistic, and political phenomena. A true re-structuring of the English department during a precarious but fertile moment during the sixties and seventies would have allowed for a more capacious and epistemologically open future. Unfortunately, Cold War machinations in American universities played a very large role in appropriating such a future before it could come to be fully conceived and realized. In the end, the Cold War university mirrored much of the Cold War world—splintered, divided, and with conflicts within its factions. With the Cold War university and

the English departments, in particular, as a charged background, I would like to zoom in on postcolonial studies, which has occupied a somewhat peculiar and perhaps even fraught place in English departments.

Postcolonial Studies

I want to first emphasize the centrality of postcolonial studies to the Cold War. One of the goals of this book is to illustrate in no uncertain terms that the Cold War profoundly impacted the postcolonial world; yet, the view that the Cold War played a decisive role in reshaping almost two-thirds of the planet colonized by Europeans is largely absent from postcolonial scholarship: It is this problematic that demands examination. Inextricably linked to decolonization, the Cold War relied upon the emerging Third World to escalate and withstand the conflict between the US and USSR. Proxy wars, coups, assassinations, weapons flooding, installation of dictators, and massive cultural interventions became commonplace. In fact, the Cold War continued and exacerbated actual, psychological, political, and linguistic violence set in motion by European colonialism almost 400 years ago. The superpowers also depended upon the Third World at the level of infrastructure and thus managed to manipulate the internecine divisions that came about due to the power vacuum left by decolonization.

At the outset, it is important to recall that the Cold War borrows heavily from colonial discourses at a linguistic and theoretical level. For example, William Pietz has argued that totalitarianism is the "theoretical anchor of cold war discourse" (1988, 55) and in articulating an anti-communist and anti-socialist ideology, totalitarianism becomes the main sieve through which Cold War theories and policies are filtered. Intellectuals, foreign policy makers, politicians, philosophers, artists, and writers opposed the Soviet Union by critiquing the structures of totalitarian statehood and the experiences that it engendered. Pietz argues that essentialist notions of Western civilization are pitted against "essential Orientalness of Russian mentality" (58). He traces this Orientalist tendency to stereotype totalitarianism as Eastern in the works of George Kennan, George Orwell, Hannah Arendt, and Arthur Koestler in their writings about totalitarian communism. Though these writers are against totalitarianism, they have a tendency to map totalitarianism upon the "other." Pietz thus insists that the Cold War must be explored through resistant postcolonial frameworks.

The Cold War is the afterlife of colonialism precisely because it allowed the US to further frameworks of governance, militarization, and culture as well as language. If this logic is foregrounded, there must be an interrogation of this continuum at the heart of the postcolonial project, especially in light of the fact that postcolonial criticism is deeply invested in shattering the binaries used in Enlightenment discourses to justify colonial

occupation and atrocities. It is regrettable that postcolonial studies does not include the Cold War as one of its most important sites of inquiry. I argue that this absence can be located within the Cold War interventions into universities across the US that appropriated and skewed the genealogy of postcolonial studies. In the past couple of decades, the field has also been a site of an extraordinary outpouring of theoretical scholarship, some of which expresses the discontents with the discipline. I will frame my discussion through some of the critics of postcolonial studies who have touched upon genealogies and mis-directions in the field. These include Neil Lazarus, Aijaz Ahmad, Ella Shohat, Benita Parry, and Anthony C. Alessandrini.

For the past five decades, postcolonial studies as a field has been located in English departments. The reasons for this vary. According to Neil Lazarus, the term "post-colonial" with a hyphen was introduced by political scientists Hamza Alavi and John S. Saul, who were using it in "a strict historical and politically delimited sense, to identify the period immediately following decolonization, when the various leaderships, parties, and governments which had gained access to the colonial state apparatuses at independence undertook to transform these apparatuses" (Lazarus 2004, 2). However, from starting out as a specifically historicizing mode, the postcolonial has been transformed and has come to be seen mainly as a literary and/or theoretical scholarship. It is this iteration of the postcolonial as literary and theoretical that tends to find a home in English departments. Postcolonial studies has been largely inclined towards producing scholarship on Anglophone cultural production and has also always been included within Anglophone cultural production. Language here is key, and influential postcolonial works such as Edward Said's *Orientalism* in 1978, the works of the Subaltern Studies group in the early eighties, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o's *Decolonising the Mind* in 1986, and field-specific guides such as *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Postcolonial Literatures* by Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin in 1989 were originally written in the English language. In addition, these theoretical works have coincided with a rich outpouring of Anglophone literature of writers from former colonies, such as Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka, Buchi Emecheta, Salman Rushdie, Anita Desai, Derek Walcott, and George Lamming, to name just a few. Though Francophone or Lusophone cultural production were also simultaneously thriving, the convergence of this literary output and the publication of major field-defining works could be one reason why postcolonial studies is associated with the English language and English language literature, and thus resides in English departments.

The absence of postcolonial studies in France, for example, only furthers the argument that this field's emergence and growth has taken place primarily within American, Australian, and British academic spaces. The French academy has often voiced their suspicion of postcolonial theory

and deemed it too Anglo-Saxon. Reasons given have often included French resistance to historicizing and overt commitment to close reading of literary works (Forsdick and Murphy 2003, 7–8). The irony here is that English language academics have never been shy about their reliance on French and Francophone literary and theoretical material. Whether it is literature itself (Ousmane Sembène, Assia Djebar, Léopold Senghor, or Aimé Césaire) or the deep influence of theorists writing in French (Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, Edouard Glissant, Frantz Fanon), the inclusion of French and Francophone scholarship in its comparative framework is vital for postcolonial studies on an onto-logical and epistemological level. There are probably several reasons why French and Francophone academic spaces are reluctant and resistant to admit postcolonial studies into their scholarly repertoire, but that discussion is beyond the purview of this chapter. Furthermore, the rather scarce existence of postcolonial studies in several other ex-colonial contexts, such as Belgian, German, Dutch, Italian, and Spanish academia, establishes the field and the discipline as a specifically Anglo-centric project.

Why were English departments such a fertile place for the emergence and growth of postcolonial studies? Some of the answers can be found in the first half of this chapter. As the US erupted in protests against the Vietnam War, the calls for a radicalized counter-culture were taken quite seriously in academia. The push for a multicultural university rein-forced the need for a reshaping of the canon and curriculum, thus break-ing the apolitical lull that English departments had found themselves in for several years before that. Decolonization movements across the globe were instrumental in giving shape and voice to feminist as well as civil rights upheavals taking place in the US. Postcolonial studies fit perfectly well with everything else that had started to appear on the horizon, the main ones being multi-ethnic literature, African-American studies, Asian-American studies, American studies, and gender studies. With its focus on non-Western, world, and "other" literatures, it func-tioned as the English department's international branch and filled out the discourses on race, gender, marginalization, and nation that were at the core of the emerging new curricula but yet were primarily West-ern in nature. However, as I have stated earlier, the proliferation of the area studies framework while promoting innovative interdisciplinary research has primarily managed to keep various disciplines apart from each other. English, in particular, has ended up relegating various non-Western subjects to area studies while keeping its traditional trajectory fairly intact. Thus, English departments were indeed a fertile place for the growth of postcolonial studies, but with the Cold War interventions in those departments, the field itself had to morph and mutate to suit the existing epistemological bias that English departments were not will-ing to forgo. This meant that the genealogy of postcolonial studies was appropriated by the English departments and their particular agendas

and, in a sense, this ensured that the field's origins and trajectory were skewed from the start.

From the very beginning, the historical and chronological basis for the term "postcolonial" could not be sustained and became transformed into something completely different due to the specific dynamics of the post-Cold War American culture within which it was received. This was the time of covert interventions and proxy wars propelled by the USA and the USSR who destabilized decolonization movements in most countries. Foreign policy was of key geopolitical importance, and the university became a site where various American governmental agencies could deploy an array of academics, strategists, and researchers to "ease the passage of American foreign policy abroad" (Saunders 2001, 1–2). Melani McAlister's work on American interests in the Middle East illustrates that foreign policy can be a semiotic, meaning-making activity that frames and sustains ideas of nationalism and nationhood. "Foreign policy statements and government actions become part of a larger discourse through their relation to other kinds of representations, including news and television accounts of current events, but also novels, museum exhibits and advertising" (2003, 5). Culture becomes "an active part of constructing the narratives that help policy make sense in a given moment," writes McAlister (6). As these initiatives unfolded in universities and institutions, the dissemination of any knowledge—no matter what field it belonged to—suffered massive setbacks. The subject of decolonization was erased from the American university space as neocolonial foreign policy ventures clamped down on any form of knowledge that was perceived as politically dangerous for the interests of the USA.

These large-scale projects grounded in universities and publishing institutions have had an inordinate impact on most academic fields to this day. The fact that the term "postcolonial" went from being a particular periodizing term that defined the politics of the post-decolonization era to an innocuous, sanitized field within which almost any discussion on marginality, nationalism, or immigration can be included should be seen as the direct effect of Cold War manipulation of academic and publishing culture. Whether postcolonial theory is applied anachronistically for an understanding of Chaucer in the Middle Ages (see Cohen 2001) or has begun to incorporate historically and spatially diverse regions from Australia to Asia and the USA to Latin America, it seems to have lost its identity as a distinct category and critical tool to understand and analyze the long duration of European colonialism and its active repercussions today. Aijaz Ahmad refers to a notable issue of the journal, *Social Text*, from 1992 (only a year after the Cold War was officially over) which attempts to define the "postcolonial." Herein, colonialism as a term is stretched back in time to include the Incas, the Ottomans, and the Chinese empires before the European empire existed, and it is also stretched forward to

include any kind of national oppression such as the Indonesian brutalization of East Timor. Ahmed explains,

> 'Colonialism' thus becomes a trans-historical thing, always present and always in process of dissolution in one part of the world or another, so that everyone gets the privilege, sooner or later, one time or another, of being colonizer, colonized and postcolonial.
>
> (Ahmad 1995, 9)

By thus over-stretching and over-applying the term, it loses the specific critical, political, and analytical agency that it was originally imbued with. By evacuating the exact meaning of the word, "we can no longer speak of determinate histories of determinate structures such as that of the postcolonial state," or the state's relationship with imperial power and its effect upon governance or culture (9).

   One entry point into investigating the appropriated genealogy of postcolonial studies is to ask why there is a gap between postcolonial reality and postcolonial theory. As previously colonized places in Asia and Africa experience continued breakdown in communication and education systems, terrifying levels of poverty, acute hunger as well as wars and genocides that threaten the very possibility of human existence, the field of postcolonial studies has moved away from an urgent engagement with these narratives. There has been a jump from the field's founding moments—where anti-imperialism, tricontinentalism, Third World nationalism and aesthetics of realism and resistance thrived—to the current trends that show a slant toward postmodernist fragmentation, metropolitan narratives, and a theorization of the field itself. When academic debates about the first Gulf War of 1990–91 (once again, this is on the cusp of the Cold War timeline) were raging in the American academy, Ella Shohat offered a stern indictment of the ambiguities associated with the term and to "unfold its slippery political significations" (1992, 100). Pondering the ominous lack of the word "postcolonial" during these debates, she wrote, "When lines drawn in the sand still haunt Third World geographies, it is urgent to ask how we can chart the meaning of the postcolonial" (99). Drawing from her own experience as an academic, she recounts the following:

> My recent experience as a member of the multicultural international studies committee at one of the CUNY branches illustrates some of these ambiguities. In response to our proposal, the generally conservative members of the college curriculum committee strongly resisted any language invoking issues such as "imperialism and Third Worldist critique," "neocolonialism and resisting cultural practices," and "the geopolitics of cultural exchange." They were visibly relieved however at the sight of the word *postcolonial*. Only the diplomatic

gesture of relinquishing the terrorizing terms *imperialism* and *neocolonialism* in favor of the pastoral *postcolonial* guaranteed approval.

(99–100)

Shohat's anecdote reveals how the term "postcolonial" connoted a safe, digestible, de-politicized realm. It also shows the transformation that the term has undergone from its founding moments, when postcolonial work was viewed as an urgent and radical discipline that was meant to unite various fields and create tools to dismantle the colonial blueprints across the world. It is also this precise lack of danger and neutered radicalism that allows for postcolonial studies to thrive in a Cold War university.

While Shohat is indignant about this issue during the first Gulf War, Lazarus returns with a similar indictment ten years later, after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In his article for a special journal issue, aptly titled "After Iraq: Reframing Postcolonial Studies," he writes that one would imagine that

the concept of "imperialism" in its full historical and political senses was indispensable to the practitioners in postcolonial studies. The fact that it has not been might lead one to conclude that "postcolonial studies" has "lost the plot" as it were.

(2006, 16)[6]

Shohat believes that a crisis in the actual Third World can be attributed to the fall of communist, socialist ideologies, the vanished hope of tricontinental revolutions, and the generally "dispersed and contradictory" power relations in the Third World. "At this difficult juncture, the word 'postcolonial' gains popularity and begins to stand in for the more politicized but failed term, 'Third World,' thereby connoting more theoretical prestige and a less activistic aura" (1992, 100). In her opinion, the term "postcolonial" had become a less political cousin of other forms of anti-imperialist criticism, and was perceived as decidedly more elite and institutionally sanctioned. Though Lazarus's essay suggests that postcolonial studies originates in political science, it gains weight in other fields of the humanities with the astounding impact of Edward Said's *Orientalism* in the late seventies, the Subaltern studies project in the late eighties, and other Anglophone writers and critics who herald the dawn of a much more expansive approach to postcoloniality.

A study of the American academy in the aftermath of the Vietnam War is a charged site to find the answers for the larger question of why postcolonialism has lost its precise political significance. Jim Neilson's *Warring Fictions: Cultural Politics and the Vietnam War Today* examines the impact of Vietnam war novels in English from the sixties to the nineties. He traces the trends within literary culture, mass media, and the academy by analyzing the reception of Vietnam War literature. Neilson does not

address postcolonial studies but instead creates a framework to expose the workings of a literary culture that shapes perceptions about colonialism, globalization, and foreign wars as well the perceptions about those wars. He writes,

> The Vietnam War novels and autobiographies that have been acclaimed by such liberal professionals were written in the age of revisionist literary studies, canon revision, and poststructuralism. Indeed, the war and poststructuralism grew simultaneously. . . . Consequently as a serious literary genre Vietnam War fiction has been defined by its endorsement of a postmodern sensibility and its adoption of the first-person psychedelic aesthetic modes of New Journalism.
>
> (1998, 53)

Aijaz Ahmad, in writing about postcolonial theory, has contended that "the dominant strands within this [postmodern] 'theory,' as it unfolded after the movements of the 1960s were essentially over" (1992, 1). These postmodern theories had in fact

> been mobilized to domesticate, in institutional ways, the very forms of political dissent which those movements sought to foreground, to displace an activist culture with a textual culture, to combat the more uncompromising critiques of existing cultures of the literary profession with a new mystique of leftish professional, and to reformulate in a postmodernist direction questions which had previously been associated with a broadly Marxist politics.
>
> (1)

Ahmad dives into the heart of the American distaste for the Marxist politics that Cold War interventions in publishing, art, and universities tried their best to eradicate or, at least, soften. Writers who espoused an apolitical veneer, modernist detachment, and aesthetic autonomy were often picked for promotion and dissemination. Openly socialist, communist, or Marxist sensibilities in art and culture were slowly pushed to the margins, sometimes by openly discrediting the author or by making the machinery of promotion, prizes, and reviews unavailable during the Cold War.[7]

It is quite possible that the very reason that leads to the exclusion of a particular canon of Vietnam War literature is also the reason that a certain kind of postcolonial literature and theory thrives. Neilson asks, "how, against the best efforts of so many, did a war once perceived as a nearly genocidal slaughter to perpetuate American neocolonialism come to be viewed as an American tragedy?" (1998, 6). I could ask a similar question about postcolonial studies. How did the study of an inhumane

history of colonialism—with its multiple genocides, massacres, tortures, and extreme exploitation—come to be seen as safe and easily digestible? Neilson's attempts to understand the way in which academic and commercial culture completely transforms and reverses an historical event can be applied to my dilemma regarding postcolonial studies. It is not far-fetched to claim that postcolonial theory also favors a certain kind of literature, with a strong preoccupation with formal elements. In an early phase of postcolonial studies, Ashcroft, Griffin, and Tiffin defined postcolonial literature in a categorical way, stating,

> What each of these literatures has in common beyond their special and distinctive regional characteristics is that they emerged in their present form out of the experience of colonization and asserted themselves as foregrounding the tension with the imperial power, and by emphasizing their differences from the assumptions of the imperial center. It is what makes them distinctively post-colonial.
>
> (1995, 2)

The simplicity of the definition and the particularity of its mission belies the actual literatures privileged by postcolonial studies. Benita Parry's article titled "Directions and Dead Ends in Postcolonial Studies" gets to the heart of this problem in literature:

> Whereas the postcolonial novel covers heterogeneous narrative styles from the former British, French, Portuguese, and Dutch empires in Africa, Asia and the Americas, critics display an excessive interest in the fiction of migrants, and within this subgenre, in extravagant innovation. Hence partisan and resistance literature, as if considered devoid of aesthetic qualities, remains a minority interest (Harlow 1987; San Juan 1988), "realist" diasporic writing is marginalized, while popular fictions from the post-independence nation-states written in local languages and deemed uncongenial to metropolitan taste are untranslated and largely undiscussed within the academies. There is, for example, a whole corpus of testimonial literature from Central and South America, the Philippines, Asia, and Africa which is known by specialists who recognize its multivalencies, but is not easily available to English readers who are familiar with Marquez, Fuentes, Soyinka, Rushdie and Coetzee. (The exception is the transcribed testament *I, Rigoberta Menchu: An Indian Woman in Guatemala* which was a bestseller in the West). These variations suggest that, instead of attempting to compile a canon of Postcolonial Literature, we need to think about postcolonial literatures as a web of different strands, not all of which are woven out of "postmodern" materials.
>
> (2002, PGS)

The long quotation from Parry illustrates that literature that is devoid of "extravagant innovation" or a postmodern sensibility is not favored in postcolonial literary studies any longer. In her article, she claims that it is not just migrant literature that is favored but that there has been an excess of critical interest in finding the signs of the imperial project in canonical English literature. She cites Spivak's reading of *Jane Eyre* or Hennessy and Mohan's focus on the Indian serpent in Conan Doyle's fiction as examples of postcolonial criticism, which have significantly "enlarged the established interpretative frame" (69). Yet Parry disavows to some degree the critics' tendency to bring "colonial figures and colonialist rhetorics to their dramatization of domestic oppressions" (69). By reading colonialism with an emphasis on fiction's ambiguities, metaphors, and metonymic transpositions, the sites and timelines of imperial activity change dramatically. This brings about an obfuscation of historical knowledge about colonialism introducing what Parry calls, "category errors" (70). Here, Parry illustrates that scholarship that argues for slavery as a metaphor in reading the themes of domestic abuse in *Jane Eyre* can obfuscate the actual history of slavery.

Thus, postcolonial studies, even through the literary canon it chooses to anoint, comes to be associated with a theorizing mode. Firstly, the field is also preoccupied with theorizing itself and secondly, it is heavily influenced by postmodernism. In addition to the books and articles that make up the field, there has "emerged a burgeoning production of scholarly texts that take the *critical field itself* as their object" (Lazarus 2004, 1). Along the same lines, Ahmad has observed, "This aggrandised sense of the term, as connoting generic definitions of periods, authors and writings gathered force through a system of mutual citations and cross-referencing among a handful of influential writers and their associates" (1995, 8). The above critiques do give us some pause and force us to re-evaluate a field that gives itself an excessive self-importance and has made a fetish of its own existence. Postcolonial studies can be accused of having become a kind of echo chamber with debates that remain confined to a handful of well-known scholars. As an example of the self-theorizing, navel-gazing tendency, I still recall with some disdain the debates on whether postcolonial should be used with or without a hyphen.[8] Though Shohat argued that the hyphen's removal consecrated the theoretical alliance between postcoloniality, poststructuralism, and postmodernism, I find that the alliance was strengthened less from placement of the hyphen and more from the actual type of scholarship that postcolonial studies had begun to produce.

Partly due to these alignments and approaches, there has come about a massive disconnect between the reality and practice of politics in postcolonial countries and the discourse about it. Ahmad observes that,

> [b]etween postcoloniality as it exists in a former colony like India, and postcoloniality as the condition of discourse as practiced by such

critics as Homi Bhabha, there would appear to be a very considerable gap. *This* gap postcolonial theory seeks to fill by a remarkably circular logic: we live in the postcolonial *period*, hence in the postcolonial *world*, but neither all intellectuals nor all discourses of this *period* and this *world* are *postcolonial* because, in order to be a properly *postcolonial discourse*, this discourse must be *postmodern*, mainly of the deconstructive kind, so that only those intellectuals can be truly *postcolonial* who are also *postmodern*.

(1995, 8)

Here, Ahmad articulates the entrenchment of a specifically French postmodern theory into postcolonial studies. There are two problems that persist here. Firstly, there is the validation of a postmodern aesthetic over historical realism, and secondly, the postcolonial gets articulated as the theoretical sans political again and again.

Between the Bandung-inspired, Third-Worldist postcoloniality of the seventies to the coming of Homi Bhabha's book *The Location of Culture* right after the fall of the USSR, an enormous shift has taken place. In Bhabha's work, the postcolonial is not a historicizing category and is meant to go against the grain of post-Marxist paradigms. Lazarus has written that Bhabha's postcolonialism is, in fact, a deliberate departure from Marxism. In fact,

it disavows nationalism as such and refuses an antagonistic or struggle-based model of politics in favour of one that emphasises "cultural difference," "ambivalence" and "the more complex cultural and political boundaries that exist on the cusp" of what "modern" philosophy had imagined as the determinate categories of social reality.

(2011, 12)

As fluidity and travel between spaces and ideas shrinks, the type of hybridity that Bhabha emphasizes becomes a kind of privileged condition and, according to Aijaz Ahmed, unfortunately becomes emblematic of "the postcolonial who has access to such monumental and global pleasures," and might also be "remarkably free of gender, class, identifiable political location" (1992, 13). This becomes evidence of the deep disconnect between postcolonial reality and theory. Ahmed also takes issue with Bhabha's claim to "displacement" as a general human condition and as philosophical position. He reminds us that only the privileged can be voluntarily mobile and feel free to shape their identities, whereas

[m]ost migrants tend to be poor and experience displacement not as cultural plenitude but as torment; what they seek is not displacement but, precisely, a place from where they may begin anew, with some

sense of the stable future. Postcoloniality is also, like most things, a matter of class.

(16)

Postcolonial scholarship attains a bourgeois prestige and this takes it further away from its foundational mission.

Marxism, unfortunately, becomes yet another major sticking point. Postcolonial studies and Marxism have never quite forged a productive relationship, an especially ironic problem since Marxist thought influenced and fueled a majority of revolutionary decolonization movements, and to that degree, it can even be seen as the midwife of postcolonial studies to begin with. *Marxism, Modernity and Postcoloniality* is an edited volume that specifically diagnosed the problem by observing that an "ambivalence toward, or rejection of, Marxism seems characteristic of 'post-'discourses in general" (Bartolovich and Lazarus 2002, 4). The contributors hoped to expose "what has been rendered archaic, rejected, or forgotten in mainstream postcolonial studies: the most important—from a Marxist perspective—being the primacy of the critique of capitalism itself" (9). The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union further allows for a discrediting of Marxism or claiming its obsolescence, and it is precisely such thinking that seeps into postcolonial studies, distancing it profoundly from the theories that shape emancipatory, anticolonial ideologies and remain ever pertinent as neocolonialism finds a solid footing in previously colonized places.

Lazarus further believes that the absence of Marxism is not just due to the routine emergence of new theoretical concepts but due to "a decisive change of paradigms or problematics" (13). This decisive change is brought about due to the fact that postcoloniality embraces and internalizes the postmodernist assumption that grand narratives have become obsolete and there an "epochal transformation from one overarching world order ('modernity') into another ('postmodernity')" has emerged (Lazarus 2011, 14). However, this is not the entire story. It is not simply a matter of feeling attracted to shiny, new theories. Questions of the institutional framework within which this scholarship is produced, the specific relationships between academic and mainstream culture, and the particularities of curricula and canons as they are designed to fit the needs of academic departments are vital for understanding why postcoloniality went from a focus on the explicitly Marxist and political to the relativist, self-referential, and studied skepticism espoused by postmodernism. I would emphasize again the Cold War assemblages that have made this transition possible, whether through the ways in which institutions co-opted the ideologies of the American government and reinforced their patriotic alliances or the publishing paradigms I will describe in the next chapter. Marxism was nudged out as a legitimate critical and theoretical tool. Area studies carved up geographical regions in ways that made it

difficult for various disciplines to build on a cohesive and comprehensive critique of colonialism, thus gradually moving away from the original *raison d'être* of postcolonial studies.

Fanon Studies

The body of work on Frantz Fanon has found renewed impetus in light of the events of the Arab Spring. The year 2011 not only marked 50 years since the death of Fanon at the young age of 36 but it also marked 50 years since the publication of his heavily read and most impactful work, *The Wretched of the Earth*. Now, more than half a century after his death, the specter of Frantz Fanon haunts the field of postcolonial studies, and his reflections on decolonization, nationalism, and violence seem more poignant than ever. Part of the reason is that instead of a successful transition into nation-states, several of the ex-colonies have become sites for terrible conflicts in the name of ethnicity, race, power, religion, and territory. This offers a new context to re-read Fanon's disturbing prophecy embedded in *The Wretched of the Earth* regarding the way in which the dream of decolonization would remain deferred in the years that followed, and to scrutinize more deeply his reflections on revolutionary violence. In this section, I would like to mobilize Fanon as a crucial point of entry for mapping postcolonial studies. Fanon has played an influential, possibly even a founding, role: the manner in which his works are received, written about, and staged within postcolonial studies becomes evidence of ways the discipline has emerged, been historicized, and has also become de-politicized.

   In the last decade, there has been a significant rejuvenation in attempts to interpret Fanon for the new century. Anthony C. Alessandrini's *Frantz Fanon and the Future of Cultural Politics: Finding Something Different* (2014) is probably the only sustained theorizing and contextualizing of the mechanisms by which Fanon's work has been disseminated, appropriated, and misappropriated by the Anglophone academy since English translations of his work started appearing posthumously in the late sixties. Earlier in 2009, Immanuel Wallerstein published "Reading Fanon in the 21st Century" in *New Left Review*, but the essay does not necessarily fulfill the promise of its title. Evoking his few meetings with Fanon, and thus somewhat personal in style, Wallerstein re-evaluates some of the paradoxes in Fanon's theories on nationalism and violence and tries to bring attention to Fanon's views on class struggle. Mbembe also enters the space being carved out for new readings and engagements with his "Metamorphic Thought: The Works of Frantz Fanon," an introduction to Fanon's complete works published in France. Mbembe claims: "Even if France is yet to fully experience the Fanon phenomenon, everything would seem to indicate that Fanon has finally emerged from the obscurity to which he has been relegated" (2012, 20). Mbembe offers another

iteration[9] of his interpretation of Fanon's thinking about violence in light of the fact that "new forms of colonial warfare and occupation are taking shape, with their share of counterinsurgent tactics and torture, Guantanamo-style camps, secret prisons, their mixture of militarism and plundering of resources from afar" (2012, 26). Unwittingly, Mbembe once again fuses Fanon's work with questions of violence and thus narrows the scope of Fanon's vision and imagination.

The year 2011 also marked the beginning of mass protests across several parts of the Arab world, where issues of revolution, violence, nonviolence, solidarity, colonialism, and neocolonialism were suddenly brought to the forefront in mainstream as well as academic discourses. For Alessandrini, it is an occasion to connect the Arab Spring to Fanon by a simple geographic intervention. Since the key spaces of demonstrations, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Libya, are located in the African continent, we are compelled to examine the movements in light of Fanon's vision "of uniting Africa across the divisions that were themselves the concrete effects of the European 'scramble for Africa'" (2014, 168). Alessandrini's formulations about an "African Spring" offer an extended reading of Fanon's work on Africa itself. By situating the Arab Spring within the African continent, he brings Fanon's writing to bear more directly upon the events, thus bringing a kind of urgency to the act of re-reading his work. A year before his death, Fanon had been seeking outside help for the Algerian Revolution and had begun shaping the "African Legion" project. Creating diplomatic ties with several African countries for this project took him to many places on the continent, including Mali, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Ethiopia, and Congo. His attendance at the Pan-African conference in Accra and two *Présence Africaine* gatherings had put him in touch with some of the most important leaders and intellectuals from the African continent (Macey 2002).

Neil Lazarus published *The Postcolonial Unconscious* in 2011, a fact that was not mere coincidence but a testament to the changing dynamics within the world and within academia and an urgent desire to re-evaluate existing tools and frameworks that imagine, define, and analyze the Third World today. Using somewhat different methodologies, both Lazarus and Alessandrini offer correctives to the existing genealogy of postcolonial studies. Both books were published three years apart, but they exist in a continuum. Lazarus's thesis that imperial violence in sites such as Iraq and Afghanistan should be located within postcolonial studies finds impetus in Alessandrini's analysis of the Arab Spring. In situating postcolonial studies within current contexts of globalized imperialisms and neocolonialisms, both scholars are compelled to address Fanon. Juxtaposing the two works yields a strong intervention into the ways in which the genealogy of the field of postcolonial studies has taken erroneous turns, and within these, the ways in which Fanon studies has been appropriated

in the service of those agendas. Furthermore, the two books offer clear ways to re-integrate more openly revolutionary, Third-Worldist theories back into the field.

Lazarus claims that though there was some discussion about figures from the decolonization era (Senghor, Castro, Guevara, Gandhi, etc.) in postcolonial studies, Fanon was the only thinker whose work was considered "essential" in the eighties and nineties by intellectuals who were urging rigorous engagement with his work. Lazarus admits to having foreseen an implosion under which the contradictory, selective, and often disjointed critical work on Fanon would collapse had it not been rescued and rehabilitated by the "magisterial" biography *Frantz Fanon* by David Macey published in 2000. "Macey's study is one of those rare works that breaks open the field into which it intervenes, enforcing in the process a reconfiguration not only of its boundaries but also of its internal arrangements and relations" (2011, 162). Lazarus finds Macey's construction of the "meaning" of Fanon into two "conflicting and incompatible schemas" particularly useful. The first one contains the liberationist Third Worldism that addresses the revolutionary anticolonial nationalism in the post-1945 period. The second schema contradicts the first by addressing the "rolling back of insurgent anticolonial nationalism by the imperialist powers since 1975 or so, and also, accordingly, from the assumed obsolescence of the earlier liberationist Third-Worldist ideologeme" (165).

Lazarus situates the origins of postcolonial studies within the second moment, which is the coming of globalization and neo-imperialism. Within this context, the Third-Worldist Fanon had waned and did not fit the agenda of the field, thus leading to the creation of what Macey called a "postcolonial Fanon." This is a less angry Fanon, and the focus is not as much on *The Wretched of the Earth* or revolutionary ideas but according to Macey, to "construct a Fanon who exists outside time and space and in a purely textual dimension" (qtd. in Lazarus 2011, 28).[10] Here, Lazarus is bickering with Bhabha, and blaming him for being the scholar that brought this particular Fanon into existence (see further Lazarus 1999). While Lazarus does not believe this postcolonial Fanon is completely subverted by Macey's work, he does find that Macey succeeds in establishing both schemas as being related to one another. Both schemas "appropriate Fanon for their own historically specific projects; both construct him in the image of their own ideological concerns" (2011, 167). In fact, Macey's goal, according to Lazarus, is to focus on Fanon as a singular figure, and part of this project includes a resurrection of the distinctly Fanonian "characterological features" such as anger, even rage, impulsiveness, passion, overarching intensity regarding ethics, impatience, and a sense of urgency around political issues.

In light of the neocolonial excursions in the Middle East, terrorist attacks in various Western cities, the War on Terror, and the relentless

cycle of violence that has the world currently in its grip, Lazarus has seen the limitations of the field:

> Yet if scholars in postcolonial studies have clearly been critical of the "war on terror" and reassuringly unimpressed by the sophistries purveyed by the retinue of state ideologists and policy hacks attempting to justify it, they have not typically seen the contemporary developments as requiring them to do any rethinking themselves about the assumptions and common understandings prevailing in their own field. On the contrary, there has been a tendency to insist that what is urgently needed in the context of the debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan is more of precisely the kind of theory that has already been prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s.
>
> (16)

Over the course of the past decade, Lazarus has consistently argued for a redirecting of concerns and methodologies within postcolonial studies. In the above quotation, he refers to Sangeeta Ray's call for continued engagement with "specular, border intellectuals" through the politics of alterity as an example of irony within the field because it predicates this idiom of alterity on the premise that imperialism is obsolete. It also serves as an example to maintain his assertion that postcolonial studies has mobilized a set of theories, concepts, methods, and assumptions that have fundamentally failed to address its object of study, which is the postcolonial world, and has systematically served to "mystify" it. Yet, in *The Postcolonial Unconscious*, Lazarus wants to move past criticism and contention and urgently begin the work of what he calls "reconstruction." Here, his book does the very important work of re-reading canonical thinkers who have shaped the field, such as Edward Said, Frantz Fanon, Homi Bhabha, and Frederic Jameson, as well as rethinking the tropes, themes, and theories that have come to define the field. Thus, when it comes to Fanon, "[a]ny argument in favor of the postcolonial Fanon must rest on the hypothesis of a radical break between the world order of Fanon's own time—the period of 'Third World' insurgency—and that of today" (180). It is precisely this dichotomy that Lazarus wants to reject, and he hopes to appropriate Fanon with the potency and resurrective qualities that his anger may represent to formulate a global anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist critique against the violent events inspired by the "new world order" in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lazarus concludes that "his work seems, to me, to have lost nothing of its relevance or its urgency" (182).

While Lazarus's book with its one chapter on Fanon does speak to the significance of Fanon in postcolonial studies, it is Alessandrini's comprehensive book focused solely on Fanon that proves how the thinker and the field are inextricably bound together. Here, we can find multiple points of entry into the debate on the genealogy of postcolonial studies

and the politics of postcolonial canon formation. Firstly, the discussion around problematic appropriations of Fanon strikes me as being symbolic as well as analogous to the problematic appropriations of postcolonial studies. The uses and misuses of Fanon in his afterlife become a microcosm within which the larger life of postcolonial studies can be observed. In Alessandrini's concern over Deborah Levy's anachronistic need to "apply" Fanonian thinking to racism in postcolonial London, I find a mirror to the ways in which postcolonial studies is similarly evoked in situations that may have scant historical and political links (2014, 3–8). While Levy is concerned with firmly placing Fanon within contemporaneity, Alessandrini's approach differs with regards to the belief that

> the most productive way to revisit Fanon today, and to engage with him as a contemporary, is not to simply wrest him from the past into the present, but precisely to deal with his life and work in all its singularity.
>
> (6)

Singularity becomes a theoretical tool, and in differentiating singularity from specificity, Alessandrini writes that he has been motivated by

> a desire to keep in play both scrupulous attention to the specificity of particular political and historical contexts, *and* a scrupulous remembrance that engaging in politics necessarily involves struggling towards the sorts of difficult generalizations that make collective social change possible.
>
> (190)

Lazarus's and Alessandrini's preoccupations with making Fanon's work relevant to social change, activism, and solidarity is evident here, and they both believe that it is through these paradigms that reconstruction can begin—not only with regards to the afterlife of Fanon but also in the field of postcolonial studies of which Fanon is a founding force.

Alessandrini's methodology is particularly useful for the field of Fanon studies and it consists of revisiting Fanon's work through pairings with other influential and canonical writers, namely Edward Said, Michel Foucault, Jamaica Kincaid, and Paul Gilroy. He explicitly addresses his investigation of postcolonial studies in the title of his chapter on Said and Fanon, "Towards a New Genealogy of Postcolonial Studies." Here, he makes a familiar claim, attributing Marxist and Marxist-influenced analyses undertaken by anticolonial and decolonization intellectuals to the origins of the field, as opposed to viewing the field as having been birthed by postmodernism. He engages Edward Said's influential essay, "Traveling Theory," which asks: "What happens to [the theory or idea] when, in different circumstances and for a new reasons, it is used again

and, in still more different circumstances, again?" (50) In order to create an alternate trajectory for writings on humanism, Alessandrini now pairs Said and Fanon and finds "Traveling Theory" to be a useful framework for working through "the form a theory takes at its moment of arrival rather than its point of origin" (50). Leaving the question of humanism aside for the moment, what is more striking about this essay is the way in which Said's legacy gets reconfigured within postcolonial studies. The influence of Foucault upon Said's work, particularly in *Orientalism*, is often acknowledged above others. One could even argue that it is Said's *Orientalism* that places Foucault's oeuvre firmly within postcolonial studies and actually makes the structuralist, post-structuralist, and post-modern French theorists pivotal to the field. What is often left out of the exegeses of Said's writings is his debt to Fanon. Perhaps we can say that Algeria is to Fanon what Palestine is to Said. It is the theoretical, ideological, and philosophical journeys to articulate those counter-cultural politics and identities that bind the two (50–1).

The connection between Said and Fanon is reinforced in two ways. The first is that Said's engagement with Foucault often yields theoretical inconsistencies, and these can be attributed to "particular conjunctures in the Palestinian struggle," or "symptoms of particular historical pressures" (69–70). In the reception of Said's oeuvre, his literary-theoretical work and political work have often been perceived as two separate bodies. Fanon, here, becomes a crucial conduit that fuses the two inseparable aspects of Said's work and dismantles artificial divisions. Alessandrini's second point addresses this problem by delving into Said's efforts to bridge the political and professional. Here, Alessandrini revisits the famous schism between Said and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat over the Oslo Accords. Said had continued to insist that it was Arafat's inadequate linguistic, analytical, and close-reading abilities that made him accept the limited autonomy being given to the Palestinian people as opposed to real liberation. Alessandrini believes that Fanon "was also concerned with misreadings," especially those performed by what he called "native intellectuals," and finds that *The Wretched of the Earth* abounds with examples of such misreadings in which his criticism of the ways in which colonial powers exploit the shortcomings of decolonization leaders are unabashed (70).

Finally, it is their engagement with humanism that unites the two thinkers. Both Said and Fanon attempted to articulate what appeared to be a theoretically inconsistent humanism due to its clash with seemingly anti-humanist articulations. Anticolonial thinking has been forced to contend with and strategize against European humanist hypocrisies originating in the era of Enlightenment. Critics have argued that paradoxes within Said's more Foucauldian formulation were due to a "residual humanism." Alessandrini overturns such arguments by claiming that Said was instead practicing a decidedly Fanonian "emergent humanism." To illustrate this

point, Alessandrini uses the example of Said's 1995 piece for Al-Hayat about George H.W. Bush's attempts to set up an unprecedented hegemony in the Middle East with the first Gulf War. Said wrote that the language of US foreign policy continues to regurgitate the same old ideas, exercise the same brute force, and show no fresh vision of the future. He concludes that, "the Great White Father . . . has come to the end of his reign. A new era is dawning" (71). Alessandrini finds this moment particularly poignant and observes that, as with Fanon, this is aimed at the victims, who "must also become the victors, the inheritors of this new era that must be brought into existence. This is the language of emergence, not residue; it has always been at the heart of Said's work" 70–1). Alessandrini sums up the chapter thus:

> The goal, as Fanon put it fifty years ago, is to create a critical consciousness "freed from colonialism and forewarned against any attempt at mystification or glorification." If we are to understand the work done (and yet to be done) by postcolonial theory—not just the work of Fanon and Said, but also work that has been inspired by their examples (including the work that you are reading now)—as more than just a particularly successful offshoot of "postmodernism," we need to understand precisely what is at stake in their struggles within humanism, especially as it relates to the historical forces that condition, and continue to condition such struggles. This is especially important if we are to acknowledge that just as history has not yet ended neither have the legacy and practices of colonialism.
>
> (73)

This particular convergence of Said and Fanon immediately places postcolonial studies in direct alignment with discourses on social change in a way Lazarus would surely view as the work of "reconstruction." By pairing Fanon with Antiguan writer Jamaica Kincaid, this reconstruction agenda comes into view in an even more pointed manner. Alessandrini begins by emphasizing that Fanon's most poignant contribution is not focused on the "postcolonial condition," but represents a fundamental and challenging paradox as it ponders "what might, through the anticolonial struggle, be brought into existence after postcolonialism" (101). The connection to postcolonial criticism is made swiftly by the claim that "the ambivalence that can be found throughout Fanon's work is also the central ambivalence in postcolonial criticism today" (101). In Alessandrini's assessment, postcolonial studies suffers from a prematurely celebratory tone in which the "post" may subsume existing discourses on neocolonialism as well as the tangible aftermaths of colonialism itself—even if it has issued a much-needed challenge to Eurocentric writing, has made room for new voices from formerly colonized regions, and offered comparative frameworks to study disparate locations. In the picture that

emerges, there has been a deliberate re-centering of the field characterized by its move away from Marxist theory toward postmodernism, and also through the canonization and celebration of metropolitan, multiculturalist writing over Third-Worldist literature.

In heeding such calls for the reconstruction of postcolonial studies at the level of representation of its genealogy and in terms of reconsidering themes that have fallen by the wayside as the field has evolved, both critics are asking for a close scrutiny of present-day political and ideological structures that are directly implicated in the unceasing, violent upheavals of our time. These range from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the War on Terror and the Arab Springs. I would like to add that, while Lazarus's and Alessandrini's interventions offer impressive and impactful correctives on the field's blind spots, there is very little focus on internecine violence and civil wars that have been part of the postcolonial landscape. In the past 60 years, approximately 243 large and small conflicts[11] have been reported. These can be traced back to the decolonization period, which often saw colonial regimes being replaced by brutal dictatorships, or they can be attributed to the connivance of Cold War interference in starting a cycle of proxy wars. Literary representation of this phenomenon is widespread, with hundreds of published novels, poetry, dramas, and non-fiction works, though not necessarily through mainstream channels. The curious absence of this particular topic as a dominant and pivotal component in postcolonial studies remains unchallenged due to the fact that contemporary academic literary culture nurtures and propagates an entirely different body of postcolonial writing. The focus has been on metropolitan narratives that privilege the experiences of displacement, multiculturalism, and hybrid identities, and there has not been enough engagement with working through the past injustices of colonialism and their repercussions today. Crucial attention must to be paid to the writing emerging from these contexts and, given that violence and neo-imperialism are key signifiers in these texts, Fanon's oeuvre is inseparable from this study.

The long arm of the Cold War is thusly made visible through disciplinary interventions in the US. Though it seems that it was mainly the sciences and social sciences that were complicit with Cold War entities, I argue that the humanities were also co-opted in the service of sanitizing radical discourses and making them palatable within an academic setting. Here, the development of area studies departments permitted English to become a pastoral and apolitical retreat for the study of literature and language. Yet oddly, as postcolonial studies continues to thrive in English departments, it soon becomes evident that this is a very de-politicized realm of postcoloniality that has become divested from Third-Worldist anger, Marxist readings of literature and politics, and mysteriously, it does not engage with what I believe is the postcolonial phenomenon called the Cold War. A corrective on the genealogy of postcolonial studies

is therefore necessary to alert readers to the means of reading disciplinary formations. We are entering a particularly potent era of ghettoization of disciplines and over-specialization when it comes to various subjects while being simultaneously told that we are in the most fertile period of interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary activities. It is in the heart of Cold War interventions that we can locate how this smoke and mirrors phenomenon has been generated in the sprawling and complicated American university system and the assemblage of systems that it births. Yet, academia and universities were just the tip of the iceberg. The following chapter connects these campus discourses with the wider sphere of literary and publishing culture as it played out during the *longue durée* of the cultural Cold War.

Acknowledgments

Notes

1. Some of the titles include Winks (1987); Levin (2013); Simpson (1994); Simpson (1998); and Chomsky et al. (1997).
2. Cull (2008) argues that it was Eisenhower that foreground the term through what he called the "P-Factor" which simply meant the psychological factor of all warfare. Cull offers a detailed historical understanding of how it became ingrained in American intelligence activities, whether of a cultural of geopolitical nature.
3. It has been argued that T.S. Eliot was predominantly the reason why modernism and New Criticism share common ground. Louis Menand and Lawrence Rainey illustrate this idea by tracing a direct line that starts with Eliot and ends with New Criticism being established in American universities:

   The key figure in the conventional assimilation of modernism and the New Criticism is T. S. Eliot, and the viability of this assimilation is a function of the complex of roles associated with him: the parts that Eliot himself wished to assume, the roles his contemporaries assigned him, and the roles in which he has been cast by subsequent critics. All these were, in reality, extremely fluid, and changed a great deal over the course of several decades. There was the inventive body of criticism that Eliot wrote between 1917 and 1924; the ways in which it was worked up into a corpus of acceptable interpretive techniques by I. A. Richards, among others, in the years immediately following; the brilliant exercise of those techniques by Richards's student William Empson; the renegade variant of Cambridge English established by F. R. Leavis and the group surrounding Scrutiny in the 1930s and 1940s; the way these various influences fed into the work of the American New Critics, such as Cleanth Brooks, John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, and Robert Penn Warren, a group with its own distinctive intellectual roots in the American South;

and the gradual establishment of the New Criticism as a powerful critical orthodoxy within American universities, a development epitomised by Brooks's move from Louisiana State University to Yale in 1947.

(2008, 7)

4. Gerald Graff argues that the foundation for "disciplinary and pedagogical themes" of New Criticism was laid in the 1890s due to a confluence of factors. Indiana University's English department chairman Martin Wright Sampson insisted on a study of literature that was not reliant on biography or literary history. Simultaneously, courses on Modern Novels had also sprung up at other institutions and a general trend towards aesthetic criticism could be observed in the first two decades of the 20th century. For full discussion, see Graff (2007).

5. In a bold argument Menand and Rainey connect the rise of New Criticism with the rise of the modern university:

But the New Criticism was, in America, the movement that successfully introduced literary criticism—the interpretation and evaluation of literary texts—into the university; and for all the limitations of its scope and ultimate influence as a doctrine of poetry, it established a pattern of institutional adjustment and legitimation which has been imitated by every critical movement since. This means that a history of modernism and the New Criticism is inevitably a history of the rise of the modern university as well.

(Litz, Menand, and Rainey 2008, 8)

6. Lazarus, Neil. "Postcolonial Studies after the Invasion of Iraq." *New Formations: A Journal of Culture/Theory/Politics*, Issue 59, "After Iraq: Reframing Postcolonial Studies." 2006, 16, Shohat's italics.

7. These claims are discussed and developed more extensively in Chapter 4.

8. Most postcolonial scholars had to qualify at the outset why they chose to go with or without the hyphen. In my memory, Ashcroft, Griffins, and Tiffin (1995); and McLeod (2000).

9. The first iteration of Achille Mbembe's thesis on Fanon's conceptions of violence appeared in his chapter "Out of This World" in Mbembe (2001, 173–211).

10. Lazarus further quotes Macey:

"Third Wordlist" readings largely ignored the Fanon of *Peau noire, masques blancs*, post-colonial readings concentrate almost exclusively on that text and studiously avoid the question of violence. The Third Worldist Fanon was an apocalyptic creature; the post-colonial Fanon worries about identity politics, and often about his own sexual identity, but he is no longer angry.

(2011, 28)

11. Taken from The New COW War Data, 1816–2007 (v4.0)—www.correlate sofwar.org/COW2%20Data/WarData_NEW/WarList_NEW.html and more specifically, Intra-state War data set.

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4   The Cold War Paradigm
A Trajectory of Literary Canons

America, why are your libraries full of tears?

Allen Ginsberg, "America," 1956

The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming or emerg-
ing, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of
the main connections between them.

Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*

Covert propaganda is the hidden exercise of the power of persuasion. In
the world of covert propaganda, book publishing activities have a special
place.

US Senate Select Committee report, 1976

As American universities in the US transformed into complex and some-
what frenetic spaces during the Cold War, they remained in a kinetic
symbiosis with the wider realm of culture, particularly in the area of
literature. This chapter focuses on the literary and publishing aspect of
the Cold War by examining the assemblages of power, aesthetics, and
narratives generated by a set of small magazines that were infiltrated by
the CIA through a front organization called the Congress for Cultural
Freedom (CCF). The idea that empire, however ubiquitous that term
might seem, is indeed the midwife that births a transnational network of
literary culture has been on the rise and continues to be explored in stud-
ies of literary circuits, transnational dissemination, and cultures of read-
ing in the Anglo-American academy.[1] European colonial authorities had
already put institutions in place for these activities, and branches of the
British Council and Alliance Française, for example, were commonplace
in most metropolitan spaces in the colonized world. With the onset of the
Cold War, the US and USSR took inspiration from these cultural missions
that were the backbone of colonial civilizing agendas and propagandist
impulses, and they created their own institutions to further these impera-
tives. This phase came to be called the cultural Cold War, and the many
projects that were set up and sustained during this time are a dynamic

site for the study of literary circuits and processes of canon formation. In this chapter, I argue that these interventions have established certain frameworks, trajectories, and networks that continue to influence the way literary publishing functions to this day.

Let me start with two examples. PEN America is a longstanding organization invested in protecting the freedom of expression and the human rights of writers worldwide. Its annual literary festival, the PEN World Voices Festival, invites non-Western writers to participate, especially those who have experienced censorship, imprisonment, torture, or exile for their dissident political views. The figure of the dissident is honored, and the themes of the festival's panels tend to explore issues of oppression, political literature, rights, freedom of expression, and dissent. In 2015, the festival focused on Africa and African writers, and participants included prolific figures such as Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, the formerly imprisoned Kenyan writer; Boubacar Boris Diop, courageous critic of France's role in the Rwandan genocide; Mona Eltahawy, audacious Egyptian feminist; Zanele Muholi, queer visual activist; and equally important public figures such as Teju Cole, Alain Mabanckou, Binyavanga Wainaina, and Aminatta Forna, among others. The festival usually ends with a high-profile, keynote lecture by a person who has had experience with censorship and rights infringement. Past keynotes have been delivered by Orhan Pamuk, David Grossman, Umberto Eco, Nawal El Saadawi, Wole Soyinka, Salman Rushdie, and Sonia Sotomayor.

In 2015, even with a host of dissident writers present, the festival chose Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie to deliver the keynote. It was an odd choice, since Adichie's trajectory did not have much in common with censored, exiled, or dissident writers. No one, of course, was more sensitive to this fact than Adichie herself. In an entertaining and anecdotal way, she confessed that agreeing to deliver this lecture made her nervous, and that festival director László Jakab Orsós had asked her to be as personal as possible. Adichie wished that she had "a dramatic story of being hauled off to prison by Nigerian soldiers because of something I had written." In the honest and self-reflective opening to her keynote, she said,

> But since I do not have such a story, sadly, I would like to talk instead about censorship, about the shades, the smaller, quieter meanings of censorship, beyond the cacophony of cowardice and courage. An American journalist once asked me what it was like to be an exile. I kept telling her I was not an exile. And she just kept asking about exile. And then when I managed finally to convince her that I was not an exile, she asked if I would talk about other African writers who were in exile. . . . I got the disturbing sense that the journalist wanted me to be an exile. There's something almost titillating about

the writer from a foreign and preferably developing country who is in exile.

(2015)[2]

Adichie's somewhat distraught and shocking admission spoke volumes about the way in which the figure of an exiled dissident is perceived in the United States. Firstly, it showed the extent to which the figure of a dissident has come to be synonymous not just with African writers but also with those from the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Secondly, Adichie's anecdote about the American journalist (who was adamant that Adichie had indeed been exiled) is evidence of the allure that this figure holds for our literary culture. Though the story of Adichie and PEN may express these ideas in crude tones, it appears that this attraction to the dissident has existed within American culture for a long time. In fact, I illustrate that the beginnings of an interest in a particular type of dissidence—one that is projected onto a non-Western "other"—is located and situated within the cultural interventions that took place during the Cold War.

The above story can be juxtaposed with yet another disturbing phenomenon in American literary culture: that of the African child soldier novel. Recent trends in publishing have indicated an interest in such stories, some of which are rendered in memoir form and some as novels. Yet these books can be divided into two distinct categories. Those in the first category make it onto bestseller lists, are chosen for high-profile book clubs, are turned into films, and are widely reviewed and written about. The second category circulates within a much smaller and largely academic space; these works are often translated, are stylistically challenging, and tend not to be sold in popular bookstores or reviewed in mainstream newspapers and magazines. The first category includes, for example, *A Long Way Gone* by Ishmael Beah (2007) and *Beasts of No Nation* by Uzodinma Iweala (2005). The second group includes *Allah Is Not Obliged* by Ahmadou Kourouma (2000) and *Johnny Mad Dog* by Emmanuel Dongala (2002). The latter half of the chapter will look more closely at these works, but for now it suffices to point out that Beah's and Iweala's books unequivocally embrace savior dynamics and end with Western NGOs rehabilitating the protagonists. Kourouma and Dongala, on the other hand, press upon those very humanitarian discourses by offering cogent critiques of those NGOs. The former are structured as conventional *bildungsromane* and the latter subvert the genre by experimenting with ruptures in the child's trajectory. The former also emphasize healing and peaceful futures, and the latter are unable to move past the darkness of violent situations that persist to this day.

Why two different receptions for a set of books that offer varied perspectives on the same phenomenon? The cultural Cold War can be held responsible to a large extent. Strategic reception for certain books was a

science, designed and perfected during this time. Though a book's actual text was very important for the political and societal reality it espoused, its reception was able to entirely alter the course of the book's impact on how certain places were viewed, how much visibility and popularity its author could garner, and whether the book could secure a spot in the literary canon. Certainly some answers can be found in cultural interventions staged by the CCF, an organization that was founded in 1950 and was later discovered to have been established and funded by the CIA. The CCF alternatively founded, funded, and managed up to 30 small magazines over a course of 18 years (Saunders 2001). These small magazine interventions, along with the cumulative web of cultural propaganda that the CCF spun, were very influential with regards to how a certain American literary publishing culture was shaped during an over-politicized and ideologically charged climate. In this chapter, the CCF becomes a key case study, and the small magazines that they managed in several countries worldwide adds exponentially to our knowledge of transnational literary circuits and builds an understanding of publishing practices in the US, as well as the Anglophone world more widely.

The two decades during which these interventions shaped the course of literary and academic culture culminated in the era of the Vietnam War. By this point a certain Cold War cultural apparatus had already been put in place, and this included ways of marketing and promoting certain literature, strategies for book distribution, and the creation of literary tastes through prizes, book clubs, and modes of editing and reviewing books. I call these sets of apparatuses the "Cold War paradigm," and I will elaborate on this in greater detail shortly. Moving from here to the 1990s and then onto the present moment, the reception of child soldier novels, for example, becomes a litmus test for American literary culture. Why did some of these child soldier narratives thrive in the American market, and why were others relegated to the margins of readership? The chapter tries to answer such questions as they are refracted through an investigation of the politics of visibility and dissemination, so much of which was put in place through the cross-pollination of CCF-published material and a push towards narratives that were forgiving of American interventions abroad. Three timelines emerge: the first phase of the cultural Cold War from the end of World War II until the war in Vietnam; the second phase sees the coming of counter-cultures and protest cultures during the Vietnam war up to the end of the Cold War in 1991; and finally, the third phase can be marked as the aftermath of the Cold War, which also includes the advent of digital publishing.

Though the early goals of the cultural Cold War included stimulating approval for (and obfuscating the reality of) the proxy wars and upheavals that the Cold War had set in motion—aiding espionage activities, and winning over writers, artists, and intellectuals to the American side—its most inadvertent triumph was the creation of the Cold War paradigm.

This paradigm is an assemblage of guiding principles and overarching ideologies—a process of doing things, so to speak, in publishing that have come to be seen as obvious and commonsensical. These ideas shaped the production and circulation of texts during the Cold War and continue to influence literary culture to this day. Through a host of secret and not-so-secret activities, several governmental and cultural agencies managed to manipulate spaces of literature, art, education, publishing, and academia in ways that fundamentally altered the role of books and other cultural materials as they circulated through society. The Cold War paradigm put into place a manufactured consensus regarding an apolitical American narrative that pushed international and translated works to the margins. It also led to the silencing of oppositional discourses and constructed the notion of a literary world that is separate from politics. The Cold War paradigm that we have inherited privileges certain gatekeeping practices in the literary world through the sustenance of an incestuous agent-editor-reviewer nexus and, in the end, advances certain types of styles and narratives in Anglophone writing.

My final section explores the realm of the digital. Ideologies of openness, innovation, and secularism are the mainstay and promise of digital technology as it sweeps through our society, bringing with it a tsunami of transformation. The advent of computers and the foundations of the American relationship with computational technology has its roots in the Cold War's race for nuclear power. Thus, the infrastructural logic of how these computational technologies have evolved and the way in which the Internet has actually been built are very much influenced by a Cold War zeitgeist. Framing it through a theory of technopolitics, this section will take a close look at the circumstances in which technology is designed to satisfy and sustain national, political agendas. In particular, publishing and literary culture will remain the thrust of this chapter through a focus on the emergence and growth of digital publishing. Euphoric cyber-utopian discourses insist that digital publishing has radicalized publishing forever; not only are we in a moment of extraordinary exposure to new, global writing but the processes of literature review, dissemination, the marketing of literature, and academic scholarship have been revolutionized and secularized. Through an investigation of the digital giants such as Amazon, Google, and Wikipedia, this final section shows that digital publishing does not quite live up to its self-proclaimed ideology of openness in carving new, independent spaces for previously marginalized narratives. I find that a close examination of the nuts and bolts of digital publishing and the actual platforms that serve its needs reveals that the Cold War paradigm still holds sway.

It would be inaccurate to say that a particularly large body of scholarship exists on the subject of the cultural Cold War, but several key works have emerged in the past decade as part of a renewed interest in Cold War historiography, particularly as it pertains to literary trajectories. These include publications by Andrew Rubin, Peter Kalliney, Greg Barnhisel

(2010), Giles Scott-Smith and Monica Popescu (2010). Within a wider, less academic realm *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* by Hugh Wilford (2009); *The Zhivago Affair: The Kremlin, the CIA, and the Battle over a Forbidden Book* by Peter Finn and Petra Couvée (2014); and *Finks* by Joel Whitney (2016) are the first long works to follow in the footsteps of Frances Stonor Saunders, whose book *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (2001) not only became the benchmark for the subject but also revealed a hitherto unknown archive of writers and artists who had been co-opted and compromised by the CIA. But a post-Saunders multiplication of mainstream and academic articles has emerged, as well as monographs that have added to the slowly accumulating knowledge of the subject. This chapter builds carefully upon Rubin's work, whose 2012 book *Archives of Authority: Empire, Culture, and the Cold War* looks at the transfer of the imperial civilizing mission agenda from England to the United States. The cultural Cold War is, of course, central to that task. Rubin also attends to the question of dissemination and cultural transmission of texts, and herein it becomes possible to expand on his scholarship by delving further into the politics of how texts were forced to circulate and how that model endures to this day. Additionally, I extend the work of Jim Neilson whose book *Warring Fictions: Cultural Politics and the Vietnam War Today* offers incisive insights into the history of book reviews and the practices of agents and editors in mainstream periodicals and journals that remain prestigious and vital in the American cultural sphere today. Several co-edited and single-authored volumes by Giles Scott-Smith, in particular *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and Post-War American Hegemony* and *Campaigning Culture and Global Cold War: The Journals of the Congress for Cultural Freedom* have altered the landscape of cultural Cold War studies significantly, allowing for a move past Saunders's exposé style to one involving a close reading of declassified documents and stronger archival work. I also rely on the CIA's own understanding of their agendas and strategies, documented in the 676-page long "Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities: Together with Additional, Supplemental and Separate Views" and compiled in 1976, as well as the CIA's comprehensive website containing a variety of archival sources about the cultural Cold War. Both of these sources have special sections devoted to books and other media and are thus an excellent primary source of factual information and analytical justification of the cultural Cold War.

It is crucial to offer a long historical context to figure out how several of these cultural interventions were put into motion. Scott-Smith and Charlotte A. Lerg observe that, until now, the literature about these interventions could be divided into three categories: "the arguments of 'justifiable cause,' 'Westernisation,' and 'moral critique'" (2017, 2). Scholars such as Peter Coleman, who argue for justifiable cause, believe that this

was a necessary war that had to be won. The Westernization framework saw the US cultural interests as heavily reliant on West Germany and France, and the "justifiable cause" argument illustrates that the relationship between the CIA and the writers/artists was symbiotic to a degree. The moral critique insists on a critical and ethical evaluation of the CCF activities as well as a questioning of larger constructs of concepts such as freedom. With the producers of culture trying to benefit from the arrangements, the CIA had a much harder time maintaining precision or control over how these initiatives panned out. Scott-Smith and Lerg believe that no matter what the primary argument, all three approaches were fundamentally transatlantic and have to be studied as a confluence of global directives and local outputs (4–5). My work, though indebted to these studies, does not focus on each and every magazine and its particular micro-history as it impacted respective localities. Several scholars have already undertaken detailed archival work examining correspondences and a close reading of works published in these magazines, and this work is continuing to enrich the field of Cold War studies.[3]

My aim and approach diverges from my predecessors. I attempt to coalesce this vast body of knowledge spanning several decades into a cohesive and discernable circuit. It is the opposite of the bird's eye view of these events; rather, it is a zooming out in a way that yields a visualization of the webs of power, patterns of book trajectories, and networks of literary transmission as they emerged and slowly became entrenched. I trace an arc from the moment that the American governmental agencies decided to play in the arena of the publishing world up until the contemporary moment, several decades later, wherein I find practices that seem to borrow from and remain indebted to certain ideologies, approaches, and ecosystems that the cultural Cold War helped cultivate. Here, I do not claim decisive historical narratives and stringent frameworks. These are imaginative assemblages that emerge as trajectories, orbits, and ellipses when several seemingly heterogeneous concepts and sites are placed alongside one another. What we can learn is that American imperialism—as it sustained and developed from the Cold War onwards—was a hydra-headed beast. As in the previous chapters, I articulate polyvalent sites, examples of which include the politics of visibility, approaches towards dissidence, the aesthetic of modernism, technopolitics, and gatekeeping ideologies as they emerge from the astounding traffic of global literary circuits during the first three decades of the Cold War. These allow for a re-evaluation of the existing understanding of mainstream and academic publishing practices and also shed light on digital publishing.

The "Special" Role of Books

The cultural Cold War began to take shape fairly soon after the end of World War II and was intended to win the hearts and minds of people

at home and abroad. In 1946, an American embassy official in Moscow, George F. Kennan, set off an anxious chain of events in the United States through what came to be called the "Long Telegram." Though infiltrating governments and intelligence agencies through the use of creative espionage techniques had been a common practice for most imperial powers during the World Wars, Kennan was intent on convincing the US government of the national insecurity that would stem from failing to curtail the power of Communist Russia. Kennan explained that Russia "had an elaborate and far-flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history" (qtd. in Wilford 2009, 22). More importantly, this influence could be used, in particular, to poison Western societies through the penetration of national associations; women's and youth organizations; religious, cultural, racial, and social groups; and magazines and publishing houses. Kennan's telegram also coincided with Winston Churchill's famous coinage of the term "Iron Curtain." With growing tension over the Soviet refusal to be part of the United States' Marshall Plan and the news of the revival of Comintern (the Communist Information Bureau), the CIA was born.

In *Hearts, Minds, Voices: US Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World*, Jason C. Parker writes that this phase of government prioritized the American desire for a new kind of war:

> A major bureaucratic reshuffling at war's end—the first of four during the Truman years, each under a different director—sent the USIS (US Information Service) and VOA (Voice of America), along with some residual "overt-operations" functions of the OWI and the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA), into the Internal International Information Service (IIIS). This in turn was folded into the Department of State, alongside its newly created Office of International Cultural Affairs and International Press and Publications Division. The covert-operations side was housed in the newborn CIA and charged with waging psychological war.
>
> (2016, 18)

Manipulating the opinion of the general public outside of the US about the role of the US in the world at large became a priority around this time. The early years saw a lot of "bureaucratic reshuffling," especially due to the unintended consequences of the Truman Doctrine, which illustrated that though the US would aggressively counter Soviet ambition and expansion, such a foreign policy would not be possible without winning over American and foreign publics (19). The American government eventually settled on a combination of "overt" public diplomacy and the "covert" CIA version of the cultural Cold War. In 1953, President

Eisenhower established the United States Information Agency (USIA), which did the work of setting up teaching and translation programs for the dissemination of the English language and engaged film, radio, and television media in order to broadcast American music and Hollywood films.[4] Books, of course, were also central to the work of propaganda. Book initiatives included the USIA's "Books from America" program that gifted used American books in foreign countries; exposing censored books such as *Dr. Zhivago*, translations and dissemination of works such as George Orwell's *Animal Farm*, and Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*; all kinds of political booklets that were distributed overseas; and the launch of the "Ladder Series" books in Latin America which published literary works in abridged versions and in simplified English (Cull 2009). Yet other examples involve prominent American cultural figures such as author William Faulkner. Cohn describes how Faulkner was persuaded by the State Department to serve as a goodwill ambassador to countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America:

> On his trips he taught, spoke about his work, and commented on race relations in the US. Both his words and his very presence testified to American achievements in nations hostile to the US, and his visits were instrumental in tempering this sentiment.
>
> (2006, 396)

Thus went the work of the cultural Cold War. By 1965, this work came under the rubric of Public Diplomacy (Cull 2010).

The CIA created an Office of Special Projects devoted entirely to covert operations and the stage for aggressive and worldwide political intervention was thus set. From 1950 to 1967, the CIA developed a program of cultural propaganda through the CCF—an organization that it founded and funded, and whose main goal, according to Saunders, was to "battle for men's minds" in the United States and Western Europe in order to create a world that was more accepting and embracing of "the American way" (Saunders 2001, 2). This could only be accomplished by nudging the intelligentsia away from the "contagion of Communism" (2). The entire premise of the CCF and the consortium of specialists it brought into being was to usher in "a new age of enlightenment, and it would be called The American Century" (2). It was intellectual and psychological warfare of the most sophisticated kind; it put into place structures of thought and modes of cultural exchange and behavior that have become an undergirding ideology that sustains a continuing American cultural imperialism remaining at producing blockbuster movies consumed the world over.

At this juncture, it is crucial to observe how imperial power worked on two parallel planes: the first plane deployed aggressive violence and was intent on redrawing the physical and governmental maps of regions,

and the second plane was committed to the use of soft power that mainly aimed to influence opinion and often even claimed to improve people's conditions through aid and education. While it is easy to disavow physical and militaristic violence, there is a tendency to profess that soft power has inadvertent positive consequences, and the cultural Cold War is no exception in this push to assert the good effects of empire. But the two planes are connected to and inextricable from each other. Simpson has argued that military power and ideological persuasive power are two sides of the same coin. This is because

> [e]ffective persuasion and propaganda were (and are) widely viewed as a relatively rational alternative to the extraordinary brutality and expense of conventional war. Persuasive mass communication can improve military operations without increasing casualties, its advocates contend, especially when encouraging a cornered enemy to surrender rather than fight to the death.
>
> (1994, 6)

Violent interventions cannot be sustained unless they are simultaneously backed up by strategic psychological and educational agendas. The discussions of violence in the previous chapters thus realize new offshoots and iterations. The goal of the cultural Cold War was not merely to obfuscate the truth of aggressive military initiatives abroad, but also to convince those countries that the American way was the right way.

Within this general realm of soft power, the CIA declared, book publishing had a very special place. In 1976, the United States Senate published a 673-page report compiled by a special committee titled "Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate: Together with Additional, Supplemental, and Separate views." It detailed all of the CIA's covert intelligence activities, foreign and domestic, and, more importantly, the agency's understanding of books:

> Books differ from all other propaganda media, primarily because one single book can significantly change the reader's attitude and action to an extent unmatched by the impact of any other single medium. . . . [T]his is, of course, not true of all books at all times and with all readers—but it is true significantly often enough to make books the most important weapon of strategic (long-range) propaganda.
>
> (Select Committee Report [hereafter SCR], 193)

The report interrogates the constitutional framework for these activities, the history of the CIA, various departments and individuals involved, the testing and use of biological and chemical weapons, covert operations, and counterintelligence. The section that is most relevant for this chapter

is only 20 pages long and is entitled, "The Domestic Impact of Foreign Clandestine Operations: The CIA and Academic Institutions, the Media, and Religious Organizations" (179–204). It alternates between justifying the CIA's actions and reprimanding the agency for what might be an infringement of the liberties and freedoms of American citizens. The report claims, "Americans recognize that insofar as universities, newspapers, and religious groups help mold the beliefs of the public and the policymakers, their diversity and legitimacy must be rigorously protected" (SCR 179). But immediately afterward, the committee writes, "At the same time, Americans also recognize the legitimacy and necessity of certain clandestine operations, particularly the collection of foreign intelligence" (179). This duality seems to mark the actual project of cultural intervention, a contradiction that was reconciled through an understanding that, first, the actual impact of these interventions is hard to gauge (the idea that not all published propaganda may work—"not true of all books at all times and with all readers"—and that such efforts are "long-range"); and, second, that in terms of feasibility there is a marked dichotomy between executing these interventions abroad and doing so on domestic soil, thus not impacting domestic freedoms and laws.

In early 1967, the radical journal of culture and politics, *Ramparts*, ran full-page announcements in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* about their forthcoming article that would expose ties between CIA and the National Student Agency (NSA) (Stern 1967). The *New York Times* took this lead seriously and uncovered the agency's funding of various left-wing magazines.[5] The CIA retroactively admitted, "We have taken particular caution to ensure that our operations are focused abroad and not in the United States in order to influence the opinion of the American people about things from a CIA point of view" (SCR 192). Thus, publishing projects that were channeled into recently decolonized countries had a particular resonance. These governmental interventions established a global and transnational flow of books and magazines that continues to dictate the way literature enters and exits the American book market even today. No matter what the committee's report gives evidence of, that the CIA took this particular intervention seriously is proven by the fact that over a thousand books were produced, a quarter of these in English. Some of these books were directly published and disseminated abroad by the CIA, but the majority were published through cultural organizations that the agency funded and managed. The books that were written and published in collaboration with the CIA were openly anti-Communist and tried to offer diverse perspectives on the allegedly terrifying and malevolent nature of life and government in the USSR. The committee's report chose three examples as prototypes of CIA book publishing: a book about the wars in Indochina that was disseminated to select magazines and newspapers and published in both English and French; an account of a student from a developing country who studied

in a communist country; and *The Penskovskiy Paper*s by Oleg Penskovs-
kiy (a colonel who defected from USSR), which was published in 1965
and found significant commercial success.

Manipulating culture and trying to wield it as soft power was a tac-
tic that was also embedded within the civilizing logic of colonial policies.
Rubin writes about the British Council, an extremely powerful association
that maintained control over the cultural domain in its colonies by sending
them writers, books, and sometimes recordings of authors' voices to repre-
sent British literature and culture. By 1957, it had 95 libraries in 57 countries
with around 900,000 volumes and about 10,000 periodicals; the cultural
presence took the form of centers, institutes, libraries, pamphlets, novels,
manuals, auditoriums, and galleries (Rubin 2012, 48). At least within the
dynamics of Western culture, the United States came to occupy the posi-
tion held by Britain and France in the years preceding the Second World
War, though in this case, it was the fight against Communism that came to
engage and drive the strategies around cultural interventions. These efforts,
which took place over a period of almost 30 years, had many disconcert-
ing and probably unplanned resonances. They certainly had an impact on
how non-Western literature in general was received within the sphere of an
American and European literary and academic culture. They also obviously
impacted cultural production in the particular countries themselves, but
this chapter is less focused on those local dynamics. These initiatives also
managed to transform the publishing industry in ways that had implicit
and explicit connections to frameworks and paradigms put in place by the
Cold War's cultural agendas.

The CCF is an important case study, explored here in order to excavate
these lineages and echoes, and the CCF is by no means the only organiza-
tion engaged in the cultural Cold War at the time. The CCF was run by
CIA agent Michael Josselson: at its height, it had "offices in thirty-five
countries, employed dozens of personnel, published over twenty prestige
magazines, held art exhibitions, owned a news and features service, orga-
nized high-profile international conferences, and rewarded musicians
and artists with prizes and public performances" (Saunders 2001, 1).
The unclassified and abridged version of these activities was summarized
as follows: "*university officials and professors provide leads and make
introductions for intelligence purposes*; scholars and journalists collect
intelligence; journalists devise and place propaganda; United States pub-
lications provide cover for CIA agents overseas" (SCR 179).[6] Thus the
scope and reach of the CCF was diverse and multilayered, and "jour-
nals, books, conferences, seminars, art exhibitions, concerts and awards"
(Saunders 2001 1) were subsumed under a vast intelligence web.

Founded in Berlin—the headquarters, so to speak, of the Cold War in
1950—the CCF set out over the next 17 years "to sway European intel-
lectuals away from the Soviet Union, and toward the Western camp"
(Engerman 2001, xxv). But it was not just Europe that was to be swayed,

but also decolonized countries, many of which were in the grip of US and USSR-sponsored violent, internecine conflicts. Stories of the founding of the CCF vary from whitewashed and glorified accounts to renditions that focus on the absurdities and ironies that abounded in the situation. For example, in his gripping narrative version—one that Scott-Smith and Lerg would likely label as coming from a place of "justifiable cause" (Scott-Smith and Lerg 2017, 4)—CIA historian Michael Warner writes that he was very impressed with everything that went on with the building of the organization. He called the CCF "daring and effective" and claimed that it was established to "solidify the CIA's emerging strategy of promoting the non-Communist Left—the strategy that would soon become the theoretical foundation of the Agency's political operations against Communism over the next two decades" (Warner 1998). Others have studied the larger impact of the CCF on American radicalism and seen it as the beginnings of radicalism's failure. Yet many of these works (Saunders, Coleman, Lasch) retain a fascination with what they see as an embryonic and generative period for Western "culture," and figures like Arthur Koestler, George Orwell, and Arthur Schlesinger continue to be lionized. Similarly, portraits of key founders such as Michael Josselson and Melvin Lasky are often sympathetic: "[T]hese two Russian Jews decided to save Western civilization," writes Peter Coleman, without any irony (1989, 13).

Coleman delineates three main periods of the CCF. The first period spanned about eight years, from 1950 to 1958, and was largely seen as a period of "creativity and expansion" (9) in which international seminars were organized, international protests against censorship and artistic oppression were orchestrated, and a network of prestige magazines were sponsored in places like the United Kingdom, India, Australia, and Italy. The second period, from 1958 to about 1964, saw more magazines being sponsored, but it was also a more ideologically moderate phase in which the CCF tried to "encourage 'liberalization' behind the Iron Curtain" (10) in countries such as Poland and Hungary. It also used seminars, books, conferences, and magazines to sustain liberalism in Indonesia and parts of Latin America and Africa. The third period was a much darker one in which the CCF's links to the CIA were exposed and managing defamatory publicity became the main goal, though it was perhaps in vain. The period of the Vietnam War did not help secure a positive image of American politics, and the CCF was soon dissolved, though a majority of the magazines continued to operate without any change to their policies and circulation.

Though the CCF was forced to disband, it did succeed in furthering the alternative ideological paradigm referred to as the "non-Communist Left" (or NCL, as it was cryptically called in State Department circles) (8). The CIA archives reveal how the CCF "helped to solidify CIA's emerging strategy of promoting the non-Communist left—the strategy that would

soon become the theoretical foundation of the Agency's political opera-
tions against Communism over the next two decades" (Warner 1998).
While the non-Communist Left had existed in Europe, the American
government took note of this third alternative when attempts to coun-
ter communism became an urgent concern. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.'s
rousing 1948 essay asked for the word "left" to be abandoned entirely
and that non-Communist Left be adopted instead. "A united Left is an
illusion," Schlesinger insisted.

> [T]he question of freedom vs. totalitarianism cannot be compromised.
> When we talk about the Left, we mean either the pro-Communist Left
> or the non-Communist Left; and when this vital distinction becomes
> part of our thinking, we will enormously sharpen our understanding
> of foreign affairs.
>
> (Schlesinger, 1948)

The non-Communist Left ushered in a new type of intellectual who was
progressive, anti-conservative and often nonreligious, and who felt that
he continued to belong to the Left but had no ties to or affiliation with
Communism whatsoever. Koestler, for example, embodied the paradox;
he remained a vociferous critic of the Left because he felt that he him-
self was a man of the Left. Political writer and anti-Communist Dwight
Macdonald, who was surprised to find himself at great ease with these
contrary-seeming values, admitted,

> We had a common culture . . . we read the same books, went to
> the same art shows and foreign films, shared the same convictions
> in favor of the (American) underdog—the Negroes, the Jews, the
> economically underprivileged—and against such institutions as the
> Catholic hierarchy and the U.S. State Department.
>
> (qtd. in Coleman 1989, 12)

Around this time, Richard H. Crossman's edited anthology, *The God
That Failed*, became emblematic of the politics and ethos of the non-
Communist Left, and eventually of the CCF. It gained the reputation of
having "defined a new paradigm for Western intellectual life in the Cold
War: American-centered, closely tied to political power, and staunchly
anti-Soviet" (Engerman 2001, vii). It included six authors (Arthur Koes-
tler, André Gide, Stephen Spender, Irving Kristol, Richard Wright, and
Louis Fischer) and was divided into two sections: "The Initiates" and
"Worshippers from Afar." Reviews of the book applauded its openly anti-
Communist politics precisely because they were expressed by those who
had become disillusioned with them. In his recent introduction to the
compilation, David C. Engerman rightly points out that the book "func-
tioned as a set of conversion narratives as well as a how-to manual for

transforming interwar radicals into Cold-War liberals" (2001, xxv). The CCF was openly excited that they "shared both personnel and program with the book" (xxv). Koestler served on CCF's Executive Committee; Stephen Spender worked with Irving Kristol on the CCF-sponsored magazine *Encounter*; and furthermore, the translations of the six essays were published in yet another CCF-sponsored magazine *Der Monat* (xxvi). Though the anthology's anti-Communist politics and the confessional style in which these "conversion narratives" were rendered became an inspiration for the CCF, their work eventually far surpassed the publication's ambition and impact. The CCF magazines often published writers who had no idea that their work was being funded, controlled, and disseminated by the very people to whom they were possibly opposed. Here, Richard Wright becomes a key example. He was one of the contributors to *The God That Failed*, having suffered great disillusionment during the time he was a member of the Communist Party in the United States. But several years later in Paris, Wright was to suffer a deep shock after finding out that his own work and radical anti-racism were covertly funded and manipulated by the CCF and other such foundations whose policies and politics he had spent much of his life resisting.

This contradictory yet attractive and easily digestible articulation of left identity offered a great ideological impetus for the cultural Cold War. The CCF-funded cultural production managed to mitigate and soften the impact of American agendas in the realm of culture when proxy wars, ruptured decolonization movements, and actual censorship of ideologically undesirable projects and people was thriving. What it set in motion was a kind of decoy—progressive politics where agendas like the search for truth, pro-dissent and anti-censorship beliefs, deflected leftist positions, and large banners like freedom and openness covered up much more insidious propagandist and censorious strategies. The CCF tended to secure support for and complicity with American imperial motives as the warmongering and a nuclear arms race continued unabated. These cultural interventions obscured those agendas by making them seem either benign or valiant. More importantly, the process engendered a deep and complex irony—the massive propaganda machine that the United States set in motion succeeded in turning propaganda itself into a dirty word, and thus it did its work by perfectly obfuscating the very means and goals that underpinned those agendas.

The CIA's role in manipulating book publishing was included among its media activities. The Select Committee report claims that, right up until 1976,

> the CIA maintained covert relationships with about 50 American journalists or employees of U.S. media organizations. They are part of a network of several hundred foreign individuals around the world who provide intelligence for the CIA and at times attempt to influence foreign opinion through the use of covert propaganda.
>
> (192)

The totality of CIA infiltration is revealed here and appears as a system connecting the various forms of media. In addition, the CIA's program for propaganda and cultural warfare was quite clear when it came to the special role of books. The following section from the Senate report is certainly revealing:

> According to The Chief of the Covert Action Staff, the CIA's clandestine handling of book publishing and distribution could:
>
> (a) Get books published or distributed abroad without revealing any U.S. influence, by covertly subsidizing foreign publications or booksellers.
> (b) Get books published which should not be "contaminated" by any overt tie-in with the U.S. government, especially if the position of the author is "delicate."
> (c) Get books published for operational reasons, regardless of commercial viability.
> (d) Initiate and subsidize indigenous national or international organizations for book publishing or distributing purposes.
> (e) Stimulate the writing of politically significant books by unknown foreign authors—either by directly subsidizing the author, if covert contact is feasible, or indirectly, through literary agents or publishers.
>
> (193)

In what follows, I would like to illustrate that many of the ideas outlined in this five-point plan were implemented with success in varying degrees. The through lines between book publishing, the newspapers that reviewed those books, and the other media outlets that promoted and marketed the books worldwide need to be foregrounded because (though these various media seem to be unrelated) they in fact form a set of networks that create and disseminate cultural artifacts of various kinds— whether journalism, books, or television or radio programs. Here, the magazine becomes an assemblage: it is not only a place where several media interact with one another but also births alternative ideological circuits of aesthetic and political value. For this reason, the magazine is far more effective and efficient than books for the pursuit of propagandist goals.

Little Magazines

Magazines are similar to journals in that they are periodicals and contain a collection of written materials. However, it is the magazine's investment in images as well as its circulation outside a sphere of specialized academic fields that separates it from the journal. The magazine is said to have originated in Europe in the 18th century, but it's astounding growth in the 20th century, especially in the United States, is more relevant here.

In particular, there are two subgenres of the magazine that I would like to focus on: the first is the "small magazine," which is often (though not always) part of the second, the "literary magazine" (Mott 1930; Kurowski 2008). Ezra Pound's definitive and polemical defense of small magazines, entitled "Small Magazines," upholds, above all, the influence of these periodicals for the development of European modernism, though he does not say so outright. He argues that there is great value in "fugitive periodicals of 'small circulation'" (1930, 701), even if they might be economically impractical. Pound finds that small or free or little magazines, as they are alternatingly called, emerged in the wake of "elder magazines" such as *The Atlantic*, *Harper's*, and others, which had "grown increasingly somnolent" due to advertising and sales pressures. He attributes the birth of the "active phase" of American small magazines to poet, critic, and editor Harriet Monroe's periodical titled *Poetry*, founded in 1911 in Chicago. In Pound's view,

> The work of writers who have emerged in or via such magazines outweighs in permanent value the work of the writers who have not emerged in this manner. The history of contemporary letters has to a very manifest extent, been written in such magazines.
>
> (701)

Not only do these magazines go against the grain of established, commercial ideals but they take the risk of dabbling in literary experiment. In fact, literary experiment is a key concern for Pound, as he equates it with the intellectual life of the nation, and even goes so far as to claim that small magazines helped "set up civilization in America" (698).

A more recent reflection on little magazines by Paul Bixler echoes much of Pound's praise, but Bixler is dissatisfied with studies and histories of little magazines (1992). He attempts to pin down the precise characteristics of little magazines by using four main criteria: size (ideally a small enterprise); stability (while its status is always in flux due to funding, it must aim to be stable and to prolong its life cycle); control; and content (the material is usually minor or of limited appeal). Further reflecting on the particular content of little magazines, he claims that "these little-magazine selections differ from their fellows" since they "exhibit a greater awareness of social problems," which may "include race relations as a major or minor theme or as part of the psychological atmosphere" (82). Both Pound's and Bixler's ways of understanding little magazines emphasize that there is a kind of innovation at play in them, whether through formal experiment, stretching political boundaries, or publishing hitherto marginalized writers. It is precisely the opening offered by these yet undefined and somewhat flexible spaces that the CCF managed to manipulate. Crucial here are the little magazines' ties to modernism. In a way, the little, small, literary, or prestige magazine became the perfect

laboratory for the CCF's—and, by extension, the CIA's—own decidedly modernist literary experiment.

The CCF managed to span quite a chunk of the globe with a whopping 30 or so magazines that it chose to fund and control to the best of its ability. It was a diverse mix that, while privileging Europe, did not leave out several recently decolonized countries. Some of the most prominent of the magazines included *Cuadernos* in Mexico, *Encounter* in London, *Forum* in Austria, *Preuves* in Paris, *Der Monat* in Germany, *Jiyu* in Japan, *Quadrant* in Australia, *Transition* in Uganda, *Black Orpheus* in Nigeria, *Quest* in India, *Tempo Presente* in Rome, *Hiwar* in Beirut, and *Solidarity* in Manila. *Partisan Review*, *Kenyon Review*, and *Hudson Review* were some of the magazines that were based in the United States. The physical dynamics of the distribution of these magazines had fundamentally altered in the postwar years of incredible technological innovation and it ensured that these publications were delivered to their destinations with great speed. This technological acceleration sped up communication among the magazines themselves too and allowed for cross-publications, a transnationalist climate of exchange, and the solidifying of certain genres such as the essay, ushering in a "new historical phase of writing" (Rubin 2012, 19).

There were several ways in which these CCF magazines controlled and manipulated culture. It was an infiltration that worked as an assemblage of individual and interconnected CCF magazines, via four modes. First, there was the mode of *direct intervention* that took place through books published by the CIA, such as *The Penskovskiy Papers*. But there was yet another kind of direct intervention: sometimes CCF employees would swoop in and rearrange the masthead of a magazine by firing an editor and hiring a new one more suited to their agenda. The second mode deployed by the magazines was a very strategic *politics of visibility*, in which certain writers were published and cross-published over and over again while others were deliberately left out and sometimes even discredited. The politics of visibility also worked through the giving of awards and prizes, and through funding writers' appearances at CCF-sponsored events worldwide. Third, the CCF magazines completely reorganized and reframed what can loosely be called political writing. Through a *refashioning of the figure of the dissident* and by promoting a very particular type of dissident writing, the CCF magazines managed to create an illusion of the free, democratic, liberal, and pro-dissent Western world, and a totalitarian, brutal, violent, regime-centric, censorious "other" world that consisted of the USSR and any state or persons aligned with communism. Finally, there was a deliberate *deployment of watered-down aspects of modernism*—a cultural, philosophical, literary, and artistic movement that thrived in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In this case, selective modernist characteristics of form were encouraged through funding and marketing to bring about a distinct and potent

division between aesthetics and politics. These four modes contributed to the construction of the Cold War paradigm and in which the CCF magazines played a significant, if not a leading, role. Though the CCF's cover was blown in 1967, this paradigm had by then firmly taken root and had begun to operate through other foundations, prizes, and book publishing practices that followed in the lines of canon formation and gatekeeping practices that had been generated during the two decades of the Cold War.

Direct Intervention

Direct intervention was not typically the approach used by the CCF, and the few recorded examples of it are mainly an illustration of the lengths to which the CCF went to ensure that its agenda was met. Part of the reason that it is important to emphasize these direct interventions, despite there being so few examples, is that so much of the CCF's activity took place under the veneer of promoting culture in a civil and seemingly inoffensive manner. When in direct mode, the CCF might choose and re-choose the right publishers and editors until its rather precarious agenda of non-Communist leftism and liberal work was adhered to and written in the precise approved form. The examples below show that this tactic was only used when CCF organizers felt that all else had failed. Coleman's brief introduction to several of the CCF-funded magazines from the sixties is particularly useful, especially his anecdotes about the magazines *Jiyu* in Japan and *Hiwar* in Lebanon. Sociologist and Japan scholar Herbert Passin urged the CCF to start a magazine in Japan that would counter the anti-American leftism and anti-Western sentiment of the main magazines of the time. But once *Jiyu* was launched, it was not all smooth sailing. When John Hunt, a CIA agent who was posted at the Paris Secreteriat, went to Tokyo to investigate the problems, he found that the "publisher chose its articles with a view to sales and without regard to political and literary values" (qtd. in Coleman 1989, 188). These poor choices included "a liberal critique of Left and Right totalitarianism, an appreciation of Japanese traditions and methods of change . . . a cover designed by Ichiro Fukuzuwa, a surrealist painter . . . [and] a full-page advertisement of a Chinese Communist novel" (188). Hunt's frustration was evident in his letter to Passin in which he complained about the publisher's inability to stand for "intellectual responsibility and democratic procedure" (188). "Japan is far too tricky ideologically to leave our magazine in the hands of a man who is not tried and true," Hunt wrote. He then decided to remake *Jiyu* with a team entirely composed of "one hundred percent of our people" (188). In only a few years, *Jiyu* was a success and became the independent, liberal magazine the CCF hoped it would be.

Similarly, in Lebanon, the establishment of the magazine *Hiwar* was a fraught ideological battleground—far more openly so than the other

CCF projects. From a small bureau in Beirut where the CCF organized seminars on "nonpolitical" themes, the bimonthly Arabic literary magazine was launched, followed by a Novelist's Club that facilitated literary prizes and translations. Soon after publication of *Hiwar* began, Communists, Baathists, and Nasserites unleashed a strong attack on the CCF; this led *Hiwar*'s literary prizewinner Yusuf Idris to return his prize money in the aftermath of attacks on him in the Egyptian press. Yet another type of direct intervention that the CCF indulged in was called "axing," which was the practice of vetoing articles that would go against its agendas. Such pieces included Dwight Macdonald's article "America! America!" criticizing American culture, and Emily Hahn's article (title not known) critiquing American foreign policy in China (Whitney 2017, 93–4). These types of arm-twisting interventions, which were designed to enforce certain politics and literary styles, need to be emphasized more than ever given that soft power is often seen as not being linked to larger questions of governance and military interventions. The belligerence displayed by the CCF shows that there was a lot at stake—certainly enough to warrant openly crude types of manipulation.

Politics of Visibility

Not all CCF interventions were overt or aggressively enforced. Rubin argues that CCF magazines often revealed that the publisher believed that the magazines were "trying to do the job of the maintenance of Western culture against all forms of totalitarianism" by combatting the problems of Communism and neutralism (Rubin 2012, 52). However, magazines did not peddle crudely anti-Communist writing but instead hoped to filter and delimit the discourses about the United States, rather than confront issues of cultural freedom overtly. As a result, knowledge about decolonizing spaces was carefully controlled. For example, *Encounter* magazine's translation and reprint of one of Albert Camus's essays in their inaugural issue illustrates some of the ethos of such cultural initiatives. "The Wind at Djemila," published in October 1953, is a beautifully written essay that deftly straddles the genres of travel writing, memoir, and philosophical reflection. Djemila is a town without people, and it is an overwhelming, emotionally draining landscape of sun, wind, and dust. In fact, it is a place where "the spirit dies so that a truth may be born which is spirit's very negation" (46). Moreover, Djemila in its "arid splendor" (46) manages to "lead nowhere and opens on nothing" (46). In a language riddled with Orientalist mystification and evocative colonial discovery, Algeria is simply rendered as a backdrop for more abstract writing on existentialism, belying the seething and extraordinarily violent nexus of Cold War politics that it actually was. Compare such an essay with Fanon's indignant and bellicose writing on the Franco-Algerian war as it seeped through every nook and cranny of the Algerian countryside,

and it becomes immediately evident how safe, idyllic, and digestible Camus's Algeria is. Articles avoided mentioning American involvement in African and Asian decolonization movements, or indeed racism and civil rights struggles at home. This deliberate and contrived softness around anything political was not achieved through crude editorial interventions; it was, in fact, established at the outset through the choices of the writers asked to contribute to the magazine. As Rubin writes,

> On the whole, the magazines published by the CCF ensured that only certain writers were socially certified to comment on political affairs. It rarely censored its writers, because for the most part, it did not need to do so; their positions were chosen in advance. It would publish Albert Camus, not Jean-Paul Sartre; Richard Wright, but not Frantz Fanon, C.L.R. James, or W.E.B. DuBois; Wole Soyinka, but not Derek Walcott; Edith Sitwell, but not Doris Lessing; Isaiah Berlin, but not John Berger; Hugh Seton-Watson, but not Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill, or V.G. Kerinan; Tosco Fyvel, but not Konni Zilliacus; Raymond Williams but not E.P. Thompson; W.H. Auden, John Wain, and Dylan Thomas, but not Christopher Logue, Nicholás Guillén, or Nâzim Hikmet.
>
> (2012, 54)

Rubin's strategic classification of who was in and who was out reveals the profoundly disturbing ways in which entire bodies of writing were excluded from what eventually constituted what was read and disseminated within the cultural spheres of the United States and the United Kingdom. While it can be argued that the writers who were left out also went on to eventually acquire fame and stature within the literary world, their reception was bumpier. Whether it was Sartre's extreme-left positions, Fanon's theories of violence, or Walcott's seemingly dense style, the ones left out of CCF journals were often those whose reputations and works were received with caveats. The list shows that values such as modernist detachment, abstract style, and aesthetic experimentation were privileged over the more vociferous, openly critical, and politically radical works, illustrating that modernism had been co-opted by the CCF as merely a style that was bereft of politics—a discussion to which I will return shortly.

 There was also an acceleration in actual physical travel for writers, as cash seemed abundant at the CCF. Traveling to give talks or attend culture-oriented conferences had already been in effect with organizations like the British Council Library, and here the colonial civilizing mission found a new iteration as foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation openly viewed this as an occasion to shape geopolitical dynamics and "as opportunities to reshape and give a direction to the humanities" (Rubin 2012, 50). The writer also emerged

as a cultural emissary and had to mitigate a partially official position as a representative of national culture. The CCF and the many shell organizations to which it funneled money organized a spate of conferences and literary gatherings worldwide. Fanon is prescient and astute in capturing a certain mood when he writes,

> As soon as the colonized begin to strain at the leash and to pose a threat to the colonist, they are assigned a series of good souls who in the "Symposiums on Culture" spell out the specificity and richness of Western values.

> (Fanon 2004, 8)

He goes on to attack the intellectuals and the newly anointed Third World leaders who remain captive to neocolonial missions of diplomacy and neutrality. In fact, he says,

> they are wooed. They are given bouquets of flowers. Invitations. To be frank, everyone wants a piece of them. They are constantly on the move. The leaders and students of the underdeveloped countries are a gold mine for the airlines. Asian and African officials can attend a seminar on socialist planning in Moscow one week and then another on free trade in London or at Columbia University.

> (41–2)

Richard Wright's belated discovery toward the end of his life that the CIA had indeed funded much of his travel to Bandung and elsewhere was the subject of his distraught conference presentation in Paris entitled, "The Situation of the Black Artist and Intellectual in the United States." In his memoir, Nigeria's Wole Soyinka also expressed the surprise he felt after discovering how much of his travel for intellectual and literary activity was sponsored without his having had any sense of the source of its funding (2007, 73–4).

   Being published in a CCF-funded journal meant a dizzying activity of cross-publication and promotion. Rubin illustrates this with the example of T.S. Eliot's work, which was translated into Arabic and published in *Hiwar* in Lebanon alongside the work of Palestinian poet Tawfiq Sayigh. Sayigh then went on to translate Eliot's *Four Quartets* into Arabic. *Hiwar* also published an essay by Albert Hourani on Taha Hussein, which was reprinted in *Cuadernos* and *Preuves* (Rubin 2012, 59). While English and American authors were traveling to various countries as cultural emissaries of a freedom-loving, democracy-peddling United States, non-Western writers also found worlds opening up to them and their works entering a whole new arena. One of the most important effects was that the select few intellectuals and writers from the rapidly decolonizing world who were co-opted by CCF journals would become

precisely those authors who entered commercial and literary spheres even after the Cold War was over. This shows that the CCF's choices had an impact on how the canon of multicultural and postcolonial literature came to be developed.

Rubin offers a compelling example in the way in which Wole Soyinka's work was disseminated. His play *Dear Parent and Ogre* was first produced by the Mbari Writers Club (founded and supported by the CCF), and was reviewed in *Transition*, then a CCF magazine. It was subsequently promoted in *Encounter*, another CCF magazine. In fact, *Encounter* had previously introduced Soyinka to its readers by giving him a literary prize for his novel *Dance of the Forest*, and further solidified his reputation by giving *Dear Parent and Ogre* an award when Nigeria got its independence (2012, 59). Additionally, Melvin Lasky's (CCF co-founder and editor-in-chief of *Encounter*) forays into Africa had put him in touch with Soyinka. Lasky's travels were published in *Encounter* as "Africa for Beginners: A Traveller's Notebook (I)" and recounted semi-lurid adventures in nightclubs with Soyinka and a comical moment avoiding a snake in the middle of the night, only to find out it was a 35mm film strip (1961). Ulli Beier, the German editor who founded the CCF-funded *Black Orpheus* (of which Soyinka would later be editor), also shows up in Lasky's romp through Nigeria, revealing the web of connections and friendships that seemed to echo directly in the cross-pollination efforts in which all these magazines were engaged.

In Soyinka's memoir, he recalls his time with Lasky with some bitterness and admits to having thought of Lasky as objective and of a "wide-ranging mind" (2007, 73). He was, however, shocked that several conferences, clubs, and magazines had been CIA funded under the guise of the Farfield Foundation. "Nothing—virtually no project, no cultural initiative—was left unbrushed by the CIA's reptilian coils," he proclaimed (74). Soyinka's anger was directed not only at his having been manipulated but also at the CIA for having put a wrench in what he saw as the generative and creative spirit of a new postcolonial world. This was not unlike the case of Richard Wright, who also had found himself the subject of a double intervention. When he moved to Paris to escape racism in the United States, he founded an organization that would tackle racism in Paris and investigate American hiring practices abroad. It came to light later that its meetings were infiltrated and that information on Wright was being compiled in an FBI file. But that was not all. The CCF supported his view that Communism would not be beneficial to black Americans by funding his trip to the Bandung conference; it also funded the American Society of African Culture (AMSAC), an organization that Wright helped found. A few weeks before his mysterious death, he shocked his audience with "The Situation of the Black Artist and Intellectual in the United States," a brutally honest lecture in which he claimed that black artists lived in a nightmarish jungle that silenced those who spoke out against racism and spied on those who

lived abroad. He added that they also funded apparently radical groups in an effort to defuse challenges to its growing global power. Wright burst out, "I'd say that most revolutionary movements in the Western world are government sponsored," adding, "They are launched by agent provocateurs to organize the discontented so that the government can keep an eye on them" (qtd. in Wilford 2009, 197). Like Soyinka, Wright enjoyed a lot of funding from the CCF and though the authors felt they retained their independence from the hands that fed them, the truth was that these were extraordinary manipulations that allowed for certain types of political and cultural ideologies to be firmed up. Quite often when exposed, the revelations caused a great deal of strife and self-doubt in the impacted authors.

Discrediting writers who did not fit the CCF's agenda, and sometimes deliberately ruining their reputations, was also part of the strategy. The CCF's campaigns against John Berger and Pablo Neruda are the most easily available proof of this. *Encounter* magazine pushed negative reviews of Berger's first book, the 1958 novel *A Painter of Our Time*, because its protagonist János was seen as sympathetic to the Soviet side during the Hungarian revolution. The negative reviews soon multiplied and reached such a frightful public pitch that the UK publisher Secker & Warburg withdrew the already published book, which had only been minimally distributed (Whitney 2017, 97). The case of Pablo Neruda was similar but much more insidious in its allegations. After John Hunt found out that Neruda was likely to win the Nobel Prize in 1964, he did not have a hard time convincing disillusioned Communist Julian Gorkin, now editor of the magazine *Cuadernos* in Mexico, to launch a smear campaign against Neruda. The attack was multifrontal. A dual-language report in French and English that was sent to a strategic set of people made the claim that Neruda was a political propagandist for the cause of Communism and that he had been awarded the 1953 Stalin Prize for "poetic servility." In a particularly vicious move, it also pinned him as an accomplice of Mexican painter David Alfaro Siqueiros in a failed attempt to assassinate Leon Trotsky. "The report concluded by quoting from Neruda's preface to his hymn to the Cuban Revolution 'Cancíon de Gesta': 'I assume once more with my pride, my duties as poet of public utility, that is, pure poet'" (Feinstein 2005, 355). That year, Jean-Paul Sartre, not Neruda, was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, and Sartre famously rejected it.

The CCF's strategy of putting its chosen authors through the echo chamber of a manicured literary space established a framework of "visibility" that continues to resonate deeply within our current publishing space. Through the strategic exclusion of unfavorable opinions and certain forms, the CCF orchestrated visibility for some authors by funding their travel, continually promoting and cross-publishing their writing, and building up the importance and noteworthiness of their images and

their work by awarding them prizes organized by the CCF itself. Rubin explains that writers were given "tremendous visibility" because

> [t]he CCF and other institutions effectively used the cultural world as a kind of disguise that certified that specific public writers were permitted to politically engage in a social system from which others were implicitly—and at times explicitly—excluded.
>
> (Rubin 2012, 17–18)

Exclusion was thus a key component of the strategy of visibility, along with decisive repetition and the creation of prestige. Inadmissible writers were locked out of these hip and trendy "global," "transatlantic" magazines. The echo chamber that was generated through a replication of their work in magazines in various countries, along with the prestige conferred upon them through prizes, effectively brought into being the precise dynamics that we see being mapped onto the way publishing works now. Since the CCF was exposed, an illusion has arisen that these practices have ceased but, in fact, the damage had already been done. It was replaced by a gatekeeping nexus of agent-editor-reviewer that strives to create an aura of prestige through visibility politics that engage public relations strategies. What is important to remember here is that a lot of care is taken to sanitize and delimit possibly political offshoots that a literary work might produce, and that these practices, nurtured by the CCF, have come back to haunt our print and digital publishing worlds today.

Politics of Dissidence

The CCF had an extremely complicated relationship with dissent and dissidence. Through the magazines, it cultivated a very particular understanding of dissent—one that mainly included those dissenting from Communist regimes and those having a very public change of heart about their former attraction to and involvement in Communist parties and philosophy. "A Manifesto of Congress for Cultural Freedom," drafted by Arthur Koestler with some later addenda by Hugh Trevor-Roper and A.J. Ayer in Berlin in 1950, insisted on intellectual and cultural freedom, peace, democracy, an end to war, and an end to emergency restrictions, and it claimed that a totalitarian state was the greatest challenge to humanity. These excerpts offer a sampling of the manifesto's basic concerns:

2. Such freedom is defined first and foremost by his right to hold and express his own opinions, and particularly opinions which differ from those of his rulers. Deprived of the right to say "no," man becomes a slave.
3. Freedom and peace are inseparable. In any country, under any regime, the overwhelming majority of ordinary people fear and

oppose war . . . Peace can be maintained only if each government submits to the control and inspection of its acts by the people whom it governs, and agrees to submit all questions immediately involving the risk of war to a representative international authority, by whose decision it will abide . . .

5. Freedom is based on the toleration of divergent opinions. The principle of toleration does not logically permit the practice of intolerance . . .

12. We hold that indifference or neutrality in the face of such a [totalitarian] challenge amounts to a betrayal of mankind and to the abdication of the free mind. Our answers to this challenge may decide the fate of man for generations.

<div align="right">(in Coleman 1989, 249–51)</div>

Open ironies abound in this manifesto. Koestler and his co-authors made their righteous declarations about the freedom to express differing opinions at exactly the same time as the virulent era of McCarthyism, a concentrated five-year period in which repression and censorship of those holding opinions that dissented from a singular government agenda, had taken hold in the United States. Thousands were accused of being aligned with Communism and were targeted for questioning and investigation. The realm of culture was key, and the Hollywood blacklist barred the employment of actors, directors, and other industry workers who were accused of having affiliations with the Communist Party in the United States; many of them were ultimately held in contempt of Congress for refusing to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee. Bertolt Brecht, Langston Hughes, Irwin Shaw, and Thomas Mann were some of the writers who were persecuted (Navasky 1980). Much of this had already unfolded by 1950, thus rendering the CCF manifesto as something drafted by a few sanctimonious people who were turning a blind eye to events in the very space that they had deemed democratic and free of censorship.

   To speak of freedom and peace as symbiotic also raises red flags given the violent interventions that the United States had begun staging in the decolonized world, not to mention the then-recent use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That peace itself was never quite the goal of US politics did not factor into this short-sighted manifesto. The question of neutrality also becomes a point of contention because the CCF magazines went on to cultivate precisely a kind of political neutrality by choosing writers for whom political opinions, especially about the United States, were not the primary concern. Lastly, the nature of dissident activity as it related to the CCF's agendas is, *a priori*, fraught and contradictory. But the CCF did become synonymous with freedom of speech and a point of view that was anti-censorship and pro-dissent, and this was achieved through a selective and highly strategic approach that

was honed and perfected in a struggling postwar Europe and a ruptured and ideologically vulnerable decolonizing Third World.

The anthology *The God That Failed* represented the blueprint for what the CCF wanted to achieve. The publishers wanted to show that authors dissenting against Communism had a real home in the United States. In fact, the book's editor, Richard Crossman, and its main architect, Arthur Koestler, were hoping to use American resources and clout to steer Europeans away from the threat that Marxist ideas and Communism posed. But this was not accomplished through crude criticism or open propaganda. The voices of six authors who had dissented from Communist communities were crucial in framing this work as courageous and steeped in anxieties about censorship, totalitarian regimes, and potential freedoms. This is not to say that the writers included in this anthology had not had a deeply disillusioning and disorienting experience of Communism, but to point to ways of framing "dissent" in a way that later came to suit the CCF's leanings. For example, in his 2001 foreword, Engerman writes about the challenges involved in inviting someone like Richard Wright to contribute: "Wright insisted that the book include opinions from workers and union leaders as well as intellectuals. But here the organizers got their way, incorporating Wright's contribution without expanding the list of authors" (xxi). This moment in the process of assembling the book reveals the need to include an African-American whose exit from the Communist Party represented an ideological way forward for the disenfranchised and discontent black population in the United States, even though Koestler had admitted that Wright was "neither sufficiently first-class nor reliable politically to be admitted into this most illustrious company" (xxi). In addition, the interest in unions and workers smacked of a crudely Marxist leftism—the unattractive kind. Eventually, Wright was published in the anthology but with his agenda whittled down and inscribed very much within the frame of dissidence that was being pushed by the editors. Mitigating editorial policies in this way become somewhat emblematic of the little magazines of the CCF, especially as they became increasingly transnational and global.

The books and magazines promoted by the CCF became skilled at cultivating voices that were anti-Communist without being crudely so, dissident without being activist, stylistically pleasing without being jarring, liberal without being leftist. Though the inability to see the irony of Koestler's CCF manifesto was one iteration of the problem of framing "dissidence," the issue was really amplified by the ways in which the CCF cultivated a complete disconnection between the United States and the Soviet Union's violent Cold War games that involved fostering dictatorships, planning the assassinations of popular leaders, starting proxy wars, and destabilizing newly decolonized nations along with the outreach provided to the very writers and artists who were opposing those events and puppet leaders. The Farfield Foundation and the CCF, both CIA fronts,

fostered the magazines *Black Orpheus* and *Transition* in Uganda and Nigeria, respectively, at the precise moment of decolonization. Africa occupied a fairly central place in the American and Soviet imaginations. Peter Kalliney writes that

> [w]inning the favor of African intellectuals was deemed vital in the geopolitical context of decolonization and the Cold War. US intelligence officers who feared that decolonizing nations would drift toward the Soviet Union believed that covert support for intellectuals in those regions would help stem the Communist influence. This was the policy of containment translated into cultural patronage.
>
> (2015, 339)

In his account of why Congress would fund small magazines in Africa, Peter Benson claims that South African writer Es'kia Mphahlele and executive director John Thompson of the Farfield Foundation decided to support *Transition* to bolster the values that they saw epitomized in editor Rajat Neogy and that they wanted to further reinforce in Africa as a whole. These included "multi-party democracy; freedom of speech; the predominance of intellectual over bureaucratic political, military, and traditional tribal elites; a continued cultural interchange with, and allegiance to, the West" (Benson 1986, 162). The loud, antigovernment, and dissident politics of figures like Wole Soyinka were amplified and, to a degree, commodified through prizes and accolades. Such dissidence, a very particular kind of dissidence, was always paraded and advertised as fitting into American patriotic agendas. In the case of Wole Soyinka, his opposition to his own government enabled the United States to foreground its own commitment to freedom of speech and democratic ideals, thus putting forward a flashy and parental image of American progressiveness and liberalism. It also allowed the United States to cover up regime changes and proxy wars that it had unleashed in several countries in Africa.

Within such a deeply politicized and hawkish framework, it was no coincidence that the term "dissidence" became synonymous with the struggle for freedom and human rights taking place behind the Iron Curtain, and came to be applied to those struggling under a Third World that seemed to be putting draconian dictatorships into place. Dissidence came to be interchangeable with a foreign "other," whether that foreignness was located in the ubiquitous East, in the Third World, or within locatable pockets that had penetrated the "free world." Censorship, it seemed, only thrived elsewhere, and the United States made sure that its own image became associated with freedom, openness, and democratic ideals. Rubin accurately claims that the CCF "effectively and comprehensively prevented, or at the very least manipulated in complex ways, the emergence of alternative and dissenting discourses" (2012, 54). Though a type of dissidence

was always seen as fitting into the CCF agenda, the less attractive forms of dissidence were effectively excluded. A very manicured definition of dissidence was also achieved by encouraging silence, particularly from those "whose dissenting practices threatened to undermine the episteme upon which the Cold War was based—a seemingly relentless conflict between 'totalitarianism' and the free world" (8). Thus the CCF's cultivation of dissidence as an aesthetic managed to put into place a binaristic framework of an oppressed, violent, and totalitarian world on the one hand, and a free, democratic, liberal, and progressive world on the other—an extension of the civilized and uncivilized binaries put in place during European colonialism.

Politics of the Apolitical

Without doubt, one of the important goals of the United States' cultural Cold War agenda was the management of discourses around cultural and intellectual freedom. Just as the definition and usages of the term "dissidence" were manipulated and manicured, so too were the categories of political art, political literature, and politicized culture in general. While global and international in appearance, the CCF was invested in creating a continuum between European and American culture. Giles Scott-Smith writes, "Yet it was exactly in the cultural-intellectual realm of activity, the realm of 'high culture' as it were, that considerable efforts were made to legitimize Euro-American Atlanticism, a prime example being the Congress for Cultural Freedom" (2001, 2). At the CCF's founding moment at the conference held in West Berlin in 1950, Scott-Smith notes that, out of the 118 invitees representing 21 nationalities, only two were from India and Colombia; the rest were either from Europe or were émigrés from the Soviet bloc. The emphasis was on a liberal-social democratic outlook, and great care was taken to also invite more conservative delegates to create a "favorable polyphony of voices rather than a deliberate unanimity" (4). As the CCF became more established and organized festivals, conferences, and seminars, the message was always the same:

> that freedom of the intellect and of culture in general was a prerequisite for any assessment of a progressive democratic society. In other words, no intellectual or cultural activity worth its name could be carried out, and no claim to cultural excellence could be made, without the assurance of a complete independence from political interference.
> (4)

The intersecting ideals of a Euro-Atlantic alliance and zero political interference in the site of culture were crucial for constructing the image of a writer and intellectual who was the vanguard of the kind of civilizational values that Western Europe purported to stand for throughout its

long colonial history. This writer/intellectual figure was also not engaged in anything political. This figure was worldly, urbane, invested in "high culture," well traveled, and represented a world that was not sullied by a political engagement that resembled the crude, "totalitarian" political ethos associated with communism.

A subtler way in which CCF strategies worked to create a politics that appeared apolitical on the surface was by creating a dichotomy between art and politics, particularly through the forms that it chose to espouse in writing as well as in visual arts. The now well-known story of the CIA funding abstract expressionist painters, such as Jackson Pollock and Willem de Kooning, is a great corollary to the type of aesthetic experimentation that was encouraged in literature. Saunders has argued that one of the reasons the CIA supported modern art for almost two decades was to prove that Americans were not philistines and the United States was not a cultural desert—and that, in fact, a thriving movement that expressed creativity and freedom could thrive here (Saunders 1995). Louis Menand claims that in 1946, the CIA spent an astronomical $49,000 on a show called "Advancing American Art," only for the event to encounter a significant backlash (2005). The show was criticized for the very thing it was attempting to shape: a Euro-American alliance. But the event and the backlash aside, Menand asks an important question, one that can be directly connected to the CIA's interest in promoting certain forms of writing: "What would have been the geopolitical uses of abstraction?" (2005). Many explanations have been proposed. Saunders and other critics believed that abstract expressionism represented autonomy, was not didactic, and celebrated individualism, thus perfectly standing for everything the United States aspired to. It was also seemingly apolitical, and inspired apolitical forms of criticism. Menand insists that this apolitical aspect contained the precise politics of the art being promoted:

> The "apolitical" interpretation of abstract painting derived, quite self-consciously, from a politics. Both Greenberg, the critic most responsible for the view that Abstract Expressionism was pure painting, and Harold Rosenberg, the critic most responsible for the view that it was pure expression, were left-wing anti-Communists who had been associated with the anti-Stalinist Partisan Review in the nineteen-forties, and whose theories of art were formed in reaction to Soviet aesthetic dogma, according to which abstraction was individualist self-indulgence. Greenberg and Rosenberg were both outspoken champions of the Americanness of Abstract Expressionism.
>
> (2005)

All of this quite simply emphasizes that promoting and developing apolitical art was not an impulse but a deliberately conceived political move. It is no surprise that Greenberg and Rosenberg were fairly

powerful members of the non-Communist Left group that had worked tirelessly to create a progressive left-liberal ideology that could be considered as distant from Communism as possible. The comical contradiction inherent in championing such art is not lost on Menand: "Cold Warriors in the nineteen-fifties often found themselves in the position of propagandizing for American values by exhibiting art that was manifestly élite, and attacking the Soviet Union for mandating that art appeal to the common man" (2005). Thus, it was perhaps inadvertent that a certain type of snobbish, Europhile high culture was brought into being and that it was at odds with the American celebration of popular culture and values of class-free egalitarianism.

This exact phenomenon was mirrored in the realm of literature as well. A starting point for understanding the CCF's ability to delineate an apolitical politics in culture is to look at the way in which aspects of modernism were encouraged. Greg Barnhisel has claimed that, first, Cold War initiatives heralded a shift whereby modernism went from being a "cause" to a "style"; and second, that Cold War modernism "is a rhetorical reframing that capitalized on the conjunctions of government, business, and elite cultural institutions (museums, foundations, and universities) particular to America of the 1940s and 1950s" (2015, 4). This reframing meant that modernism was transformed merely into a set of formal techniques that emphasized abstraction, autonomy, fragmentation, indirectness, the undermining of emotion and politics, and a veneer of high seriousness. What this eventually achieved is that it "worked to 'swerve' public understanding of modernism, deactivating or nullifying its associations with radicalism and antinomianism and making it safe for consumption by American middle-class audience" (4). When it came to exporting these forms abroad through the CCF's magazines, book publishing projects, and conferences, Kalliney's recent work on African writers who chose to adopt modernist modes in their literary practice is very illuminating. Kalliney claims that African writers chose to invest in modes of aesthetic autonomy and deliberately neutral and apolitical stances because "modernist proclamations of intellectual and creative independence held a profound appeal" (2015, 334). However, he insists that these tendencies were, in a sense, running parallel to what CCF magazines like *Transition* and *Black Orpheus* were publishing, and that, in fact, it was a coincidence that CCF attachment to the legacy of modernism found a fit in an African literary setting that was already engaging with this form.

Kalliney derives comfort in the idea that the CIA programs were covert, and argues that if the writers were not aware of the patronage, they essentially had the freedom to experiment as they pleased and used that freedom to coincidentally experiment with "the right to be apolitical" (335). He disregards the work of cross-promotion, the politics of exclusion and inclusion, and the specific dynamics of dissidence outlined earlier in this

chapter. Though Kalliney is not wrong in claiming that several African writers were indeed drawn to modernist aesthetics, he does not recognize that these were precisely the writers who were further promoted and seen as fitting into the CCF's agendas. Wole Soyinka is a key example once again. His early plays *A Dance of the Forests* and *Kongi's Harvest* dabble in modernist aesthetics, and it is precisely writers such as Soyinka were co-opted for Cold War ideological agendas through a parallel politics of dissemination. Kalliney does not engage issues of dissemination and distribution at all, instead adhering to the notion that the politics of a text is somehow disconnected from the milieu from which the book is born and the milieu within which it enters. But as I argued earlier in the section on the politics of visibility, these dissemination techniques did matter, and the writers who were heavily promoted and cross-published in CCF magazines were those who had been granted entry into the canon.

Kalliney and scholars such as Asha Rogers, who is following in Kalliney's footsteps, argue that the work produced by magazines such as *Transition* should be divested from their entanglement with CIA funding since editor Rajat Neogy insisted that the financial help he received was without any direct influence (Rogers 2017, 193). Rogers also points out that *Transition* had been influential in the publication of a few million books by African authors in the USSR illustrating its importance in the Soviet cultural sphere and thus proving that while Cold War imperatives were certainly a factor, *Transition* was not "a straightforward fit" for American agendas (193). While I do not wish to discredit, in any way, the anti-Empire writers and the often engaged cultural production coming out of these places, I do wish to emphasize that the CCF was selective and clear about who they funded, and they made sure that their mission was directly matched by a magazine's output. As for the question of influence, CCF interventions were rarely direct but more subtly articulated through practices that seem peripheral to literary studies, such as cross-publication, marketing of certain authors, and various affiliated activities such as prizes and book tours. Kalliney's article does not take into consideration that once the long-term effects of CCF magazines' cultivation of these forms come into view, it is clear that a certain kind of postcolonial and multicultural literature became canonized within Anglophone publishing circles and in the academy. Again, the example of Wole Soyinka can highlighted, and his own heartbreak at having found out about CIA funding. It is no coincidence that postcolonial scholar Neil Lazarus eventually addresses the depoliticization and canonization of postcolonial studies by using the depoliticization and canonization of modernism as an analogous example (2011, 27–32).

The CCF largely succeeded in advancing a type of writing that was apolitical, and that fit neatly into its modernist agendas. It killed many birds with a single stone: it nurtured and funded specifically transnational,

postcolonial Anglophone literature that successfully integrated American and European cultural production and produced a transatlantic imaginary; it countered what was seen as the crude representational and didactic Communist culture with an autonomous, independent, and experimental high culture stemming jointly from the United States, Europe, and Europe's former colonies; and finally, it successfully cultivated a false dichotomy between politics and literature, one that has had a direct impact on mainstream and academic literary culture today, as the upcoming discussion on Vietnam War literature will illustrate.

The Cold War Paradigm After 1991

The Cold War paradigm gradually became a normalized mindset and practice when it came to choosing, editing, and promoting books in American publishing enterprises. There came about a commonsensical market logic in publishing and selecting a manuscript that was not openly political, potentially modernist in style, did not engage in critiquing American wars elsewhere or managed to rescue a foreign dissident came to be perceived as obvious wisdom and as an example of good taste. There existed a continuum between mainstream cultural production, academic consumption, and the American political and military agenda; thus, such practices and ideologies resonated through several different circuits, from mainstream publishing to academic scholarship to digital platforms. These circuits are productive and generative sites to explore how literary canons are formed and sustained. The Cold War might have officially ended in 1991, but the spheres, connections, and ideological environment that it engendered continues to echo through publishing practices. By historicizing and foregrounding the direct connection between commercial publishing and academic scholarship in the field of literary studies as it evolves during the politically charged time of the Vietnam war, I reveal the intricate ways in which they symbiotically contribute to the canonization of certain works and authors long after the Cold War officially ended in 1991.

The late sixties—a time when the CCF's links to the CIA were revealed in *Ramparts* and *New York Times* exposés—had also become a hotbed of activism and protest movements against the Vietnam War, one of the most deadly and lengthy of the Cold War-era proxy wars. But while the incredible resistance mounted by mass movements against the Vietnam War was a defining feature of those times, the frameworks of inclusion/exclusion, dissidence, apolitical politics, and (to a degree) self-censorship that the two-decade-long CCF-managed media interventions had put into place had taken root in publishing cultures. In order to bring the focus back onto literature, engaging with Jim Neilson's groundbreaking work on Vietnam War literature elucidates the ways in which this Cold War intervention into publishing had significant and fairly drastic repercussions on how the literary canon came to be manufactured. Neilson uses

the critical reception of Vietnam War novels within the United States as a point of entry and a site for investigating "not merely the vicissitudes of literary taste but the ideology of literary culture" (1999, 2). Through an apolitical aesthetics, modest critiques of war (in this case, the Vietnam War), and the production and reproduction of circumscribed views, literary culture managed to help "revise the war to accord with the needs of capital" (8). Neilson asks how a nation that had a massive antiwar movement and had once expressed outrage over US atrocities suddenly became oblivious to these histories and their representations. Why, he demands, is it so difficult to find the violent proxy conflicts and the civil wars it engendered represented in literary and cultural spheres? This manicured cultural space has succeeded in covering up American realities overseas, and cultural interventions played a deliberate and strategic role in creating a dichotomy between political realities and their representations within the space of culture.

Neilson's study evaluates the critical response to Vietnam war novels in order to offer a longitudinal understanding of which books enjoyed popular reception and which were cast aside. Graham Greene's *The Quiet American* (1955), for example, landed in the United States to mixed reviews. Greene received "considerable flak" for his depiction of the United States' negative behavior in Indochina (67). Though American literary culture did not receive it with "lock-step anticommunism," Greene was taken to task for having Communist sympathies (63). Over time, the reception of *The Quiet American* became focused on the human condition, which allowed for an obfuscation of "Greene's political concerns and ignored his depictions of U.S.-sanctioned terror" (74). Neilson finds several other books similarly meaningful in proving that even though anti-Vietnam War movements were gaining ground, "the practice of literary assessment continued to emphasize an ahistorical aestheticism" (90).

Victor Kolpacoff's *The Prisoners of Quai Dong* (1967), for example, was praised by reviewers but overlooked by academics, who were preoccupied with works that were more formally exciting. Similarly, John Clark Pratt's novel *The Laotian Fragments* (1974) has been left out of the canon because its critical reception was mainly centered on how Pratt questioned the nature of truth. Pratt's account of clandestine warfare in Laos had also upset the higher-ups. However, the critics not only failed to acknowledge Pratt's attempts to offer a corrective to the events of the war but they devoted their energies to speculating on the philosophical nature of truth itself. "Instead of correcting a documentary record aggressively rewritten by the Right," Neilson observed, "academic critics have questioned the validity of documentary itself—and have seen this questioning as itself radically subversive" (133). This focus on the act of questioning tied into yet another academic trend at the time: namely, the sway of postmodernism as a philosophy and as a critical tool. Realism was becoming outmoded, and realistic accounts of the Vietnam War were

seen as severely lacking in their ability to convey ephemeral, fragmented, and aesthetically exciting truths. Michael Herr's widely acclaimed hallucinogenic account in *Dispatches* was a case in point. The book's lack of verisimilitude, its eccentric structure, and its feverish prose were hailed by critics as capturing the true, nightmarish reality of the war. Through these examples, Neilson's goal is to uncover "liberal pluralism," which he believes is the shared ideology of academic and literary culture. Liberal pluralism is the precise legacy of the Cold War cultural machinations and connects with the efforts to solidify the "non-Communist Left" perspectives, discussed previously in this chapter. Neilson uses the term contemptuously to signal a de-radicalized politics that places far too much emphasis on individual choice and vague understandings of the concept of freedom.

Before venturing further, I would like to establish that mainstream literary culture and academic scholarship have an interdependent and reciprocal relationship. For example, Richard Ohmann's study of canon formation in the United States from 1960 to 1975 illustrates that certain magazines and periodicals played a disproportionately large role in influencing the dissemination and legitimization of literature (1983). Periodicals focused on book reviews, like the *New York Times Book Review* and the *New York Review of Books*, largely determined whether a book would become valued and debated, and whether it would remain an integral part of cultural discourse. So, while certain books were bestsellers or gained popularity, a book's positive review did not necessarily mean that it gained academic legitimacy. These magazines (of which Ohmann identifies eight as key tastemakers) were keenly read by professors and "75 percent of our elite intellectuals" (204). Often the motivations of these magazines were dictated by the market (205),[7] but once a novel, for example, was anointed by reviewers as having intellectual weight, then

> it was likely to draw the attention of academic critics in more specialized and academic journals like *Contemporary Literature* and by this route make its way into college curricula, where the very context—course title, academic setting, methodology—gave it de facto recognition as literature. This final step was all but necessary: the college classroom and its counterpart, the academic journal, have become in our society the final arbiters of literary merit, and even of survival.
> (206)

Ohmann further adds that novels could only become canonical with the confluence of market credibility and critical merit. He maps the trajectory of a book that has attained literary and canonical status during this time through what seems like a series of concentric circles. The first, smallest ring comprised a network of editors and publishers; the second ring included prestigious journals and reviewers; and the third, widest

ring eventually brought in academics and allowed the book to enter classroom curricula and an arena of enduring literary prestige. Not only did the readers and buyers, meanwhile, remain largely unaware of the processes that were developing their tastes, but, according to Ohmann, the process was completely obfuscated by the fact that these novels precisely mirrored the needs, the values, and the means of representation of this newly emerging Cold War-era reading class. The relationship between mainstream publishing and academia has thus proven inextricable, and the circuits between the two contribute significantly to what comes to be seen as a "classic," "canonical," or "timeless" work. Contrary to the mistaken impression that academic literary culture exists in a lofty, ivory-tower orbit, Neilson's and Ohmann's work proves that there is a deep empathy between these two spheres, one that is necessary for and constitutive of both of them, and also one that relies upon Cold War dynamics to come into being.

The two decades of psychological warfare and soft power interventions put in place by the CIA and other security agencies through the infiltration of media, publishing, and academia play a significant and defining role in sustaining the Cold War paradigm in the nineties and well into the 21st century. The Cold War paradigm can be defined as a manufactured consensus, one that starts to function as an obvious logic about what constitutes good, sometimes great, literature. As discussed in the previous sections, a framework is put into place that tends to privilege a particular American narrative that places international and translated works at the margins. This happens without any kind of censorious activity but through a politics of visibility. This visibility mobilizes a network of people that may include agents, editors, reviewers, funders, prize committee members, academics, and so on to confer merit and value upon a certain book or a certain writer. What started out with the CIA trying out various approaches to making certain politics visible or invisible in a book or author is now a tried and tested practice in book publishing.

The typical journey of a work of literature usually begins with the author finding an agent, who then finds an editor, who then puts a marketing dynamic in place, which leads to reviewers. The reviewers then work through a basic interpretation of the book and generate a place for it with the use of strategic categories (crime, African-American, international, women, mass market, etc.). The reviews must also be published in very specific periodicals, many of which publish and republish reviews of the same author or disproportionately publish reviews from particular publishing houses. In the US, it is, first, rare to see reviewers and publishers leave the comfort zone of having the editors and agents determine whether a book is or is not valid, deserving of merit, and potentially "important." And secondly, reviewing books that do not seem to be aligned with national geopolitical interests is not a common practice either. Eventually, these books then enter a kind of academic canon once

they are anointed by scholars who rely on particular commercial journals and magazines, and they are often encumbered by those very same category errors and ideological thrusts. This is thus the first outcome of the politics of visibility.

But the question is, how is the book chosen to be made visible in the first place? Neilson's statistics reflect the particular moment during and after the Vietnam War, but it would not be an overstatement to say that getting published remains excruciatingly difficult even today after two or more decades have passed, for a variety of reasons addressed in this chapter. Neilson's research showed that at the time, only one out of 30,000 unsolicited book submissions was likely to be published since it had not been chosen by an agent or editor. Criteria for rejection may include that the book is "too depressing":

> The rejection of a manuscript because it is "too depressing" is at root ideological—especially when this depressing content reflects the actions of a government more interested in maintaining nuclear supremacy, maximizing corporate profit, and building a national security state than in protecting its citizens' health. Another explanation for this aversion to material that is "too depressing" is that commercialism requires optimism and reassurance; ideally, consumers are to be put in a positive, spending mood. . . . Refusing to publish a book because it is too depressing effectively recasts ideological exclusion as commercial common sense.
>
> (24)

The second reason Neilson cites is that a book may be too "difficult," which is often shorthand for "unfamiliar"; this means that foreign or international works often get left out of the equation. This process does not take place through overt censorship but through a sympathetic dependence between the publishing house and its corporate owner. Often unintended, it has consistently led to a marginalization of views outside of a manufactured, consensual narrative.

Let me unpack this trajectory by returning to the contemporary example of African child soldier novels. These have become a staple in the "international fiction" space and are also taught widely at universities. Framed as ruptured *bildungsromane* wherein the child protagonist often undergoes a physical and psychological journey, these novels and memoirs frequently end with the child having to choose one of two available paths: one is the path of a bleak daily survival even after the wars have ceased, and the second leads to healing, rehabilitation, and the child's eventual reentry into society. Nigerian author Ken Saro-Wiwa's *Sozaboy* (1985), an early example of a child soldier narrative, ends on a note of great destruction, as the young adult protagonist comes back to his village to find that it is wrecked and abandoned, and his family killed by a

bomb. The villagers refuse to acknowledge his presence as real, and he is viewed as a ghost wandering through the vicinity in search of his family. Ahmadou Kourouma's child soldier novel *Allah Is Not Obliged* (2007) has a fairly hopeless ending as well. Protagonist Birahima and his mentor Yacouba become hardened, unrepentant criminals. They join a militia that survives solely on a system "based on exploiting refugees, ripping off NGOs" (209). Though Birahima himself appears excited and happy about his life, the reader is sadly aware of the fact that he will always remain an outcast trying to survive illegally on the margins of society.

Meanwhile Sierra Leonian Ishmael Beah's *A Long Way Gone* (2008) and Nigerian American Uzodinma Iweala's *Beasts of No Nation* (2005) diverge significantly from the above-mentioned works. In both cases, the novels' young boys are rescued by Western humanitarian agencies and make a clean start in society. Iweala's Agu ends up in a hospital with a room of his own, books, a sunny window, art supplies, and a priest who speaks to him about turning to God. In addition, the child says, "And every day I am talking to Amy. She is a white woman from America who is coming here to be helping people like me" (140). Amy is an American psychologist who is gently making Agu tell his life story and urging him to discuss his feelings. The book ends with Agu confessing that he is not a beast or a devil, as Amy sits next him, her eyes brimming with tears. The experience that Beah writes of is no different. After a long healing process in a United Nations rehabilitation center, the young Ishmael becomes a model of recovery and goes on to speak at the United Nations in New York about his experience as a child soldier and his gratitude toward the Western NGOs that rescued and revived him.

It is interesting to note that the two kinds of endings have led to two kinds of receptions for the books. While *Sozaboy* and *Allah Is Not Obliged* are relegated to the relative obscurity of academic readership, *A Long Way Gone* and *Beasts of No Nation* are widely distributed, are displayed at all of the mainstream bookstore chains, and have made their way into book clubs. Beah's book was picked by both Oprah Winfrey's and Starbucks' book clubs, something that ensures that the book sells at a rapid rate; it has also been made into Cliffnotes Study Guides and is available as an audiobook. Conference panels likewise appeared at the time of its publication, exploring the end of violence in Africa and a discourse of healing specifically inspired by Beah's narrative. The violence is thus considered a thing of the past, with a focus on rebuilding and healing, even though violence continues unabated and unexamined (certainly in the literature being published) in many regions of the postcolonial world.

This brings us back to the complicated problem of the various agents involved in disseminating knowledge and information about these wars, some of which are a direct result of Cold War machinations through coups, assassinations, and implanted dictatorships. The American interest in Beah stems from a readership that is not simply invested in a rehabilitation

narrative that shows various Western humanitarianism entities in a positive light but also in "saving" Beah himself. Whether through television appearances, his scholarship to attend Oberlin College, his work as a goodwill ambassador to the United Nations, or relentless publicity interviews, Beah was constantly made to keep the memory of the brutalities he experienced and participated in alive. But this memory also came with a kind of forgetting, and that forgetting entails the complete rewriting of the event of war in Africa generally and in Sierra Leone particularly. Devoid of any political context and historiography, Beah's Africa is conveniently without any complexity; it is war-ravaged and brutal and filled with "meaningless" violence. It is not the Africa of Kourouma's child soldier, which satirizes African dictatorships and their linkages with the West, nor is it the Africa of Emmanuel Dongala's child soldier novel *Johnny Mad Dog*, which depicted animal rights activists abandoning a young girl in the dangerous forest while airlifting endangered gorillas to save them from war. It is a scenario similar to that of Iweala's novel, which was recently turned into a film that opened to rave reviews—despite its inability to offer specificity of location, context for the war, choice of language, and the rendering of war as a hallucinatory, psychologized, and de-politicized experience. There is no doubt that the depressing realities of Kourouma's, Dongala's, and Saro-Wiwa's accounts—written in a challenging linguistic hybrid or arriving as translated works into the Western market—are no match for the sweet simplicity of the model child soldier narrative emerging out of Beah or Iweala. The dual dissemination trajectories of the child soldier novels make clear that knowledge about these postcolonial wars is sure to remain under-analyzed and biased in our particularly difficult and problematic global economy and culture.

Yet another way this Cold War paradigm operates is through the various means in which the politics of visibility is kept alive. For example, there was a period when an undue amount of attention was devoted to authors of Indian heritage—whether in the form of commercial publishing deals, Booker and Pulitzer Prizes, or academic approval. The Indian novelist writing in English has earned a place of privilege in American literary culture and in the US market as well, and authors like Salman Rushdie, Anita Desai, Arundhati Roy, and more recently Jhumpa Lahiri used to be favorably reviewed and generally well received in commercial and academic spaces. Though the recent success of African authors has been touted as a groundbreaking new trend, the number is still shockingly small—not to mention that this fiction tends to reveal a lopsided focus on war and child soldiers in Africa. Fiction from the Indian subcontinent, on the other hand, downplays the civil wars in South Asia, even though accounts of child soldiers have been published in local languages.[8] There is nothing ostensibly wrong with nurturing Indian writers, some of whom are pioneers of an Indo-English form, and several of these novels have been groundbreaking in terms of thematic content as well as stylistic

innovation. But their success has led to the branding of the Indian writer in English as a best-selling commodity who is given a disproportionate amount of visibility. The books are packaged in "exotic" reds and golds with titles that include a range of special fruits, or flowers, or abundant references to monsoons, and the publishers are keen on authors who look attractive on book jackets, cultivating the image of an attractive, metropolitan intellectual. The space of American and British publishing is finite when it comes to publishing and nurturing a diverse non-Western literature in English, and the room given to these authors has always been particularly small. But within that, the focus on Indian writing, for example, leads to a marginalization of other countries and histories of the Global South. The Cold War paradigm of visibility and invisibility fundamentally contains the paths through which books and authors make their way into our cultural spheres. Representations of the real scale of devastation that colonialism and then the Cold War wreaked upon the postcolonial world are kept out of sight and, to some degree, out of reach.

So far, I have spanned the period of the Cold War from the start of the CCF up to its exposure in the late sixties. The process of canon formation during the Vietnam War spans the decades of the seventies and eighties, and the examples of child soldier novels illustrate trends in the nineties and early 21st century. This brings us into the present day, and I would like to emphasize that the American government-engineered agendas have several ramifications for commercial and academic publishing today. The main argument here is that the roots of this phenomenon can be traced to the cultural Cold War. From here, it advances via magazines to journals and into the classroom, all the while shaping not just the commercial book industry but also literary studies in academia. This journey has had a disproportionate impact on globalized literature and in shaping a canon of postcolonial studies, multicultural literature, and world literature. The advancement of a particular literary sensibility and narrative has either managed to push translated works to the margins or has promoted and nourished a very particular kind of literature. It has also led to the establishment of a bureaucratic network of agents, editors, reviewers, and academics who are in charge of shaping the literary scene and who remain the gatekeepers of culture, more generally. In the present moment, even with the advent of the digital, blueprints for media and culture designed and nurtured through Cold War initiatives continue to influence the practices and sensibilities within digital publishing today. Sadly, the Cold War paradigm continues to influence and penetrate even this saturated technological climate of innovation, ostensible openness, and utopic potentials.

Digital Publishing

In the last two and a half decades, digital technologies have facilitated a host of new literary publishing possibilities that have engendered new

literary milieus and practices. Digitality, as it pertains to publishing, involves two main transformations: firstly, it comprises the furious digitization and archiving activity that enables readers to access hitherto inaccessible works online; and secondly, it includes the publication of books specifically designed for e-readers and on computers, thus allowing for new types of material to be published—often based on specific tastes and trends. These technological changes bring about a sea change in literary culture with the multiplication of venues, platforms, and opportunities that lead to the emergence of new spaces for criticism, blogging, reviewing, and commenting: all cumulatively give the impression of a zeitgeist wherein the world has shrunk drastically and book publishing and book dissemination has become secularized and widely available. More importantly, it gives credence to the idea that traditional gatekeeping practices and mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion have fallen apart; that publishing has been freed from old hierarchies. Anyone can get published and censorious, elitist, or ideological taste-making mechanisms have finally been abolished. It is precisely these presumptions that I dissect in this section. I first examine these new publishing cultures by attending to the infrastructure that enables the choosing, anointing, distributing, and canonizing of certain works and authors. I ask if the Cold War paradigm might still play a role even several years after the Cold War has supposedly ended, and neoliberalism appears to have taken a tenacious hold in American society. By looking at the workings of giant entities such as *Amazon*, *Google*, and *Wikipedia*, it appears that Cold War paradigm is still foundational to the discourses of openness, freedom, and prestige. It might seem far-fetched, but I find that now ossified cultural Cold War structures are still relevant when thinking through the process of literary canon formation, the politics of visibility, and the issues of aesthetics that it engendered.

Systems of technology are often credited with altering and reshaping the course of history. At the outset, there is no doubt that technology is vital for the publishing process. Rubin reminds us that the little magazines of the Cold War completely relied on technological innovation to "not simply be mechanically reproduced but replicated synchronically." He adds that "[n]ever before had there been an active transnational imaginary articulated in quite this way," since "postwar technical innovations in printing and distribution dramatically altered the conditions of cultural transmission" (2012, 59). Theories of technopolitics attempt to parse through the ways in which technology, culture, and politics are fundamentally connected (see Mitchell 2002; Edwards 1997; von Schnitzler 2016). Gabrielle Hecht and Paul N. Edwards argue that technopolitics illustrates the ways in which the discourses of technology during the Cold War were shaped. In fact, it is possible to locate the processes by which these ideas and practices have heralded and certainly shaped the rigorous

and hectic technological and digital moment we find ourselves in today. Hecht and Edwards explain:

> Properly deployed, the sociotechnical systems approach can help trace links between apparently unconnected historical actors, such as American nuclear weapons designers and the Congolese hard-rock uranium miners who supplied their raw materials. Where the former derived enormous power from their technical knowledge and technological resources, the latter suffered from their lack. How do actors derive power from technical knowledge? In what does their power consist? Familiar historical categories such as race, class, institutions, and culture, can help explain these relations. But they are not enough. In sociotechnical systems, power derives from the control of knowledge, artifacts, and practices. This hybrid form of power has cultural, institutional, and technological dimensions. We call it "technopolitics."
>
> Technopolitics is the strategic practice of designing or using technology to enact political goals. Such practices are not simply politics by another name. They produce artifacts whose design features matter fundamentally to their success, and to the ways in which they act upon the world.
>
> (2007, 4)

Within Cold War studies, technopolitics is a theoretical tool that is primarily used to investigate military histories and nuclear technology. More specifically, it enriches research about the global systems that were created and designed not just for the use of nuclear power but also for inventing warning and prevention systems to deal with potential nuclear attacks. Elsewhere, Joseph Masco has observed that the atomic bomb fundamentally changed American society. As a technological and geopolitical paradigm and project, the preoccupation with the nuclear arms race "provided officials with new means of engaging and disciplining citizens in everyday life" (2013, 252). In fact, the immediate and imminent fear of apocalypse and nuclear ruin that became a daily American psychological reality contributed to the way the nation-state was constructed.

Hecht and Edwards discuss the intersection of military-nuclear power and what came to be its complete and utter reliance upon computers; this is where the digital ideologies that we have inherited today can be located. Computerized control made global nuclear command possible, forcing the two superpowers to invest heavily in innovation in this area. The Cold War gave birth to an intense technological moment where disaster could be brought on with a simple push of a button. But sometime in the 1960s, the histories of nuclear systems and computers began to diverge. From "big technology" attractions in governments and corporations, they became consumer products in the 1980s with desktop

"personal computers," and the many booms that came and went laid the groundwork for the Internet. Hecht and Edwards explain that during the Cold War, "both nuclear power and computers were the subjects of utopian visions" (275). By the 1970s, economic and technical power was not able to shed its symbolic ties to nuclear weapons, whereas computers rapidly managed to cast off the baggage of military association. Computers became inscribed with the ideology of "cyber-utopianism" that "shook off every fear, gathering strength even into the present. Whereas nuclear technologies proved mainly divisive, computer technologies emerged—at least in the popular imagination—as a global unifying force and a symbol of libertarian freedom" (275).

The decoupling of violent technology from computers led to euphoria about technology in the United States. What was remarkable about all these sweeping changes and these immense interventions into technology was how the political aspect of them started to be masked: "[E]xperts framed their designs as technological imperatives, the result of the inevitable path of technological progress," even if they were involved in insidious and militantly political activities such as making missile guidance technologies and perfecting nuclear weapons. Historically, US discourse on science and technology emphasized a "disinterested search for truth," one that is "value-neutral" (278). Notions of progress, efficiency, ingenuity, and entrepreneurship were naturalized along with the liberal market capitalism that it also developed and depended on. It became commonplace to think of Soviet nuclear technology as politically shaped and profoundly ideological, but the same activities in the United States were framed as apolitical (278). Liberal ideologies during and after the Cold War conveniently framed technology in the United States as innovative, progressive, and essential, and effectively obscured the political dimensions that had been intricately bound up with the origins of computers.

Currently we find ourselves in a similarly dynamic, fast-paced, and densely innovative technological moment. In particular, the culture of literary and academic publishing is undergoing radical and rapid shifts. Modes of dissemination are changing and have forever altered our perception—not just of what constitutes an audience, readership, or reading practice but of time and space itself within all aspects of publishing. But what does the advent of the digital really mean for circuits of commercial and academic publishing as well as for literary culture more generally? In what way does it shift the dynamics between the United States and the reception and dissemination of literature from the postcolonial Global South? Has digitality created a forceful intervention into the existing Cold War paradigm of reception, dissemination, and gatekeeping of literary culture, or has the digital also been co-opted and transformed in ways that imitate the dynamics that had been exacerbated by the Cold War? The answers are complicated, to say the least.

By foregrounding the ways in which technology was rendered apolitical from the Cold War era onward, we can trace a direct line to contemporary perceptions of digitality and the internet. Scoffing at the oxymoron "digital revolution," Robert McChesney points out that all of the discourse on the internet lies along the binary of the "celebrants" of the digital and the "skeptics" of the digital with regard to the internet's utility, its impact on our lives, and the ways in which it changes us as individuals and as a society (2013). There has been a complete failure to address the ideological and economic factors that have shaped our digital age as well as our perceptions of it. McChesney points fingers at governments and regimes that use technology to manipulate information and use big data for geopolitical and military interests. Scandals in the recent past have brought some of these connections to light, though not in ways that have significantly altered the techno-digital landscape. The exposure of the NSA surveillance program, the controversies surrounding Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning, and the continual efforts by Julian Assange to hack through large security apparatuses are some of the examples.

However, cyber-utopianism is omnipresent in the world of mainstream publishing—especially within the field of literature—when it comes to the question of digital advancements and interventions. The digital, very broadly, carries the promise for better dissemination of globalized literatures due to the emergence of online magazines, a wider space for independent publishers, the vast blogosphere, the e-book market, progressive forms of e-literature, online literary prizes, the opening up of the space of booksellers, and the transformation of reading practices. But the question remains: has the literary culture that we have inherited from the Cold War paradigm really changed? Is there a continuum between the extraordinary shifts that came about due to Cold War interventions in the realm of literature and the world of digital publishing today? The framework I mapped earlier in this chapter traces the arrival of new literature through the nexus of agents, editors, and reviewers in the commercial sphere. The journey of a particular work is further solidified through high-prestige cultural magazines and journals, until it is eventually canonized within an academic culture. These works are often encumbered by category errors, falsified genealogies, and are laden with ideological structures.

Though the seemingly "open" expanse of the internet and digital technologies should have completely radicalized this system of gatekeeping, canon formation, and meaning-making, I believe that these mechanisms have only undergone a cosmetic change and continue to function as actively as they did before these digital resources were made available. Much of the perceived change is partially the result of the Cold War legacy of viewing anything related to computers as neutral and apolitical. The euphoria and the utopic discourses that surround digitality and the internet manage to mask the geopolitical manipulation of arts and

literature, and the often-disguised nature of capitalist imperatives. While a critique of the digital age's internalization of capitalist economic systems and the commercial takeover of media has emerged, there is still very little published on how literary culture has been impacted. Overall, the conversation around literary publishing alternates between pessimism about e-books leading to decreased sales of printed books or the optimism around digitality heralding a new era of independent publishing that brings with it the promise of openness and accessibility for all. I argue that the gatekeeping practices that came into being during the Cold War continue to prevail. Furthermore, questions of openness and accessibility have become politically fraught with forms of inclusion and exclusion and an apolitical politics that yet again widen the existing notions of a free, democratic Global North and a barbaric, autocratic, postcolonial Global South.

The trajectory of a book manuscript today is not very different from that of its predecessors of a couple of decades ago. I have had the chance to observe these journeys closely after having founded an independent online magazine called *Warscapes*, which strives to publish writers, poets, and artists from places and contexts that are below the mainstream radar.[9] Writers must still jump through the hoops I outlined earlier—finding an agent, soliciting the right editor, marketization and categorization, the dependence on reviews, entries for awards—and embark on the potential journey to academic spaces. Additionally, writers who succeed in getting published now have to contend with the powerful triumvirate of *Amazon*, *Google*, and *Wikipedia*. Successful dissemination through these three entities does not depend on public opinion or fluke algorithms but requires well-placed reviews in the same magazines that Neilson had found to be the tastemaker and gatekeeper outlets in the eighties and nineties. These would include the *New York Times*, the *New Yorker*, the *New York Review of Books*, and *Publishers Weekly*, among others. If a book is reviewed in these select outlets, *Wikipedia*, possibly one of more overtly exclusivist platforms, will immediately allow the book and author to breeze through its "notability" criteria. In this case, the relevance of a book, event, or person is decided based on whether they have been mentioned by a well-known and "notable" publication. This rules out any hope for new and independent persons or books to find a footing within the mainstream media. Indeed, the same literary values are likely to be regurgitated thus never effectively making room for a bolder political engagement or for formal innovations.

Searchability and mentions on *Google* are determined by these same prestigious outlets as well, and this same searchability can be managed and controlled based on Search Engine Optimization (SEO)—the visibility afforded to a website or a web search. Though SEO is always framed as incidental and organic to the actual popularity of the element being searched for online, it is determined by algorithms that enable certain words and images to pop up quickly. Book marketing and magazine advertising departments pay SEO experts to create visibility and "buzz"

around certain persons or topics. Needless to say, the better funded a publication is, the higher the budget for manipulating and harnessing sales, hits, and hype on the Internet. Certain books, authors, or reviews appear again and again in superficially related searches, creating a completely fabricated hype and aura around a certain work. Meanwhile the most valiant efforts to get a work self-published or published by a small press do not generate notability or garner the critical attention a book may deserve unless it eventually finds a way to go through the fixed, bigger channels.

Wikipedia, in particular, has created and paradoxically foreclosed a discourse on "openness" that resembles the ways in which Cold War discourses on freedom, dissidence, and political writing were framed. Wikipedia was founded on the principle not just of openness but also of neutrality. But Nathaniel Tkacz's masterful political-philosophical theorization of Wikipedia certainly gives pause when it comes to accepting these master categories without questioning their precise operating principles. Openness works as "a powerful new form of political desire in network cultures" to the extent that both Wikipedia and Google, two very mainstream organizations, function with openness as their undergirding idea and structure (2015, 28). Moreover, *Wikipedia*, a contemporary digital encyclopedia, articulates its claim to neutrality thus:

> All encyclopedic content on Wikipedia must be written from a neutral point of view (NPOV), which means representing fairly, proportionately, and, as far as possible, without editorial bias, all of the significant views that have been published by reliable sources on a topic.
>
> (Wikipedia, Neutral Point of View)

Here, the main assumption is that Wiki entries are made possible due to a neutral and unbiased point of view, an ideal that is attained through a complex, collaborative system with multiple checks and balances. Tkacz dismantles Wikipedia's claim to neutrality, arguing that the site "is collaborative not because it has no hierarchies, but because it has policies that mediate between different and, indeed, often conflicting views, seemingly absorbing different perspectives into a single frame" (49). "Seemingly" is the operative word here, and this ability to create a frame of openness that can integrate various complex and contradictory perspectives is a legacy of non-Communist Left liberalism as practiced in the United States.

In addition to openness and neutrality, Wikipedia entries rely on a category called "notability." Described as a "test used by editors to decide whether a given topic warrants its own article," it is a criterion that has a particularly detrimental impact on independent digital publishing activity. Wikipedia has a web page outlining the five criteria it uses to gauge

the notability criteria for books. For a book to be admitted as a Wikipedia entry, it must meet one of the five:

1. The book has been the subject of two or more non-trivial published works appearing in sources that are independent of the book itself. This includes published works in all forms, such as newspaper articles, other books, television documentaries, bestseller lists, and reviews. This excludes media re-prints of press releases, flap copy, or other publications where the author, its publisher, agent, or other self-interested parties advertise or speak about the book.
2. The book has won a major literary award.
3. The book has been considered by reliable sources to have made a significant contribution to a notable or significant motion picture, or other art form, or event or political or religious movement.
4. The book is, or has been, the subject of instruction at two or more schools, colleges, universities or post-graduate programs in any particular country.
5. The book's author is so historically significant that any of the author's written works may be considered notable. This does not simply mean that the book's author is notable by Wikipedia's standards; rather, the book's author is of exceptional significance and the author's life and body of written work would be a common subject of academic study.

<div align="right">("Notability")</div>

These criteria create a veritable echo chamber. For the most part, a book cannot be cited, reviewed, or written about in any capacity unless its availability and description can be found on Wikipedia, and it is Wikipedia that becomes a marker not just of the book's importance but sometimes of its very existence. Without this entry, the book is unlikely to win a literary award, be turned into an adapted work, or be assigned on class syllabi.

   Once again, the book and the author become completely dependent on the politics of visibility determined by the agent-editor-reviewer nexus. This open and neutral entity sustains and synthesizes several aspects of the Cold War paradigm—it allows for the management of dissenting discourses, it creates a manicured politics that subsumes existing categories in ways that eschew modes of subversion, and it creates notability criteria that furthers existing paradigms of visibility, inclusion, and dissemination as outlined by early participants in the cultural Cold War. Technology here is used for specific means, and its very design illustrates its inability to close off ideas, acts, experiences, and events that originate and develop in an already marginalized Global South. Thus, digital publishing also becomes entangled in the legacies of the cultural Cold War. Earlier in the book, I discussed the significant and decisive role played by academics,

not just in the Cold War more generally but also more dynamically within the processes of canon formation. Scholarly publishing brings prestige to a book and allows for it to be adapted to syllabi, thus keeping it in circulation and print. But due to a cyclical and interdependent relationship, academics actually rely on commercial networks wherein the agent-editor-reviewer nexus clarifies which book will be deemed worthy of literary celebrity, notability, and honor. The gatekeeping practices that *Wikipedia*, *Google*, or *Amazon* may put in place certainly make sure that these same circuits continue to thrive and that the promise of openness and neutrality is not quite realized.

Within the university setting, digitality makes its way into various humanities fields and reconfigures and remaps several disciplines. Within the humanities, "Digital Humanities" (DH) is the broad term under which the wide-ranging methods and research agendas are filed. It is no coincidence that the roots of DH intersect with the exact moment of the Cold War, and in her history of the field, Susan Hockey traces the first DH project to 1949, when an Italian Jesuit priest, Father Roberto Busa, made an index verborum of all the words in the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas and related authors, totaling 11 million words of medieval Latin (2004). Father Busa had heard of computers, and, predicting that a machine might aid his ambitious project, he solicited the help of IBM in the United States. It was really in the sixties that some of these computational techniques started to be seen as necessary to the study of literature. While centers dedicated to the use of computers in the humanities sprang up in the sixties, it was only a decade or so later that a lot of methodologies began to be consolidated, solidified, and more importantly, legitimized. But it was in the 1990s, with the advent of the World Wide Web, that DH really came of age.

It has not been very long since DH was inscribed within the academic realm as a legitimate scholarly field, and one of the markers of its entry was Blackwell's print publication of the anthology *A Companion to Digital Humanities*. Its editors—Schreibman, Siemens, and Unsworth—claim that while DH has broadened its reach with the coming of the internet, it has "remained in touch with the goals that have animated it from the outset: using information technology to illuminate the human record, and bringing an understanding of the human record to bear on the development and use of information technology" (2004, xxiii). Matthew G. Kirschenbaum adds that "[a]t its core, digital humanities is more akin to a common methodological outlook than an investment in any one specific set of texts or even technologies" (2010, 56). What started as a term of consensus among a small group of researchers has now been backed by a growing number of campus initiatives and has begun to receive high levels of funding and infrastructure.

I would like to conclude this chapter by marking a rather devastating rupture—one that forces us to view academia through the technopolitical

lens: the story of Aaron Swartz, who committed suicide by hanging himself in his apartment in Brooklyn in 2013. An American programmer, innovator, and internet activist, Swartz's death sent shock waves through the digital community. A child prodigy, Swartz's path toward becoming a tech legend started in third grade when he built a working ATM at the school he attended in the Chicago suburbs. At the age of 13, he coauthored a version of RSS, a webfeed system that allows streaming of news from across the Internet onto a single reader. However, he is also known, perhaps more notoriously so, for the seeds he sowed within a growing community of progressive activists who were part of the "copyleft" movement. The main agenda of the copyleft was to build a culture based on sharing. In fact, Swartz helped create the coding backbone of the Creative Commons Licenses (Lessing 2013) that we now take for granted. These allow artists and writers to claim or waive certain rights to control their works or share them online. Wesley Yang, author of a posthumous article on Swartz, claims that he

> was one of the early catalysts for the campaign that stopped the Internet regulation known as the Stop Online Piracy Act (and its corollary, the Protect Intellectual Property Act), which its opponents believe would have effectively allowed private companies to censor the Internet.

> (2013)

In the years leading up to his death, Swartz's hacking activities had become bolder and more notorious as he became an activist for the Open Access movement and even penned a Guerilla Open Access Manifesto. He made a few simple and indignant points. "Information is power," he wrote.

> But like all power, there are those who want to keep it for themselves. The world's entire scientific and cultural heritage, published over centuries in books and journals, is increasingly being digitized and locked up by a handful of private corporations.[10]

He also targeted academia more specifically:

> Forcing academics to pay money to read the work of their colleagues? Scanning entire libraries but only allowing the folks at Google to read them? Providing scientific articles to those at elite universities in the First World, but not to children in the Global South? It's outrageous and unacceptable.

> (Swartz, Manifesto)

It was simple: technology was being co-opted for a divisive, and exclusivist, system of hierarchy and power when, in fact, technology could

actually make this knowledge available to all. Libraries in the United States and elsewhere spend an extraordinary amount of money for subscriptions to academic journals—money that represents a significant chunk of their budgeted spending every year. In fact, most research and university libraries struggle to this day to obtain budgets for journal subscriptions. While there is consensus about the fact that knowledge and scholarship should be public goods, the entry of commercial journal publishers on the scene has altered the market forever. Edwards and Schulenburger claim that commercial publishers dramatically raised the prices on journals with the knowledge that academics require access to the top journals in their fields and that the market tends to be relatively fixed. "The commercial publishers," they observe, "quickly proved that prices could be set far above the level that the scholarly societies had established. Big profits followed" (2003, 14). The coming of an open access philosophy while seen as an epistemic shift has also transformed itself into an exploitative and profit-mongering endeavor (Smith 2017).[11] Swartz argued that the digitization projects across campuses and research centers were, in fact, only further widening the gap between those who had access and those who did not.

The events that led to Swartz's fall and eventual death began in September 2010 when, over the course of several weeks, he downloaded nearly five million articles from JSTOR, the digital repository, as a gesture of protest against the locking away of academic articles behind a paywall. The consequences were immediate and draconian. He was charged with wire fraud, computer fraud, unlawfully obtaining information from a protected computer, and recklessly damaging a protected computer—charges that carried penalties of about $1 million in fines and up to 35 years in prison. The indictment was later amended to 13 felony counts and as many as 50 years in prison. However, Swartz was reportedly offered a plea bargain of six to eight months if he would plead guilty to 13 felony counts. A hue and cry ensued from various quarters, from the legal to the techno-digital to the academic. Most agree that Swartz's eventual suicide stemmed from years of depressive tendencies that were suddenly exacerbated by his becoming a focus of media attention, as well as being unfairly and brutally prosecuted for crimes that schools like MIT and Harvard alternately indulge and penalize, though never to this degree.

The tenuous connections between the digital, academia, and publishing come to the fore with the case of Aaron Swartz. They lay bare the extremely politicized framework of digitality as it operates through academic and commercial publishing, and existing notions of a free, democratic Global North and a barbaric, autocratic Global South. While it is not necessarily possible to inscribe these events directly within a Cold War framework, Swartz's revolutionary activities reveal the ways in which the shadows of the Cold War lurk and linger. The Cold War continues to cut through, get

imbricated in, and poison discourses of freedom, dissent, openness, flows of capital, and institutional funding, and fundamentally exacerbates the violence that forms the underlayer of cultural modes that it controls and curbs. If we shake loose the internalized and normalized structures of the Cold War, then these seemingly disparate yet profoundly interconnected links can be made visible. It is, after all, about circuits of freedom and the valiant efforts made by these resistant figures to allow for that freedom to not become complicated and compromised. Whether it is the visions of decolonization that the Cold War subverted or the mitigated cultural spaces that it birthed, this book insists on making those rich palimpsests visible. It is in only in such a speculative assemblage that the *fil rouge* connecting the revolutionary activities from Frantz Fanon to Aaron Swartz can emerge and through which the extraordinary proliferation of Cold War ideologies and effects can be viewed.

Notes

1. Examples include Rubin (2012); Casanova (2007); Barnhisel (2015); Scott-Smith and Lerg (2017); Davies, Lombard, and Mountford (2017); and Ganguly (2016), among others.
2. I transcribed this passage from the audio recording of the lecture.
3. Notable among them, the work of Elizabeth Holt, Monica Popescu, Deborah Cohn, Asha Rogers, Jason Harding, Peter Finn and Petra Couvée, Michael Hochgeshwender, and Peter Benson and Erin Pullin.
4. For a truly comprehensive history of the USIA's cultural arm, see Cull (2009, 81–133).
5. The front page of *New York Times* on February 16, 1967 ran this following article by John Herbers, "President Bars Agency Influence Over Education." In a full page insert on page 26 titled "Foundations Linked to CIA Are Found to Subsidize 4 Other Youth Organizations," these were some of the article included: Neil Sheehan's "Funds Identified as Go-betweens"; Wayne Eugene Groves's "'Warm, Open' Scholar"; Juan de Onis's "Ramparts Says CIA Received Student Report." Coverage continued over the next few days with articles such as the following: Sheehan's "5 New Groups Tied to CIA Conduits; Got Funds of 3 Foundations the Agency Aided Student Unit Favors Ending," *New York Times*, February 17, 1967; and Ben A. Franklin's "Students Accuse C.I.A. of 'Trapping' Some Into Spying; Students Assert C.I.A. Trapped Some Into Spying," *New York Times*, February 19, 1967.
6. The italicized passage in the report included a footnote that stated that this particular aspect was substantially abridged and that a classified version was available to members of the Senate.
7. Ohmann also writes,

   > [*The New York Review of Books*] was founded by Jason Epstein, a vice-president of Random House, and co-edited by his wife, Barbara Epstein. It may be more than coincidental that in 1968 almost one-fourth of the books granted full reviews in the *New York Review* were published by Random House (again, including Knopf and Pantheon)—more than the combined total of books from Viking, Grove, Holt, Harper, Houghton Mifflin, Oxford, Doubleday, Macmillan, and Harvard so honored; or that in the same year one-fourth of the reviewers had books in print with Random House and that a third of those were reviewing other

Random House books, mainly favorably; or that over a five-year period more than half the regular reviewers (ten or more appearances) were Random House authors. This is not to deny the intellectual strength of the *New York Review* only to suggest that it sometimes deployed that strength in ways consistent with the financial interest of Random House. One need not subscribe to conspiracy theories in order to see, almost everywhere one looks in the milieu of publishing and reviewing, linkages of fellowship and common interest. Together these networks make up a cultural establishment, inseparable from the market, both influencing and influenced by it.

(205)

8. Sri Lankan writer Shobasakthi published *Gorilla* in 2001 in Tamil. The book narrates his story as a child recruit of the Tamil Tigers during the civil war in Sri Lanka.
9. *Warscapes*, online magazine. www.warscapes.com.
10. Full text of the Guerilla Open Access Manifesto is available online at https://archive.org/stream/GuerillaOpenAccessManifesto/Goamjuly2008_djvu.txt. Accessed February 2, 2017.
11. Several scholars in the humanities, sciences and social sciences are outraged at some of the more predatory practices of publishers while pretending to be open access. In an useful article, K.L. Smith offers a typology of predatory open-access publishing strategies while also arguing against the use of the term "predatory" (4–10).

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Epilogue
The Postcolony Is a Cold War Ruin

> When we contemplate ruins, we contemplate our own future.
> Christopher Woodward, *In Ruins: A Journey*
> *Through History*, *Art and Literature*

A young Mozambican woman sits in a hospital examination room speaking directly into the camera. Her arm has been blown off by a bomb, the wound a raw, gruesome pink. Soon, her tiny baby comes into view; the baby's leg has been blown off, too, and the pulpy remnants are a dull yellow, the color of bile. Both mother and child are calm and patient as the footage eventually moves to show the now bandaged mother breastfeeding her child. This woman, seen in the archival footage of Göran Hugo Olsson et al.'s 2014 documentary, *Concerning Violence: Nine Scenes from the Anti-imperialistic Self-Defense*, has been described by Gayatri Spivak as a black version of Venus de Milo, the armless statue of a Greek goddess that immediately evokes an archetypal ruin. The significance is doubled: Here are a woman's and child's ruined, debilitated bodies now placed in a relationship with the dignified but ironically lifeless statue they resemble.

Walking around the grounds of the Asmara Expo Park in Eritrea a couple of years ago, I came across an abandoned aircraft. It had no business being there, surrounded as we were by restaurants and sporadic arts and crafts stalls. The aircraft is riddled with bullet holes, its door fallen off, the wheels so sunken they aren't visible. In some places, its metal sheets were curling after years of exposure to sun and rain. It is a surprising ruin, made majestic by its peaceful and unexpected posture. The aircraft is fenced in by tall weeds, tufts of uneven grass, and an array of random stones that look like they had been hurled at the plane many years ago. This aircraft is one of several you stumble upon in the park grounds; these monstrous, misshapen, and now muzzled objects are witness to the 30-year war that raged between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and that heavily involved the US and the USSR.

In Nuruddin Farah's *Links* (2003) and Etel Adnan's *Sitt Marie Rose* (1982), Mogadishu and Beirut have been destroyed by terribly

long civil wars, both marked by Cold War connivances. But in these cities, war allows for palimpsests to emerge from the ruins. The wars play an antithetical role; on the one hand, the multilayered space has been destroyed, but on the other hand, it brings all the buried histories to the fore, laying bare the site where the old and faded co-exists with the new and the fresh. Somalia's violent history, with its range of cultural influences, is evoked:

> As one of the most ancient cities in Africa south of the Sahara, Mogadiscio had known centuries of attrition: one army leaving death and destruction in its wake, to be replaced by another and another and yet another, all equally destructive: then the Arabs arrived and got some purchase on the peninsula, and after they pushed their commerce and along with it the Islamic faith, they were replaced by Italians, then the Russians, and more recently the Americans, nervous, trigger-happy, shooting before they were shot at. The city became awash with guns, and the presence of the gun-crazy Americans escalated the conflict to greater heights.
>
> (Farah 2003, 15)

When Farah's protagonist, Jeebleh, returns to a city once a colonial ruin, now a war ruin, the narrative of *Links* starts to function as a lengthy palimpsest. Carefully regarding the geography, peeling and unpeeling, seeing and interpreting the space as if it were an old, weary, yet historically loaded parchment soon becomes Jeebleh's prerogative. War digs up and uncovers material evidence of different layers—in the debris, in the spaces of refuge, in the hotel, on the streets and in Jeebleh's dreams—enabling the narrator to do the work of re-inscription and re-historicization.

Similarly, in *Sitt Marie Rose*, Adnan's Beirut is a living, breathing being, but has been humiliated by war and has vomited out its complex, hybrid past: "She (Beirut) gathered the manners and customs, the flaws and vengeance, the guilt and debauchery of the whole world into her belly. Now she has thrown it all up, and that vomit fills all her spaces" (1982, 20). This ghastly spew literally comprises centuries-old stones mixed with ancient manuscripts, mingled with the fresh blood of victims and now revealing Beirut's cultural hybridity. A city throwing up the layers and layers of its complicated histories, languages, and cultures is a disturbing image. Yet, these fresh ruins once again become a parchment and serve to dish out the reality of interconnections, flows of capital, geopolitical hysterias, and the staggering consequences of violent manipulations.

The postcolony is a Cold War ruin.

The omnipresence of ruins in postcolonial encounters and the frequency with which they are evoked in art and literature reveal the intensity with which the Cold War was unleashed upon the postcolonial world. The numbers of dead and wounded are staggering, the catastrophic

devastation caused on bodies and landscapes is incalculable. The ruins of empire have been replaced by those of the Cold War. However, ruins associated with the Cold War are presented as something entirely different. Cold War ruins, as we experience them in the Global North, incite an aesthetic excitement and the pleasure of nostalgia—whether they are the heavily photographed, faded slabs of Brutalist buildings; the delightful pastel kitsch of painstakingly reconstructed rooms and objects from East Germany at Berlin's DDR museum;[1] or the revivalist trend around bunkers located in Europe or North America.[2] Ruins in the postcolony do not inspire museum exhibits, photobooks, decor ideas, or themed bars.[3] The truth is that tattered, proxy war landscapes, desecrated temples and tombs, weapons wedged among weeds, the abject debris of developmentalist agendas, or the debilitated body are often studied outside the parameters of Cold War influences and consequences.

It brings us back to the main problematic being articulated this book—that of narrating an inclusive Cold War history, which would centralize the postcolonial dimension. A renewed postcolonial Cold War historiography is urgently needed, and ruins are one site where these deliberations can begin. This book bears down upon the dichotomy that continues to exist between what passes as the story of the Cold War and the story of the decolonizing Third World. These stories, histories, narratives, discourses—when taken as two separate entities—muddle the historiography of the postcolony, replete as it then becomes with lacunas and riddles. Thus, with the coming of independence, there is much that does not add up: The postcolony becomes a place of mysterious, relentless, possibly endemic violence; postcolonial time becomes ruptured time as failed states and fallen revolutionaries mark its inability to enter history; and postcolonial theory begins to further obfuscate these links. As I have tried to show with the chapters on Gandhi, Fanon, Lumumba, Cabral, and Sankara, the ruination brought upon the postcolony starts with colonialism, but it is prolonged and intensified by the Cold War—two long and complicated durations that I insist are deeply entangled.

With the coming of decolonization, the previously humiliated and marginalized colonized subject is born anew in the Fanonian sense and embarks on the tremendously difficult task of self-representation, self-articulation, and self-defense—attempting to do the work of writing and gazing back. These efforts are also thwarted as the Cold War players rupture culture. Here, I shift to the Anglo-American setting to observe closely the dissemination and reception of specifically postcolonial cultural iterations. As the web of the cultural Cold War subsumes Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America, the reality of Cold War machinery starts to become blurred. An aggressively anti-communist and anti-Marxist strain embeds itself firmly within the narrow confines of the academy as well as in the wider sphere we call culture. In the last half of the book, I show that the cultural Cold War manages to take our two objects of

study—the Cold War and the postcolony—and completely decouple their engagement, despite how deeply interwoven they are. This happens less through blatant erasures or censorship but rather through tangled circuits of transmission, through a shaving-off of political voice, through an over-compartmentalization of knowledge, and through a cumulative burial of radical epistemologies. Skewed genealogies, disturbed temporalities, spatial schisms, and broken bodies litter the view of postcolonial Cold War sites. Speculative assemblages might allow for a stitching together of these heterogenous, disparate, and polyvalent entities. My book stacks together several such sites of impact (violence, nation, culture) and instances of meaning-making (assassinations, disciplinarity, failure, technology, theory) to instigate new strategies for building a postcolonial Cold War corpus.

Let me welcome ruins to this list as well, particularly in the service of innovative methodology. But for starters, the definition and the significance of ruins must be expanded and extrapolated. Ruins are not simply rubble and wreckage. They are potent residues that incite palimpsests, specters, hauntings. Ruins are alive. They bleed, they breed, they inscribe, they encompass. They must be made to tell stories not simply of a mangled past but must become instead a fresh blueprint for a rich and capacious approach that can eschew the amnesia that has blurred the lines between colonialism, the Cold War, and the powder keg of a postcolony these two epochs gave birth to.

The relationship between ruins and historiography has been previously articulated by scholars, particularly within the framework in which human civilization is viewed as a vicious cycle of conquest, war, destruction, and reconstruction. But scholarship on ruins has generally been nostalgic, heavily aestheticized, and centered on Europe (Hell and Schönle 2010),[4] whether it is Europe's glorious, ancient pasts or the devastation of the two World Wars. However, within the last decade, two contemporary, edited volumes engage ruins through the lens of empire in a serious way. Julia Hell's and Andreas Schönle's *Ruins of Modernity* (2010) and Laura Ann Stoler's *Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination* (2013), published within only a few of years of each other, decenter theories of ruins from ones that privilege a meditative reflection on Western history to ones that think through the destruction brought about by the *longues durées* of American and European imperialism. Using the events of 9/11 as their marker, Hell and Schönle draw attention to the fact that ruins themselves have become a hotly debated, political issue. They argue that a "rich body of approaches to ruins teaches us that the ruin is predicated on the particular gaze cast upon it, either modern or postmodern" (39) and thus, "the ruin is often the playground of speculative strategies" (7). Part of this speculative engagement involves the "ruin gaze," a concept that originates in the work of Svetlana Boym and makes its way in the fabrics of both works mentioned above (qtd. in Hell and Schönle 2010, 132). For Boym, the 20th century

is marked by a fascination with ruins and the evocation of reminders. A ruinophilia thus emerges from the shock of "vanishing materiality" partially brought about by our digital age. However, Boym believes that "[a] critical ruin gaze does not aestheticize history. It does not turn it into nostalgic heritage or yearn for a total restoration. Rather, it remains reflective, pointing at imperfections, gaps, and eccentricities that disturb architectural and teleological designs" (170). Thus, while embedded in the ontology of modernity, it appears that pondering, looking, regarding a ruin, cultivating a "ruin gaze," can stimulate generative approaches to the problematic of narrating history.

Stoler (2013) also argues that a ruin may facilitate an historical intervention, one within which the failures and erasures can be re-identified and parsed through. She warns that ruins often privilege "sites of reflection" and "pensive rumination," but this enchantment and melancholy falls away when we are faced with the ruination caused by empire and the ruins it leaves in its wake. Though ruins create damage and debris, they do become sites where alternative histories could be observed and, in contemplating that ruination, futurity can be mapped. Stoler's perspective, though inherently postcolonial, pushes back on the term itself, considerably widening the book's scope. The book takes seriously "the relationship between colonial pasts and colonial presents" (5) and enlivens the brute impacts of colonial pasts upon landscapes, monuments, infrastructure, and human bodies. Debris and decomposition is of particular interest to the authors because these are the kinds of sites that "fall outside historical interest and preservation" and are "places not honored as ruins of empire" (13). Invoking Derek Walcott's "rot that remains" and Fanon's "tinge of decay," Stoler observes: "Stories congeal around imperial debris, as do critiques. So do disqualified knowledge and subjugated histories decoupled from the processes of which they were a part" (19). The connections between history and ruins, debris and narrative, destruction and subjugated histories, are taken seriously and solidified.

Both these projects offer much material for animating and deepening postcolonial Cold War historiography, yet they remain incomplete and do not entirely succeed in carving out a capacious theoretical framework for bringing together disparateness between the "postcolonial" and "Cold War." In both cases, the Cold War is intensively folded into the way the studies are organized, but as is often the case, the Cold War is rendered without postcolonial actuality, and the postcolonial is rendered without Cold War impact. In the case of Hell and Schönle, the book does away with the typically Eurocentric approaches that privilege ancient Rome and Greece, but there is still a distinctly Western aftertaste. A large concern is the way in which the aftermaths of the Cold War are framed as European. The ruins of the Cold War are located in Berlin, Prague, or Moscow, and the logic of this placement is obvious: the Cold War indeed took place there. But the other Cold War—the one that

raged from Somalia to Vietnam, from Chile to South Africa—does not find articulation within this geography of ruins. In Stoler's work, the situation is reversed. The chapters investigate imperial detritus within many postcolonial places, but when it comes to the Cold War, only one of the chapters homes in on the American dimensions of the phenomenon. The ruin is clearly commonplace in postcolonial narratives, and it is certainly privileged in Cold War historiography. Why, then, are the two always kept apart? Though both works allow for a theory of ruins to come of age in the last decade, the gap between which ruins are privileged versus which are left out also comes to the fore.

How should we go about using ruins to reframe the lens, the imaginary, and the historiography of the postcolonial Cold War? The ruin is literally everywhere, but it's time to get to work, to make lemonade, so to speak. It is imperative that this ruin work be active work that enables deliberation, reconstruction, and excavation. The materiality of ruins is analogous to the affective topography of failures associated with the postcolony: failure of revolution, failed states, failed independence, failure of theory. Add to these the inevitable falls associated with the Cold War: fall of socialism, fall of communism, fall of the Berlin wall. I propose that a rigorous investigation of the ruin-fall-failure triptych become the point of entry for this new historiography. But this is not a pessimistic formation; it does not sulk and brood over what did not come to be. What binds the ruin, the fall, and the failure is their entanglement, perhaps investment, in futurity. Peter Hitchcock reminds us that, for the colonies, "the raising of a national flag did not signal a final break from the machinations of imperial dominion" (2007, 728), and it is this prolonged condition, this project that was never completed, that might be vaguely considered the essence of postcoloniality. "If we say, 'This is postcolonial,' we mean simultaneously that the task of elaboration (elaborare—to work out) remains before us. It is not an acknowledgment of completion but the very tissue of an itinerary" (728). Hitchcock writes that it is chronotopicity or rather "the structure of time/space coordinates" (728) that must be emphasized. Indeed, it is the generative, bountiful nature of this chronotopocity that must be sought in the ruin-fall-failure triptyph.

Ruins evoke time—the passing of time, autumnal and nostalgic times, times gone by. They also offer glimpses into future time. They can thus "bear witness" (Hell and Schönle 2010, 42) to several overlapping temporalities, and to that end, they are the evidence and also symbols of the ways in which the Cold War inscribes itself upon postcoloniality. Gazing at degeneration also invites contemplation upon the questions of future transformation—economic, cultural, or psychological. Ruins are not purely physical; they also build an affective structure. It is the melancholy and anguish that comes from *feeling* ruined. As the euphoric futures imagined by decolonial dreams were crushed, failure became a fixture within postcolonial ontology. In fact, when it comes

to the postcolony, future and failure can be invoked simultaneously and the Cold War is largely to blame for that.

The perfect example of the new historiographies I seek and which actively explores several of the above ideas can be found in Mauritanian filmmaker Abderahmane Sissako's 1997 documentary *Rostov-Luanda*. Narrated by Sissako himself, the documentary is framed around his search for an old Angolan friend, Alfonso Barinbanga. After studying together in Rostov in the former USSR, Sissako decides to look for him in his home country, Angola, which by then has been torn asunder by 16 years of civil war, one of the major hot conflicts of the Cold War. With an old group photograph of his African friends in Russia in hand, Sissako goes from city to countryside and speaks to people belonging to a wide of range of class, race, and age groups, archiving their stories, which are inadvertently split into a timeline of before the war and after the war. In fact, time is the main theme here; people speak of times gone by, how time flies, time is unforgiving, time heals, and so on. It is an intensive and rigorous reflection on memory—every single character in the documentary making a reference to time, whether to honor it or to rage against it. Sissako discovers a country struggling to find itself after a long duration of the suspended, impasse of the time of war. Of his quest for Barinbanga, he says that he is "gathering fragments here and there to try and recompose his image." But it is also an image of Angola that emerges from this destruction. To this end, *Rostov-Luanda* is a sophisticated retelling and re-assembling of an Angola in the throes of aftermaths, or in the midst of ruins. As Sissako sets off on this journey, old haunts come into view—for example, a cafe called Biker where old cronies gather to gossip and reminisce, along with a generation of younger women who come to relax and decompress after a day of work. In an interview there, a loyal customer talks of it as if it were a Borgesian place "with twelve open doors—you go in through one and go out through another." Multiple perspectives, multiple exits and entries, and multiple durations are supposed to be contained in Biker cafe, which has endured and survived decades of violence. Foregrounding plurality as metaphor and method to investigate this historically and psychologically complicated place, we launch into the film.

Open spaces appear particularly distressed. Over the sound of a haunting flute melody, the young orphan Nandinho talks of losing his mother and moving around perpetually during the war. The camera stays still as we surveil a playground that is essentially rubble, weeds, a lone child seeking shade, and a stray dog. It is established that the war plunged the country into extreme poverty and complete infrastructural collapse. Driving into the countryside and other, smaller towns, we witness the poverty and destitution even more acutely. In a large, open market made of half-broken wagons and makeshift stalls, Sissako pulls out the black and white photo and several people pore over it. "Everyone here is familiar with the

act of searching for a kin," he explains. This is an ethos of displacement. No one is surprised at tropes of return and journeys in search of loved ones separated from one another.

For a majority of the documentary, there is a heavily nostalgic atmosphere made stronger by vast panoramic shots of urban or ocean landscapes, the occasional sunset, and the emphasis on much older and aging characters arduously and sincerely recalling past national events. In addition, Sissako exercises the "ruin gaze" to present a melancholic and meticulous tableau of the echoes and residues of war. The images come one after another, always overlaid with narration, sometimes directly referring to the image, sometimes not at all. The town of Huambo has been fundamentally devastated. Sissako pans from a city wall riddled with bullets to an iron fence blown into the remnants of an old zoo of which there is nothing left but a broken gate with railings crumbling over, and stones and dust. There is a lemonade factory, now a haunted, abandoned space, dark and eerie; and then there is a brewery, of which there is just one wall left. A grove of trees has sprung up around it. A park with several dilapidated bronze statues comes into view. Many of these seem to be figures from Angola's colonial past, but their bodies and faces are pockmarked by the bullets; bits and pieces have been blown off. A palimpsest is emerging here, and the images stacked on top of one another generate a rich and charged historical narrative, one wherein colonial ruins and Cold War ruins enter into a layered and bittersweet entanglement.

But this is the "ruin gaze" with overlapping temporalities—it is not simply the past and the present that it encapsulates, but, in fact, a triptych of ruin-fall-failure that comes into direct engagement with the future too. Sissako embeds a hopeful and abundant futurity alongside his depictions of precarity and loss. A man rummages through tall, unwieldy grass with a mine detector, reminding the audience of Angola's profoundly disturbing landmine crisis (Nieva and Kerr 2017), where an estimated 35,000 landmines still remain, live and dangerous. But this image points to future directions, to acts of salvaging and rebuilding. Soon after, a spirited teacher speaks about her town, which had been abandoned during the war, but in which people have now returned to rebuild: "There was nothing left here, but they invested in a future," she says. As if to illustrate the point, Sissako makes his way through a cheerful, life-affirming, future-affirming village carnival. Later in the film, disability and debility is evoked, first with a large, older woman whose legs were thought to be paralyzed but performs her movement and joy for us, mocking what was either a false rumor or a temporary lapse; it's uncertain what really transpired, but all that matters is her jubilance. Second, a blind man speaks beautifully about how to survive endless war: It is through peace and hope, he says, leading Sissako to a group of people making music on the beach.

For Monica Popescu, *Rostov-Luanda* shows an alternative and unique dimension of the Cold War because of its ability to encompass the Eastern Bloc, the oceanic trajectories of the Black Atlantic, and pan-postcolonial circuits in one layered narrative. Speaking of filmmakers such as Sissako and the friends who studied alongside him in Russia, Popescu writes that these Cold War routes depicting "previously unanticipated cultural journeys" can "highlight the full complexity of these cultural networks as well as make visible the historical reasons for their formation" (2014, 95). The melancholy of the film also builds on a topography of loss that came out of the "unexpected collapse of the Eastern bloc" (95) and had severe repercussions, not just on African nations invested in their alliances with the Soviet Union, but which also "placed the memory of this diasporic experience in a cone of shadow, willed to be forgotten at a time when to be Marxist or to have communist affiliations was no longer respectable or expedient" (95–6). The documentary thus refuses this amnesia and significantly widens the scope of Cold War postcoloniality, enlivening the many networks it created and sustained. *Rostov-Luanda* is a deliberate and carefully choreographed assemblage composed of sometimes connected, sometimes disconnected imagery, sounds, and default discoveries. Polyvalent resonances are key here, and through its many temporalities, its palimpsestic rendering, its attention to the spectral, its ability to enfold so many circuits and trajectories, and its richly layered and symbolically charged narratives, it exemplifies, for me, an innovative postcolonial Cold War historiography.

The "ruin gaze" is thus foregrounded often in the experience of and in the representation of postcolonial civil violence stemming from the Cold War. These are surprising encounters, whether it is the sight of a mangled aircraft in Eritrea or Sissako's complicated quest in search of old friendships. No matter how peaceful or frozen they seem, ruins are alive. In "Casualty," Edward Luka's story of Sudanese children stumbling upon a rusty old army truck in an overgrown thicket or a nearby forest, a curious child protagonist finds an iron ball and brings it into his home (2016). The suspense builds as the child plays with the ball and one wonders if this object, clearly a grenade to the adult reader, is still potent. The story ends on an explosion. The violent Cold War past is not simply conjured by accident, but still has the capacity to activate, to injure.

Somali poet Ali Jimale Ahmed asks:

> Do the parched remains of a scuttled idea
> Refurbish a tale mangled by time
> And reduced to ashes?
> Let cinders tell our story.
>
> (2011)

The postcolony is a Cold War ruin. Indeed, let the cinders tell our story.

Notes

1. The DDR Museum, Berlin, Germany www.ddr-museum.de/en. Accessed March 28, 2018.
2. Several new books and news pieces feature Cold War bunkers in the last few years (Catford 2010; Bennet 2017). Some stories amongst several include Enoch (2018); McLaughlin (2017); and Hunt (2015). In Kane (2018) you can even buy a bunker.
3. Some examples include Berlin Bar in Melbourne and Nuclear Winter supper club in London. Berlin Bar is Cold War-themed and decorated to resemble a bunker. www.berlinbar.com.au/ and Nuclear Winter describes itself thus: "Clamber over the iron curtain for cabaret and entertainment in our demilitarised zone or hang out with Russian babushka's in a steamy banya, or get invited by the top brass to our Doctor Strangelove inspired CIA supper club." www.nuclear-winter.co.uk/. All links accessed on March 28, 2018. In addition, certain publications have also shown similar inclinations. For example, the Red Africa Special Report in *Calvert Journal*, www.calvertjournal.com/features/show/5324/red-africa-special-report. Accessed July 19, 2018, and Ractliffe and Hayes (2016).
4. In *Ruins of Modernity*, the editors go through a list of art and writing about ruins and observe: "This story of imperial legacies, (colonial) empires, and their ruins is familiar, and it seemed to be a story of European ruins." The works they mention include Friedrich Ratzel's *Die Erde und das Leben* (1902), W.B. Sebald's *Rings of Saturn*, Christopher Woodward's *In Ruins: A Journey Through History, Art and Literature*, Diderot's Salon of 1967, and Walter Benjamin's *The Arcades Project*.

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Index

abstract expressionism 163
Adichie, Chimamanda Ngozi 135–6
Adnan, Etel 189–90
Africa 57, 62; anticolonial movement in 86; authors 172–3; colonialism in 31; decolonization in 31, 70, 87, 154, 160–1; end of violence in 171; France's atomic bomb testing in 56; funding of small magazines in 161; impoverishment in 91; postcolonial history of 76, 117; USSR ties in 86; war in, rewriting of 172; *see also* South Africa
Agostino Neto of Angola 72
ahimsa (nonviolence) 27, 30, 42, 54; *see also* nonviolence
Ahmad, Aijaz 111, 113–14, 116, 118–19
Alessandrini, Anthony C. 111, 121–3, 124–8
Algeria 25, 36, 58n3; anticolonial movements in 14; as idealized nation 47–53, 58n3; overthrow of Ben Bella in 87
Algerian Revolution 122
Al-Hayat 126–7
Allah Is Not Obliged (Kourouma) 136, 171–2
ALN *see* Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN)
Amazon 10, 17, 138, 174, 178, 181
anticolonialism 10, 14–15, 22–6, 28, 33–4, 38, 40–1, 44–5, 48, 50, 53–4, 63, 65–8, 71, 73–5, 78, 83–4, 86–7, 88; and Cold War disciplinarity 120, 123, 125–7; hyper-masculinity of 41; *see also* colonialism, European; decolonization
anti-imperialism 11, 16, 114, 124; *see also* imperialism

Arab Spring 121, 122, 128
Arendt, Hannah 35–7, 81, 110
Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) 36
Ashcroft, Bill 111, 117
Assange, Julian 177
assassinations 1, 3, 8, 9, 14–15, 45, 53, 58n5, 61–2, 66, 82–92, 106, 110, 157, 160, 171, 192
assemblages 138; choreographed 197; Cold War 1–21, 98, 109, 120, 129, 134, 197; and cultural production 14; as framework 6; imaginative 140; magazines as 149, 151; origins as 5; speculative 184, 192; theories of 3, 6; use of term 6–8

Bandung Conference (1955) 11–13, 30, 155, 156
Baraka, Amiri 88
Barnhisel, Greg 138–9, 164
Baruch, Bernard 10–11
Beah, Ishmael 136, 171–2
Beasts of No Nation (Iweala) 136, 171
Beier, Ulli 156
Belgium 1, 2, 61, 68, 85–7, 112
Bella, Ben 87
Benjamin, Walter 61, 64
Benson, Peter 161
Berger, John 154, 157
Beti, Mongo 78
Bhabha, Homi 26, 31, 118–19, 123, 124
Bhagavad Gita 26–7, 45
Bible, The 26–7, 42
Black Orpheus (magazine) 151, 156, 160–1, 164
Bourdieu, Pierre 33–4
Boym, Svetlana 192–3